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CHAPTER I.: GENERAL DIVISION. - Jeremy Bentham, The Works of Jeremy Bentham, vol. 3 [1843]

Edition used:

The Works of Jeremy Bentham, published under the Superintendence of his Executor, John Bowring (Edinburgh: William Tait, 1838-1843). 11 vols. Vol. 3.

Part of: The Works of Jeremy Bentham, 11 vols.

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CHAPTER I.

GENERAL DIVISION.

A Code of Laws is like a vast forest; the more it is divided, the better it is known.

To render a code of laws complete, it is necessary to know all the parts which should be comprised in it. It is necessary to know what they are in themselves, and what they are in relation to one another. This is accomplished when, taking the body of the laws in their entirety, they may be divided into two parts, in such manner that everything which belongs to the integral body may be found comprised in the one or the other part, and yet nothing shall at the same time be found in both parts. This is the only case in which the division is complete.

§ 1.

Customary Divisions.

The customary divisions are—

First Division: 1. Internal law; 2. Law of Nations.—The first is National law, which takes its name from the country to which it refers; as English law, French law, &c. &c.

A detached part of this law which only concerns the inhabitants of a town, of a district, or of a parish, forms a subdivision which is called municipal law.

The second is that which regulates the mutual transactions between sovereigns and nations. This might be called exclusively international law. This division is complete, but its parts are unequal and slightly distinguished.

Second Division: 1. Penal law; 2. Civil law.—When this division is given as complete, international law has at least been forgotten.

Third Division: 1. Penal law; 2. Civil law; 3. Political law.—To distinguish this latter from international law, it would be better to call it constitutional law. If the second division is complete, what must be thought of this? Its third part must, in some shape or other, have been comprised in the other two.

Fourth Division: 1. Civil or Temporal law; 2. Ecclesiastical or Spiritual law.—A complete division, but unequal, and one of which the parts are much intermixed.

Fifth Division: 1. Civil law; 2. Military law.—Another division apparently limited to internal law.

This unfortunate epithet civil, opposed alternately to the words penal, ecclesiastical, political, military, has four different meanings, which are incessantly confounded with each other. It is one of the most unmeaning protean terms in all jurisprudence.

Sixth Division: 1. Written law; 2. Unwritten, or Customary law.

Laws may exist in the form of statutes or in the form of customs. The statute law is called written positive law; custom is a conjectural law which is drawn by induction from the former decisions given by the judges in similar cases.

Seventh Division: 1. Natural laws; 2. Economical laws; 3. Political laws, to which correspond,—the duties devolving upon an individual, family duties, and the duties of man in society. But where does man exist without society?—and if there be any such place, whence are its laws derived? What are these natural laws, which nobody has made, and which everybody supposes at his fancy? What are these economic laws, which are not political? The making of such divisions may be parodied by distributing zoology into the science of chimeras, of horses, and of animals! Such, nevertheless, is the nomenclature of legislation, according to the noblest spirits of the age, the D’Alemberts, the Diderots, and the principal of the economists. What, then, must be the condition of the science?

They also withdraw from the body of the law considerable portions which do not give rise to the idea of division, because the words which respectively express them have no correlative terms to express the residue of the mass of the laws. Maritime law—law relating to police, finance, political economy, procedure, &c.: these portions being extracted, what relation have they with the more formal divisions?—in which ought they to be placed?

Criminal law is a portion altogether undetermined of penal law. It is a law directed against an offence which has been called a crime. This distinction is the result of many indeterminate circumstances: odious procedure—enormous evil or reputation of enormity—evil intention—severe punishment.

Canon law. This is a sufficiently determinate portion of ecclesiastical law:—That portion of this law which is derived from a certain source.

§ 2.

New Divisions.

The divisions which follow are either altogether new—have only received a semidenomination—or have been but little considered at present. I announce them in this place, because of the light they shed upon the theory of the laws, and because of their practical utility.

Eighth Division: 1. Substantive laws; 2. Adjective laws.—This last is the name which I give to the laws of procedure, for the purpose of designating them by a word correlative to the principal laws from which it will be so often necessary to distinguish them. The laws of procedure could neither exist nor even be conceived of, without these other laws, which they cause to be observed. Whoever understands the meaning of these two words, as applied to grammar, will understand the meaning which I would attach to them when applied to jurisprudence.

Ninth Division: 1. Coercive and Punishing laws; 2. Attractive or Remuneratory laws.—The former employ punishments—the second employ rewards as their sanctions.

Tenth Division: 1. Direct laws; 2. Indirect laws.—I call those direct, which reach their end in the most direct manner, by directing or prohibiting the act to which they would give birth, or which they would prevent. I call those indirect, which, for accomplishing a purpose, employ distant means, attaching themselves to other acts, which have a more or less immediate connexion with the first. Prohibition of murder under pain of death, is a direct method of preventing assassinations: prohibition against carrying offensive weapons an indirect method* of preventing them.

Eleventh Division: 1. General laws; 2. Particular laws.—In the first are included those in which everybody is interested—in the second those which are directly interesting only to certain classes. This division is of great practical utility in facilitating a knowledge of the laws.

Twelfth Division.: 1. Permanent Laws; 2. Laws necessarily Transitory.—There are some laws which die of themselves, when the circumstance which gave birth to them has ceased. A law which refers to the conduct of a certain individual must die with him. Among transitory laws, the greater number are called regulations. Such are particular orders, laws which must and which ought to be changed, and which only correspond with a certain state of things.

Thirteenth Division: 1. Code of the Laws; 2. Code of Formularies.—A formula constitutes a part of the laws when it is directed by the legislature: a patent of creation, a record, a certificate, a deed, a form of petition, may all become part of the law.

Of all these divisions, the third into Penal Law, Civil Law, Constitutional Law, is the most complete, the most usual, and the most convenient. It is therefore the centre from which I shall cause all the parts to diverge.

As to writers on matters of jurisprudence, they may be ranged into two classes. Some treat of the laws of one country, explaining, commenting upon, and reconciling them; as Heineccius on the Roman laws, and Blackstone with reference to the laws of England.

The others treat of the art of legislation itself, either by explaining its preliminary notions, the terms of universal jurisprudence, such as powers, rights, titles, contracts, obligations, crimes, &c.; or seeking out the general principles upon which they ought to be founded, or examining the legislation of a certain country, to show whether it be feeble or strong.

Few works of law are of a unique and distinct character. Grotius, Puffendorf, Burlamaqui, assume successively, and sometimes at one time, all these characters. Montesquieu, in his “Esprit des Lois,” at first proposed to make a treatise upon the art; but in his last books the legislator assumes the antiquarian and the historian; and he can only be compared to the river, which after having traversed and fertilized noble countries, never reaches the sea, but is lost in the sand.

Hobbes and Harrington, who have treated only of the principles of constitutional law, have so done in a general manner, but with a view to local application. Beccaria, in his Treatise on Crimes and Punishments, has attended exclusively to them as a branch of philosophy.

[* ]Here it is clear, that a law which is indirect as to one act, becomes direct in reference to another. These terms are correct only when they refer to one and the same act, or to two different laws.