The Online Library of Liberty

A project of Liberty Fund, Inc.

• Editor’s Note
• Foreword to the Fourth Edition
• Foreword to the Third Edition
• Introduction
• 1: Economics and Praxeology
• 2: The Epistemological Problem of a General Theory of Human Action
• 3: Economic Theory and the Practice of Human Action
• 4: Résumé
• Part 1. Human Action
• Chapter 1: Acting Man
• 1: Purposeful Action and Animal Reaction
• 2: The Prerequisites of Human Action
• On Happiness
• On Instincts and Impulses
• 3: Human Action As an Ultimate Given
• 4: Rationality and Irrationality; Subjectivism and Objectivity of Praxeological Research
• 5: Causality As a Requirement of Action
• 6: The Alter Ego
• On the Serviceableness of Instincts
• The Absolute End
• Vegetative Man
• Chapter 2: The Epistemological Problems of the Sciences of Human Action
• 1: Praxeology and History
• 2: The Formal and Aprioristic Character of Praxeology
• The Alleged Logical Heterogeneity of Primitive Man
• 3: The a Priori and Reality
• 4: The Principle of Methodological Individualism
• I and We
• 5: The Principle of Methodological Singularism
• 6: The Individual and Changing Features of Human Action
• 7: The Scope and the Specific Method of History
• 8: Conception and Understanding
• Natural History and Human History
• 9: On Ideal Types
• 10: The Procedure of Economics
• 11: The Limitations On Praxeological Concepts
• Chapter 3: Economics and the Revolt Against Reason
• 1: The Revolt Against Reason
• 2: The Logical Aspect of Polylogism
• 3: The Praxeological Aspect of Polylogism
• 4: Racial Polylogism
• 5: Polylogism and Understanding
• 6: The Case For Reason
• Chapter 4: A First Analysis of the Category of Action
• 1: Ends and Means
• 2: The Scale of Value
• 3: The Scale of Needs
• 4: Action As an Exchange
• Chapter 5: Time
• 1: Time As a Praxeological Factor
• 2: Past, Present, and Future
• 3: The Economization of Time
• 4: The Temporal Relation Between Actions
• Chapter 6: Uncertainty
• 1: Uncertainty and Acting
• 2: The Meaning of Probability
• 3: Class Probability
• 4: Case Probability
• 5: Numerical Evaluation of Case Probability
• 6: Betting, Gambling, and Playing Games
• 7: Praxeological Prediction
• Chapter 7: Action Within the World
• 1: The Law of Marginal Utility
• 2: The Law of Returns
• 3: Human Labor As a Means
• Immediately Gratifying Labor and Mediately Gratifying Labor
• The Creative Genius
• 4: Production
• Part 2: Action Within the Framework of Society
• Chapter 8: Human Society
• 1: Human Cooperation
• 2: A Critique of the Holistic and Metaphysical View of Society
• Praxeology and Liberalism
• Liberalism and Religion
• 3: The Division of Labor
• 4: The Ricardian Law of Association
• Current Errors Concerning the Law of Association
• 5: The Effects of the Division of Labor
• 6: The Individual Within Society
• The Fable of the Mystic Communion
• 7: The Great Society
• 8: The Instinct of Aggression and Destruction
• Current Misinterpretations of Modern Natural Science, Especially of Darwinism
• Chapter 9: The Role of Ideas
• 1: Human Reason
• 2: World View and Ideology
• The Fight Against Error
• 3: Might
• Traditionalism As an Ideology
• 4: Meliorism and the Idea of Progress
• Chapter 10: Exchange Within Society
• 1: Autistic Exchange and Interpersonal Exchange
• 2: Contractual Bonds and Hegemonic Bonds
• 3: Calculative Action
• Part 3: Economic Calculation
• Chapter 11: Valuation Without Calculation
• 1: The Gradation of the Means
• 2: The Barter-fiction of the Elementary Theory of Value and Prices
• The Theory of Value and Socialism
• 3: The Problem of Economic Calculation
• 4: Economic Calculation and the Market
• Chapter 12: The Sphere of Economic Calculation
• 1: The Character of Monetary Entries
• 2: The Limits of Economic Calculation
• 3: The Changeability of Prices
• 4: Stabilization
• 5: The Root of the Stabilization Idea
• Chapter 13: Monetary Calculation As a Tool of Action
• 1: Monetary Calculation As a Method of Thinking
• 2: Economic Calculation and the Science of Human Action

1

The Gradation of the Means

Acting man transfers the valuation of ends he aims at to the means. Other things being equal, he assigns to the total amount of the various means the same value he attaches to the end which they are fit to bring about. For the moment we may disregard the time needed for production of the end and its influence upon the relation between the value of the ends and that of the means.

The gradation of the means is, like that of the ends, a process of preferring a to b. It is preferring and setting aside. It is manifestation of a judgment that a is more intensely desired than is b. It opens a field for application of ordinal numbers, but it is not open to application of cardinal numbers and arithmetical operations based on them. If somebody gives me the choice among three tickets entitling one to attend the operas Aïda, Falstaff, and Traviata and I take, if I can only take one of them, Aïda, and if I can take one more, Falstaff also, I have made a choice. That means: under given conditions I prefer Aïda and Falstaff to Traviata; if I could only choose one of them, I would prefer Aïda and renounce Falstaff. If I call the admission to Aïda a, that to Falstaff b and that to Traviata c, I can say: I prefer a to b and b to c.

The immediate goal of acting is frequently the acquisition of countable and measurable supplies of tangible things. Then acting man has to choose between countable quantities; he prefers, for example, 15 r to 7 p; but if he had to choose between 15 r and 8 p, he might prefer 8 p. We can express this state of affairs by declaring that he values 15 r less than 8 p, but higher than 7 p. This is tantamount to the statement that he prefers a to b and b to c. The substitution of 8 p for a, of 15 r for b and of 7 p for c changes neither the meaning of the statement nor the fact that it describes. It certainly does not render reckoning with cardinal numbers possible. It does not open a field for economic calculation and the mental operations based upon such calculation.