CHAPTER VI.: COUPLE BURTHEN WITH BENEFIT. - Jeremy Bentham, The Works of Jeremy Bentham, vol. 2 
The Works of Jeremy Bentham, published under the Superintendence of his Executor, John Bowring (Edinburgh: William Tait, 1838-1843). 11 vols. Vol. 2.
About Liberty Fund:
Liberty Fund, Inc. is a private, educational foundation established to encourage the study of the ideal of a society of free and responsible individuals.
The text is in the public domain.
Fair use statement:
This material is put online to further the educational goals of Liberty Fund, Inc. Unless otherwise stated in the Copyright Information section above, this material may be used freely for educational and academic purposes. It may not be used in any way for profit.
- Principles of Judicial Procedure, With the Outlines of a Procedure Code.
- Note By the Editor.
- Chapter I.: General View—ends of Judicature.
- Chapter II.: Ends Apt and Unapt.
- Chapter III.: Procedure—its Relation to the Rest of the Law.
- Chapter IV.: Judiciary Establishment.
- Chapter V.: Procedure—its Subject-matters.
- Chapter VI.: All-comprehensive Arrangements.
- Chapter VII.: Practical General Rules.
- Chapter VIII.: Judicial Application.
- Chapter IX.: Proxies.
- Chapter X.: Judicial Communication.
- Chapter XI.: Evidence.
- Chapter XII.: Initiatory Hearing.
- Chapter XIII.: Defence, How Elicited.
- Chapter XIV.: Suits, Their Sorts.
- Chapter XV.: Suits, Continuance Of.
- Chapter XVI.: Suits—termination.
- Chapter XVII.: Suits, Their Stages.
- Chapter XVIII.: Means of Execution.
- Chapter XIX.: Counter-security.
- Chapter XX.: Remedies,—compensation.
- Chapter XXI.: Judicial Transfer.
- Chapter XXII.: Prehension.
- Chapter XXIII.: Jury-trial.
- Chapter XXIV.: Special Juries.
- Chapter XXV.: Grand Juries.
- Chapter XXVI.: Quasi-jury.
- Chapter XXVII.: Recapitulatory Examination, Or Quasi-trial.
- Chapter XXVIII.: Appeal and Quasi-appeal.
- Chapter XXIX.: Natural and Technical Systems Compared.
- Appendix A.: Initial Sketch of the Procedure Code.
- Appendix B.: Account-taking Judicatories.
- Appendix C.: British India—jury System.
- From the Right Honourable Sir Alexander Johnston, to the Right Honourable Charles W. Williams Wynn, President of the Board of Controul.
- The Rationale of Reward.
- Advertisement By the Editor.
- Remarks By Mr. Bentham.
- Preliminary Observations.
- Book I.—: Of Rewards In General.
- Chapter I.: Definitions.
- Chapter II.: Matter of Reward—sources.
- Chapter III.: Of Reward and Punishment Combined.
- Chapter IV.: Of the Union of Interest With Duty, and of Self-executing Laws.
- Chapter V.: Matter of Reward—reasons For Husbanding.
- Chapter VI.: Remuneration Ex Post Facto.
- Chapter VII.: Punition and Remuneration—their Relations.
- Chapter VIII.: Remuneration—where Hurtful.
- Chapter IX.: Remuneration—where Needless.
- Chapter X.: Proportion As to Rewards.
- Chapter XI.: Choice As to Rewards.
- Chapter XII.: Procedure As to Rewards.
- Chapter XIII.: Rewards to Informers.
- Chapter XIV.: Rewards to Accomplices.
- Chapter XV.: Competition As to Rewards.
- Chapter XVI.: Rewards For Virtue.
- Chapter XVII.: Accompaniments to Remuneration.
- Book II.—: Rewards Applied to Offices.
- Chapter I.: Salary—how a Reward.
- Chapter II.: Rules As to Emoluments.
- Chapter III.: Fees and Perquisites—none.
- Chapter IV.: Minimize Emolument.
- Chapter V.: No More Nominal Than Real.
- Chapter VI.: Couple Burthen With Benefit.
- Chapter VII.: By Emoluments Exclude Corruption.
- Chapter VIII.: Give Pensions of Retreat.
- Chapter IX.: Of the Sale of Offices.
- Chapter X.: Of Qualifications.
- Chapter XI.: Of Trust and Contract Management.
- Chapter XII.: Of Reforms.
- Book III.—: Reward Applied to Art and Science.
- Chapter I.: Art and Science—divisions.
- Chapter II.: Art and Science—advancement.
- Chapter III.: Art and Science—diffusion.
- Leading Principles of a Constitutional Code, For Any State.
- Section I.: Ends Aimed At.
- Section II.: Principal Means Employed For the Attainment of the Above Ends.
- Liberty of the Press, and Public Discussion.
- Jeremy Bentham to the Spanish People.
- Letter I.: On the Liberty of the Press—the Approaching Eight Months’ Sleep of the Cortes—and the Exclusion of Experience From the Succeeding Cortes.
- Letter II.: On the Liberty of Public Discussion In Free Meetings.
- Letter III.: On the Liberty of Public Discussion In Free Meetings—continuation From Letter II.
- Letter IV.: On the Liberty of Public Discussion In Free Meetings—continuation of the Subject From Letter III.
- An Essay On Political Tactics, Or Inquiries Concerning the Discipline and Mode of Proceeding Proper to Be Observed In Political Assemblies: Principally Applied to the Practice of the British Parliament, and to the Constitution and Situation of the Nati
- Chapter I.: General Considerations.
- Chapter II.: Of Publicity.
- Chapter III.: Of the Place of Meeting and Its Dependencies.
- Chapter IV.: Of What Concerns the Members Present At a Legislative Assembly.
- Chapter V.: Of the Presidents and Vice-presidents Belonging to Political Assemblies.
- Chapter VI. *: of the Mode of Proceeding In a Political Assembly In the Formation of Its Decisions.
- Chapter VII.: Of the Proposal of Measures For Adoption.
- Chapter VIII.: Of the Different Acts Which Enter Into the Formation of a Decree.
- Chapter IX.: Of the Promulgation of Motions—of Bills—of Amendments, and Their Withdrawment.
- Chapter X.: Of the Drawing Up of Laws.
- Chapter XI.: Of Debates.
- Chapter XII.: Of Amendments.
- Chapter XIII.: Of Dilatory Motions, Or Motions of Adjournment.
- Chapter XIV.: Of Voting.
- Chapter XV.: Of Committees.
- Chapter XVI.: Of Formulas.
- The Book of Fallacies: From Unfinished Papers of Jeremy Bentham. Edited By a Friend.
- Preface By the Editor of the Original Edition.
- The Book of Fallacies.: Introduction.
- Section I.: A Fallacy, What.
- Section II.: Fallacies, By Whom Treated of Heretofore.
- Section III.: Relation of Fallacies to Vulgar Errors.
- Section IV.: Political Fallacies the Subject of This Work.
- Section V.: Division Or Classification of Fallacies
- Section VI.: Nomenclature of Political Fallacies.
- Section VII.: Contrast Between the Present Work and Hamilton’s “parliamentary Logic.”
- Part I.: Fallacies of Authority, the Subject of Which Is Authority In Various Shapes, and the Object to Repress All Exercise of the Reasoning Faculty.
- Chapter I.
- Chapter II.: The Wisdom of Our Ancestors; Or Chinese Argument—( Ad Verecundiam. )
- Chapter III.: Fallacy of Irrevocable Laws.
- Chapter IV.: No-precedent Argument—( Ad Verecundiam. )
- Chapter V.
- Chapter VI.: Laudatory Personalities— (ad Amicitiam.)
- Part II.: Fallacies of Danger, the Subject-matter of Which Is Danger In Various Shapes, and the Object to Repress Discussion Altogether, By Exciting Alarm.
- Chapter I.: Vituperative Personalities— (ad Odium.)
- Chapter II.
- Chapter III.: Fallacy of Distrust, Or, What’s At the Bottom?—( Ad Metum. )
- Chapter IV.: Official Malefactor’s Screen—( Ad Metum. )
- Chapter V.: Accusation-scarer’s Device—( Ad Metum. )
- Part III.: Fallacies of Delay, the Subject-matter of Which Is Delay In Various Shapes—and the Object, to Postpone Discussion, With a View of Eluding It.
- Chapter I.: The Quietist, Or “no Complaint”—( Ad Quietem )
- Chapter II.: Fallacy of False Consolation— (ad Quietem.)
- Chapter III.: Procrastinator’s Argument ( Ad Socordiam. )
- Chapter IV.: Snail’s-pace Argument.—( Ad Socordiam. )
- Chapter V.: Fallacy of Artful Diversion—( Ad Verecundiam. )
- Part IV.: Fallacies of Confusion, the Object of Which Is, to Perplex, When Discussion Can No Longer Be Avoided.
- Chapter I.: Question-begging Appellatives—( Ad Judicium. )
- Chapter II.: Impostor Terms—( Ad Judicium. )
- Chapter III.: Vague Generalities—( Ad Judicium. )
- Chapter IV.: Allegorical Idols—( Ad Imaginationem. )
- Chapter V.: Sweeping Classifications—( Ad Judicium. )
- Chapter VI.: Sham Distinctions—( Ad Judicium. )
- Chapter VII.: Popular Corruption—( Ad Superbiam. )
- Chapter VIII.: Observations On the Seven Preceding Fallacies.
- Chapter IX.: Anti-rational Fallacies—( Ad Verecundiam. )
- Chapter X.: Paradoxical Assertion—( Ad Judicium. )
- Chapter XI. :non-causa Pro Causa: Or, Cause and Obstacle Confounded—( Ad Judicium. )
- Chapter XII.: Partiality-preacher’s Argument—( Ad Judicium. )
- Chapter XIII.: The End Justifies the Means—( Ad Judicium. )
- Chapter XIV.: Opposer-general’s Justification:—not Measures But Men; Or, Not Men But Measures—( Ad Invidiam. )
- Chapter XV.: Rejection Instead of Amendment—( Ad Judicium. )
- Part V
- Chapter I.: Characters Common to All These Fallacies.
- Chapter II.: Of the Mischief Producible By Fallacies.
- Chapter III.: Causes of the Utterance of These Fallacies.
- Chapter IV.: Second Cause—interest Begotten-prejudice.
- Chapter V.: Third Cause—authority-begotten Prejudice.
- Chapter VI.: Fourth Cause—self-defence Against Counter-fallacies.
- Chapter VII.: Use of These Fallacies to the Utterers and Acceptors of Them.
- Chapter VIII.: Particular Demand For Fallacies Under the English Constitution.
- Chapter IX.: The Demand For Political Fallacies:—how Created By the State of Interests.
- Chapter X.: Different Parts Which May Be Borne In Relation to Fallacies.
- Chapter XI.: Uses of the Preceding Exposure.
- Anarchical Fallacies; Being an Examination of the Declarations of Rights Issued During the French Revolution.
- An Examination of the Declaration of the Rights of the Man and the Citizen Decreed By the Constituent Assembly In France.
- A Critical Examination of the Declaration of Rights.
- Declaration of the Rights and Duties of the Man and the Citizen, Anno 1795.
- Observations On Parts of the Declaration of Rights, As Proposed By Citizen Sieyes.
- Principles of International Law.
- Essay I.: Objects of International Law.
- Essay II.: Of Subjects, Or of the Personal Extent of the Dominion of the Laws.
- Essay III.: Of War, Considered In Respect of Its Causes and Consequences.
- Essay IV.: A Plan For an Universal and Perpetual Peace.
- Appendix. * —junctiana Proposal.
- A Protest Against Law-taxes, Showing the Peculiar Mischievousness of All Such Impositions As Add to the Expense of Appeal to Justice.
- Supply Without Burden; Or Escheat Vice Taxation: Being a Proposal For a Saving of Taxes By an Extension of the Law of Escheat, Including Strictures On the Taxes On Collateral Succession Comprised In the Budget of 7 Th December 1795.
- Section I.: General Idea.
- Section II.: Order of the Details.
- Section III.: Advantages.
- Section IV.: Originality.
- Section V.: Produce.
- Section VI.: Application.
- Section VII.: Heads of Objection, With Answers. †
- Section VIII.: Existing Law.
- Section IX.: Ancient Law.
- Section X.: Blackstone.
- Tax With Monopoly; Or Hints of Certain Cases In Which, In Alleviation of the Burden of Taxation, Exclusive Privileges May Be Given As Against Future Competitors, Without Producing Any of the Ill Effects, Which In Most Cases Are Inseparable From Everyth
- I.: Stock-brokers.
- II.: Bankers.
COUPLE BURTHEN WITH BENEFIT.
Rule V. The expenses of an office ought to be defrayed by those who enjoy the benefit of the services rendered by the office.
The author of the Wealth of Nations, in investigating the manner in which the expense of services ought to be divided, has shown that in some cases it ought to be defrayed by the public—in others, exclusively by those who immediately reap the benefit of the service. He has also shown that there is a class of mixed cases, in which the expense ought to be defrayed partly by the public, and partly by the individuals who derive the immediate benefit. To this class belongs public education.
The rule just laid down seems scarcely to stand in need of proof. It may, however, be useful to mention the modes in which it may be violated; as—I. When, for a service rendered to one person or set of persons, the obligation of payment is imposed upon another. This is partly the case of dissenters who support their own clergy, in so far as they are obliged to pay for the support of the clergy of that established sect from which they dissent. 2. When, for a service rendered to a certain number of individuals, the obligation of payment is imposed upon the public: for example, the expenses of a theatre, wholly or in part paid out of the public purse. 3. When, for a service rendered to the public, the obligation of payment is imposed upon an individual.
With respect to this third case, the examples are but too abundant.
I. The most remarkable example will be found in the administration of justice. At first sight, it may be thought that he who obtains a verdict in his favour reaps the principal, or even the only advantage to be obtained; and therefore that it is reasonable he should bear the expense incurred—that he should pay the officers of justice for the time they have been employed. It is in this manner that the subject appeared even to Adam Smith. (B. v. sec. 2.) Upon a closer examination, we shall discover an important error. The individual in whose favour a verdict is given, is precisely the individual who has received least benefit: setting aside the rewards paid to the officers of justice, how many other expenses, which the nature of things render inevitable, remain! It is he who, at the price of his time, his care, and his money, has purchased that protection which others receive for nothing.
Suppose that among a million persons there have been, for example, a thousand lawsuits in a year: without these lawsuits—without the judgments which terminate them, injustice would have had nothing to hold it in check but the defensive energy of individuals. A million acts of injustice would have been perpetrated in the same time. But since, by means of these thousand judgments, a million acts of injustice have been prevented, it is the same thing as if each complainant had himself prevented a thousand. Because he has rendered so important a service—because he has exposed himself to so many mishaps, to so much trouble and expense, does he deserve to be taxed? It is as though the militia who defend the frontiers should be selected to bear the expenses of the campaign.
“Who goeth a warfare any time at his own charges?” saith St. Paul. It is the poor litigant who makes war upon injustice, who pursues it before the tribunals at his own risk, and who is made to pay for the service which is rendered by him.
When such expenses are thrown upon a defendant, unjustly dragged into the litigious contention, the case is yet worse: instead of anything having been done for his advantage, he has been tormented, and he is made to pay for having been tormented.
If the expenses are altogether thrown upon the party who is found to have done wrong (although it often happens, owing to the uncertainty either of the facts or of the law, that there has been no wilful wrong on either side,) this cannot be done at first: this party can only be known at the termination of the suit. But then such a judgment would be a punishment; and there is a chance that such a punishment may not be deserved; another chance, that the individual may not be in a condition to support it; another chance, that it will be either too great or too little.
II. As another violation of this rule, may be cited the practice of taking fees, as carried on in most custom-houses, and which constituted a great abuse in those of England, previously to the reform introduced by Mr. Pitt. Many of the officers, not receiving salaries sufficient for their maintenance, were allowed to make up the deficiency by fees received for their own advantage. This custom had an appearance of reason. “We pass your merchandise through the custom-house,” they might have said; “and you ought to pay for this service.” But this reason is deceptive. “Without this custom-house,” the merchants might have replied, “our merchandise would have gone straight forward. It is not for our advantage that this costly depôt is established—it is for the general wants of the State; the State, therefore, which you serve, ought to pay you, and not us, whom you torment with your services, which we should be very happy to do without.” But it may be said, this expense must be borne by somebody: why should it not be borne by these merchants as well as anybody else? Because it is a partial and unequal tax. Taxes upon merchandise are generally in proportion to the value of the goods; this abusive tax seldom is so. A rich merchant does not feel it; he is reimbursed by the sale of his goods: a poor individual is oppressed by this second contribution, which he finds it necessary to pay to the clerk after be has paid what is due to the Exchequer; and it with reason appears to him the more odious, because it is oftentimes arbitrary.
III. In conclusion as a last example of the violation of this rule, we mention the emoluments of the clergy, in so far as they consist of tithes. If the services of the clergy contribute to the maintenance of public morality, and obedience to the laws, even those to whom these services are not personally directed are benefited by them—they are useful to the whole state: their expense, whatever ought to be its amount, ought to be borne by the whole community. Distributed as this expense is at present, under the system of tithes, in such manner that every one knows how much and to whom he pays it, no advantage is derived from this knowledge; whilst the inconveniences are but too manifest, in that hatred which so frequently subsists between the parishioners and their minister, the shepherd and his flock; by means of which his labours, so long as this enmity subsists, are rendered worse than useless. Were this expense to be defrayed from the general source of the public treasure, these scandalous dissensions would be avoided; and whether the revenues were more or less ample, it would be possible to preserve a more just proportion between them and the different degrees of labour, instead of floating as at present between £20 and £20,000 per annum, under the direction of chance.