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• Errata—vol. III.
• Defence of Usury; Showing the Impolicy of the Present Legal Restraints On the Terms of Pecuniary Bargains; In Letters to a Friend.
• Letter I.: Introduction.
• Letter II.: Reasons For Restraint—prevention of Usury.
• Letter III.: Reasons For Restraint—prevention of Prodigality.
• Letter IV.: Reasons For Restraint—protection of Indigence.
• Letter V.: Reasons For Restraint—protection of Simplicity.
• Letter VI.: Mischiefs of the Anti-usurious Laws.
• Letter VII.: Efficacy of Anti-usurious Laws.
• Letter VIII.: Virtual Usury Allowed.
• Letter IX.: Blackstone Considered.
• Letter X.: Grounds of the Prejudices Against Usury.
• Letter XI.: Compound Interest.
• Letter XII.: Maintenance and Champerty.
• Letter XIII.: To Dr. Smith, On Projects In Arts, &c.
• A Manual of Political Economy: Now First Edited From the Mss. of Jeremy Bentham.
• Chapter I.: Introduction. *
• Chapter II.: Analytical Survey of the Field of Political Economy.
• Chapter III.: Of Wealth.
• Chapter IV.: Of Population.
• Chapter V.: Of Finance.
• Chapter VI.: Operation of a Sinking Fund On the Production of Wealth.
• Chapter VII.: Noscenda.
• Observations On the Restrictive and Prohibitory Commercial System; Especially With a Reference to the Decree of the Spanish Cortes of July 1820.
• Preface.: Observations, &c.
• Section I.: Nature of the Prohibitory System.
• Section II.: Mischiefs of the Prohibitory System.
• Section III.: Causes of the Prohibitory System.
• A Plan For Saving All Trouble and Expense In the Transfer of Stock, and For Enabling the Proprietors to Receive Their Dividends Without Powers of Attorney, Or Attendance At the Bank of England, By the Conversion of Stock Into Note Annuities.
• Introduction.
• Chapter I.: Plan For the Creation, Emission, Payment, and Eventual Extension, of a Proposed New Species of Government Paper, Under the Name of Annuity Notes.
• Chapter II.: Form of an Annuity Note. (see Table II.)
• Chapter III.: Comparison of the Proposed, With the Existing Government Securities, &c.
• Chapter IV.: Grounds of Expectation, In Regard to the Proposed Measure.
• Chapter V.: Financial Advantages.
• Chapter VI.: Advantage By Addition to National Capital.
• Chapter VII.: Advantage By Addition to Commercial Security.
• Chapter VIII.: Particular Interests Concerned.
• Chapter IX.: Rise of Prices—how to Obviate.
• Chapter X.: Reduction of Interest—proposed Mode Compared With Mr. Pelham’s.
• Chapter XI.: Moral Advantages.
• Chapter XII.: Constitutional Advantages.
• Chapter XIII.: Recapitulation and Conclusion.
• Appendix A.: Government Ought to Have the Monopoly of Paper Money, As Well As of Metallic Money.
• Appendix B.: Paper Money—causes Why Not Circulated By Government Without Interest, As Well As By Individuals.
• General View of a Complete Code of Laws.
• Chapter I.: General Division.
• Chapter II.: Relations Between the Laws Concerning Offences, Rights, Obligations, and Services.
• Chapter III.: Relation Between the Penal and Civil Code.
• Chapter IV.: Of Method.
• Chapter V.: Plan of the Penal Code.
• Chapter VI.: Of the Division of Offences.
• Chapter VIII. Titles of the Penal Code.
• Chapter IX.: First General Title of the Civil Code, * of Things.
• Chapter X.: Second General Title of the Civil Code. of Places.
• Chapter XI.: Third General Title of the Civil Code. of Times.
• Chapter XII.: Fourth General Title of the Civil Code. of Services.
• Chapter XIII.: Fifth General Title of the Civil Code. of Obligations.
• Chapter XIV.: Sixth General Title of the Civil Code. of Rights.
• Chapter XV.: Seventh General Title of the Civil Code. of Collative and Ablative Events.
• Chapter XVI.: Eighth General Title of the Civil Code. of Contracts.
• Chapter XVII.: Ninth General Title of the Civil Code. of the Domestic and Civil States.
• Chapter XVIII.: Tenth General Title of the Civil Code. of Persons Capable of Acquiring and of Contracting.
• Chapter XIX.: Of the Particular Titles of the Civil Code.
• Chapter XX.: Of Elementary Political Powers.
• Chapter XXI.: Of Elementary Political Powers— Subject Continued.
• Chapter XXII.: Plan of the Political Code.
• Chapter XXIII.: Plan of the International Code.
• Chapter XXIV.: Plan of the Maritime Code.
• Chapter XXV.: Plan of the Military Code.
• Chapter XXVI.: Plan of the Ecclesiastical Code.
• Chapter XXVII.: Plan of Remuneratory Laws.
• Chapter XXVIII.: Of Political Economy.
• Chapter XXIX.: Plan of the Financial Code.
• Chapter XXX.: Plan of Procedure Code.
• Chapter XXXI.: Of the Integrality of the Code of Laws.
• Chapter XXXII.: Of Purity In the Composition of a Code of Laws.
• Chapter XXXIII.: Of the Style of the Laws.
• Chapter XXXIV.: Of the Interpretation, Conservation, and Improvement of a Code.
• Pannomial Fragments.
• Chapter I.: General Observations.
• Chapter II.: Consideranda.
• Chapter III.: Expositions.
• Chapter IV.: Axioms.
• Nomography; Or the Art of Inditing Laws: Now First Published From the Mss. of Jeremy Bentham.
• Chapter I.: The Subject Stated.
• Chapter II.: Relations.
• Chapter III.: Proper End In View.
• Chapter IV.: Imperfections Primary.
• Chapter V.: Explanations Relative to the Imperfections of the Second Order.
• Chapter VI.: Of Remedies. *
• Chapter VII.: Of Language.
• Chapter VIII.: Of the Perfections of Which the Legislative Style Is Susceptible.
• Chapter IX.: Of Forms of Enactment.
• Appendix. Logical Arrangements, Or Instruments of Invention and Discovery
• Equity Dispatch Court Proposal; Containing a Plan For the Speedy and Unexpensive Termination of the Suits Now Depending In Equity Courts. With the Form of a Petition, and Some Account of a Proposed Bill For That Purpose
• Section I.: Purpose Explained. Jeremy Bentham to the Honest and Afflicted Among Equity Suitors.
• Section II.: Equity Suitors’ Petition For Dispatch Court. to the King’s Most Excellent Majesty, —
• Section III.: Dispatch Court Bill—some Account of It.
• Section IV.: Information Requisite From Petitioning Suitors.
• Equity Dispatch Court Bill: Being a Bill For the Institution of an Experimental Judicatory Under the Name of the Court of Dispatch, For Exemplifying In Practice the Manner In Which the Proposed Summary May Be Substituted to the So Called Regular Sy
• Editor’s Note.
• Preface.
• Preamble.
• Part I.—: Judiciary.
• Section I.: Judge Located, How.
• Section II.: Remuneration.
• Section III.: Registrar, &c.
• Section IV.: Eleemosynary Advocate.
• Section V.: Judges’, &c. Deputes.
• Section VI.: Judge’s Powers—exemptions—checks.
• Section VII.: Prehensors and Messengers.
• Section VIII.: Consignees; * Or Say, In-trust-holders.
• Section IX.: Grounds of Decision For the Dispatch Court Judge.
• Section X. ‡: Suits’ Comparative Suitableness; and Order of Cognizance.
• Section XI.: Auxiliary Judges and Accountants.
• Section XII.: Sittings, Times Of.
• Part II.—: Procedure.
• Section XIII.: Definitions. *
• Section XIV.: Examination of Solicitors.
• Section XV.: Initiatory Examination of Parties, &c.
• Section XVI.: Appropriate Intercourse, Constant and Universal, Secured.
• Section XVII.: Mutual Security For Forthcomingness of Persons and Things. ‡
• Section XVIII.: Evidence-procuring Money, How Provided.
• Section XIX.: Subsequential Evidence, How Elicited.
• Section XX.: Execution, How Performed.
• Section XXI.: Equity Court Costs, How Disposed Of.
• Section XXII.: Dispatch Court Costs, How Disposed Of.
• Section XXIII.: Eventual Retrotransference of a Suit to the Equity Court.
• Section XXIV.: Expense of the Court, How Provided For.
• Supplemental Sections:—
• Section I. Or XXV.: Bankruptcy and Insolvency.
• Section II. Or XXVI.: Henceforward Dispatch Court.
• Schedules to the Bill.
• Plan of Parliamentary Reform, In the Form of a Catechism, With Reasons For Each Article: With an Introduction, Showing the Necessity of Radical, and the Inadequacy of Moderate, Reform.
• Introduction.
• Section I.: History of the Ensuing Tract—alarming State of the Country and the Constitution.
• Section II.: Most Prominent Present Grievance, Gareisoning France.
• Section III.: Causes of the Above and All Other Mischiefs:—particular Interests Monarchical and Aristocratical, Adverse to the Universal—their Ascendency.
• Section IV.: Sole Remedy In Principle—democratic Ascendency.
• Section V.: Remedy In Detail: Radical Parliamentary Reform: Elementary Arrangements In This Edition of It—their Necessity.
• Section VI.: Differences Between This and the Original Editions of Radical Reform.
• Section VII.: Virtual Universality of Suffrage Further Considered.
• Section VIII.: Virtual Universality of Suffrage—its Undangerousness.
• Section IX.: Freedom of Suffrage Further Explained—seductive Influence—its Forms, Instruments, &c.
• Section X.: Bribery and Terrorism Compared.
• Section XI.: Purchase of Seats—in What Cases Mischievous—in What Beneficial.
• Section XII.: Secresy of Suffrage—its Importance Further Developed.
• Section XIII.: Exclusion of Placemen, &c. From the Right of Voting—mischievousness and Profligacy of the Opposite Arrangement.
• Section XIV.: Universal Constancy of Attendance—its Importance.
• Section XV.: Representatives—impermanence of Their Situation—its Importance:—objections—their Groundlessness.
• Section XVI.: Moderate Reform—its Arrangements—their Inadequacy.
• Section XVII.: Trienniality Inadequate;—annuality Necessary.
• Section XVIII.: Interests Adverse to Adequate Reform—support Given By Them to Moderate, to the Exclusion of Radical: Tories—whigs—people’s Men.
• Catechism of Parliamentary Reform; Or, Outline of a Plan of Parliamentary Reform; In the Form of Question and Answer; With Reasons to Each Article.
• Section I.: Ends to Be Aimed At On the Occasion of Parliamentary Reform.
• Section II.: Means, Conducive Towards These Ends.
• Section III.: Means—their Uses, With Reference to Their Respective Ends.
• Section IV.: Means Conducive to Aptitude In Members: I. Placemen Not to Vote, Nor to Be Seated By Election.
• Section V.: Means, &c. Continued.—ii. Placemen Seated By the King, With Speech and Motion, Without Vote.
• Section VI.: Means, &c. Continued.—iii. Elections Frequent—annual.
• Section VII.: Means, &c. Continued.—iv. Speeches Authentically and Promptly Published.
• Section VIII.: Means, &c. Continued.—v. Attendance, Punctual and General, Secured.
• Section IX.: Inconveniences Incident to Elections, and Election Judicature.
• Section X.: Election Inconveniences—means For Their Removal.
• Section XI.: Collateral Advantages, Referable to the Situations of Electors, Placemen, Lords, &c.
• A Sketch of the Various Proposals For a Constitutional Reform In the Representation of the People, Introduced Into the Parliament of Great Britain, From 1770 to 1812.
• Radical Reform Bill, With Extracts From the Reasons.
• Preliminary Explanations.
• Title of the Proposed Act.
• Preamble.
• Section 1.—: Seats and Districts.
• Section 2.—: Electors, Who.
• Section 3.—: Eligible, Who.
• Section 4.—: Election Offices.
• Section 5.: Election Apparatus.
• Section 6.—: Promulgation of Recommendations In Favour of Proposed Members.
• Section 7.—: Voters’ Titles Pre-established.
• Section 8.—: Election, How.
• Section 9.: Election Districts and Polling Districts, How Marked Out.
• Section 10.—: Vote-making Habitations, How Defined.
• Section 11.—: Members’ Continuance.
• Section 12.—: Vacancies Supplied.
• Section 13.—: Security For the House Against Disturbance By Members. †
• Section 14.—: Indisposition of Speakers Obviated.
• Appendix, Including General Explanations.
• Radicalism Not Dangerous. Extracted From the Mss. of Jeremy Bentham. *
• Part I.—: Introduction.
• Section I.: Radical Reform Bill Recapitulated.
• Section II.: Persuasion of the Dangerousness of Radicalism—cause of It, and of the Vituperative Expression Given to It.
• Section III.: Terms of the Accusation,—speeches From the Throne, 16 Th July and 21 St November 1819.
• Section IV.: The Accusation In General Terms—counter-averment.
• Section V.: Plan of This Defence.
• Part II.—: Deference From the General Nature of the Case.
• Section I.: Conditions Necessary to a Man’s Embarking In Such a Design.
• Section VII.: Concurrence In Any Other Extensive Plan of Spoliation Impossible.
• Section VIII.: Concurrence of Any Constituted Authorities Impossible.
• Section IX.: Accomplishment Impossible—design Impossible.
• Section X.: The Talked-of Spunge No Proof of the Design.
• Part III.—: Defence From Experience In the Case of the United States.
• Part IV.: Defence From Particular Experience In the Case of Ireland: Years 1777 Or 1778, to 1783.
• Section I.: Analogy Between This and the Previous Case.
• Section II.: Democratic Ascendency, How Produced.
• Section III.: Fruit of Democratic Ascendency a Golden Age.
• Section IV.: Coincidence of Its Characters With Those of Radicalism.
• Section VI.: Extinction of Democratic Ascendency and Reform—restoration of Monarchico-aristocratical Ascendency, and Its Consequences.
• Conclusion.

CHAPTER XIII.

RECAPITULATION AND CONCLUSION.

Upon the whole, the proposed measure, it is believed, will be found to promise, with some degree of assurance, the following connected, but perfectly distinct advantages:—

1. Advantage of financial profit, by contributing in so many various, and to such considerable amounts, to the redemption of the principal of the national debt, as well as to the reduction of the rate of interest—and by affording an instrument more advantageous than any other for the application to that end of such means as are or may be provided from other sources.

2. Moral advantages, by the encouragement of frugality, and thence of temperance, among the inferior and most numerous ranks of the community.

3. Constitutional advantages, by constituting an additional bond of connexion with the government, and thence affording an additional safeguard to internal tranquillity.

4. Politico-economical advantage, by addition made to the mass of national productive capital, and thence to the mass of growing wealth.

Each of the above four masses of advantage appears sufficient to warrant an experiment, even should it be attended with some risk. Shall they not all of them together be deemed sufficient to give birth to an experiment altogether free from risk?

Few measures have ever been brought to view pregnant with such high advantages—none in which, in case of success, the degree of success has been beforehand so precisely ascertainable—none in which the deviation from the path of safety, as marked out by experience, is so slight and imperceptible.

Were the proposal expressed in these words—“Make your exchequer bills for small sums,”* —this, though not completely nor correctly expressive of the measure, would express all the innovation of it.

The only feature in the proposed plan, which, separately taken, can be called new, is, the bringing into the market portions of government currency less than heretofore—portions less than have been issued by government in this country, but not less than than what have been issued by governments in other countries, and in this country by individuals.

The other leading features are collected altogether from established institutions. The annuity engaged for is perpetual, but redeemable—the paper containing the evidence of its sale by government, light and transferable—the produce of the sale appropriated to the extinction of the national debt.

If the experiment be tried, the earlier the success the greater;—but sooner or later, and to a certain extent, success is infallible, and even failure would be unattended with loss.

[* ]Supposing the general plan of the proposed annuity-note currency to be discarded, an advantage upon a smaller scale might still be derivable from it, by applying some of the features of it to the improvement of the existing species of government currency called an exchequer bill, in such manner as to cause it to be accepted of at a lower rate of interest than it would otherwise be.

1. It might be made out for much smaller sums, say £10 or £5; that is to say, a part of the whole mass might be broken down with a view to general circulation—a competent portion being reserved in the present large sums for operations on a large scale.

2. It might be furnished with the proposed aids to computation, by proper tables printed on the front or back of it.

3. It might be made to receive those facilities for general circulation, which depend upon the physical qualities of the paper—viz. upon the size, form, texture, and thinness, &c., which are possessed by the notes which compose the currency of the Bank of England.

4. It might be invested with all the new securities against forgery which are here proposed.

5. Markets for the purchase of it might be opened all over the country, by the simple expedient of remitting it, in such quantities and proportions as should be deemed advisable, to the several local offices already in the pay of government:—for example, post-offices—stamp-offices—excise-offices—custom-house offices.

This suggestion is made solely for the purpose of illustration. Compared with the proposed general plan, the sacrifice made by thus confining the application of it, would be a sacrifice without an object. Limited as it is in respect of its total amount—limited as it is in respect of the duration of the annuity conveyed by it, the exchequer-bill currency is radically incapable of meeting the demand of the two classes of petty hoarders; and thus a proportionable part of the accommodation afforded to individuals would be lost. The utmost it could do, would be the going a small part of the way towards meeting the demand for temporary interest on the part of the other great class—possessors of temporary sums—customers for flying annuities:—and even to this portion of the demand, it would become less and less suitable, as the time when the annuity would cease, and the trouble of carrying in the bill for payment, and receiving the redemption money for it, approached.

The supposed modification and improvement of the exchequer-bill currency would be productive of but a part, and that a very small part, of the advantages held out by the institution of the proposed annuity-note currency. But by the institution of the proposed annuity-note currency, the advantages thus derivable from the supposed improvement of the exchequer-bill currency would be obtained in their full extent—obtained in the way of collateral result, and without any distinct measures directed to that end.

At an early period of the exchequer currency, bills were issued for sums as low as £10, or even £5. How it should have happened that the practice of issuing such small notes should have ceased, and the minimum note be raised to and invariably fixed at its present pitch of £100, is not difficult to conceive. The form of the security would naturally be adapted to the convenience of the lenders, more especially as the lenders were individuals acting on their own account, and the borrowers statesmen acting without any personal interest for the public at large. The lenders on this security have been, on the one part, and that the principal part, the immensely opulent company the Bank of England;—on the other part, the small but prodigiously opulent circle of monied men, known to each other, and meeting one another continually at or in the neighbourhood of the Exchange. £100 was a magnitude quite small enough for persons of this class. The faculty of employing in the same way a smaller sum, suppose £50, would have been of no use to them;—even £100 is not so much as they would each be under the necessity of keeping by them, or at their bankers, for the purpose of current expenses, and payments on a small scale. Bills of less magnitude would thus be attended with no advantage, and they would be attended with the disadvantage of making a proportionable addition to the trouble of computation. Another relative disadvantage, and a much more considerable one, is, that the effect of small bills—£10 and £5 bills for example—would be to open the market to a greater number of customers; thence to increase the competition for the article, and to raise the price;—in other words, to lower the rate of interest upon this paper, and thence diminish the profit to be made by purchasing it.

Whether government were aware of this at the time, is a point which at this time of day it might perhaps be difficult to ascertain. They might see it, but not be able to profit by it. If in times such as those of King William and Queen Anne, the connected circle of London monied men concurred in insisting upon large sums in preference to small sums, it would have been difficult for the government to resist:—pressed by the exigencies of the moment, it might have been hazardous, and perhaps impracticable, to wait for the success of an experiment upon the more extended scale. As to the monied men, some would be aware of this, others not:—witness the Bank, who, guided (it should seem) rather by habit than reflection, forbore for such a length of time to give that extension to the circle of customers for their paper, which, when given at last, relieved them from their embarrassments, and seems to have proved that the scarcity which had produced their embarrassments might as properly be called a scarcity of small notes, as a scarcity of cash.