The Online Library of Liberty

A project of Liberty Fund, Inc.

• Government.
• I.: The End of Government; Viz. the Good Or Benefit For the Sake of Which It Exists.
• II.: The Means of Attaining the End of Government; Viz. Power, and Securities Against the Abuse of That Power.
• III.: That the Requisite Securities Against the Abuse of Power, Are Not Found In Any of the Simple Forms of Government.
• IV.: An Objection Stated — and Answered.
• V.: That the Requisite Securities Are Not Found In a Union of the Three Simple Forms of Government;—doctrine of the Constitutional Balance.
• VI.: In the Representative System Alone the Securities For Good Government Are to Be Found.
• VII.: What Is Required In a Representative Body to Make It a Security For Good Government?
• VIII.: What Is Required In the Elective Body to Secure the Requisite Properties In the Representative Body.
• IX.: 1. Objection: That a Perfect Representative System, If Established, Would Destroy the Monarchy, and the House of Lords.
• X.: II. Objection: That the People Are Not Capable of Acting Agreeably to Their Interests.

VI.

In the Representative System alone the Securities for good Government are to be found.

What then is to be done? For, according to this reasoning, we may be told that good Government appears to be impossible. The people, as a body, cannot perform the business of Government for themselves. If the powers of Government are entrusted to one man, or a few men, and a Monarchy, or governing Aristocracy, is formed, the results are fatal: And it appears that a combination of the simple forms is impossible.

Notwithstanding the truth of these propositions, it is not yet proved that good Government is unattainable. For though the people, who cannot exercise the powers of Government themselves, must entrust them to some one individual or set of individuals, and such individuals will infallibly have the strongest motives to make a bad use of them, it is possible that checks may be found sufficient to prevent them. The next subject of inquiry, then, is the doctrine of checks. It is sufficiently conformable to the established and fashionable opinions to say, that, upon the right constitution of checks, all goodness of Government depends. To this proposition we fully subscribe. Nothing, therefore, can exceed the importance of correct conclusions upon this subject. After the developments already made, it is hoped that the inquiry will be neither intricate nor unsatisfactory.

In the grand discovery of modern times, the system of representation, the solution of all the difficulties, both speculative and practical, will perhaps be found. If it cannot, we seem to be forced upon the extraordinary conclusion, that good Government is impossible. For as there is no individual, or combination of individuals, except the community itself, who would not have an interest in bad Government, if entrusted with its powers; and as the community itself is incapable of exercising those powers, and must entrust them to some individual or combination of individuals, the conclusion is obvious: The Community itself must check those individuals, else they will follow their interest, and produce bad Government.

But how is it the Community can check? The community can act only when assembled: And then it is incapable of acting.

The community, however, can chuse Representatives: And the question is, whether the Representatives of the Community can operate as a check?