CHAPTER VII.: OF THE PROPOSAL OF MEASURES FOR ADOPTION. - Jeremy Bentham, The Works of Jeremy Bentham, vol. 2 
The Works of Jeremy Bentham, published under the Superintendence of his Executor, John Bowring (Edinburgh: William Tait, 1838-1843). 11 vols. Vol. 2.
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- Principles of Judicial Procedure, With the Outlines of a Procedure Code.
- Note By the Editor.
- Chapter I.: General View—ends of Judicature.
- Chapter II.: Ends Apt and Unapt.
- Chapter III.: Procedure—its Relation to the Rest of the Law.
- Chapter IV.: Judiciary Establishment.
- Chapter V.: Procedure—its Subject-matters.
- Chapter VI.: All-comprehensive Arrangements.
- Chapter VII.: Practical General Rules.
- Chapter VIII.: Judicial Application.
- Chapter IX.: Proxies.
- Chapter X.: Judicial Communication.
- Chapter XI.: Evidence.
- Chapter XII.: Initiatory Hearing.
- Chapter XIII.: Defence, How Elicited.
- Chapter XIV.: Suits, Their Sorts.
- Chapter XV.: Suits, Continuance Of.
- Chapter XVI.: Suits—termination.
- Chapter XVII.: Suits, Their Stages.
- Chapter XVIII.: Means of Execution.
- Chapter XIX.: Counter-security.
- Chapter XX.: Remedies,—compensation.
- Chapter XXI.: Judicial Transfer.
- Chapter XXII.: Prehension.
- Chapter XXIII.: Jury-trial.
- Chapter XXIV.: Special Juries.
- Chapter XXV.: Grand Juries.
- Chapter XXVI.: Quasi-jury.
- Chapter XXVII.: Recapitulatory Examination, Or Quasi-trial.
- Chapter XXVIII.: Appeal and Quasi-appeal.
- Chapter XXIX.: Natural and Technical Systems Compared.
- Appendix A.: Initial Sketch of the Procedure Code.
- Appendix B.: Account-taking Judicatories.
- Appendix C.: British India—jury System.
- From the Right Honourable Sir Alexander Johnston, to the Right Honourable Charles W. Williams Wynn, President of the Board of Controul.
- The Rationale of Reward.
- Advertisement By the Editor.
- Remarks By Mr. Bentham.
- Preliminary Observations.
- Book I.—: Of Rewards In General.
- Chapter I.: Definitions.
- Chapter II.: Matter of Reward—sources.
- Chapter III.: Of Reward and Punishment Combined.
- Chapter IV.: Of the Union of Interest With Duty, and of Self-executing Laws.
- Chapter V.: Matter of Reward—reasons For Husbanding.
- Chapter VI.: Remuneration Ex Post Facto.
- Chapter VII.: Punition and Remuneration—their Relations.
- Chapter VIII.: Remuneration—where Hurtful.
- Chapter IX.: Remuneration—where Needless.
- Chapter X.: Proportion As to Rewards.
- Chapter XI.: Choice As to Rewards.
- Chapter XII.: Procedure As to Rewards.
- Chapter XIII.: Rewards to Informers.
- Chapter XIV.: Rewards to Accomplices.
- Chapter XV.: Competition As to Rewards.
- Chapter XVI.: Rewards For Virtue.
- Chapter XVII.: Accompaniments to Remuneration.
- Book II.—: Rewards Applied to Offices.
- Chapter I.: Salary—how a Reward.
- Chapter II.: Rules As to Emoluments.
- Chapter III.: Fees and Perquisites—none.
- Chapter IV.: Minimize Emolument.
- Chapter V.: No More Nominal Than Real.
- Chapter VI.: Couple Burthen With Benefit.
- Chapter VII.: By Emoluments Exclude Corruption.
- Chapter VIII.: Give Pensions of Retreat.
- Chapter IX.: Of the Sale of Offices.
- Chapter X.: Of Qualifications.
- Chapter XI.: Of Trust and Contract Management.
- Chapter XII.: Of Reforms.
- Book III.—: Reward Applied to Art and Science.
- Chapter I.: Art and Science—divisions.
- Chapter II.: Art and Science—advancement.
- Chapter III.: Art and Science—diffusion.
- Leading Principles of a Constitutional Code, For Any State.
- Section I.: Ends Aimed At.
- Section II.: Principal Means Employed For the Attainment of the Above Ends.
- Liberty of the Press, and Public Discussion.
- Jeremy Bentham to the Spanish People.
- Letter I.: On the Liberty of the Press—the Approaching Eight Months’ Sleep of the Cortes—and the Exclusion of Experience From the Succeeding Cortes.
- Letter II.: On the Liberty of Public Discussion In Free Meetings.
- Letter III.: On the Liberty of Public Discussion In Free Meetings—continuation From Letter II.
- Letter IV.: On the Liberty of Public Discussion In Free Meetings—continuation of the Subject From Letter III.
- An Essay On Political Tactics, Or Inquiries Concerning the Discipline and Mode of Proceeding Proper to Be Observed In Political Assemblies: Principally Applied to the Practice of the British Parliament, and to the Constitution and Situation of the Nati
- Chapter I.: General Considerations.
- Chapter II.: Of Publicity.
- Chapter III.: Of the Place of Meeting and Its Dependencies.
- Chapter IV.: Of What Concerns the Members Present At a Legislative Assembly.
- Chapter V.: Of the Presidents and Vice-presidents Belonging to Political Assemblies.
- Chapter VI. *: of the Mode of Proceeding In a Political Assembly In the Formation of Its Decisions.
- Chapter VII.: Of the Proposal of Measures For Adoption.
- Chapter VIII.: Of the Different Acts Which Enter Into the Formation of a Decree.
- Chapter IX.: Of the Promulgation of Motions—of Bills—of Amendments, and Their Withdrawment.
- Chapter X.: Of the Drawing Up of Laws.
- Chapter XI.: Of Debates.
- Chapter XII.: Of Amendments.
- Chapter XIII.: Of Dilatory Motions, Or Motions of Adjournment.
- Chapter XIV.: Of Voting.
- Chapter XV.: Of Committees.
- Chapter XVI.: Of Formulas.
- The Book of Fallacies: From Unfinished Papers of Jeremy Bentham. Edited By a Friend.
- Preface By the Editor of the Original Edition.
- The Book of Fallacies.: Introduction.
- Section I.: A Fallacy, What.
- Section II.: Fallacies, By Whom Treated of Heretofore.
- Section III.: Relation of Fallacies to Vulgar Errors.
- Section IV.: Political Fallacies the Subject of This Work.
- Section V.: Division Or Classification of Fallacies
- Section VI.: Nomenclature of Political Fallacies.
- Section VII.: Contrast Between the Present Work and Hamilton’s “parliamentary Logic.”
- Part I.: Fallacies of Authority, the Subject of Which Is Authority In Various Shapes, and the Object to Repress All Exercise of the Reasoning Faculty.
- Chapter I.
- Chapter II.: The Wisdom of Our Ancestors; Or Chinese Argument—( Ad Verecundiam. )
- Chapter III.: Fallacy of Irrevocable Laws.
- Chapter IV.: No-precedent Argument—( Ad Verecundiam. )
- Chapter V.
- Chapter VI.: Laudatory Personalities— (ad Amicitiam.)
- Part II.: Fallacies of Danger, the Subject-matter of Which Is Danger In Various Shapes, and the Object to Repress Discussion Altogether, By Exciting Alarm.
- Chapter I.: Vituperative Personalities— (ad Odium.)
- Chapter II.
- Chapter III.: Fallacy of Distrust, Or, What’s At the Bottom?—( Ad Metum. )
- Chapter IV.: Official Malefactor’s Screen—( Ad Metum. )
- Chapter V.: Accusation-scarer’s Device—( Ad Metum. )
- Part III.: Fallacies of Delay, the Subject-matter of Which Is Delay In Various Shapes—and the Object, to Postpone Discussion, With a View of Eluding It.
- Chapter I.: The Quietist, Or “no Complaint”—( Ad Quietem )
- Chapter II.: Fallacy of False Consolation— (ad Quietem.)
- Chapter III.: Procrastinator’s Argument ( Ad Socordiam. )
- Chapter IV.: Snail’s-pace Argument.—( Ad Socordiam. )
- Chapter V.: Fallacy of Artful Diversion—( Ad Verecundiam. )
- Part IV.: Fallacies of Confusion, the Object of Which Is, to Perplex, When Discussion Can No Longer Be Avoided.
- Chapter I.: Question-begging Appellatives—( Ad Judicium. )
- Chapter II.: Impostor Terms—( Ad Judicium. )
- Chapter III.: Vague Generalities—( Ad Judicium. )
- Chapter IV.: Allegorical Idols—( Ad Imaginationem. )
- Chapter V.: Sweeping Classifications—( Ad Judicium. )
- Chapter VI.: Sham Distinctions—( Ad Judicium. )
- Chapter VII.: Popular Corruption—( Ad Superbiam. )
- Chapter VIII.: Observations On the Seven Preceding Fallacies.
- Chapter IX.: Anti-rational Fallacies—( Ad Verecundiam. )
- Chapter X.: Paradoxical Assertion—( Ad Judicium. )
- Chapter XI. :non-causa Pro Causa: Or, Cause and Obstacle Confounded—( Ad Judicium. )
- Chapter XII.: Partiality-preacher’s Argument—( Ad Judicium. )
- Chapter XIII.: The End Justifies the Means—( Ad Judicium. )
- Chapter XIV.: Opposer-general’s Justification:—not Measures But Men; Or, Not Men But Measures—( Ad Invidiam. )
- Chapter XV.: Rejection Instead of Amendment—( Ad Judicium. )
- Part V
- Chapter I.: Characters Common to All These Fallacies.
- Chapter II.: Of the Mischief Producible By Fallacies.
- Chapter III.: Causes of the Utterance of These Fallacies.
- Chapter IV.: Second Cause—interest Begotten-prejudice.
- Chapter V.: Third Cause—authority-begotten Prejudice.
- Chapter VI.: Fourth Cause—self-defence Against Counter-fallacies.
- Chapter VII.: Use of These Fallacies to the Utterers and Acceptors of Them.
- Chapter VIII.: Particular Demand For Fallacies Under the English Constitution.
- Chapter IX.: The Demand For Political Fallacies:—how Created By the State of Interests.
- Chapter X.: Different Parts Which May Be Borne In Relation to Fallacies.
- Chapter XI.: Uses of the Preceding Exposure.
- Anarchical Fallacies; Being an Examination of the Declarations of Rights Issued During the French Revolution.
- An Examination of the Declaration of the Rights of the Man and the Citizen Decreed By the Constituent Assembly In France.
- A Critical Examination of the Declaration of Rights.
- Declaration of the Rights and Duties of the Man and the Citizen, Anno 1795.
- Observations On Parts of the Declaration of Rights, As Proposed By Citizen Sieyes.
- Principles of International Law.
- Essay I.: Objects of International Law.
- Essay II.: Of Subjects, Or of the Personal Extent of the Dominion of the Laws.
- Essay III.: Of War, Considered In Respect of Its Causes and Consequences.
- Essay IV.: A Plan For an Universal and Perpetual Peace.
- Appendix. * —junctiana Proposal.
- A Protest Against Law-taxes, Showing the Peculiar Mischievousness of All Such Impositions As Add to the Expense of Appeal to Justice.
- Supply Without Burden; Or Escheat Vice Taxation: Being a Proposal For a Saving of Taxes By an Extension of the Law of Escheat, Including Strictures On the Taxes On Collateral Succession Comprised In the Budget of 7 Th December 1795.
- Section I.: General Idea.
- Section II.: Order of the Details.
- Section III.: Advantages.
- Section IV.: Originality.
- Section V.: Produce.
- Section VI.: Application.
- Section VII.: Heads of Objection, With Answers. †
- Section VIII.: Existing Law.
- Section IX.: Ancient Law.
- Section X.: Blackstone.
- Tax With Monopoly; Or Hints of Certain Cases In Which, In Alleviation of the Burden of Taxation, Exclusive Privileges May Be Given As Against Future Competitors, Without Producing Any of the Ill Effects, Which In Most Cases Are Inseparable From Everyth
- I.: Stock-brokers.
- II.: Bankers.
OF THE PROPOSAL OF MEASURES FOR ADOPTION.
There ought to be in every assembly one individual officially charged with the initiative, that is bound to commence the operations, and to propose the necessary measures. For if no member in particular ought to have a plan respecting the business to be considered, it may happen that there will be no plan, and that the assembly will remain in a state of inaction.
It is not only necessary that there should be a plan upon each occasion, but there ought to be a train—a connexion, between the projects submitted. It is not enough to provide for the first sitting: there ought to be a general plan, embracing all the requisite operations, disposing them in the best order, and leading them onward to their conclusion.
This obligatory initiative naturally belongs to those who convoke a political assembly, and who are best acquainted with the wants of the state. The general distribution of labour is the duty of the administration: the ministers should propose—the assembly deliberate and resolve.
But the right of initiation ought not to be the privilege of the executive exclusively:—each member ought equally to possess it. There are three principal grounds for this arrangement:—
1. That the intelligence of the whole assembly may be improved for the general good.
There is as good a chance for obtaining the best advice from one party as from the other. To limit the right of proposing, is to renounce everything which might be expected from those who are excluded: it is to institute a monopoly mischievous in every respect, both because it extinguishes the emulation of those whom it reduces to merely a negative part, and because it may retain the greatest talents in a state of inaction. The most intelligent and clever men may, under this exclusive system, be enchained by those who are greatly their inferiors in genius and knowledge.
2. That abuses may reformed. If the right of proposing belong only to the administration, those abuses which are favourable to it would be perpetual: the assembly would have no direct method of causing them to cease. This arrangement would give to the government a most commodious species of negative as against all measures which were unpleasant to it—a negative without noise and without debate.
3. That the danger arising from the negative right, when it exists alone, may be prevented. The assembly which should possess the power of rejecting alone, would be tempted to abuse it; that is to say, to reject good measures, either from a feeling of pride, that it might show that it was not a mere nullity, that it might exercise its authority, or that it might constrain the hand of government, and lead it to concede one point that it may obtain another: for the right of refusal may be converted into an instrument of offence, and may be employed as a positive means of constraint. Such a system, instead therefore of producing harmony, would tend to produce discord by creating a necessity on the part of the assembly for the adoption of an artificial conduct towards the executive power.
But it may be said, if the direction of affairs ought to be confided to the officers of the executive power,—if they ought to propose those measures which the necessities of the state require:—how, then, can this agree with the desire which all the members may have of making propositions? For this right, if it be to be efficacious, supposes that the assembly has the power of entertaining them. But if it thus entertain them, the ministerial plan will be liable to be interrupted by incoherent, and even entirely subversive motions: there will be no longer any regular progress; and there may even result from it general confusion in the government.
I can only answer this objection by supposing in the assembly an habitual disposition to leave to the ministers the ordinary exercise of the right of proposing.
The general privilege should be reserved for all the members without distinction; but the right of priority should be conceded by a tacit convention to the ministerial propositions.
It is here that it is proper to notice the conduct of the British parliament.
In the ordinary course of affairs, all eyes are fixed upon the minister: whether he present a plan, or speak in support of it, he is listened to with a degree of attention which belongs only to him. By a general, though tacit arrangemnt, important business is not commenced before he arrives.
He proposes all the principal measures—his opponents confine themselves to attacking them: in short, he is the director, the prime mover, the principal personage. Still he has not by right the slightest pre-eminence: there is no rule which secures to his motions, a preference above those of any other member;—there is no rule which gives him a right to speak first—it is an arrangement which exists only in virtue of its convenience and its utility. Whilst the minister possesses the confidence of the majority, he is sure to preserve the right of the initiative: when he loses this confidence, he cannot much longer remain minister, but must give place to another.
It may be well here to attempt to dissipate an error which may justly be called popular, both on account of the little reflection which it discovers, and the number of those who adopt it. This error consists in concluding, that an assembly like the House of Commons is corrupt, because in its ordinary course it is led by the ministers. This pretended proof of the corruption of the assembly, or its subjection, is, on the contrary, a real proof of its liberty and its strength. Why does the minister always take the lead in Parliament? It is because unless he had the power thus to lead, he would no longer be minister. The preservation of his place depends upon the duration of his credit with the legislative assembly. Were we to suppose all the members endowed with the most heroic independence, matters could not be better arranged than they are at present.