- Principles of Judicial Procedure, With the Outlines of a Procedure Code.
- Note By the Editor.
- Chapter I.: General View—ends of Judicature.
- Chapter II.: Ends Apt and Unapt.
- Chapter III.: Procedure—its Relation to the Rest of the Law.
- Chapter IV.: Judiciary Establishment.
- Chapter V.: Procedure—its Subject-matters.
- Chapter VI.: All-comprehensive Arrangements.
- Chapter VII.: Practical General Rules.
- Chapter VIII.: Judicial Application.
- Chapter IX.: Proxies.
- Chapter X.: Judicial Communication.
- Chapter XI.: Evidence.
- Chapter XII.: Initiatory Hearing.
- Chapter XIII.: Defence, How Elicited.
- Chapter XIV.: Suits, Their Sorts.
- Chapter XV.: Suits, Continuance Of.
- Chapter XVI.: Suits—termination.
- Chapter XVII.: Suits, Their Stages.
- Chapter XVIII.: Means of Execution.
- Chapter XIX.: Counter-security.
- Chapter XX.: Remedies,—compensation.
- Chapter XXI.: Judicial Transfer.
- Chapter XXII.: Prehension.
- Chapter XXIII.: Jury-trial.
- Chapter XXIV.: Special Juries.
- Chapter XXV.: Grand Juries.
- Chapter XXVI.: Quasi-jury.
- Chapter XXVII.: Recapitulatory Examination, Or Quasi-trial.
- Chapter XXVIII.: Appeal and Quasi-appeal.
- Chapter XXIX.: Natural and Technical Systems Compared.
- Appendix A.: Initial Sketch of the Procedure Code.
- Appendix B.: Account-taking Judicatories.
- Appendix C.: British India—jury System.
- From the Right Honourable Sir Alexander Johnston, to the Right Honourable Charles W. Williams Wynn, President of the Board of Controul.
- The Rationale of Reward.
- Advertisement By the Editor.
- Remarks By Mr. Bentham.
- Preliminary Observations.
- Book I.—: Of Rewards In General.
- Chapter I.: Definitions.
- Chapter II.: Matter of Reward—sources.
- Chapter III.: Of Reward and Punishment Combined.
- Chapter IV.: Of the Union of Interest With Duty, and of Self-executing Laws.
- Chapter V.: Matter of Reward—reasons For Husbanding.
- Chapter VI.: Remuneration Ex Post Facto.
- Chapter VII.: Punition and Remuneration—their Relations.
- Chapter VIII.: Remuneration—where Hurtful.
- Chapter IX.: Remuneration—where Needless.
- Chapter X.: Proportion As to Rewards.
- Chapter XI.: Choice As to Rewards.
- Chapter XII.: Procedure As to Rewards.
- Chapter XIII.: Rewards to Informers.
- Chapter XIV.: Rewards to Accomplices.
- Chapter XV.: Competition As to Rewards.
- Chapter XVI.: Rewards For Virtue.
- Chapter XVII.: Accompaniments to Remuneration.
- Book II.—: Rewards Applied to Offices.
- Chapter I.: Salary—how a Reward.
- Chapter II.: Rules As to Emoluments.
- Chapter III.: Fees and Perquisites—none.
- Chapter IV.: Minimize Emolument.
- Chapter V.: No More Nominal Than Real.
- Chapter VI.: Couple Burthen With Benefit.
- Chapter VII.: By Emoluments Exclude Corruption.
- Chapter VIII.: Give Pensions of Retreat.
- Chapter IX.: Of the Sale of Offices.
- Chapter X.: Of Qualifications.
- Chapter XI.: Of Trust and Contract Management.
- Chapter XII.: Of Reforms.
- Book III.—: Reward Applied to Art and Science.
- Chapter I.: Art and Science—divisions.
- Chapter II.: Art and Science—advancement.
- Chapter III.: Art and Science—diffusion.
- Leading Principles of a Constitutional Code, For Any State.
- Section I.: Ends Aimed At.
- Section II.: Principal Means Employed For the Attainment of the Above Ends.
- Liberty of the Press, and Public Discussion.
- Jeremy Bentham to the Spanish People.
- Letter I.: On the Liberty of the Press—the Approaching Eight Months’ Sleep of the Cortes—and the Exclusion of Experience From the Succeeding Cortes.
- Letter II.: On the Liberty of Public Discussion In Free Meetings.
- Letter III.: On the Liberty of Public Discussion In Free Meetings—continuation From Letter II.
- Letter IV.: On the Liberty of Public Discussion In Free Meetings—continuation of the Subject From Letter III.
- An Essay On Political Tactics, Or Inquiries Concerning the Discipline and Mode of Proceeding Proper to Be Observed In Political Assemblies: Principally Applied to the Practice of the British Parliament, and to the Constitution and Situation of the Nati
- Chapter I.: General Considerations.
- Chapter II.: Of Publicity.
- Chapter III.: Of the Place of Meeting and Its Dependencies.
- Chapter IV.: Of What Concerns the Members Present At a Legislative Assembly.
- Chapter V.: Of the Presidents and Vice-presidents Belonging to Political Assemblies.
- Chapter VI. *: of the Mode of Proceeding In a Political Assembly In the Formation of Its Decisions.
- Chapter VII.: Of the Proposal of Measures For Adoption.
- Chapter VIII.: Of the Different Acts Which Enter Into the Formation of a Decree.
- Chapter IX.: Of the Promulgation of Motions—of Bills—of Amendments, and Their Withdrawment.
- Chapter X.: Of the Drawing Up of Laws.
- Chapter XI.: Of Debates.
- Chapter XII.: Of Amendments.
- Chapter XIII.: Of Dilatory Motions, Or Motions of Adjournment.
- Chapter XIV.: Of Voting.
- Chapter XV.: Of Committees.
- Chapter XVI.: Of Formulas.
- The Book of Fallacies: From Unfinished Papers of Jeremy Bentham. Edited By a Friend.
- Preface By the Editor of the Original Edition.
- The Book of Fallacies.: Introduction.
- Section I.: A Fallacy, What.
- Section II.: Fallacies, By Whom Treated of Heretofore.
- Section III.: Relation of Fallacies to Vulgar Errors.
- Section IV.: Political Fallacies the Subject of This Work.
- Section V.: Division Or Classification of Fallacies
- Section VI.: Nomenclature of Political Fallacies.
- Section VII.: Contrast Between the Present Work and Hamilton’s “parliamentary Logic.”
- Part I.: Fallacies of Authority, the Subject of Which Is Authority In Various Shapes, and the Object to Repress All Exercise of the Reasoning Faculty.
- Chapter I.
- Chapter II.: The Wisdom of Our Ancestors; Or Chinese Argument—( Ad Verecundiam. )
- Chapter III.: Fallacy of Irrevocable Laws.
- Chapter IV.: No-precedent Argument—( Ad Verecundiam. )
- Chapter V.
- Chapter VI.: Laudatory Personalities— (ad Amicitiam.)
- Part II.: Fallacies of Danger, the Subject-matter of Which Is Danger In Various Shapes, and the Object to Repress Discussion Altogether, By Exciting Alarm.
- Chapter I.: Vituperative Personalities— (ad Odium.)
- Chapter II.
- Chapter III.: Fallacy of Distrust, Or, What’s At the Bottom?—( Ad Metum. )
- Chapter IV.: Official Malefactor’s Screen—( Ad Metum. )
- Chapter V.: Accusation-scarer’s Device—( Ad Metum. )
- Part III.: Fallacies of Delay, the Subject-matter of Which Is Delay In Various Shapes—and the Object, to Postpone Discussion, With a View of Eluding It.
- Chapter I.: The Quietist, Or “no Complaint”—( Ad Quietem )
- Chapter II.: Fallacy of False Consolation— (ad Quietem.)
- Chapter III.: Procrastinator’s Argument ( Ad Socordiam. )
- Chapter IV.: Snail’s-pace Argument.—( Ad Socordiam. )
- Chapter V.: Fallacy of Artful Diversion—( Ad Verecundiam. )
- Part IV.: Fallacies of Confusion, the Object of Which Is, to Perplex, When Discussion Can No Longer Be Avoided.
- Chapter I.: Question-begging Appellatives—( Ad Judicium. )
- Chapter II.: Impostor Terms—( Ad Judicium. )
- Chapter III.: Vague Generalities—( Ad Judicium. )
- Chapter IV.: Allegorical Idols—( Ad Imaginationem. )
- Chapter V.: Sweeping Classifications—( Ad Judicium. )
- Chapter VI.: Sham Distinctions—( Ad Judicium. )
- Chapter VII.: Popular Corruption—( Ad Superbiam. )
- Chapter VIII.: Observations On the Seven Preceding Fallacies.
- Chapter IX.: Anti-rational Fallacies—( Ad Verecundiam. )
- Chapter X.: Paradoxical Assertion—( Ad Judicium. )
- Chapter XI. :non-causa Pro Causa: Or, Cause and Obstacle Confounded—( Ad Judicium. )
- Chapter XII.: Partiality-preacher’s Argument—( Ad Judicium. )
- Chapter XIII.: The End Justifies the Means—( Ad Judicium. )
- Chapter XIV.: Opposer-general’s Justification:—not Measures But Men; Or, Not Men But Measures—( Ad Invidiam. )
- Chapter XV.: Rejection Instead of Amendment—( Ad Judicium. )
- Part V
- Chapter I.: Characters Common to All These Fallacies.
- Chapter II.: Of the Mischief Producible By Fallacies.
- Chapter III.: Causes of the Utterance of These Fallacies.
- Chapter IV.: Second Cause—interest Begotten-prejudice.
- Chapter V.: Third Cause—authority-begotten Prejudice.
- Chapter VI.: Fourth Cause—self-defence Against Counter-fallacies.
- Chapter VII.: Use of These Fallacies to the Utterers and Acceptors of Them.
- Chapter VIII.: Particular Demand For Fallacies Under the English Constitution.
- Chapter IX.: The Demand For Political Fallacies:—how Created By the State of Interests.
- Chapter X.: Different Parts Which May Be Borne In Relation to Fallacies.
- Chapter XI.: Uses of the Preceding Exposure.
- Anarchical Fallacies; Being an Examination of the Declarations of Rights Issued During the French Revolution.
- An Examination of the Declaration of the Rights of the Man and the Citizen Decreed By the Constituent Assembly In France.
- A Critical Examination of the Declaration of Rights.
- Declaration of the Rights and Duties of the Man and the Citizen, Anno 1795.
- Observations On Parts of the Declaration of Rights, As Proposed By Citizen Sieyes.
- Principles of International Law.
- Essay I.: Objects of International Law.
- Essay II.: Of Subjects, Or of the Personal Extent of the Dominion of the Laws.
- Essay III.: Of War, Considered In Respect of Its Causes and Consequences.
- Essay IV.: A Plan For an Universal and Perpetual Peace.
- Appendix. * —junctiana Proposal.
- A Protest Against Law-taxes, Showing the Peculiar Mischievousness of All Such Impositions As Add to the Expense of Appeal to Justice.
- Supply Without Burden; Or Escheat Vice Taxation: Being a Proposal For a Saving of Taxes By an Extension of the Law of Escheat, Including Strictures On the Taxes On Collateral Succession Comprised In the Budget of 7 Th December 1795.
- Section I.: General Idea.
- Section II.: Order of the Details.
- Section III.: Advantages.
- Section IV.: Originality.
- Section V.: Produce.
- Section VI.: Application.
- Section VII.: Heads of Objection, With Answers. †
- Section VIII.: Existing Law.
- Section IX.: Ancient Law.
- Section X.: Blackstone.
- Tax With Monopoly; Or Hints of Certain Cases In Which, In Alleviation of the Burden of Taxation, Exclusive Privileges May Be Given As Against Future Competitors, Without Producing Any of the Ill Effects, Which In Most Cases Are Inseparable From Everyth
- I.: Stock-brokers.
- II.: Bankers.
At first sight, it would appear scarcely possible to class amendments, since they may embrace every modification which the human mind can conceive with respect to a given motion. Upon calling analysis, however, to our assistance, we shall discover that this difficulty vanishes.
All amendments are necessarily relative to the choice of terms, or to the mode of their connexion.
Amendments which relate to terms, can only have for their object one or other of these three objects—to suppress, to add, or to substitute. This last operation is effected by the union of the two first.
Amendments with reference to the connexion of ideas, can only have for their object—their division, their union, or their transposition.
Does the original proposition appear to me too complicated? I demand that it be divided, with the intention of allowing the assembly the power of rejecting one part, without rejecting the other.
Does it appear proper that two propositions which are separated in the original project, should be considered together, or one following the other? I demand their union.
Amendments which consist in transposing a certain word or phrase may have the effect of entirely changing the project: the word only, for example, placed in different situations, will produce a meaning totally different.
Amendments are thus reduced to six kinds, and are capable of receiving clear and precise denominations:—
These technical terms appear necessary to prevent the confounding of ideas which only differ from each other by very slight shades. Things which are not classified, and which have no proper names, are always ill understood, and cannot be designated but by periphrases which are often obscure.
A proper name is a great assistance to the understanding, to the memory, and to the communication of ideas. The greatest difficulty which can be alleged against new words is, that they are difficult to be understood; but those derived from more familiar terms are perfectly intelligible.
It frequently happens, that many amendments are offered upon one motion, and even amendments which refer to a previous amendment: this is what is called a sub-amendment. In what order ought they to be discussed? It is very difficult to give positive rules in this respect: each party will support the importance of his own, and seek to obtain priority. If a debate were always necessary to decide the matter, the principal question would be lost sight of, and the attention of the assembly exhausted upon these accessories.
These contests may be rendered more rare and short, by laying down as a general principle, that amendments upon the connexion shall always be taken into consideration first. What is their object? To place the objects to be discussed in the most suitable order: but this order, once formed, is that which most tends to produce a good discussion. Among this class of amendments, the divisive ought to have the priority. Complex questions are the occasion of the most obscure and obstinate debates.
Among amendments as to the choice of terms, it might also be laid down as a general principle, that suppressive amendments ought to have the priority over the two others of the same kind. The suppression of a single term may remove the strongest objections, and that which is omitted is no longer the subject of debate: on the other hand, additive or substitutive amendments may be productive of sub-amendments of the same species.
The value of these observations will only be fully apprehended by those who have had experience in political assemblies. They will be aware how much confusion is produced by multiplied amendments, and how happy it would be, if without absolute rules some thread could be found which would lead out of the labyrinth.
There remain many more difficulties upon this subject. When there are many additive amendments in concurrence, in what order should they be submitted to the vote? Ought they to be presented singly, or all at once? If they are presented singly, by deciding according to priority you do not give the others an equal chance. It is the same in elections. If you have to choose among many candidates, you do not treat them with equality if you put them to the vote one after another. He who is presented first, will in general have a great advantage; and if he be elected, the others would be rejected without having any chance of success. It is proper, therefore, to vote for rival amendments after the elective manner. I see no other inconvenience than the length of the process. It would be proper always to have recourse to this in cases of great importance. In ordinary cases, it may be allowed to the president to put amendments to the vote in the order which appears to him most suitable, it being understood, that if objection be made, it belongs to the assembly to decide.
It is scarcely necessary to say that amendments are only trials which ought to admit of every possible variation. If the amendment pass, it does not follow that the clause amended shall be adopted. The motion, thus modified, becomes the object of debate, and may be rejected. That which has been suppressed, may be re-established: that which has been added, may be struck out. Words may be placed and displaced, as in the corrections of style, without deciding upon the value of the composition, which after this labour may be condemned or destroyed.
One rule which ought to be absolute with respect to amendments, is—not to admit any which are insidious.
I call those pretended amendments insidious, which, instead of improving the motion, represent it as ridiculous or absurd, and which cannot be adopted without making the motion fall by means of the amendment itself.
Ridicule is useful for the overthrow of an absurdity which does not deserve to be seriously attacked; but an epigram in the shape of an amendment is a piece of wit which is unbecoming the gravity and the design of a political assembly. To propose an amendment, is to declare that one seeks to improve the motion, that it may become worthy of approbation: to propose an amendment which renders the motion ridiculous, is a species of fraud and insult, resembling that particular kind of impertinence which in society is called jeering.
Besides; these insidious amendments are altogether useless. They cannot pass unless the majority of the assembly be already disposed to reject the motion itself. It is therefore to go round about, in order to reach the end which may be attained by direct means. You only render necessary two operations instead of one. You begin by receiving the amendment which renders the motion absurd, and then reject the motion thus amended.
Let us apply these observations to the celebrated vote of the House of Commons in 1782—a vote which served as the foundation of a kind of revolution in the government:—
“It is declared, that the influence of the crown has increased, is increasing, and that it ought to be diminished.”
Let us suppose that one of the opponents of the motion had proposed that it be adopted, upon the insertion of the word necessary before influence.
Here would be an example of the amendment insidious; since the insertion of this word would have rendered the motion contradictory, and even criminal; and the amendment having been admitted, the motion ought to be rejected.
Another example:—A motion having been made for the production of all letters written by the Lords of the Admiralty to an officer of marines,—it was proposed to add as an amendment, the words “which letters may contain orders, or relate to orders not executed, and still subsisting.” The amendment having been adopted, the whole motion was rejected without a division.
This mode of procedure united both the inconveniences I have mentioned: insult and derision were its object—cunning and tergiversation were its means. It was entirely opposed to the maxim—suaviter in modo, fortiter in re.