The Online Library of Liberty

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• Debates In the Convention of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, On the Adoption of the Federal Constitution.
• Commonwealth of Massachusetts. In Convention of the Delegates of the People of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, 1788.
• Fragment of the Debates In the Convention of the State of Connecticut, On the Adoption of the Federal Constitution.
• New Hampshire Convention.
• The Debates In the Convention of the State of New York, On the Adoption of the Federal Constitution.
• The Circular Letter, From the Convention of the State of New York to the Governors of the Several States In the Union.
• The Debates In the Convention of the State of Pennsylvania, On the Adoption of the Federal Constitution.
• Proceedings of the Meeting At Harrisburg, In Pennsylvania.
• A Fragment of Facts, Disclosing the Conduct of the Maryland Convention, On the Adoption of the Federal Constitution.
• Address to the People of Maryland.

PROCEEDINGS OF THE MEETING AT HARRISBURG, IN PENNSYLVANIA.

Harrisburg,Sept. 3, 1788.

Agreeably to a circular letter which originated in the county of Cumberland, inviting to a conference such of the citizens of this state who conceive that a revision of the federal system, lately proposed for the government of these United States, is necessary, — a number of gentlemen from the city of Philadelphia, and counties of Philadelphia, Bucks, Chester, Lancaster, Cumberland, Berks, Northumberland, Bedford, Fayette, Washington, Franklin, Dauphin, and Huntingdon, assembled at this place for the said purpose, viz.: —

Blair M’Clenahan, Esq., was unanimously elected chairman, and John A. Hanna, Esq., secretary.

After free discussion, and mature deliberation, had upon the subject before them, the following resolutions and propositions were adopted —

The ratification of the federal Constitution having formed a new era in the American world, highly interesting to all the citizens of the United States, it is not less the duty than the privilege of every citizen to examine with attention the principles and probable effect of a system on which the happiness or misery of the present as well as future generations so much depends. In the course of such examination, many of the good citizens of the state of Pennsylvania have found their apprehensions excited that the Constitution, in its present form, contains in it some principles which may be perverted to purposes injurious to the rights of free citizens, and some ambiguities which may probably lead to contentions incompatible with order and good government. In order to remedy these inconveniences, and to avert the apprehended dangers, it has been thought expedient that delegates, chosen by those who wish for early amendments in the said Constitution, should meet together for the purpose of deliberating on the subject, and uniting in some constitutional plan for obtaining the amendments which they may deem necessary.

We, the conferees, assembled for the purpose aforesaid, agree in opinion, —

That a federal government, only, can preserve the liberties and secure the happiness of the inhabitants of a country so extensive as these United States; and experience having taught us that the ties of our union, under the Articles of Confederation, were so weak as to deprive us of some of the greatest advantages we had a right to expect from it, we are fully convinced that a more efficient government is indispensably necessary. But although the Constitution proposed for the United States is likely to obviate most of the inconveniences we labored under, yet several parts of it appear so exceptionable to us, that we are clearly of opinion considerable amendments are essentially necessary. In full confidence, however, of obtaining a revision of such exceptionable parts by general convention, and from a desire to harmonize with our fellow-citizens, we are induced to acquiesce in the organization of the said Constitution.

We are sensible that a large number of the citizens both of this and the other states, who gave their assent to its being carried into execution previous to any amendments, were actuated more by fear of the dangers that might arise from delays, than by a conviction of its being perfect; we therefore hope they will concur with us in pursuing every peaceable method of obtaining a speedy revision of the Constitution in the mode therein provided; and, when we reflect on the present circumstances of the Union, we can entertain no doubt that motives of conciliation, and the dictates of policy and prudence, will conspire to induce every man of true federal principles to give his support to a measure which is not only calculated to recommend the new Constitution to the approbation and support of every class of citizens, but even necessary to prevent the total defection of some members of the Union.

Strongly impressed with those sentiments, we have agreed to the following resolutions: —

I. Resolved, That it be recommended to the people of this state to acquiesce in the organization of the said government; but, although we thus accord in its organization, we by no means lose sight of the grand object of obtaining very considerable amendments and alterations, which we consider essential to preserve the peace and harmony of the Union, and those invaluable privileges for which so much blood and treasure have been recently expended.

II. Resolved, That it is necessary to obtain a speedy revision of said Constitution, by a general convention.

III. Resolved, That, in order to effect this desirable end, a petition be presented to the legislature of this state, requesting that honorable body to take the earliest opportunity to make application, for that purpose, to the new Congress.

The petition proposed is as follows: —

To the Honorable the Representatives of the Freemen of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, in General Assembly met:

The petition and representation of the subscribers humbly show —

That your petitioners possess sentiments completely federal; being convinced that a confederacy of republican states, and no other, can secure political liberty, happiness, and safety, throughout a territory so extended as the United States of America. They are well apprized of the necessity of devolving extensive powers to Congress, and of vesting the supreme legislature with every power and resource of a general nature; and consequently they acquiesce in the general system of government framed by the late federal Convention, — in full confidence, however, that the same will be revised without delay; for, however worthy of approbation the general principles and outlines of the system may be, your petitioners conceive that amendments in some parts of the plan are essential not only to the preservation of such rights and privileges as ought to be reserved in the respective states, and in the citizens thereof, but to the fair and unembarrassed operation of the government in its various departments. And as provision is made, in the Constitution itself, for the making such amendments as may be deemed necessary, and your petitioners are desirous of obtaining the amendments which occur to them as more immediately desirable and necessary, in the mode admitted by such provision, —

They pray, that your honorable house, as the representatives of the people in this commonwealth, will, in the course of your present session, take such measures as you, in your wisdom, shall deem most effectual and proper to obtain a revision and amendment of the Constitution of the United States, in such parts, and in such manner, as have been or shall be pointed out by the conventions or assemblies of the respective states: and that such revision be by a general convention of representatives from the several states in the Union.

Your petitioners consider the amendments pointed out in the propositions hereunto subjoined as essentially necessary; and as such they suggest them to your notice, submitting to your wisdom the order in which they shall be presented to the consideration of the United States.

The amendments proposed are as follows, viz.: —

I. That Congress shall not exercise any powers whatever, but such as are expressly given to that body by the Constitution of the United States: nor shall any authority, power, or jurisdiction, be assumed or exercised by the executive or judiciary departments of the Union, under color or pretence of construction or fiction; but all the rights of sovereignty, which are not by the said Constitution expressly and palinly vested in the Congress, shall be deemed to remain with, and shall be exercised by, the several states in the Union, according to their respective constitutions; and that every reserve of the rights of individuals, made by the several constitutions of the states in the Union, to the citizens and inhabitants of each state respectively, shall remain inviolate, except so far as they are expressly and manifestly yielded or narrowed by the national Constitution.

Article 1, section 2, paragraph 3.

II. That the number of representatives be, for the present, one for every twenty thousand inhabitants, according to the present estimated numbers in the several states, and continue in that proportion until the whole number of representatives shall amount to two hundred; and then to be so proportioned and modified as not to exceed that number, until the proportion of one representative for every thirty thousand inhabitants shall amount to the said number of two hundred.

Section 3. III. That senators, though chosen for six years, shall be liable to be recalled, or superseded by other appointments, by the respective legislatures of the states, at any time.

Section 4. IV. That Congress shall not have power to make or alter regulations concerning the time, place, and manner of electing senators and representatives, except in case of neglect or refusal by the state to make regulations for the purpose; and then only for such time as such neglect or refusal shall continue.

Section 8. V. That when Congress shall require supplies, which are to be raised by direct taxes, they shall demand from the several states their respective quotas thereof, giving a reasonable time to each state to procure and pay the same; and if any state shall refuse, neglect, or omit to raise and pay the same within such limited time, then Congress shall have power to assess, levy, and collect the quota of such state, together with interest for the same, from the time of such delinquency, upon the inhabitants and estates therein, in such manner as they shall by law direct; provided that no poll tax be imposed.

Section 8. VI. That no standing army of regular troops shall be raised or kept up in time of peace, without the consent of two thirds of both houses in Congress.

Section 8. VII. That the clause respecting the exclusive legislation over a district not exceeding ten miles square be qualified by a proviso that such right of legislation extend only to such regulations as respect the police and good order thereof.

Section 8. VIII. That each state, respectively, shall have power to provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining the militia thereof, whensoever Congress shall omit or neglect to provide for the same. That the militia shall not be subject to martial law, but when in actual service, in the time of war, invasion, or rebellion; and when not in the actual service of the United States, shall be subject to such fines, penalties, and punishments, only, as shall be directed or inflicted by the laws of its own state: nor shall the militia of any state be continued in actual service longer than two months, under any call of Congress, without the consent of the legislature of such state, or, in their recess, the executive authority thereof.

Section 9. IX. That the clause respecting vessels bound to or from any one of the states be explained.

Article 3, section 1. X. That Congress establish no other court than the Supreme Court, except such as shall be necessary for determining causes of admiralty jurisdiction.

Section 2, paragraph 2. XI. That a proviso be added at the end of the second clause of the second section of the third article, to the following effect, viz.: Provided, that such appellate jurisdiction, in all cases of common-law cognizance, be by a writ of error, and confined to matters of law only; and that no such writ of error shall be admitted, except in revenue cases, unless the matter in controversy exceed the value of three thousand dollars.

Article 6, paragraph 2. XII. That to article 6, clause 2, be added the following proviso, viz.: Provided always that no treaty, which shall hereafter be made, shall be deemed or construed to alter or affect any law of the United States, or of any particular state, until such treaty shall have been laid before and assented to by the House of Representatives in Congress.

Resolved, That the foregoing proceedings be committed to the chairman for publication.

BLAIR M’CLENAHAN, Chairman.

Attest, JOHN A. HANNA. Secretary.

A FRAGMENT OF FACTS, DISCLOSING THE CONDUCT OF THE MARYLAND CONVENTION, ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION.

ADDRESS TO THE PEOPLE OF MARYLAND.

Annapolis,April 21, 1788.

The following facts, disclosing the conduct of the late Convention of Maryland, are submitted to the serious consideration of the citizens of the state.

On Monday, the 21st of April, the Convention met in Annapolis, and elected the Hon. George Plater, Esq., president. On Tuesday, they established rules for the conduct of business; and, on the same day, the following question was propounded to the Convention: —

And the following question, viz., —

Which two questions the Convention determined in the negative.

On Wednesday, the proposed plan of government was read the first time, and thereupon it was resolved, “That this Convention will not enter into any resolution upon any particular part of the proposed plan of federal government for the United States; but that the whole thereof shall be read through a second time, after which the subject may be fully debated and considered; and then the president shall put the question, “That this Convention do assent to and ratify the same Constitution.” On which question, the yeas and nays shall be taken.

On Thursday, the members who were opposed to the ratification of the Constitution, without such previous amendments could be obtained as they thought essentially necessary to secure the liberty and happiness of the people, (being confined, by the last resolution, to consider, in one view, the whole of the plan of government,) stated some of their objections to the Constitution. The Convention met in the evening, when Mr. Paca, member from Hartford, having just taken his seat, rose, and informed the president that he had great objections to the Constitution proposed, in its present form, and meant to propose a variety of amendments, not to prevent, but to accompany the ratification; but, having just arrived, he was not ready to lay them before the house; and requested indulgence, until the morning, for that purpose. The proposal being seconded, and the house asked if they would give the indulgence, it was granted without a division; and they adjourned for that purpose. On Friday, at the meeting of the house, Mr. Paca rose, and informed the president, that, in consequence of the permission of the house, given him the preceding evening, he had prepared certain amendments, which he would read in his place, and then lay on the table; when he was interrupted, and one member from each of the following counties, viz., Frederic, Talbot, Charles, Kent, Somerset, Prince George’s, Worcester, Queen Anne’s, Dorchester, Calvert, and Caroline, and one member from the city of Annapolis,* and one from Baltimore town, arose in their places, and declared, for themselves and their colleagues, “that they were elected and instructed, by the people they represented, to ratify the proposed Constitution, and that as speedily as possible, and to do no other act; that, after the ratification, their power ceased, and they did not consider themselves as authorized by their constituents to consider any amendments.” After this, Mr. Paca was not permitted even to read his amendments. The opponents continued to make their objections to the Constitution until Saturday noon. The advocates of the government, although repeatedly called on, and earnestly requested, to answer the objections, if not just, remained inflexibly silent, and called for the question, that “the Convention assent to and ratify the proposed plan of federal government for the United States;” which was carried in the affirmative, by sixty-three to eleven.

The vote of ratification having thus passed, Mr. Paca again rose, and laid before the Convention his propositions for amending the Constitution thus adopted, which he had prepared by leave of the house; declaring that he had only given his assent to the government under the firm persuasion, and in full confidence that such amendments would be peaceably obtained so as to enable the people to live happy under the government; that the people of the county he represented, and that he himself, would support the government, with such amendments; but, without them, not a man in the state, and no people, would be more firmly opposed to it than himself and those he represented. Sentiments highly favorable to amendments were expressed, and a general murmur of approbation seemed to arise from all parts of the house, expressive of a desire to consider amendments, either in their characters as members of convention, or in their individual capacities as citizens; and the question was put on the following motion: —

A division was called for on this resolution, when there appeared sixty-six members for, and not more than seven against it.

And then it was resolved, “That the amendments proposed to the Constitution by the delegate from Hartford county should be referred to the above committee.”

The committee thus appointed, the Convention adjourned to give them time to prepare their propositions; and they proceeded, with every appearance of unanimity, to execute the trust reposed in them.

The following amendments to the proposed Constitution were separately agreed to by the committee, most of them by a unanimous vote, and all of them by a great majority.

By this amendment, the general powers given to Congress by the first and last paragraphs of the 8th sect. of art. 1, and the 2d paragraph of the 6th article, would be in a great measure restrained; those dangerous expressions, by which the bills of rights, and constitutions, of the several states may be repealed by the laws of Congress, in some degree moderated; and the exercise of constructive powers wholly prevented.

The great objects of these amendments were, 1st. To secure the trial by jury in all cases, the boasted birthright of Englishmen and their descendants, and the palladium of civil liberty; and to prevent the appeal from fact, which not only destroys that trial in civil cases, but, by construction, may also elude it in criminal cases — a mode of proceeding both expensive and burdensome, and which, by blending law with fact, will destroy all check on the judiciary authority, render it almost impossible to convict judges of corruption, and may lay the foundation of that gradual and silent attack on individuals, by which the approaches of tyranny become irresistible. 2d. To give a concurrent jurisdiction to the state courts, in order that Congress may not be compelled, as they will be under the present form, to establish inferior federal courts, which, if not numerous, are very expensive; the circumstances of the people being unequal to the increased expense of double courts and double officers — an arrangement that will render the law so complicated and confused, that few men can know how to conduct themselves with safety to their persons or property, the great and only security of freemen. 3d. To give such jurisdiction to the state courts that transient foreigners, and persons from other states, committing injuries in this state, may be amenable to the state whose laws they violate and whose citizens they injure. 4th. To prevent an extension of the federal jurisdiction, which may, and in all probability will, swallow up the state jurisdictions, and consequently sap those rules of descent and regulations of personal property, by which men hold their estates. And lastly, to secure the independence of the federal judges, to whom the happiness of the people of this great continent will be so greatly committed by the extensive powers assigned them.

This amendment was considered indispensable by many of the committee; for, Congress having the power of laying excises, (the horror of a free people,) by which our dwelling-houses, those castles considered so sacred by the English law, will be laid open to the insolence and oppression of office, there could be no constitutional check provided that would prove so effectual a safeguard to our citizens. General warrants, too, the great engine by which power may destroy those individuals who resist usurpation, are also hereby forbidden to those magistrates who are to administer the general government.

These were the only checks that could be obtained against the unlimited power of raising and regulating standing armies, the natural enemies to freedom; and even with these restrictions, the new Congress will not be under such constitutional restraints as the Parliament of Great Britain — restraints which our ancestors have bled to establish, and which have hitherto preserved the liberty of their posterity.

In prosecutions in the federal courts for libels, the constitutional preservation of this great and fundamental right may prove invaluable.

This provision to restrain the powers of Congress over the militia, although by no means so ample as that provided by Magna Charta, and the other great fundamental and constitutional laws of Great Britain, (it being contrary to Magna Charta to punish a freeman by martial law, in time of peace, and murder to execute him,) yet it may prove an inestimable check; for all other provisions in favor of the rights of men would be vain and nugatory, if the power of subjecting all men, able to bear arms, to martial law at any moment should remain vested in Congress.

Thus far the amendments were agreed to.

The following amendments were laid before the committee, and negatived by a majority.

The committee having proceeded thus far, all the members who voted for the ratification declared that they would engage themselves, under every tie of honor, to support the amendments they had agreed to, both in their public and private characters, until they should become a part of the general government; but a great majority of them insisted on this express condition, that none of the propositions rejected, or any others, should be laid before the Convention for their consideration, except those the committee had so agreed to.

The gentlemen of the minority, who had made the propositions which had been rejected, reduced to the necessity of accommodating their sentiments to the majority, through fear of obtaining no security whatever for the people, — notwithstanding they considered all the amendments as highly important to the welfare and happiness of the citizens of the states, — yet, to conciliate, they agreed to confine themselves to the first three of those propositions, and solemnly declared and pledged themselves, that, if these were added, and supported by other gentlemen, they would not only cease to oppose the government, but give all their assistance to carry it into execution so amended. Finally, they only required liberty to take the sense of the Convention on the first three propositions, agreeing that they would hold themselves bound by the decision of a majority of that body.

The first of these objections, concerning the militia, they considered as essential; for, to march beyond the limits of a neighboring state the general militia, which consists of so many poor people that can illy be spared from their families and domestic concerns, by power of Congress, (who could know nothing of their circumstances,) without consent of their own legislature or executive, ought to be restrained.

The second objection, respecting the power of Congress to alter elections, they thought indispensable. Montesquieu says that the rights of elections should be established unalterably by fundamental laws, in a free government.

The third objection, concerning previous requisitions, they conceived highly important: they thought, if the money required by direct taxation could be paid with certainty, and in due time, to Congress, that every good consequence would be secured to the Union, and the people of the state thereby relieved from the great inconvenience and expense of a double collection, and a double set of tax-gatherers, and they might also get rid of those odious taxes by excise and poll, without injury to the general government.

They were, however, again proposed and rejected.

Previous to this, a motion was made on Monday, the 29th, in the Convention, while the committee were sitting, in the following words, to wit: —

The committee being sent for by the Convention, the gentlemen of the majority in committee then determined that they would make no report of any amendments whatever, not even of those which they had almost unanimously agreed to; and the committee, under those circumstances, attended the house. Mr. Paca, as chairman, stated to the Convention what had passed in the committee, read the amendments which had there been agreed to, and assigned the reason why no report had been formally made. A member then rose, and proposed that a vote of thanks to the president, which had been once read before the attendance of the committee, should have a second reading; and upon the second reading thereof, the previous question was called for by the members who wished to consider the amendments agreed to by the committee, and such other amendments as might be proposed. The house thereupon divided, and the yeas and nays were called for by the minority; the sense of the Convention was taken thereon; and a majority determined that the yeas and nays should not be taken, nor would they permit the vote to be entered on the journal, by which the yeas and nays were prohibited; to preclude the consideration of any amendments.

A motion was then made, “that the Convention adjourn without day,” on which the yeas and nays were taken, and appeared as follows: —

We consider the proposed form of national government as very defective, and that the liberty and happiness of the people will be endangered if the system be not greatly changed and altered. The amendments agreed to by the committee, and those proposed by the minority, are now laid before you for your consideration, that you may express your sense as to such alterations as you may think proper to be made in the new Constitution.

We remain persuaded that the importance of the alterations proposed, calculated to preserve public liberty by those checks on power which the experience of ages has rendered venerable, and to promote the happiness of the people, by a due attention to their ease and convenience, will justify the steps we have taken, to obtain them, to our constituents and the world.

Having no interest that can distinguish us from the rest of the community, we neither fear censure nor wish applause. Having thus discharged the duty of citizens and trustees of the public, we shall now submit to the people those precautions and securities, which, on mature reflection on this momentous subject, we deem necessary for that safety and happiness.

May the all-wise and omnipotent Being, who made us masters of a fair and fruitful empire, inspire us with wisdom and fortitude to perpetuate to posterity that freedom which we received from our fathers!

[* ]The member from the city of Annapolis did not give it as his opinion that he was not at liberty to consider amendments, but said he had consulted his colleague, and that his colleague had informed him the citizens were against amendments.