The Online Library of Liberty

A project of Liberty Fund, Inc.

• Preface.
• The Life of Richard Cobden
• Chapter I.: Early Life.
• Chapter II.: Commercial and Mental Progress.
• Chapter III.: Travels In West and East.
• Chapter IV.: The Two Pamphlets.
• Chapter V.: Life In Manchester, 1837–9.
• Chapter VI.: The Foundation of the League.
• Chapter VII.: The Corn Laws.
• Chapter VIII.: Cobden Enters Parliament—first Session.
• Chapter IX.: Cobden As an Agitator.
• Chapter X.: The New Corn Law.
• Chapter XI.: Sir Robert Peel’s New Policy.
• Chapter XII.: Renewed Activity of the League—cobden and Sir Robert Peel—rural Campaign.
• Chapter XIII.: The Session of 1844—factory Legislation—the Constituencies.
• Chapter XIV.: Bastiat—new Tactics—activity In Parliament—maynooth Grant—private Affairs.
• Chapter XV.: The Autumn of 1845.
• Chapter XVI.: Repeal of the Corn Laws and Fall of the Government.
• Chapter XVII.: Correspondence With Sir Robert Peel—cessation of the Work of the League.
• Chapter XVIII.: Tour Over Europe.
• Chapter XIX.: Election For the West Riding.—purchase of Dunford.—correspondence.
• Chapter XX.: Miscellaneous Correspondence On Social and Political Movements.
• Chapter XXI.: The Don Pacifico Debate—the Papal Aggression—correspondence With Mr. Bright On Reform—kossuth.
• Chapter XXII.: The Protectionists In Office.
• Chapter XXIII.: The Panic of 1853.
• Chapter XXIV.: The Crimean War.
• Chapter XXV.: Death of His Son.
• Chapter XXVI.: Chinese Affairs—cobden’s Motion—the Dissolution.
• Chapter XXVII.: The Indian Mutiny—private Affairs—second Journey to America.
• Chapter XXVIII.: Return From America.—the New Ministry.
• Chapter XXIX.: The French Treaty.
• Chapter XXX.: Holiday and Return to Paris.
• Chapter XXXI.: The Tariff—the Fortification Scheme.
• Chapter XXXII.: The Policy of the Commercial Treaty.
• Chapter XXXIII.: Miscellaneous Correspondence, 1859–60—paris—return to England.
• Chapter XXXIV.: The American War—fortification Schemes—international Law.
• Chapter XXXV.: Correspondence With Mr. Delane.
• Chapter XXXVI.: The Danish War—last Speeches In Parliament—correspondence.
• Chapter XXXVII.: Speech At Rochdale—the Land Question—correspondence—last Days and Death.
• Chapter XXXVIII.: Conclusion.
• Appendix
• Note A. (see P. 115).
• Cobden to W. C. Hunt On the Hours of Labour.
• Full Text of the Last Letter Written By Mr Cobden
• Bibliography of Richard Cobden, Based On the British Museum Catalogue
• Biography, Criticism Etc

CHAPTER XXIX.

the french treaty.

In the summer of 1859 M. Michel Chevalier paid a visit to1859.
Æt. 55. England, which led to one of the most important chapters in the life of Cobden, as well as to a very important episode in the relations between England and France. To M. Chevalier, Free Trade was an article of religious conviction. In his early manhood he had been one of that truly remarkable band of men who between 1830 and 1840 devoted themselves to the principles of Saint Simon, to propagating them in every country from the Seine to the Nile, and to carrying them out in their own lives and persons with the fervid enthusiasm of the first followers of Saint Francis. It was they who first succeeded in setting industrial questions before political ones in French opinion; and though their organization split upon the rock of certain theocratic fantasies, the wide social views connected with it remained deeply stamped on their minds. They made a definite impression in France, and prepared the way for the events of 1848. So early as 1832 M. Chevalier had shown the bias of his views by a paper on the Mediterranean system, proposing the construction of railways throughout Europe on a scale which then seemed chimerical enough. In this he dwelt upon the facilities that would be offered for travelling from one country to another, and how these facilities “would speedily break down the barriers of 1859.
Æt. 55.ancient prejudice, remove hereditary animosities, and firmly cement nation to nation in a lasting peace.”1 The Suez Canal was another favourite idea with these far-seeing men; for one of the most striking things about them was that they united to their mystic enthusiasm, as their lives afterwards proved, practical faculties of the highest and most valuable kind. Free exchange exactly fitted in with their notions of promoting international union by increasing the pacific intercourse of nations.

In the session of 1859 Mr. Bright in a speech in the House of Commons incidentally asked why, instead of lavishing the national substance in armaments, they did not go to the French Emperor and attempt to persuade him to allow his people to trade freely with ours.2 M. Chevalier, after reading this speech, was inspired by the idea of a Commercial Treaty between England and France, and he wrote to Cobden in this sense. Coming to England shortly afterwards, he found that Cobden had arranged, for family reasons, to pass a portion of the winter in Paris. He immediately saw an opening, and urged Cobden to seize the opportunity for converting the Emperor, as fifteen years earlier he had so powerfully aided in converting the English public, to the policy of Free Trade, and to as near an execution of that policy as the circumstances of a country still in the stage of prohibition could permit.

These ideas made so strong an impression on Cobden that he grew eager to discuss them with the only statesman in the high official world with whom he felt conscious of deep moral and political sympathy. What made the idea of a Treaty possible, moreover, was that in the following1859.
Æt. 55. year terminable annuities to the amount of upwards of two millions would fall in, and the Chancellor of the Exchequer would have that amount of taxation to deal with. If the Minister could be induced to entertain the idea of a Treaty, he would by means of such a surplus be able to make that reduction in the duties on French articles which the French would regard, and insist upon, as a price for a transformation of their own prohibitive system. In the early part of September, Cobden paid a visit to Hawarden, and there he opened his mind to Mr. Gladstone. They were both of them thoroughly alive to the objections to which on strictly economic grounds treaties of commerce must always be open. They both felt it to be perfectly true, if economic rules were never under any circumstances to be contravened, that, as Mr. Bright had already said, it was our business to look to our own tariffs, and to release French products from the duties that prevented our trading with France; and this without any stipulation as to what France should do in return. But then they felt that the occasion was one which could not be judged in this simple way. An economic principle by itself, as all sensible men have now learnt, can never be decisive of anything in the mixed and complex sphere of practice. Neither Cobden nor Mr. Gladstone could resist the force of M. Chevalier’s emphatic assurance, that in no other way could the French tariff be altered in the direction of Free Trade than through a diplomatic act, that is to say, a commercial treaty with England. The Emperor, moreover, in spite of his absolutist system, was practically powerless to reduce his duties, unless the English Government gave him the help of a corresponding movement on their side.

Mr. Gladstone discerned both the opportunity which such a movement would afford for continuing the great work of 1859.
Æt. 55.tariff reform, and the strong influence that a commercial treaty would have upon the violent and dangerous perturbations in the political sentiment of the two nations towards one another. His powerful imagination was kindled, and he had the first dawn of that fine vision which he revealed to the public in the famous budget speech of the following February. He was, in fact, continuing the work which Sir Robert Peel had begun in 1842, along the very lines which Peel had then expressly laid down. In the case of wine and brandy, Sir Robert Peel had said that he did not reduce the duty, because he hoped that they might employ these duties “as instruments of negotiation, with a view of effecting a reduction in the duties imposed by other countries on the produce of our own country.” “I am not disposed,” Peel said, “to carry too far that principle of withholding from ourselves the benefits of reduction of duties in order to force other nations to act in a reciprocal manner, and in many cases we weakened the effect of instruments we held in our own hands by reducing the duty of articles relative to which negotiations might have been entered into. Our general rule was that in cases where the articles were elements of manufacture, or where there was risk from smuggling, we took to ourselves the advantage likely to arise from a reduction of duty on these articles; but in others, wine for example, we made no reduction of duty, and intend to make no reduction of duty, in the hope that we shall induce other countries to give to us an equivalent advantage.”3 The discussion therefore between Mr. Gladstone and Cobden at Hawarden in 1859 turned upon the means of realizing the hope then expressed by Sir Robert Peel in 1843, and expressed by him not casually, but as an element in a deliberate policy.

Cobden’s first suggestion had been that as he was about to spend a part of the winter in Paris, he might1859.
Æt. 55. perhaps be of use to Mr. Gladstone in the way of inquiry. Conversation expanded this modest proposal into something more definite and more energetic. It was thought that, if he had the tacit and informal authority of the British Government, he might put himself into communication with the Emperor and his Ministers, might bring to bear upon them his well-tried powers of persuasion and conversion, and might work out with them the scheme of a treaty which would give an occasion for a great fiscal reform in both countries, and in both countries would produce a solid and sterling pacification of feelings.

This was the plan with which Cobden quitted Hawarden. He was not confident of success, for he knew that he would have to deal with governments, and he had little faith in either the courage or the disinterestedness of governments. When he started on the expedition, he had written in no sanguine vein to Mr. Bright:—“Governments seem as a rule to be standing conspiracies to rob and bamboozle people, and why should that of Louis Napoleon be an exception? The more I see of the rulers of the world,” he added, in amplification of a famous saying, “the less of wisdom or greatness do I find necessary for the government of mankind.”

When he reached London he found that the Ministers had been summoned for a Cabinet Council. He called upon Lord Palmerston and Lord John Russell, and discussed M. Chevalier’s notions with them. “It is not easy,” he wrote to Mr. Bright, “to interest men whose foreign policy has been running in such different grooves, in questions of political economy and tariffs. But I spoke frankly to both of them as to the state of our relations with France, and disparaged the value of an alliance in China, or any other pretended entente cordiale, whilst we were keeping up 1859.
Æt. 55.twenty-six millions of armaments, principally as a defence against France.”

“From what I hear,” he continued, “the Cabinet is concerned with the mighty question whether France is to take a bit of territory from Morocco. We are, I suppose, to protest from Gibraltar against anything so shocking to us as picking and stealing our neighbour’s territory going on within view of that reputable possession of ours. We have taken a whole empire from a Mahometan sovereign in Asia, and we are horrified at France taking a province in the same latitude from a Mahometan sovereign in Africa. For my part, if France took the whole of Africa, I do not see what harm she would do us or anybody else save herself.”4

It will one day seem incredible that two keen and patriotic statesmen of the eminence which Lord Palmerston and Lord John Russell held in the public esteem, should at this stage of our history have so misconceived the relative importance of things, as to think the very remotest doings of any foreign government a matter of real and primary importance, and an extension of our trade, however vast it might promise to be, a matter so purely secondary as hardly to be worth an hour’s serious attention. At a Lord Mayor’s dinner, or at a meeting at Manchester, each of them often uttered the stereotyped sentences about commercial prosperity being the basis of British greatness. But neither of them had what religious writers call a living sense of the extent to which such words were true. They were really thinking all the time of strong despatches and spirited representa tions. The commercial and industrial movements of our1859.
Æt. 55. own country, and the relations of government to them, were treated as objects for men of the third or fourth order in the political system. What is curious is, that while devoting such passionate attention to foreign affairs, no men ever seem to take so little pains as ministers of this stamp to keep themselves abundantly and accurately informed of what really goes on in foreign countries, what forces are at work under the trite words of diplomatic agents, what amount of substance throws those shadows about which they write and speak so many busy sentences.

Although, however, he received no cheerful encouragement from either the Prime Minister or the Foreign Secretary, Cobden was not forbidden to proceed on the mission that he had volunteered. On October 18, he arrived in Paris, and on the 23rd he went to see Lord Cowley at Chantilly. They had a long conversation, in the course of which the English Ambassador gave the Emperor a high character for straightforwardness, and a strict adherence to his word in all his engagements with Lord Cowley himself. Two days later Cobden, M. Chevalier, and M. Rouher dined together. The Minister had been very uneasy lest the fact of his interview with Cobden should get abroad, and I have heard that the dinner was planned with as much secrecy and discretion as if they had been three housebreakers under the surveillance of the police.

M. Rouher, who was then Minister of Commerce, professed strong Free-trade views, and was thoroughly won round by cobden’s exposition of the well-known list of Protectionist subterfuges. He made no secret that it was the Emperor only who on every question gave the initiative to his Minister. If he could be induced to reform his customs duties, M. Rouher would be a very willing instrument in promoting his plans. The next step, and the 1859.
Æt. 55.greatest, was to convince the Emperor. The Minister undertook to procure an invitation, and two days later (October 27) Cobden went to St. Cloud to have his first audience. It was not the first time that they had seen one another. Cobden had met Louis Napoleon at breakfast at Mr. Monckton Milnes’s three days after the escape from Ham in 1846. He had then set the Prince down for a very mediocre person indeed. He did his best to remember that he was now talking to quite a different personage, but was not sure that he always succeeded. Cobden kept a full journal of the events of the negotiation, and the following is his account of the first interview with the convert who was of paramount importance:—

“After a few remarks upon the subject of the improvements in Paris, and in the Bois de Boulogne, and after he had expressed his regret at my not having entered the Ministry of Lord Palmerston, the Emperor alluded to the state of feeling in England, and expressed his regret that notwithstanding he had for ten years given every possible proof of his desire to preserve the friendship of the British people, the press had at last defeated his purpose, and now the relations of the two countries seemed to be worse than ever. He appealed to me if he had ever done one act to justify the manner in which he was assailed by our press? I candidly told him that I thought the Governments of both countries were to blame. He asked what he could do more than he had already done to promote the friendly relations of the two countries.5 This led to the question of Free Trade, and I urged many arguments in favour of1859.
Æt. 55. removing those obstacles which prevented the two countries from being brought into closer dependence on one another. He expressed himself as friendly to this policy, but alluded to the great difficulties in his way; said he had made an effort by admitting iron in bond for ship-building, which he was obliged to alter again, and spoke of the sliding scale on corn which had been re-imposed after it had expired. I spoke of the opportuneness of the present moment for making a simultaneous change in the English and French tariffs, as there was a prospect of a surplus of revenue next year, owing to the expiry of our terminable annuities, and that Mr. Gladstone was very desirous to make this surplus available for reducing duties on French commodities. Louis Napoleon said he had a majority of his Chambers quite opposed to Free Trade, and that they would not pass a 1859.
Æt. 55.decided measure; that by the constitution he could alter the tariff by a decree, if it were part of a treaty with a foreign power; and he asked me whether England would enter into a commercial treaty with him. I explained that we could give no exclusive privileges to any nation; that we could simultaneously make reductions in our tariffs; and the alterations might be inserted in a treaty, but that our tariff must be equally applicable to all countries. He said he was under a pledge not to abolish the prohibitive system in France and substitute moderate duties, previous to 1861. I told him that I saw no obstacle in this to a treaty being entered into next spring, for that the moral effect would be the same even if the full operation of the new duties did not come into play for two or three years. He asked me to let him know what reductions could be made in our tariff upon articles affecting his country, which I promised to do. He then inquired what I should advise him to do in regard to the French tariff. I said I should attack one article of great and universal necessity, as I had done in England, when I confined all my efforts to the abolition of the corn-laws, knowing that when that clef-de-voῦte; was removed, the whole system would fall. In France, the great primary want was cheap iron, which is the daily bread of all industries, and I should begin by abolishing the duty on iron and coal, and then I should be in a better position for approaching all the other industries; that I would, if necessary, pay an indemnity in some shape to the iron-masters, and thus be enabled to abolish their protection immediately—a course which I should not contemplate following with any other commodity but iron and coal. He spoke of the danger of throwing men out of work, and I tried by a variety of arguments to convince him, especially by a reference to the example of England, that the effect of a reduction of duties is to increase, not diminish, the demand for labour. I showed that in England we had much machinery standing1859.
Æt. 55. idle in consequence of the want of workmen at the present time; and in order to allay his fears of an inundation of British products, to throw this own people out of work, I explained that there was not an ounce of our productions which was not already bespoken, and that it would take a long time to increase largely our investment of capital, whilst it was impossible to procure any considerable addition to our labourers. On my giving him a description of the reforms effected by Sir Robert Peel, and the great reverence in which his name is held, he said, ‘I am charmed and flattered at the idea of performing a similar work in my country; but,’ he added, ‘it is very difficult in France to make reforms; we make revolutions in France, not reforms.’

“The Emperor is short in stature and very undignified; I never saw a person with fewer heroic traits in his appearance and manner. But there is nothing harsh or even cold in the expression of his countenance. His eye is not pleasant at first, but it warms and moistens with conversation, and gives you the impression that he is capable of generous emotions.

“The approach to the Palace of Saint Cloud was thronged with military, both horse and foot. I entered the building, and passed through an avenue of liveried lacqueys in the hall, from which I ascended the grand staircase, guarded at the top by sentries, and I passed through a series of apartments hung with gorgeous tapestry, each room being in charge of servants higher in rank as they come nearer to the person of the Sovereign. As I surveyed this gorgeous spectacle, I found my thoughts busy with the recollection of a very different scene which I had looked upon a few months before at Washington, when I was the guest of the President of the United States, a plain man in a black suit, 1859.
Æt. 55.living in comparative simplicity, without a sentry at his door or a livery servant in his house.”

In writing of this important interview to Mr. Bright, Cobden says (Nov. 17, 1859):—

“I had a full hour’s private talk at St. Cloud with Louis Napoleon. He knew I had taken the unpopular line in opposing the invasion cry. He is not unmindful of such acts of fairness, and I felt myself not only tolerated but encouraged to talk, with just as much frankness as I could to you or any other equal. In reply to his strong complaints against the English press, I told him that the course he had taken in beginning the Italian war suddenly, and without publishing a manifesto of his grievances to the world, had alarmed the public mind of Europe; that not only England but Germany was arming to the teeth; and that this was all in reference to himself, and from the fear that he contemplated repeating the career of his uncle. I told him that there was but one way of removing this impression, and that was by a bold measure of commercial reform; that there was only a choice between the policy of Napoleon I. and the policy of Sir Robert Peel. On this point, I used every argument, to make it appear that it was his interest to begin the work at once; quoted the complete success of our experiment; and pointed to the fame of Sir Robert Peel, and the veneration in which his memory was held, as stimulants for his honourable ambition. I found his sympathies strongly with us, but he is ignorant of practical details, and he has consequently a great dread of the protectionists. You may be sure I spared no pains to take the latter gentry down in his estimation. I never had a better private pupil. He is a good listener, and put some very pertinent questions. The most remarkable fact respecting this man is, that, whilst the press and the popular sentiment attribute to him the most tortuous and deceptive policy, allwho have business with him, without exception, give him the cha1859.
Æt. 55.racter of straightforwardness and fairness. This is the testimony of Malmesbury, Lord John, and Lord Palmerston, and of Lord Cowley to a very high degree indeed. Then, turning to Kossuth, who had the cup dashed suddenly from his lips, by the almost unaccountable turn in the affairs of the war at Villafranca, he distinctly told me that Louis Napoleon did not in the slightest degree deceive or betray him. I travelled from Paris to London last week with Klapka, who was at the headquarters of the war, and he repeated the sentiments expressed by Kossuth. Klapka thinks Louis Napoleon has genuine popular sympathies, and wound up his remarks on him with the words, ‘Il n’est pas méchant.’”

The Emperor afterwards expressed himself to M. Fould as highly satisfied with the interview. Cobden, he said, had given him a little courage. In describing this interview to Lord Palmerston, Cobden expressed a strong opinion that the Emperor was more afraid than he need have been, of the protected interests. “I have no doubt that as you say,” Lord Palmerston wrote in reply, “the Emperor and his advisers greatly exaggerate the resisting power of the protectionist classes. But the want of moral courage in Frenchmen which you advert to, is confessed even by Frenchmen themselves, and it is probably one cause of the frequency of political convulsions in France.” Napoleon was open to the impressions of political fervour. Cobden produced upon his mind the same reinspiriting effect which had followed in relation to his Italian policy from the memorable interview with Cavour in the previous spring.

M. Fould was the person next to be converted, and Cobden succeeded in persuading him that instead of the timid course of replacing a policy of prohibition by a policy of extensive protection, the Government would do better boldly to embrace a large reform. The protectionists, he 1859.
Æt. 55.very truly said, would offer as much opposition to a timid as to a bold scheme, while for a small reform there would be no vigorous popular sympathy or support. They went over again the whole question of Free Trade, M. Fould using many of the old fallacies about being inundated by British goods, labourers being thrown out of work, and so forth. “I had,” says Cobden, “to give him the first lessons in political economy.”

A day or two afterwards he received from the Emperor an invitation for himself and his wife to spend four days at Compiègne. He declined it on the plea of Mrs. Cobden’s health. M. Chevalier was very anxious that he should go, and Cobden wrote to Mr. Bright that he was sorely tempted to accept the invitation, because it would have given him a good opportunity of talking to the Emperor unreservedly, and without the risk of his audiences being reported. It was the Emperor’s custom to walk about with his guests, and chat with them over his interminable cigarettes. “If I had been sure,” Cobden says, “of converting my pupil into a practical Free-trader, I would have gone. But if I failed, the fact of my having taken part in those gay festivities would have furnished a ready taunt of my having been bought and seduced, if I had over said a word against a French invasion afterwards. So it is better as it is.”6

Ten days were passed in discussions with M Fould, and conversations with M. Chevalier. There were many vacillations, and each day brought its new rumour, for hope or discouragement. Cobden’s record of some of his interviews with the Minister is worth reproducing, because they show the mind of the French Government in listening to his arguments, and they show also how entirely the French Ministers depended on him for inspiration and guidance in their new policy.

Nov. 2.—“M. Fould called; he seemed preoccupied with1859.
Æt. 55. the uneasy and hostile state of feeling in England against France. He regretted that there was no way in which a statesman in France could make a public statement in reply to the speeches delivered at the late Conservative banquet at Liverpool; said something must be done to allay the uneasiness in the financial and commercial world; and at all events, was glad that the French and English Governments had come to an understanding respecting the joint expedition against China.7 The officers sent to England to arrange this combination of forces had, he said, completed their plans satisfactorily in conjunction with the British authorities. This warlike alliance has been strenuously sought for lately by the French Government under the impression, as I believe, that it would tend to promote a more amicable state of feeling between the two countries. I told him I had great doubts whether this expectation would be realized; that the war against China would not be popular in England; and the motives of each party in going into the alliance would be certain to be misinterpreted by the other. ‘Yes,’ he replied, ‘I suppose it will be said to be a snare on our part.’ He then repeated the words, ’something must be done,’ and he recurred at last, apparently with no great relish, to the subject of a Commercial Treaty with England.

“He saw great difficulties in the way. How, when, and where could a negotiation be carried on, and with whom? He was afraid that if a meeting between himself, the Minister of Commerce, M. Rouher, and myself, were to take place, it could not be kept a secret; that at present they 1859.
Æt. 55.had concealed even from M. Walewski, the Foreign Minister, the fact of any conversation having taken place between the Emperor, and themselves, and me. I spoke of Prince Napoleon, whom M. Fould described as quite a sincere opponent of Protection, but he added that he was very apt to talk too freely, and that we must be careful how we took him into our counsels. I told him that, as regarded the negotiations, I was prepared to go into the preliminary discussion of the changes which should be made in the tariffs of the two countries; that I could in a short interview or two with him and M. Rouher, give them a general idea as to what I thought ought to be done by both parties, and that if necessary I thought I could obtain Lord Palmerston’s authority for acting in the matter. He had no objection to make to this. He said he was to dine with the Emperor to-morrow; and all I could gather was that he seemed to be in a very timid and undecided state of mind.

“Before parting, I alluded to the state of uneasiness, not only in England but on the Continent, and reminded him of the great increase of warlike preparation which had been going on; and I expressed an opinion that a Bonaparte being on the throne of France, who had last spring invaded Italy and fought great battles, was the cause of the present feeling of mistrust, and that to this fact alone was to be attributed an augmentation of the expenditure for defensive armaments in Europe at this moment to the amount of twenty millions sterling per annum. He said that nothing was farther from the Emperor’s thoughts than to pursue a warlike policy. I remarked, as he was leaving the room, that, so far as I was acquainted with the state of public opinion in England, nothing would so instantaneously convince the people there of the Emperor’s pacific intentions, as his entering boldly upon a policy of commercial reform, by which he would enable those, who, like myself, took the unpopular side in opposing the current of prejudice and hatred which was1859.
Æt. 55. running against him in England, to turn the tables on his accusers and detractors. Afterwards I called on Lord Cowley, and explained what had passed. He was going to dine to-day with M. Fould. The droll part of these interviews, besides the timidity of the people, is that here is a government having so little faith or confidence in one another, that some of its members tie me down, a perfect stranger, to secrecy as against their most elevated colleagues!”

The next day Cobden started for London, where he remained for a week, partly engaged in some private business connected with the Illinois Railway. He saw Mr. Gladstone, who entered as heartily as before into the matter. “Glad-stone,” he said in a letter to his trusted friend at Rochdale, “is really almost the only Cabinet Minister of five years’ standing who is not afraid to let his heart guide his head a little at times.” He tried to see the Foreign Secretary, but failed. “I doubt,” he says, “whether Lord John is not just now attaching more value to the spirited turn of a phrase about Morocco, than to my efforts to lay down a commercial cable that shall bind these two great countries together.” He called on Lord Palmerston, and had a conversation on the state of public feeling in France and England. Lord Palmerston admitted that the Government of this country had no complaint against the Emperor, and no reason to be dissatisfied with his conduct, and that there was no unsettled question or ground of quarrel between the two countries. But one man had told him of a French order for ten thousand tons of iron plating for ships of war, and another man had told him of a large order for rifled cannons, and a third had talked of some flat-bottomed boats at Nantes. All these tendencies to increase his means of aggression in case of a desire to attack England, made it necessary, said Lord Palmerston, to increase our means of defence. Would it not 1859.
Æt. 55.be wiser—this is Cobden’s reflection on Lord Palmerston’s plea,—“to act as private individuals would do in such a case, namely, ask an explanation of the meaning of such apparently unfriendly proceedings, and offer frankly to explain any acts in return, which might have a hostile complexion. But governments are opposed to a simplification of their proceedings, or to bringing them under those rules of common sense which control the acts of every-day individual life.”

On his way back to France, M. de Persigny, the French ambassador, came over from Hastings to Newhaven to discuss with him the prospects of commercial reform in France. Cobden thought highly of Persigny, spoke of him as “an honest and warm-hearted” creature, and recognized, as some of the bitterest enemies of the group who helped Louis Napoleon of the throne have always recognized, that Persigny’s devotion to the Emperor would have stood the test of adverse fortune. However this may be, there can be no doubt of the French ambassador’s zeal and sincerity on behalf of the new cause.

On the 17th of November, Cobden returned to Paris, so ill that he at once took to his bed, and was confined to his room for some days. Illness, however, did not quench his zeal, and he carried on the endless argument with the Ministers in his bedroom. It is not necessary to recount the course of negotiations from day to day, nor the busy and laborious discussions with M. Fould and M . Rouher. On December 9th, M. Chevalier informed Cobden that M. Rouher had prepared his plan for a commercial treaty, which would be submitted for the Emperor’s approval on the next day. “There is but one man in the Government,” M. Rouher had said, “the Emperor, and but one will, that of the Emperor.” The will of this one man still remained uncertain. Lord Cowley who had been staying at Compiègne three weeks1859.
Æt. 55. before, said the Emperor was strong for a commercial treaty with England, but since then his language had changed. He had once more found out how many difficulties were to be overcome. It had become, as he told Lord Cowley, “une grosse affaire.” The Emperor had been pressing M. Fould as to the precise advantage that France would gain in imitating the policy of England. England, said the Emperor, was so dependent on her foreign trade, that she was constantly in a state of alarm at the prospect of war. France, on the other hand, could find herself involved in war with comparatively little inconvenience. “This remark,” says Cobden, to whom it was reported, “Struck me as disclosing a secret instinct for a policy of war and isolation.”

“Lord Cowley,” he says in another place, “who knows the Emperor so well, smiled at the idea which so generally prevails of his being always actuated by some clever Machiavellian scheme, when he is often only committing indiscretions from too much simplicity, and want to states-manlike forethought. He repeated the opinion which he had expressed before, that ‘it is not in him’ to have any great plan for a political combination, extending into the future, and embracing all Europe.”

Better ideas prevailed at last. M. de Persigny had come over from London, to tell his master how hostile and dangerous was the state of opinion in England. For the first time in his experience, he said, he believed war to be possible, unless the Emperor took some step to remove the profound mistrust that agitated the English public. The security of the throne, he went on to urge, depended on the English alliance being a reality. So long as there was a solid friendship between England and France, they need not care what might be in the mind of Russia, Austria, or 1859.
Æt. 55.Prussia. This was the course of reasoning which, in Cobden’s opinion, finally decided the Emperor. In other words, Napoleon assented to the Treaty, less because it was good for the French than because it would pacify the English. It was the only available instrument for keeping the English alliance.

M. Rouher presented his plan of a commercial treaty, together with sixty pages of illustrative reasoning upon it. The whole was read to the Emperor; he listened attentively through every page, approved it, and declared his intention of carrying it out. He then produced a letter which he had prepared, addressed to M. Fould, and intended for publication, in which he announced his determination to enter upon a course of pacific improvement, to promote the industry of the country by cheapening transport, and so forth.

The project was now disclosed to Count Walewski, the Minister for foreign affairs, and Cobden was invited to have an interview with him. Once more he went over the ground along which he had already led Fould, Rouher, and the Emperor. “I endeavoured,” says Cobden, “to remove his doubts and difficulties, and to fortify his courage against the protectionist party, whose insignificance and powerlessness I demonstrated by comparing their small body with the immense population which was interested in the removal of commercial restrictions.” The discussion with M. Walewski was followed by a second interview with the Emperor.

Dec. 21.—“Had an interview with the Emperor at the Tuileries. I explained to him that Mr. Gladstone, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, was anxious to prepare his Budget for the ensuing session of Parliament, and that it would be a convenience to him to be informed as soon as possible whether the French Government was decided to agree to a commercial treaty, as in that case he would make arrangements accordingly; that he did not wish to be in1859.
Æt. 55. possession of the details, but merely to know whether the principle of a treaty was determined upon. The Emperor said he could have no hesitation in satisfying me on that point; that he had quite made up his mind to enter into the Treaty, and that the only question was as to the details. He spoke of the difficulties he had to overcome, owing to the powerful interests that were united in defence of the present system. ‘The protected industries combine, but the general public do not.’ I urged many arguments to encourage him to take a bold course, pointing out the very small number of the protected classes as compared with the whole community, and contending for the interests of the greatest number, rather than for those of the minority. He repeated to me the arguments which had been used by some of his ministers to dissuade him from a Free-trade policy, particularly by M. Magne, his Finance Minister, who had urged that if he merely changed his system from prohibition to high protective duties, it would be a change only in name, but that if he laid on moderate duties which admitted a large importation of foreign merchandise, then, for every piece of manufactured goods so admitted to consumption in France, a piece of domestic manufacture must be displaced. I pointed out the fallacy of M. Magne’s argument in the assumption that everybody in France was sufficiently clothed, and that no increased consumption could take place. I observed that many millions in France never wore stockings, and yet stockings were prohibited. He remarked that he was sorry to say that ten millions of the population hardly ever tasted bread, but subsisted on potatoes, chestnuts, &c.—(I conclude this must be an exaggeration). I expressed an opinion that the working population of his country were in a very inferior condition as compared with those in England.

1859.
Æt. 55.“Referring to the details in his intended tariff, he said the duties would range from ten to thirty per cent. I pointed out the excessive rate of the latter figure, that the maximum ought not to exceed twenty per cent.; that it would defeat his object in every way if he went as high as thirty per cent.; that it would fail as an economical measure, whilst in a political point of view it would be unsuccessful, inasmuch as the people of England would regard it as prohibition in another form. He referred me to M. Rouher for further discussion of this question. He described to me the letter which he thought of publishing declaratory of his intention of entering on a course of internal improvement and commercial reform, and asked me whether it would not place him at a disadvantage with the British Government if he announced his policy beforehand, and whether they might not be inclined afterwards to withdraw from the Treaty. I replied that there might be other objections to his publishing such a letter, but this was not one, and that I was sure it would not be taken advantage of by our Government. We then talked of our immense preparation in naval armaments. I said I expected that in a few months we should have sixty line-of-battle ships, screws, in commission. He said he had only twenty-seven. Talking of the excited state of alarm in England, he said he was dictating to M. Mocquard a dialogue between a Frenchman and an Englishman, in which he should introduce all the arguments used in England to stimulate the present alarm of French aggression, and his answers to them, and he asked if I thought the Times would print it.

“Whilst we were in the midst of this familiar conversation, during which he smoked several cigarettes, the Empress entered the room, to whom I was introduced. She is a tall and graceful person, very amiable and gracious, but her features were not entirely free from an expression of thoughtfulness, if not melancholy. The1859.
Æt. 55. Emperor is said by everybody to be very fascinating to those who come much in personal contact with him. I found him more attractive at this second audience than the first. His manner is very simple and natural. If there be any affectation, it is in a slight air of humility (‘young ambition’s ladder’), which shows itself with consummate tact in his voice and gestures.”

Cobden gives some further particulars in a letter to Mr. Bright (Dec. 29, 1859):—

“I saw the Emperor again for a full hour last week, as you would learn from your brother. Of course, I tried to employ every minute on my own topic, but he was in a talkative mood, and sometimes ran off an other subject. It was at four o’clock; he had been busy all day, and I was surprised at the gaiety of his manner. He smoked cigarettes all the time, but talked and listened admirably. ... On this occasion my private lesson was chiefly taken up with answering the arguments with which M. Magne, his Minister of Finance, who is a furious protectionist, had been trying of frighten him. Here was one of them, which he repeated word for word to me: ’sire, if you do not make a sensible reduction in your duties, the measure will be charged on you as an attempted delusion. If you do make a serious reduction, then for every piece of foreign manufacture admitted into France, you will displace a piece of domestic fabrication.’ I of course laughed, and held up both hands, and exclaimed what an old friend that argument was; how we had been told the same thing a thousand times of corn; and how we answered it a thousand times by showing that a fourth part of the people were not properly fed. And then I showed how we had imported many millions of quarters of corn annually since the repeal of our corn law, whilst our own agriculture was more prosperous 1859.
Æt. 55.and productive than ever, and yet it was all consumed. I told him that his people were badly clothed, that nearly a fourth of his subjects did not wear stockings, and I begged him to remind M. Magne that if a few thousand dozens of hose were admitted into France, they might be consumed by these barelegged people, without interfering with the demand for the native manufacture. .... We then got upon the condition of the mass of the working people, where his sympathy is mainly centred, and on the effect of machinery, Free Trade, etc., on their fate. He said the protectionists always argued that the working class engaged in manufactures were better off here than in England, and they always assumed that Free Trade would lower the condition of the French operatives. I told him that the operatives in France were working twenty per cent. more time for twenty per cent. less wages, and paid upwards of ten per cent. more for their clothing, as compared with the same class in England. He seized a pen and asked me to repeat these figures, which he put down, observing, ‘What an answer to those people!’ I told him that if M. Magne or anybody else disputed my figures, I was prepared to prove them. But I need not repeat to you a course of argument with which we are so familiar.”

After this interview the negotiation reached the stage of formal diplomacy. Cobden’s position had hitherto been wholly unofficial. He had been a private person, representing to the French Emperor that he believed the English Government would not be indisposed to entertain the question of a commercial treaty. The matter came officially before Lord Cowley in the form of a request from Count Walewski that he would ascertain the views and intentions of his Government. Lord Cowley applied to Lord John Russell for official instructions to act, and in the course of the next month Cobden received his own instructions and powers. Meanwhile not a day was lost, and he brought the1860.
Æt. 56. same tact and unwearied energy to the settlement of the details of the Treaty, which he had employed in persuading this little group of important men to accept its principles and policy. There was one singular personage, who ought from his keen faculties, his grasp of the principles of modern progress, and his position, to have been the most important of all, but in whom his gifts have been nullified by want of that indescribable something which men call character and the spirit of conduct. This was Prince Napoleon. Cobden had several conversations with him, and came to the conclusion the few men in France had a more thorough mastery of economic questions. He thus describes their first interview, which is interesting from the clearness with which it brings out how secondary or indirect an object the commercial treaty was in itself to the French Government, compared with its importance in their eyes as a means of strengthening the alliance between France and England:—

“Jan. 4.—Dined at M. Emile de Girardin’s, and met Prince Napoleon, the son of Jerome, whose face bears a strong resemblance to the first Napoleon. After dinner I conversed apart with him for nearly an hour upon the subject of the proposed Treaty, to which he was strongly favourable. He verified the opinion I had heard of him as being favourable to Free Trade, and he spoke with much fluency and considerable knowledge on economical questions. He gives one the impression of great cleverness in a first interview. In the course of our conversation, in speaking of the relations between France and England, he said that he knew, from frequent conversations with the Emperor, that he desired, du fond de son cœur, to be at peace with England, and that he was led to this feeling by the perusal of the life of his uncle, whose fall was attributable to the hostility of England, whose wealth furnished the sinews of war to the 1860.
Æt. 56.whole of Europe. I went over the whole of the arguments, political and economical, in favour of the Treaty; and he finally proposed to see the Emperor on the subject to-morrow.

“He informed me that M. Walewski had retired from the post of Minister of Foreign Affairs.8 This led to a long conversation upon the foreign policy of France. The Prince said that as there was to be no congress on Italian affairs, the only way in which they could be arranged was by a thorough alliance between France, England, and Sardinia, by whom the Italian territory must be held inviolate against foreign intervention, and that England must be prepared, in case Austria should violate this rule, to send a fleet into the Adriatic to co-operate with France against that Power. I told him that such an alliance with the present state of public opinion in England to hostile to, or so fearful of, the designs of the Emperor, was out of the question; that the only way to alter this state of doubt and suspicion was a declaration of views by the French Government favourable to a greater commercial intercourse between the two countries; that letters or phrases would have no effect; that acts alone, as displayed in a reform of the tariff, would inspire the English people with confidence in the pacific intentions of the Emperor. The Prince professed a perfect agreement, repeating my words that there had been enough and too many phrases and letters. He said that he feared the Employer might not be firm in the affair of the Treaty; that he would be deterred from his purpose by reports which M. Billault, the Minister of the Interior, would give him of the hostile feelings of the protectionists, and their work-people at Rouen, Lille, etc.; that he had twice abandoned his purpose, and thrown over M. Rouher, whom he had previously encouraged to proceed with the reform of the tariff; that the1860.
Æt. 56. Emperor, though he persists in arriving at an object which he has once resolved to attain, yet had a habit of deviating and stumbling by the way.”

There were frequent interruptions, for, as Lord Palmerton once said, Napoleon’s mind was as full of schemes as a warren is full of rabbits. Cobden was alarmed one day, for instance, by a story that the treaty of commerce was to be thrown aside in favour of a treaty of alliance for settling the affairs of Italy. Then the treaty of commerce was not to be thrown aside, but a political treaty was to be tacked on to it. “It is possible,” Cobden wrote to Mr. Gladstone (Jan. 7, 1860), “that the Emperor may think we attach so much importance to the Treaty, that he can make it a bribe to make us agree to something else. Much as I am interested in the success of the good work, I would not allow such a stipulation to be made. The Emperor has more necessity for our alliance than we have for his just now.” When this disquieting project vanished, the Emperor wished to submit the draft of the Treaty to the Legislative Body, notwithstanding the fact that he had himself assured Cobden that the Legislative Body was irreconcilably hostile to every manner of Free Trade.

After this there was one more fierce struggle at the council-table. M. Magne—a cannon-ball protectionist, as Cobden described him—and M. Troplong, insisted that at any rate the Emperor was bound by his word of honour to have an inquiry before he abolished the prohibitive system. The Emperor yielded, and held a formal inquiry, which was limited to two days. Meanwhile, to show that he had no intention of drawing back, he sent to the Moniteur, what was for nine days a memorable document, the Letter to M. Fould. This letter was an announcement, in shadowy general terms, of the coming change; it had previously 1860.
Æt. 56.been submitted by the Emperor to Cobden, and at Cobden’s suggestion some changes and additions had been made in it. Yet, though Cobden thus was not only the inspirer of the Treaty, but actually put words and principles into the Emperor’s mouth, one of the favourite charges against the Treaty, when it came before Parliament in England, was that it was the result of a policy of subservience. With noble indignation one member of the House of Commons asked whether the free Parliament of Britain had assembled only to register the decrees of a foreign despot.

In France the Emperor’s letter excited intense excitement. An eminent member of the English Parliament happened to be at the house of M. Thiers on the evening when the news of the Treaty was brought in, and he has described the sparkling fury of the great man at the Emperor’s new card. The protectionists hastened to Paris and appointed a strong committee to sit en permanence. The feeling was so violent that the greatest industrial personage in France told Cobden that his own nephew had refused to shake hands because he, the uncle, was a free trader. The Orleanists were disgusted that Emperor should have the credit of doing a good thing, and Cobden heard one of the party declare, with much vehemence, at a dinner of the Political Economy Club, that to establish Free Trade in a country where public opinion was not ripe for it, was neither more nor less than gross oppression. Friends and foes, however, amid the hubbub of criticism, agreed in admiring the Emperor’s courage. “You may form some idea of the position.” Cobden wrote to Mr. Gladstone, “if you will imagine yourself in England in 1820, before Mr. Huskisson began his innovations in our tariff, with this serious disadvantage on the side of the French Government, that while the protectionists have all the selfishness and timidity which characterized our ‘interests’ at that time, they arrogate to themselves an amount of social and political importance which our manu1860.
Æt. 56.facturers never pretended to possess.... It would hardly be possible to assemble five hundred persons together by any process of selection, and not find nine-tenths of them at least in favour of the present restrictive system.” Only thirteen years before, as we have seen, Louis Philippe had candidly told Cobden that the ironmasters and other protected interests commanded such an overwhelming majority in the Chamber, that it was utterly impossible to take a single step in the direction of Free Trade. Cobden had been warned from the first that the iron interest had powerful friends even within the walls of the imperial palace, and he felt this occult antagonism throughout the negotiation.

The resistance to the Treaty grew stronger every hour. A hundred and twenty cotton-spinners assembled in the courtyard of the Minister of the Interior, tumultuously crying for an immediate interview. M. Thiers was said to be calling for an audience with the Emperor. The press teemed with articles and pamphlets, whose logic and temper betrayed the high pressure under which they had been composed. In Manchester, meanwhile, the Emperor’s letter had created an exultant excitement which had never been equalled since the day when Sir Robert Peel announced that he was about to repeal the Corn Laws. The letter had appeared on a Sunday (January 15th), and at the great market which used to draw men from every part of that thriving district on Tuesdays, the French Emperor was everywhere hailed as the best man in Europe. This intense satisfaction was due less to a desire for extended trade, than to the confidence that the Emperor intended peace, and had taken the most effectual means to make it permanent. The English newspapers, which every morning for months past had been accusing the Emperor of every sinister quality in statesmanship, now turned round so handsomely that M. Baroche told 1860.
Æt. 56.Cobden he wished they could be forced to moderate their compliments, as such flattery made the Treaty more unpopular in France.

A week after the publication of the letter, the Treaty was ready for execution, and the happy day arrived. The following is Cobden’s entry in his journal:—

“Jan. 23.—Went to the Embassy at eight this morning, to revise for the last time the list of articles in the Treaty. At two o’clock the plenipotentiaries met at the Foreign Office, where the Treaty was read over by a clerk in French and English, after which it was duly signed and sealed.9 It is wanting four days only of three months since I had my first interview with the Emperor at St. Cloud. The interval has been a period of almost incessant nervous irritation and excitement, owing to the delays and uncertainties which have constantly arisen. I can now understand not only the wisdom, but the benevolence, of Talleyrand, when he counselled a young diplomatist not to be in earnest. However, the work is at last at an end, and I hope it will pave the way for a change in the relations between these two great neighbours by placing England and France in mutual commercial dependence on each other.”

Cobden’s health had been so bad since his return to Paris in the middle of November, that the end of his business came none too soon. His throat and chest gave him incessant trouble, and the doctor urged a speedy flight to the lands of the sun. Lord Palmerston had written to him that “the climate of Paris is perhaps better than that of London, but then the French physicians are less in the habit of curing their patients than ours are.” From climate and physicians alike Cobden was eager to escape. As it happened, the work was not even yet quite at an end. Some small verbal loosenesses were discovered in the1860.
Æt. 56. Treaty. The negotiators had written English coke and coal, when they meant British, and harbour, when they meant shipping. It was re-written, and again signed, the signatures and seals from the old Treaty having been duly cut off. This was on January 29.

Surprise has often been expressed that a man of Cobden’s strong Liberalism should have been not only so willing to co-operate with Louis Napoleon, but so unable to enter into the feelings, of Frenchmen towards a government which, besides being lawless and violent in its origin, persisted in stifling the press, corrupting the administration, silencing the popular voice, and from time to time sending great batches of untried and often innocent men to obscure and miserable death at Cayenne. A story is told of an Englishman of reputation at this time saying to a group which surrounded him in a Parisian drawing-room:—“But surely under your present Government France is prosperous; and surely you can do as you please.” “Oh, dear, yes,” said a bystander, “if we wish only to eat, drink, and make money, we can do exactly as we please.” It was said that Cobden thought too lightly of all those things, besides eating, drinking, and making money, which the best Frenchman might wish to do an ought to be esteemed and praised for wishing to do. One or two remarks may be made upon this interesting point.

In the first place, economists have often been apt to treat the political side of affairs as secondary to the material side. Turgot, and the whole school of which he is the greatest name, systematically assumed that the reforms which they sought should proceed from an absolute central power. It was one of the distinctions of the Saint Simonians, to whom Cobden’s friend chevalier belonged, that they held strongly that government is good for something, and that authority is 1860.
Æt. 56.an indispensable principle of modern societies. M. Laffitte, the admirable chief of another earnest sect of social reformers, told an English traveller that he and his friends approved of the imperial regime. Cobden’s attitude, therefore, was in harmony with that of many able and disinterested men who had nothing to do with the imperialist party, but who conscientiously thought that the existing Government, notwithstanding its heavy drawbacks, was better than the anarchy of utopists, anarchists, and talkers, which it had superseded, and that it had at least the merit of preserving an amount and kind of order in which the ideas of a better system might grow up. Events, in the opinion of the present writer, only confirmed what sound political judgment might have led men to expect—namely, that this was a grave miscalculation. Sedan and the Treaty of Frankfort proved it. But if Cobden thought better of the Empire than it deserved, not a few good and high-minded Frenchmen erred with him.

Our second remark, however, is that Cobden was probably as well aware as others of the evils and perils of the Empire. He was no blind believer in the Emperor, as his letters testify. It was not his tendency to believe blindly in any governments. But he always revolted from the pharisaical censoriousness and most unseemly licence with which English journalists and others are accustomed to write about the rulers and the affairs of foreign nations. He always inclined to moral, no less than to a material, non-intervention in the domestic doings of other countries, and thought it right to observe and counsel a language of scrupulous decency towards a government in which the bulk of the French nation formally and deliberately acquiesced.

Apart from such considerations as these, Cobden would probably have defended himself for acting with such a government as that of Louis Napoleon, by the plain argu ment that in politics it is wise not to throw away any oppor1860.
Æt. 56.tunity of getting a good thing done. The Empire was there, and it was the part of sound sense to secure from it whatever compensation it might be made to afford for its flagrant and admitted disadvantages. It is sometimes said that the policy of Free Trade has been damaged in the opinion of France, by being thus associated with the ruined Empire. Apart from the fact that later governments have not ventured to go back from the Treaty policy, if this plea against Cobden were in any degree true, we ought to find the desire for protection strongest in those parts where dislike of the Empire is strongest. This is notoriously not the case. The feeling about the Treaty uniformly follows the interests of the people concerned, and is absolutely independent of any feeling as to the government by which the Treaty was made.

This was in fact Cobden’s own case. He knew as well as any one else that the position of the Emperor was that of a gambler, who might be driven by the chances of fortune to acts of desperation. But he insisted that, so far as England was concerned, the Emperor nursed no criminal designs, but, on the contrary, made friendship with England the keystone of his system. He insisted, moreover, that even if it were otherwise, still the most solid and durable check to the development of hostile purpose would be found in the promotion of close and deeply interested commercial intercourse between the people of the two countries. The change in the relations between the governments of France and England for the last twenty years, in the language of the French and English press, in the mutual sentiments of the two peoples, is the verification of Cobden’s hope and foresight.

[1]See Mr. A. J. Booth’s Saint Simon and Saint Simonism (Longman, 1876), p. 169—an excellent account of an extraordinary movement.

[2]The idea was in the air. In a conversation with Lord John Russell, Count Persigny expressed a wish, as an earnest of the sincerity of the Emperor’s desire for peace, for a Commercial Treaty between Great Britain and France, by which France might be enabled to lower her protective duties.—Martin’s Life of the Prince Consort, iv. 470.

[3]Feb. 17, 1843.

[4]The source of the uneasiness in Downing Street was the dispute between Spain and Morocco, as to the boundaries of the Spanish territory round Ceuta. “It is plain,” Lord Palmerston wrote to Lord John Russell, “that France aims through Spain at getting fortified points on each side of the Gut of Gibraltar”—with the ultimate view of “shutting us out of the Mediterranean” (Ashley’s Life, ii. 374). The inference as to the designs of France is a masterpiece of the perverse ingenuity of the Palmerstonian policy of alarm.

[5]In the letter which he wrote on the occasion to Lord Palmerston (Oct. 29, 1859) Cobden gave a rather fuller account of this preliminary part of the conversation—“The Emperor began the conversation after a few introductory remarks, by complaining of the English Press. I told him that I had myself been accused of every crime almost by the Press (including an attempt at murder), and that I had learnt to laugh at it. He continued this topic by asking me to point out a single act during the ten years he had been in power, which had not been dictated by a desire to stand well with England, and to keep the two countries in a state of harmony and friendship; but the Press had completely defeated his object. After reminding him that I had blamed, both in Parliament and in public meetings, the attacks made in England on the Government of France, I said that he should bear in mind that his name, which had such a charm in the cottages of France, had still a sound which carried a traditional alarm into our houses, and that this feeling was worked upon by those who for their own ends persuaded the people that he intended to repeat the career of his uncle. With some excuses, I ventured to add that the way in which he had entered on the war in Italy, without a previous exposé des motifs, had given great force to their persuasion. He interrupted me by saying that he had explained his reasons. I told him that what I meant was that he had not appealed to the world with a manifesto of his grievances and objects, and that if he had done so, from what I knew of the opinion in England and America, where the Austrian Government had hardly a friend, the feeling would have been so universally in his favour that a war would not have been necessary. But the suddenness and secrecy with which this great war was entered upon alarmed people lest the same thing should be repeated. After some further conversation about the state of feeling, which I admitted was very bad, if not perilous, in England, and which he said was brought to such a state in France that he seemed to be almost the only man friendly to England left, I expressed an opinion, very frankly, that the Governments of both countries, professing as they did to be friendly, would be responsible, if not blamable, were nothing done to try to put an end to this state to things”

[6]To J. Bright, Nov. 20. 1859.

[7]By the Treaty of 1858 the European signatories had the right of sending ambassadors to Pekin. In June, 1859, the English fleet conveying the envoy was resisted at the mouth of the Pei-Ho. Without giving the Chinese an opportunity of making reparation, the English and French Government proceeded to organize a joint expedition. It was in the course of this (Oct. 6, 1860) that the European troops committed the infamy of pillaging and burning the Summer Palace.

[8]Walewski’s retirement was due to his disagreement with the Emperor on the subject of an Italian Confederation. He was succeeded by M. Thouvenel.

[9]Lord Cowley and Cobden signed on behalf of England, and M. Baroche—then Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs—and M. Rouher for France.