CHAPTER VI.: LAUDATORY PERSONALITIES— (ad amicitiam.) - Jeremy Bentham, The Works of Jeremy Bentham, vol. 2 
The Works of Jeremy Bentham, published under the Superintendence of his Executor, John Bowring (Edinburgh: William Tait, 1838-1843). 11 vols. Vol. 2.
About Liberty Fund:
Liberty Fund, Inc. is a private, educational foundation established to encourage the study of the ideal of a society of free and responsible individuals.
The text is in the public domain.
Fair use statement:
This material is put online to further the educational goals of Liberty Fund, Inc. Unless otherwise stated in the Copyright Information section above, this material may be used freely for educational and academic purposes. It may not be used in any way for profit.
- Principles of Judicial Procedure, With the Outlines of a Procedure Code.
- Note By the Editor.
- Chapter I.: General View—ends of Judicature.
- Chapter II.: Ends Apt and Unapt.
- Chapter III.: Procedure—its Relation to the Rest of the Law.
- Chapter IV.: Judiciary Establishment.
- Chapter V.: Procedure—its Subject-matters.
- Chapter VI.: All-comprehensive Arrangements.
- Chapter VII.: Practical General Rules.
- Chapter VIII.: Judicial Application.
- Chapter IX.: Proxies.
- Chapter X.: Judicial Communication.
- Chapter XI.: Evidence.
- Chapter XII.: Initiatory Hearing.
- Chapter XIII.: Defence, How Elicited.
- Chapter XIV.: Suits, Their Sorts.
- Chapter XV.: Suits, Continuance Of.
- Chapter XVI.: Suits—termination.
- Chapter XVII.: Suits, Their Stages.
- Chapter XVIII.: Means of Execution.
- Chapter XIX.: Counter-security.
- Chapter XX.: Remedies,—compensation.
- Chapter XXI.: Judicial Transfer.
- Chapter XXII.: Prehension.
- Chapter XXIII.: Jury-trial.
- Chapter XXIV.: Special Juries.
- Chapter XXV.: Grand Juries.
- Chapter XXVI.: Quasi-jury.
- Chapter XXVII.: Recapitulatory Examination, Or Quasi-trial.
- Chapter XXVIII.: Appeal and Quasi-appeal.
- Chapter XXIX.: Natural and Technical Systems Compared.
- Appendix A.: Initial Sketch of the Procedure Code.
- Appendix B.: Account-taking Judicatories.
- Appendix C.: British India—jury System.
- From the Right Honourable Sir Alexander Johnston, to the Right Honourable Charles W. Williams Wynn, President of the Board of Controul.
- The Rationale of Reward.
- Advertisement By the Editor.
- Remarks By Mr. Bentham.
- Preliminary Observations.
- Book I.—: Of Rewards In General.
- Chapter I.: Definitions.
- Chapter II.: Matter of Reward—sources.
- Chapter III.: Of Reward and Punishment Combined.
- Chapter IV.: Of the Union of Interest With Duty, and of Self-executing Laws.
- Chapter V.: Matter of Reward—reasons For Husbanding.
- Chapter VI.: Remuneration Ex Post Facto.
- Chapter VII.: Punition and Remuneration—their Relations.
- Chapter VIII.: Remuneration—where Hurtful.
- Chapter IX.: Remuneration—where Needless.
- Chapter X.: Proportion As to Rewards.
- Chapter XI.: Choice As to Rewards.
- Chapter XII.: Procedure As to Rewards.
- Chapter XIII.: Rewards to Informers.
- Chapter XIV.: Rewards to Accomplices.
- Chapter XV.: Competition As to Rewards.
- Chapter XVI.: Rewards For Virtue.
- Chapter XVII.: Accompaniments to Remuneration.
- Book II.—: Rewards Applied to Offices.
- Chapter I.: Salary—how a Reward.
- Chapter II.: Rules As to Emoluments.
- Chapter III.: Fees and Perquisites—none.
- Chapter IV.: Minimize Emolument.
- Chapter V.: No More Nominal Than Real.
- Chapter VI.: Couple Burthen With Benefit.
- Chapter VII.: By Emoluments Exclude Corruption.
- Chapter VIII.: Give Pensions of Retreat.
- Chapter IX.: Of the Sale of Offices.
- Chapter X.: Of Qualifications.
- Chapter XI.: Of Trust and Contract Management.
- Chapter XII.: Of Reforms.
- Book III.—: Reward Applied to Art and Science.
- Chapter I.: Art and Science—divisions.
- Chapter II.: Art and Science—advancement.
- Chapter III.: Art and Science—diffusion.
- Leading Principles of a Constitutional Code, For Any State.
- Section I.: Ends Aimed At.
- Section II.: Principal Means Employed For the Attainment of the Above Ends.
- Liberty of the Press, and Public Discussion.
- Jeremy Bentham to the Spanish People.
- Letter I.: On the Liberty of the Press—the Approaching Eight Months’ Sleep of the Cortes—and the Exclusion of Experience From the Succeeding Cortes.
- Letter II.: On the Liberty of Public Discussion In Free Meetings.
- Letter III.: On the Liberty of Public Discussion In Free Meetings—continuation From Letter II.
- Letter IV.: On the Liberty of Public Discussion In Free Meetings—continuation of the Subject From Letter III.
- An Essay On Political Tactics, Or Inquiries Concerning the Discipline and Mode of Proceeding Proper to Be Observed In Political Assemblies: Principally Applied to the Practice of the British Parliament, and to the Constitution and Situation of the Nati
- Chapter I.: General Considerations.
- Chapter II.: Of Publicity.
- Chapter III.: Of the Place of Meeting and Its Dependencies.
- Chapter IV.: Of What Concerns the Members Present At a Legislative Assembly.
- Chapter V.: Of the Presidents and Vice-presidents Belonging to Political Assemblies.
- Chapter VI. *: of the Mode of Proceeding In a Political Assembly In the Formation of Its Decisions.
- Chapter VII.: Of the Proposal of Measures For Adoption.
- Chapter VIII.: Of the Different Acts Which Enter Into the Formation of a Decree.
- Chapter IX.: Of the Promulgation of Motions—of Bills—of Amendments, and Their Withdrawment.
- Chapter X.: Of the Drawing Up of Laws.
- Chapter XI.: Of Debates.
- Chapter XII.: Of Amendments.
- Chapter XIII.: Of Dilatory Motions, Or Motions of Adjournment.
- Chapter XIV.: Of Voting.
- Chapter XV.: Of Committees.
- Chapter XVI.: Of Formulas.
- The Book of Fallacies: From Unfinished Papers of Jeremy Bentham. Edited By a Friend.
- Preface By the Editor of the Original Edition.
- The Book of Fallacies.: Introduction.
- Section I.: A Fallacy, What.
- Section II.: Fallacies, By Whom Treated of Heretofore.
- Section III.: Relation of Fallacies to Vulgar Errors.
- Section IV.: Political Fallacies the Subject of This Work.
- Section V.: Division Or Classification of Fallacies
- Section VI.: Nomenclature of Political Fallacies.
- Section VII.: Contrast Between the Present Work and Hamilton’s “parliamentary Logic.”
- Part I.: Fallacies of Authority, the Subject of Which Is Authority In Various Shapes, and the Object to Repress All Exercise of the Reasoning Faculty.
- Chapter I.
- Chapter II.: The Wisdom of Our Ancestors; Or Chinese Argument—( Ad Verecundiam. )
- Chapter III.: Fallacy of Irrevocable Laws.
- Chapter IV.: No-precedent Argument—( Ad Verecundiam. )
- Chapter V.
- Chapter VI.: Laudatory Personalities— (ad Amicitiam.)
- Part II.: Fallacies of Danger, the Subject-matter of Which Is Danger In Various Shapes, and the Object to Repress Discussion Altogether, By Exciting Alarm.
- Chapter I.: Vituperative Personalities— (ad Odium.)
- Chapter II.
- Chapter III.: Fallacy of Distrust, Or, What’s At the Bottom?—( Ad Metum. )
- Chapter IV.: Official Malefactor’s Screen—( Ad Metum. )
- Chapter V.: Accusation-scarer’s Device—( Ad Metum. )
- Part III.: Fallacies of Delay, the Subject-matter of Which Is Delay In Various Shapes—and the Object, to Postpone Discussion, With a View of Eluding It.
- Chapter I.: The Quietist, Or “no Complaint”—( Ad Quietem )
- Chapter II.: Fallacy of False Consolation— (ad Quietem.)
- Chapter III.: Procrastinator’s Argument ( Ad Socordiam. )
- Chapter IV.: Snail’s-pace Argument.—( Ad Socordiam. )
- Chapter V.: Fallacy of Artful Diversion—( Ad Verecundiam. )
- Part IV.: Fallacies of Confusion, the Object of Which Is, to Perplex, When Discussion Can No Longer Be Avoided.
- Chapter I.: Question-begging Appellatives—( Ad Judicium. )
- Chapter II.: Impostor Terms—( Ad Judicium. )
- Chapter III.: Vague Generalities—( Ad Judicium. )
- Chapter IV.: Allegorical Idols—( Ad Imaginationem. )
- Chapter V.: Sweeping Classifications—( Ad Judicium. )
- Chapter VI.: Sham Distinctions—( Ad Judicium. )
- Chapter VII.: Popular Corruption—( Ad Superbiam. )
- Chapter VIII.: Observations On the Seven Preceding Fallacies.
- Chapter IX.: Anti-rational Fallacies—( Ad Verecundiam. )
- Chapter X.: Paradoxical Assertion—( Ad Judicium. )
- Chapter XI. :non-causa Pro Causa: Or, Cause and Obstacle Confounded—( Ad Judicium. )
- Chapter XII.: Partiality-preacher’s Argument—( Ad Judicium. )
- Chapter XIII.: The End Justifies the Means—( Ad Judicium. )
- Chapter XIV.: Opposer-general’s Justification:—not Measures But Men; Or, Not Men But Measures—( Ad Invidiam. )
- Chapter XV.: Rejection Instead of Amendment—( Ad Judicium. )
- Part V
- Chapter I.: Characters Common to All These Fallacies.
- Chapter II.: Of the Mischief Producible By Fallacies.
- Chapter III.: Causes of the Utterance of These Fallacies.
- Chapter IV.: Second Cause—interest Begotten-prejudice.
- Chapter V.: Third Cause—authority-begotten Prejudice.
- Chapter VI.: Fourth Cause—self-defence Against Counter-fallacies.
- Chapter VII.: Use of These Fallacies to the Utterers and Acceptors of Them.
- Chapter VIII.: Particular Demand For Fallacies Under the English Constitution.
- Chapter IX.: The Demand For Political Fallacies:—how Created By the State of Interests.
- Chapter X.: Different Parts Which May Be Borne In Relation to Fallacies.
- Chapter XI.: Uses of the Preceding Exposure.
- Anarchical Fallacies; Being an Examination of the Declarations of Rights Issued During the French Revolution.
- An Examination of the Declaration of the Rights of the Man and the Citizen Decreed By the Constituent Assembly In France.
- A Critical Examination of the Declaration of Rights.
- Declaration of the Rights and Duties of the Man and the Citizen, Anno 1795.
- Observations On Parts of the Declaration of Rights, As Proposed By Citizen Sieyes.
- Principles of International Law.
- Essay I.: Objects of International Law.
- Essay II.: Of Subjects, Or of the Personal Extent of the Dominion of the Laws.
- Essay III.: Of War, Considered In Respect of Its Causes and Consequences.
- Essay IV.: A Plan For an Universal and Perpetual Peace.
- Appendix. * —junctiana Proposal.
- A Protest Against Law-taxes, Showing the Peculiar Mischievousness of All Such Impositions As Add to the Expense of Appeal to Justice.
- Supply Without Burden; Or Escheat Vice Taxation: Being a Proposal For a Saving of Taxes By an Extension of the Law of Escheat, Including Strictures On the Taxes On Collateral Succession Comprised In the Budget of 7 Th December 1795.
- Section I.: General Idea.
- Section II.: Order of the Details.
- Section III.: Advantages.
- Section IV.: Originality.
- Section V.: Produce.
- Section VI.: Application.
- Section VII.: Heads of Objection, With Answers. †
- Section VIII.: Existing Law.
- Section IX.: Ancient Law.
- Section X.: Blackstone.
- Tax With Monopoly; Or Hints of Certain Cases In Which, In Alleviation of the Burden of Taxation, Exclusive Privileges May Be Given As Against Future Competitors, Without Producing Any of the Ill Effects, Which In Most Cases Are Inseparable From Everyth
- I.: Stock-brokers.
- II.: Bankers.
LAUDATORY PERSONALITIES—(ad amicitiam.)
Personalities of this class are the opposites, and in some respects the counterparts, of vituperative personalities, which will be treated of next in order, at the commencement of the ensuing Book.
Laudatory personalities are susceptible of the same number of modifications as will be shown to exist in the case of vituperative personalities: but in this case the argument is so much weaker than in the other, that the shades and modifications of it are seldom resorted to, and are therefore not worth a detailed exposition. The object of vituperative personalities is to effect the rejection of a measure, on account of the alleged bad character of those who promote it; and the argument advanced is—“The persons who propose or promote the measure, are bad; therefore the measure is bad, or ought to be rejected.” The object of laudatory personalities is to effect the rejection of a measure on account of the alleged good character of those who oppose it; and the argument advanced is—“The measure is rendered unnecessary by the virtues of those who are in power; their opposition is a sufficient authority for the rejection of the measure.”
The argument indeed is generally confined to persons of this description, and is little else than an extension of the self-trumpeter’s fallacy. In both of them, authority derived from the virtues or talents of the persons lauded, is brought forward as superseding the necessity of all investigation.
“The measure proposed implies a distrust of the members of his Majesty’s government; but so great is their integrity, so complete their disinterestedness, so uniformly do they prefer the public advantage to their own, that such a measure is altogether unnecessary:—their disapproval is sufficient to warrant an opposition: precautions can only be requisite where danger is apprehended; here, the high character of the individuals in question is a sufficient guarantee against any ground of alarm.”
The panegyric goes on increasing in proportion to the dignity of the functionary thus panegyrized.
Subordinates in office are the very models of assiduity, attention, and fidelity to their trust; ministers, the perfection of probity and intelligence: and as for the highest magistrate in the state, no adulation is equal to describe the extent of his various merits.
There can be no difficulty in exposing the fallacy of the argument attempted to be deduced from these panegyrics:—
1. They have the common character of being irrelevant to the question under discussion. The measure must have something extraordinary in it, if a right judgment cannot be founded on its merits, without first estimating the character of the members of the government.
2. If the goodness of the measure be sufficiently established by direct arguments, the reception given to it by those who oppose it will form a better criterion for judging of their character, than their character (as inferred from the places which they occupy) for judging of the goodness or badness of the measure.
3. If this argument be good in any one case, it is equally good in every other; and the effect of it, if admitted, would be to give to the persons occupying for the time being the situation in question, an absolute and universal negative upon every measure not agreeable to their inclinations.
4. In every public trust, the legislator should, for the purpose of prevention, suppose the trustee disposed to break the trust in every imaginable way in which it would be possible for him to reap, from the breach of it, any personal advantage. This is the principle on which public institutions ought to be formed; and when it is applied to all men indiscriminately, it is injurious to none. The practical inference is, to oppose to such possible (and what will always be probable) breaches of trust every bar that can be opposed, consistently with the power requisite for the efficient and due discharge of the trust. Indeed, these arguments, drawn from the supposed virtues of men in power, are opposed to the first principles on which all laws proceed.
5. Such allegations of individual virtue are never supported by specific proof—are scarce ever susceptible of specific disproof; and specific disproof, if offered, could not be admitted, viz. in either House of Parliament. If attempted elsewhere, the punishment would fall, not on the unworthy trustee, but on him by whom the unworthiness had been proved.
FALLACIES OF DANGER,
THE SUBJECT-MATTER OF WHICH IS DANGER IN VARIOUS SHAPES, AND THE OBJECT TO REPRESS DISCUSSION ALTOGETHER, BY EXCITING ALARM.