Front Page Titles (by Subject) PART I: On Apprehension - Logic, Metaphysics, and the Natural Sociability of Mankind
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PART I: On Apprehension - Francis Hutcheson, Logic, Metaphysics, and the Natural Sociability of Mankind 
Logic, Metaphysics, and the Natural Sociability of Mankind, ed. James Moore and Michael Silverthorne, texts translated from the Latin by Michael Silverthorne, introduction by James Moore (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 2006).
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On the Divisions of Apprehension
Apprehension is also called perception, concept, notion, intention,1 and idea; the word which signifies it is called a term.
Apprehension is a bare representation of a thing without any opinion (sententia) of the mind, and is either noncomplex, for instance pen, or complex, for instance, pen in the hand.
Judgment is an act of the mind by which it forms an opinion about two ideas. The sign [of a judgment] is a proposition or expression, which is an utterance that affirms or denies something of something; it is also called predication.
Discourse is an act of the mind by which from two or more judgments a third is inferred.
1. Ideas are divided into sensations, imaginations, and pure intellections.2
Sensation is twofold, external and internal. External sensation is “the perception of a corporeal thing impacting the organs of the body.”
Imagination is “the idea of a corporeal thing which is not impacting the body.”
A pure intellection is “any idea which is not reached or grasped by any of the bodily senses.” By intellection we not only discern things which are different from body as well as their modes, but we also attain more accurate ideas of numbers and of shapes which have several parts than those which the senses provide.3
The powers of bodies to excite ideas of “colors, sounds, smells, tastes, heat and cold” are called secondary qualities, or qualities which are sensible in the proper sense that we perceive each of them only by a single sense. Things which are perceived by more than one sense, by both sight and touch, for example, such as extension, figure, position, motion and rest, are primary and true qualities of bodies; hence they have the power to excite ideas of secondary qualities to which there is nothing corresponding in the bodies themselves. There are also two ideas which can be perceived both by internal and by external sense, and these are duration and number.
2. Imagination calls up a rather weak idea of a thing that had been formerly perceived by sense. And the mind can form only images whose elements have all been perceived by sense.
3. There is also an internal sense which above all furnishes pure intellections; this is called consciousness (conscientia) or the power of reflection. This sense affects all the actions, passions, and modes of the mind: namely, judgment, discourse, certainty, doubt, joy, sorrow, desires, aversions, love and hatred, virtues, vices. The more precise and abstract ideas of primary qualities are also attributed to pure intellections. But in truth all ideas arise from reflection or from [an] external sense.4
1. Ideas are either clear or obscure: a clear idea is one which “vividly affects the mind”; an obscure idea is one which affects the mind faintly.
2. Ideas may be proper [ideas] and truly depict the thing put before it or at least represent the appearance (speciem) which nature commonly intended; or they may be analogical [ideas] and exhibit a kind of general and imperfect impression of a thing, not as it is in itself or as it is represented in the common order of nature, but by a kind of analogy with other, very different things which are known by proper ideas. Those who have the use of sight have a proper idea of sight; a blind man has an analogous idea, but he does still have some kind of useful notion of this faculty.
3. Ideas are either simple or complex; a simple idea is a kind of uniform representation not made up of parts that are different from each other.
A complex idea is one “which is made up of dissimilar parts into which it can also be resolved.”
The idea of being is the simplest [idea]; ideas of secondary qualities are also mostly simple, as well as abstract ideas of certain modes of thinking.
4. In respect of their names, ideas are either distinct or confused. A distinct idea is one “which is easily told apart from others.” A confused idea is one “which is not easily told apart from others from which it is thought to be different.”
But perhaps more correctly the name itself or the term which denotes the idea is said to be distinct “when a known and certain complex of ideas is bound together by a name which cannot be altered without our being aware of it”; it is confused when “that complex is not sufficiently certain, so that something may at some point be added or removed [from it] without our noticing.”
5. In respect of their objects, ideas are either of substances or of modes, or of substances together with their modes. A substance is “a being subsisting in itself.” A mode is “a being which inheres in another [being].”
6. Ideas likewise may be real (or true), or they may be fictitious. Real ideas are “ideas which have corresponding objects,” or [ideas] which arise from natural causes following the order of nature. Fictitious [ideas] are “arbitrary conjunctions of ideas not drawn from true things.”
7. Ideas are either adequate or inadequate. Adequate ideas are those “which represent the whole nature of an object,” or at least all of it that we want to conceive in our minds. Such are the complex or combined ideas of modes which the mind assembles in an arbitrary fashion without referring them to an external model; also ideas of modes of thinking or of states of mind. Our ideas of substances are all inadequate.
Abstraction is “the act of the mind by which it directs itself to one or some of the ideas which are contained in a complex [idea] and ignores the rest.” Abstract ideas are ideas which are denoted by names or symbols that signify several things that are similar to each other but which also have some evident differences.6
After the mind has observed a variety of things that give rise to various complex ideas, and has seen that they are alike in certain qualities and unlike in others, it forms a universal idea by abstracting itself from the points in which they differ, while retaining the ideas of the points in which they are alike, and by denoting them with a specific name. This is how the eighth distinction between ideas arises, that some are universal and others singular.
A singular idea is an idea “which is intended to represent one thing alone” and is denoted either by a proper noun, like Alexander the Great, or by a common noun applied to one man, for example, this man or that man.
A universal idea is an idea “which is suitable for representing several things individually” whose sign (which is a common noun) can be predicated distributively of individuals, as man [can be predicated] of Peter, Paul, etc.
Nouns which denote a collection [of things], or one thing which is an aggregate of several things, are not properly predicated of individuals and often denote singular complex ideas. Examples are the city of Rome, Alexander’s army, the human race, the world.
Complex ideas are said to have comprehension, which “is a collection of all the simpler ideas which are combined in the complex,” for example, in animal [are contained the ideas of] body, living, and sentient.
Universal ideas are said to have extension, or quantity, which is “a collection of objects which an idea can represent, or [objects] the word for which is predicable individually.”
From what has been said about abstraction, it will be clear that the greater the extension, the less the comprehension, and vice versa.
A universal idea or predicable word has five species: genus, species, differentia, property, and accident.8 They are defined with regard either to ideas or to terms as follows:
With respect to ideas
1. A genus is a universal idea representing an object as a thing, which extends to other universal ideas.
2. A species is “a universal idea representing a thing, which is subordinate to a more general idea,” or [an idea] which applies only to individual things.
With respect to terms
1. A genus is a [word] predicable of several things which differ in kind (specie) in some respect (in quid) “or as a material part of the essence, as animal of man and brute.”
2. A species is “a [word] predicable of several things which are numerically different in some respect (in quid ),” or as the total essence, as man [is predicable] of Peter and Paul.
The highest genus is [the genus] “which does not have a more general genus above it,” for example, being. A subaltern is one “which can be a species with respect to a more general [genus].”
The lowest species is [the species] “which covers individuals alone”; a subaltern species can be a genus.
3. A differentia is “a universal idea which represents a thing modified by an essential primary attribute,” i.e., [an idea] which divides a genus into species, and combines with a genus to constitute a species.
4. A property is the “universal idea of a thing modified by an essential secondary attribute,” that is, [an attribute] which is contained in the idea of the thing not formally but as a consequence; for instance, being subject to law is a property of man.
5. An accident is “the universal idea of a thing modified by a true/true mode,” that is, [a mode] which may be either present or absent.
3. A differentia is “a [word] predicable of several things that differ in species or number, in respect of some quality (in Quale Quid )” or as a formal part of the essence; for when it is added to a genus it completes the essence of a species and its definition.
4. A property is “a [word] predicable of several things in respect of a quality necessarily” (in Quale necessario), that is, [an attribute] which belongs to this species, and only this species, and the whole of this species, at all times, or as bound up with its essence.
5. An accident is “a [word] predicable of several things in respect of a quality contingently” (in Quale contingenter).
A genus is said to be a logical whole or universal with respect to its species which are logical parts in the division of it. On the other hand a species is said to be a metaphysical whole, with respect to its genus and its differentia, which are metaphysical parts of its essence, but is said to be a physical whole with respect to its integrating parts. For example, (1) animal is the logical whole with respect to man and the brutes; (2) man is the metaphysical whole, or formal [whole], with respect to that which is animal and rational; (3) man is the physical or integral whole with respect to body and soul. The human body is also the integral whole with respect to head, chest, abdomen, limbs, etc., which are the integrating parts.9
N.B. Abstract, absolute, or denominating names of true modes, as well as abstract ideas themselves, may be either genera or species when they represent objects as things, without any distinct or direct idea of the subject, for instance, justice, virtue, and their opposites; true substances regarded as appendices of other things, and their concrete and connotative names, may be differentiae, properties, or accidents, for example, golden, silvery, clothed, shod.
A logical whole, or the extension of an idea, is expressed by a division, which is “the enumeration of the several things contained in the extension of a common idea or name.” These are its rules:
1. “The parts should be so distinct that no single one contains within its own [extension] the extension or part of the extension of another [part].”
2. “The division should be made into the species immediately below.”
3. “The parts should exhaust the thing divided”; or the division should be adequate.
A metaphysical whole, or the comprehension of a complex idea, is expressed by a definition, which is “a statement which explicates the simpler ideas that are combined in a complex [idea].” There are other definitions which are improper, for instance, nominal [definition], which explicates a word, as coelum (“sky”), which is from [Greek] koilon (“hollow”). There is also accidental definition, which explicates modes, causes [and] effects. For example, man is an animal which is featherless, biped, erect, etc.; this constitutes a description. [And] there is physical definition, which explicates natural parts; for instance, man is an animal consisting of an organic body and a soul endowed with reason.
The rules [of definition] are:
1. “Definitions should be short.”
2. “They should be clear.”
3. “They should be adequate,” so that they may be reciprocating, i.e., so that the definition and the thing defined may be mutually predicated of each other distributively.
4. “Avoid metaphors.”
5. “They should consist of the nearest genus and the proper differentia.”10
Categories or predicaments are “a series of ideas or terms arranged by degrees (gradatim) under the same highest genus.” Different authorities give different categories. For Aristotle there are ten: substance, quantity, quality, relation, action, passion, place, time, position, and state.11 He means that every predication or affirmation may be reduced to one of these. If we explain one, the rest will be understood.
These are the substances:12
Hence also that of which something is affirmed or denied in any category should be called a subject.
A term is “a name which signifies an idea or a thing, and which can be the subject or predicate of a proposition”; hence it is called a predicable (categorema).
Other components of terms are jointly predicable (syncategoremata), such as all, no. Some are mixed, such as always, i.e., in all time; no one, i.e., no man; [he] runs, [he] is running.13
An intention of signifying, or the understanding (acceptio) of a word, is called a suppositio. When it stands for an idea or a thing, it is called a formal suppositio; when it stands for the uttered word itself, it is called a material suppositio.
An example of the former is saying, Man is an animal; an example of the latter is, Man is a monosyllable. In a formal suppositio, the name is sometimes of the first intention, or of personal supposition, that is, in a normal act of understanding (acceptio): as in the phrase, Man is an animal. Otherwise it is of the second intention, or of simple suppositio for the idea or the term, that is, when a term of art (aliquid artificiale) is used of the same thing, for example, Man is a species.14
The divisions of terms into universal and singular, abstract and concrete, are evident from the divisions of ideas.
A transcendent term is one which belongs to every real thing, such as being, thing, one, something. A supertranscendent term is one which also belongs to fictions, such as imaginable, possible. All other terms are non-transcendental.
Every term where “not” is absent is finite; where the particle “not” is present, it is infinite, as in not-man, not-learned. “Not” is said to be infinitans. Finite and infinite [terms] together comprehend every being disjunctively: every being is either learned or not-learned, and so on; they exaust the whole range of being.
A univocal term is “predicable of several things individually according to the same idea,” as animal [is predicable] of man and of beast.
An equivocal term is “predicable of several things individually according to different ideas,” like Gallus. “Where there is some underlying reason for it or affinity of meaning,” a term is said to be analogous or deliberately equivocal, as [when] healthy [is predicated] of animal and of food, or Alexander of a man and of a picture. When there is no reason, it is said to be equivocal by chance, like Gallus or (in English) canon.15
Compatible terms may be predicated of one and the same thing at the same time, like strong and pious; they are often disparate.
Conflicting or opposed terms [are those] which “cannot be predicated of each other, nor of the same thing, in the same respect, and at the same time.” This opposition of terms is noncomplex; the opposition of propositions, on the other hand, is said to be complex.16
There are four species of noncomplex opposition: contrary, contradictory, relatively opposed, and privatively opposed. Disparates do not conflict ( pugnant), for they are “terms denoting ideas in which there is very little or nothing in common, beyond the vague idea of being or of mode,” as in brave and tall or sweet and white.
Contraries are “true opposed qualities,” such as pain and pleasure.
Contradictories are “a word and its negation,” such as learned and not-learned or man and not-man.
Relatively opposed are relative terms, such as father and son.
Privatively opposed are “a quality and its absence in a subject which has the capacity for it,” as in sighted and blind in the case of an animal.
Negatively opposed are “a quality and its absence in any kind of subject,” as in sighted and nonsighted, which are also contradictories.
On the Noetic Judgment and the Proposition
A judgment is “an action of the mind by which it gives a verdict on two ideas in comparison with each other.” That is, a verdict is given that either the ideas represent the same object, or a certain relation or connection exists between their objects.1
A noetic judgment is “when a verdict is given about ideas which are being directly compared with each other.”
A dianoetic judgment is “a verdict of the mind about two ideas, by means of comparison of both with a third.”2
A proposition is “a statement which expresses a noetic judgment.” There are three parts to it: subject, predicate, and copula.
The subject is “that about which something is affirmed or denied.” The predicate is “that which is affirmed or denied.” The copula is the logical verb (verbum), is or is-not.
N.B. Subjects and predicates are distinguished not by their position but by the sequence of speech. These three parts are always present, either explicitly or suppressed and implied: for example, curro [“I-run”] = ego sum currens [“I am running”].
In respect of their internal form or quality, propositions, like judgments, are either affimative or negative.3
In respect of their content, propositions are either true or false. Every [proposition] is either true or false; no [proposition] is both true and false; and there are no [propositions] which change from true to false, if we look at the judgment itself and not at the words. Those which seem to be both true and false are double or denote two judgments. Those which seem to change are likewise double; this is obvious from the nature of the word, which is “a word which implies time.” Hence, when the same words are uttered at different times, they sometimes give rise to quite different propositions.
Logical truth is “the agreement (convenientia) of the signs with the things signified.” Moral truth is “the agreement of the signs with the sense of the mind”; it belongs to the ethical forum.
With regard to quantity, propositions are universal, particular, singular, or indefinite.
1. A universal proposition is “when the subject is a universal term in its whole extension,” or is distributed.
2. A particular proposition is one “whose common subject is restricted to a part of its extension,” or is not distributed.
The marks of distribution or universality are all, no, each, etc. Notes of particularity are someone, a certain, not every, etc.
3. A singular proposition is one “whose subject is singular or individual,” i.e., [a subject] which, not having a divisible extension, is understood of the whole; the same rules apply to singulars as to universals.
4. An indefinite proposition is “when a common subject is not modified by any mark of quantity.” In the sense of the speaker, however, it is always either universal or particular. For example, men are animals is universal; men are learned is particular; it depends whether the content is necessary or contingent.
We need only look at two of these kinds, namely universal and particular, because the others come under the same rules.
From the different combinations of quality and quantity, four classes of propositions arise, which are indicated by well-known symbols.
In respect of substance, propositions are either categorical or hypothetical. A categorical [proposition] “indicates something absolutely.” A hypothetical proposition “indicates something subject to a condition.”
The [following] divisions show the responses to the most frequent questions about propositions.
What [proposition]? Categorical or hypothetical. What sort of [proposition]? Negative or affirmative. What quantity of [proposition]? Universal, particular, indefinite, singular.
Axioms about the quantity of terms:
1. “In every affirmative proposition the predicate is taken particularly,” and it is not also required that it be true.
2. “In a negative proposition the predicate is taken universally” or is distributed, for a negation is understood to be false if any part of the predicate may be truly affirmed of the subject.
3. The quantity of subjects is understood from the signs prefixed [to them]. Hence in A, the subject is universal, and the predicate is particular. In E, both are universal. In I, both are particular. In O, the subject is particular, and the predicate is universal.
Only those propositions are said to be universal in which the subject is distributed, and a predicate is affirmed or denied of the individual things which are covered by the common word. This is not the case when the predicate is [made up] of several [things] collectively: thus, All men are mortal is universal, but not the following: All men form one state; all the apostles were twelve.
Propositions about kinds of individuals are in a certain sense universal; e.g., Every animal was in Noah’s ark, or, the Gospel has been preached to men of all nations.
Here it is said that certain individuals of each kind were in the ark or have heard the Gospel, but these things are not predicated separately of every individual or of each individual in the kinds.
These are the axioms about universals:
1. “Whatever is affirmed of a distributed subject (that is, [of a subject] universally taken) may be affirmed of all the inferiors which are contained in its extension.”
2. “Whatever is denied of a distributed subject can equally be denied of all its inferiors.” These two in combination are the dictum de omni et nullo; on this depend both subalternation and the force of the syllogism, which we shall discuss later.5
Some propositions are simple, others complex; simple [propositions] “denote one single judgment”; complex [propositions] “denote more than one judgment.”
Among complex propositions, the modal propositions are preeminent [which are] “when something is both predicated and the mode of its connection with the subject is made clear.” There are four modes: the necessary, the impossible, the possible, and the contingent.6 But generally modal [propositions] are simple [propositions], or signify a single judgment of a speaker. For they are ambiguous. Sometimes they merely affirm or deny the statement itself more emphatically, as in saying, “God most certainly exists” or “Certainly no man is immortal.” Sometimes the proposition itself, which is called the statement, is the subject, and the mode is predicated of it, as in saying, “the Divine existence is necessary,” or “God is, is a necessary proposition”; and similarly with the other modals.
In the same way it is shown that the four kinds [of modal propositions], which might appear from their names to be complex, are simple, namely: (1) conditional [propositions]; (2) disjunctive [propositions]; (3) negative copulative [propositions]; and (4) relative [propositions].
In a conditional or hypothetical [proposition] there are two parts, the antecedent and the consequent: for example, if God exists, the world is governed by providence. Neither of these is asserted; it is merely asserted that they are connected. Hence this [proposition] also is equally true: If there were no God, there would be no providence.
In disjunctive [propositions] the whole subject is said to be included in two connected predicates; for example, it is either day or night means the same as all time is included in daytime and nighttime.7
In negative copulative [propositions] it is denied that both the predicates are compatible with the subject at the same time: it is not both day and night; i.e., no time is both daytime and nighttime.
In relative [propositions] the terms may be complex, but the judgment is single, namely, that the reasons (rationes) are equal or unequal.
The true complex propositions therefore are (1) copulative, (2) causal, (3) adversative, (4) exclusive, (5) inceptive, and (6) desitive;8 and they are easy to learn.
Some propositions or judgments are abstract, “in which from the comparison of ideas itself, there is seen or shown to be a relationship apart from any consideration of time”; hence they are said to be eternal and unalterable truths.
Other propositions are absolute; they assert that a thing is, was or will be at a certain time, or ascribe a common accident to it as existing at a certain time.
Abstract affirmative propositions, in which ideas are not only viewed in themselves but are related to objects, are all hypothetical and merely predicate attributes on the hypothesis that the thing exists. An absolute conclusion can only be deduced from absolute premisses, and abstract conclusions from abstract [premisses].
Other propositions are [self-]evident; here, by a power natural to the mind, “a certain relation or connection is perceived among the terms in themselves.” Nor is there any other criterion of truth.9 Other [propositions] are probable, when connection of that kind is not certain. And others are manifestly false.
The relative states (affectiones) of propositions are subalternation, conversion, and opposition.
1. Subalternation is “the deduction of a particular proposition from a universal [proposition]”; the former is called the subalternating [proposition], the latter the subalternated; for example, Every man is an animal, therefore, Some man is an animal. This is clear from the dictum de omni. “But from a particular to a universal [proposition] there is no inference.”
2. Conversion is “the transposition of the subject into the place of the predicate.” The given proposition is called the convertend, and the derived proposition the converse. And since every relation, likeness, or equality is mutual, the consequence will be valid provided that the same terms are used in the converse with the same extension and with the same temporal relation (ratio).
Conversion is threefold. It is either (i) simpliciter, “when the same quantity of propositions is kept”: no A is B and no B is A; or (ii) it is per accidens, “when the convertend is universal and the converse is particular”: as in, all A is B, some B is A; or (iii) by contraposition, “when the negations [of the terms] are put in the place of the terms and are transposed”: as in, Every man is an animal, therefore, that which is not-animal is not-man.10
Universal negative and particular affirmative [propositions] are converted simpliciter. Universal affirmative [propositions], as well as [universal] negative [propositions], may be converted per accidens; and it is only in this way that [universal] affirmative [propositions] can [be converted], because their predicates are particular.
Universal affirmative [propositions] and particular negative [propositions] [can be converted] by contraposition: Some man is not European, therefore, some not-European is not a not-man, i.e., is a man.
The value of these [conversions] lies in proving the validity of syllogisms, and in perfecting them.
3. Opposition of propositions is said to be complex. Opposed propositions are “two propositions which affirm and deny the same predicate about the same subject, in accordance with the same thing, in the same manner, at the same time.”
There are three kinds of opposed [propositions], namely, contradictory, contrary, and subcontrary. Subaltern [propositions] do not conflict.
Contradictory [propositions] are those “of which one is universal, the other particular, one is affirmative, the other negative”; or which are opposed in quantity and quality, as, A and O, E and I.
Contrary [propositions] are “two universal [propositions], one affirmative, the other negative,” which conflict in quality, not in quantity, like A and E.
Subcontrary [propositions] are “two particular [propositions], one affirmative, the other negative”; they too are in conflict by quality alone, like I and O. Since they are often both true at the same time, namely when they have contingent content, they are not truly opposed.
The rules of opposition are: (1) “of contradictories, one is always true, the other false”; this is the major opposition. (2) “Contraries are never at the same time true, but are sometimes both false at the same time,” i.e., with contingent content. (3) “Subcontrary [propositions] are never false at the same time.” If it is false that some man is learned, it will not be false that some man is not learned, since the contradictory of the former is true.12
When the relation or connection of two ideas or terms cannot be directly perceived, the relation between them will often be able to be seen by a comparison of both of them with some third or middle [idea or term] or with several middle [ideas or terms] which are clearly connected with each other. This mental process is dianoetic judgment or discourse.
When there is only one middle, we are said to have a syllogism; when there are several middles connected with each other, by which the comparison of the terms is made, it is a sorites, or complex form of reasoning.1 First, therefore, we must deal with the simple and categorical syllogism, for the other more complex forms may be reduced to syllogisms.
A syllogism is “discourse in which a third proposition is inferred from two propositions rightly arranged.”
Before a proof is given by means of a syllogism, there is a question or problem of showing the relationship between two terms. These terms are called the Extremes; they are the Major term and the Minor term. The Major term is “the predicate of the question” or of the conclusion, and the Minor term is “the subject of the question.” The Middle Term is that which is compared with both of the extreme terms in the premissed propositions.
Irrespective of the content of the syllogism, there are these three terms: the Major, the Minor, and the Middle Terms. Taking account of the content, there are three propositions: the Major Proposition, the Minor Proposition (these are also called the Premisses), and the Conclusion. They are distinguished not by their order but by their nature.
1. The major proposition “is that in which the major term is compared with the middle term” and is called the proposition par excellence.
2. The minor proposition is that “in which the minor term is compared with the middle term” and is called the assumption or subsumption.
3. The conclusion is that “in which the extremes are compared with each other,” and the middle term never appears here.
The whole force of the syllogism may be explained from the following axioms.2
Axiom 1. “Those things which agree with a single third thing agree with each other.”
2. “Those of which one agrees and the other does not agree with one and the same third thing, do not agree with each other.”
3. “Those which agree in no third thing, do not agree with each other.”
4. “Those which do not disagree with any third thing, do not disagree with each other.” From these [axioms] the general rules of syllogisms are deduced. The first three are about the quality of propositions.
Rule 1. If one of the premisses is negative, the conclusion will be negative (by axiom 2).
Rule 2. If both the premisses are affirmative, the conclusion will be affirmative (axiom 1).
Rule 3. From two negative [premisses] nothing follows because those which agree with each other and those which disagree with each other may both be different from a third.
Two [rules] on the Quantity of Terms:
Rule 4. The middle must be distributed once, or taken universally; for a common term often contains two or more species which are mutually opposed to each other, and from which predication may be made according to different parts of its own extension; therefore terms do not truly agree with a third term, unless one at least agrees with the whole of the middle.
Rule 5. No term may be taken more universally in the conclusion than it was in the premisses, because an inference from particular to universal is not valid.
On the Quantity of Propositions:
Rule 6. “If one of the premisses is particular, the conclusion will be particular.” For (i) suppose the conclusion is affirmative: therefore (by rule 1) both premisses are affirmative; but no term is distributed in a particular [premiss]; therefore (by rule 4) the middle term has to be distributed in the other one; it is therefore the subject of a universal affirmative; therefore the other extreme is also taken particularly, since it is the predicate of an affirmative, ergo, the conclusion will be particular (by rule 5). (ii): Suppose the conclusion is negative: therefore, its predicate is distributed; hence (by rules 5 and 4) both the major term and the middle term have to be distributed in the premisses, but (rule 3) when one premiss is negative, the other is affirmative. If one [premiss] is particular, only these two terms can be distributed; when one premiss is affirmative, the other should be particular. Therefore the minor extreme, the subject of the conclusion, is not distributed in the premisses; therefore (by rule 5) it is not distributed in the conclusion.
Rule 7. “From two particulars nothing follows,” at least in our normal way of speaking, according to which the predicate of a negative is taken to be distributed. For (i) if the conclusion is affirmative and both premisses are affirmative, no term in the premisses is distributed (contrary to rule 4). (ii) Suppose the conclusion is negative; therefore some predicate is distributed, but the predicate is distributed only in particular premisses; it will therefore be invalid (contrary to rule 4 or 5).
Rules 1 and 7 are thus reduced to one rule. The conclusion follows the weaker side, i.e., the negative or particular. All the rules are contained in these verses:3
In a curious and unusual manner of speaking, a certain negative conclusion may be reached, with the predicate undistributed, as in this example:
A figure of a syllogism is “the proper arrangement of the middle in the premisses”; there are only four figures.
1. That in which the middle is the subject of the major and the predicate of the minor.
2. That in which the middle is the predicate of both.
3. That in which the middle is the subject of both.
4. That in which the middle is the predicate of the major and the subject of the minor.
In the first [the middle is] sub[ject and] pre[dicate]; in the second [it is] twice a pre[dicate]; in the third [it is] twice a sub[ject]; and in the fourth [it is] pre[dicate and] sub[ject].
The mood of the syllogism is “the correct determination of the propositions according to quantity and quality.”
Sixty-four arrangements are possible of the four letters A, E, I, O; of these, fifty-two are excluded by the general rules. There remain, therefore, twelve concluding modes of which not all lead to a conclusion in every figure because of the nature of the figure; and some are not useful at all.
The special rules of the figures are as follows.
1. i. In figure 1 the minor [premiss] must be affirmative; if it were negative, the conclusion would be negative (by rule 1), and its predicate would be distributed. But the major would be affirmative (by rule 3), and its predicate would not be distributed; hence there would be a fallacy (contrary to rule 5).
ii. The major [premiss] must be universal. For the minor is affirmative (from the former rule), and therefore its predicate is particular, namely the middle term. It must therefore (by rule 4) be distributed in the major of which it is the subject. These things will be more easily made clear by the schema below, where the letters denote distributed terms.5
Here are examples of fallacies.
N.B. Capital letters denote distributed terms; lowercase letters particular terms.
2. Rules of the second figure:
i. One of the premisses must be negative. For since the middle term is predicated of both, it would be distributed in neither if both were affirmative (contrary to rule 4).
ii. The major must be universal. For the conclusion is negative, and its predicate is distributed. It must therefore (by rule 5) be distributed in the major of which it is the subject.
3. Rules of the third figure:
i. The minor must be affirmative, for the same reason as in the previous figure.
ii. The conclusion must be particular. For since the minor is affirmative, its predicate, the minor term, is not distributed; therefore (by rule 5) it is not distributed in the conclusion of which it is the subject.
Examples of fallacies:
4. Rules of the fourth figure:
i. “If the major is affirmative, the minor must be universal”; otherwise it will contravene rule 4.
ii. If the conclusion is negative, the major must be universal; otherwise it will contravene 5.
iii. If the minor is affirmative, the conclusion must be particular, for the same reason as in the third figure.8
The concluding modes in the four figures are six.
1. AAA, EAE, AII, EIO, *AAI, *EAO.
2. EAE, AEE, EIO, AOO, *EAO, *AEO.
3. AAI, EAO, IAI, AII, OAO, EIO.
4. AAI, AEE, IAI, EAO, EIO, *AEO.9
Thus there are two [modes] in the first [figure], two likewise in the second, and one in the fourth, which are useless and have no names, because they make a particular inference where the valid conclusion would be universal.
The named modes are contained in these verses:
Here are examples of the modes according to the vowels which are contained in the words [of the mnemonic], A, E, I, O.
From axioms 1 and 2 (p. 32) the force of the inference in all of these modes will be clear, since both of the extremes are compared with the middle, and one of them with the distributed middle; and either both agree with it, or one only does not agree.
The Aristotelians neatly demonstrate the force of the inference, and perfect the syllogisms, by means of reduction, since the validity of all [the syllogisms] in figure 1 is evident from the dictum de omni et nullo (see p. 26); they also give, in their technical language, the rules of conversion and opposition, by means of which all the other modes can be reduced to the four modes of the first figure, which Aristotle calls the perfect [modes].10
There are two kinds of reduction, ostensive and ad absurdum. The initial letters in each of the modes (B, C, D, and F) indicate the modes of the first figure to which the modes of the other [figures] are to be reduced, i.e., those of which the initial letter is the same.11 S and P following a vowel show that that proposition is to be converted, S simpliciter, P per accidens. M shows that the propositions are to be transposed, K that the reduction is made per impossibile, of which more later. When this is done, the conclusion reached will be either the same as in reducing Cesare, Festino, etc., or [a conclusion] which implies the same conclusion, or the contradictory to the conceded premiss. The validity of an ostensive reduction is known from the rules of conversion and subalternation.
Reduction to the impossible is as follows. If it is denied that a given conclusion follows from true premisses, let the contradictory of the conclusion be substituted for the premiss whose symbol includes a K, like the major in Bokardo and the minor in Baroko; these premisses will then show in Barbara the truth of the contradictory of the premiss which was claimed to be true. If therefore the given premisses had been true, the conclusion would also have been true; for if it was not, its contradictory would have been true, and if that had been true, it will show (in Barbara) that the other premiss is false, contrary to the hypothesis.
For these rules of syllogisms to hold, we have to look carefully for the true subjects and predicates of the propositions, which are sometimes not at all obvious to beginners; and then we have to determine whether they are really affirmative or negative as they are used in the argument. For in complex [propositions], sometimes one part is negative, the other is affirmative, and occasionally it is the negative part (the less obvious part) which is chiefly in point. For example,
Everything different from God may err, }
Every council is different from God. }
All Holy Scripture is worthy of belief, }
Mathematical proof is not Holy Scripture. }
And the dictum de omni et nullo is so useful in proving a true argument and detecting a false one, that by its help any intelligent person may be able to see both true syllogistic force and its fallacious semblance, according to whether one of the premisses contains the conclusion or not, even before applying the special rules of syllogisms.
With regard to the remaining forms of argument, it is evident that they are imperfect syllogisms or may be reduced to imperfect syllogisms.
1. The enthymeme12 or rhetorical syllogism is “when one of the premisses is unspoken because it is quite obvious”; it is for this reason that an enthymematic judgment has full syllogistic force.
2. Induction is “an inference from various examples,” of which the chief use is in physics, in politics, and in household matters. It does not generate the highest credit or exclude all fears of the contrary, unless it is clear that there are absolutely no contrary examples.
3. An epicheirema13 is “a complex syllogism in which a confirmation is attached to one or both of the premisses.”
4. Sorites is “discourse which contains several syllogisms which are connected with each other,” or where there are several middle terms which are connected with each other or with the extremes in several propositions of which if even one is negative, the conclusion will be negative, and if two are negative or any middle term is not distributed at least once, there will be no inference.
5. A dilemma is “a kind of epicheirema, where in making a division, that which is shown about the individual parts in the premisses is concluded of the whole.”
6. A hypothetical syllogism is “one in which one of the premisses is hypothetical”; when the minor is hypothetical, so also is the conclusion; these also serve to prove the inference in an enthymeme. More frequent are those in which the major is hypothetical, for example:
But since a more general predicate follows from any of the corresponding kinds (for example, If it is a man, if it is a horse, etc., it will also be an animal), but from a general predicate, no one particular species will follow (for from the fact that it is an animal, it does not follow that it will be a horse or an ass), it is evident that hypothetical syllogisms rightly proceed (1) from the positing of an antecedent to the positing of a consequent, or (2) from the removal of a consequent to the removal of an antecedent.
It is a fallacious inference from the removal of an antecedent, or the positing of a consequent:
The positing of a negative will be a negation, and the removal of it an affirmation.
Hypothetical [syllogisms] are reduced to categorical [syllogisms] by this general method: “every case which posits that Titius is a man, posits that he is an animal; but every case, or some case, posits that he is a man; therefore, etc.” But often it may be more easily and briefly done when there is either the same subject or the same predicate to the antecedent and the consequent; for example:
7. Disjunctive syllogisms are “those in which the major is disjunctive, [whether] affirmative or negative.” Either it is day, or it is night; but it is not day, therefore it is night. Or, it is not both night and day, but it is day; therefore it is not night. The force of the inference is obvious enough, when by positing an affirmative disjunctive major, an affirmative conclusion is drawn from a negative minor; or from a copulative negative major and an affirmative minor, the conclusion is negative. For in the former case the syllogism will be reduced to Barbara.
There is no inference from an affirmative minor, in the former, or from a negative [minor] in the latter.
As far as content is concerned, syllogisms are either certain or probable depending on their premisses.
A demonstration is “an argument duly reaching a conclusion from certain premisses,” and it is either ostensive, or leading to absurdity; the latter is the case when the contradictory of a proposition is shown to be false, from which it will be clear that it is itself true. The former is either a priori, or of a cause,14 “when an effect is shown from a known cause.” But there are causes of being and causes of knowing. The former are prior by nature and per se; the latter [are prior] in being known and in relation to us. Demonstrations drawn from both kinds of causes are called a priori, but especially those which are drawn from things prior by nature.15
“The discipline which relies on demonstrations” is science. The general rules of science are
1. “All terms must be accurately defined,” nor is their meaning ever to be altered.
2. “Certain and evident axioms are to be posited.”
3. “One must proceed from the better known to the less known by demonstrations step by step,” and premisses which go beyond axioms and propositions previously demonstrated are not to be admitted.
Demonstrations only deal with abstract propositions, especially in geometry and arithmetic.
There is no single principle of human knowledge which you may rightly say is prior to the rest. There are many evident principles apart from the most general axioms. Nor will any syllogism carry full credence unless both terms of the conclusion are found connected with the middle term in evident propositions. In demonstration, therefore, through several syllogisms which are connected in a continuous series, the number of evident propositions will exceed the number of middle terms by one.
In absolute propositions, and in those which are chiefly useful in life, there is another way of knowing which has its own proper evidence, albeit different from demonstrative [evidence]. Absolute propositions asserting that things exist are known (1) by consciousness, (2) by sense, (3) by reasoning, or by an observed link with existing things, or (4) by testimony. Other experiential truths about the powers and qualities of things are chiefly learned by experience, and by a varied acquaintance with life, and by induction; and whenever any example is similar, it should, other things being equal, be included with the larger rather than the smaller number. For rarely can men see any connection among the actual powers and qualities of things.
There are innumerable degrees of likelihood, from the slightest probability to full and stable assent; from the judicious appreciation [of their degrees] grave men are more likely to earn a reputation for prudence and wisdom than from cleverness in the sciences.
“Assent given to arguments which are probable but do not achieve the highest likelihood” is called opinion. Where either of the premisses is uncertain, there is only a probable conclusion; hence in a long chain of arguments, the result will be a very weak assent.
Arguments which create belief are either artificial and involve the use of reasoning, or inartificial, from testimony. “In recent [writers]16 assent resting on testimony is belief (par excellence).” Belief is either divine or human, depending on whether the assent rests on the testimony of God or of men.
Divine belief will be a fully firm assent when it is clearly established that God has revealed something, since a superior nature cannot deceive or be deceived.
Human belief too, although often hazardous, may sometimes attain full certainty, when it is clear that the witnesses could not have been deceived, and could not have intended to deceive others, so that neither their knowledge nor their reliability nor their truthfulness is in doubt.
Sometimes the knowledge of witnesses will be evident from the nature of the matter in hand; and their reliability will be established if they have not been induced to give testimony about the question in hand by any reward or other inducements; even more so when they testify to their own peril or loss, and could not expect to persuade others, if they themselves knew that the thing was otherwise.
If testimony is not liable to any suspicion of fraud or ignorance, belief may be given (1) to facts which cannot be known in any other way; (2) also to things totally different from what we have previously observed, if indeed there are no internal arguments that prevent belief; (3) and third, even to things that are strange and contrary to all our experience or observation, provided the testimony deals with material and circumstances that are different and remote from our own affairs.
[1 ]Hutcheson followed John Loudon, “Logica,” closely in this chapter. Loudon had written (dictated) under “Apprehension” that “first, the operations of the mind are said to be ideas or notions, perceptions, intentions.” Loudon was responding (like Antoine Arnauld in The Art of Thinking and Nicholas Malebranche in The Search After Truth) to the skeptical and Epicurean logic of Pierre Gassendi, Institutio Logicae, for whom the first operation of the mind was “simple imagination” or “conception, apprehension, intellection, notion”: p. 3 (Latin), p. 83 (English).
[2 ]Loudon, “Logica,” p. 2: “On the division of ideas into sensations, imaginations, and pure intellections.”
[3 ]In opposition to the arguments of Gassendi (and Hobbes), who derived all ideas from the senses and the imagination, Arnauld, in The Art of Thinking, pt. 1, chap. 1, p. 32 ff., maintained that “as soon as we reflect on what occurs in the mind we recognize the difference between imagination and pure intellection.” And Malebranche argued that sensation and imagination are only modifications of thought or pure intellect (The Search After Truth, bk. 3). John Loudon, in “Logica,” included among ideas of pure intellect all ideas of spiritual things, of affirmation and negation, of truth and virtue.
[4 ]Hutcheson’s theory that ideas of pure intellect are generated by internal sensation and therefore include ideas of beauty and virtue, and other concomitant ideas, as described in his Inquiry (1725) and Essay (1728), constitutes the principal point of connection between his logic and his writings on aesthetics and morals. For his proposal that ideas of internal sensation should be considered ideas of reflection, as Locke understood them: see A Synopsis of Metaphysics, Part II, chap. 1, p. 115, n. 9.
[5 ]The types of ideas distinguished in this chapter derive primarily from Locke, Essay, bk. 2, chaps. 29, 30, 31, and 32. See also Le Clerc, Logica, pt. 1, chaps. 9 and 10, pp. 36-43; and Loudon, “Logica,” p. 27 ff.
[6 ]On abstraction, and on the application of knowledge by abstraction to universal ideas, see Arnauld, The Art of Thinking, pt. 1, chaps. 5 and 6; Locke, Essay, bk. 2, chap. 12, pp. 163-66; Le Clerc, Logica, pt. 1, chaps. 6 and 7, pp. 25-36; and Loudon, “Logica,” pp. 9-11.
[7 ]This is where chapter 4 began in Hutcheson’s “Logica,” p. 7. There was no chapter 4 in the published version of Hutcheson’s Logicae Compendium.
[8 ]These were the five predicables distinguished by Porphyry in his Isagoge or introduction to the logic of Aristotle. See Aristotle, The Organon, or Logical Treatises of Aristotle with the Introduction of Porphyry, vol. 2, pp. 609-33. Hutcheson’s table, which describes the parallels between the predicables considered as ideas and as terms, appears to have drawn upon Arnauld, The Art of Thinking, pt. 1, chap. 7, pp. 52-59 (for the predicables as ideas) and Henry Aldrich, Artis Logicae Compendium, bk. 1, chap. 1, sec. 5, p. 5 (for the predicables considered as terms).
[9 ]In the logic of the Aristotelian scholastics, where every whole was explained by the manner in which parts participate in the whole, the tripartite division followed by Hutcheson was sometimes expressed by the terms universal (logical), essential (metaphysical), and integral (physical). See Robert Sanderson, Logicae Artis Compendium, I, 8, pp. 62-64; Franco Burgersdijk, Monitio Logica (an abstract in translation of Institutiones Logicae), I, 14, pp. 43-48; and Aldrich, Artis Logicae Compendium, I, 1, 5, p. 5.
[10 ]See Sanderson, Logicae Artis Compendium, I, 17, pp. 59-60.
[11 ]See Aristotle, Organon, II, pp. 636-39, and A Synopsis of Metaphysics, Part I, chap. 5, pp. 101-10, for an extended discussion of Aristotle’s categories.
[12 ]This illustration of the various forms of substance is “the tree of Porphyry” (Arbor Porphyriana): see Aldrich, Artis Logicae Compendium, II, 1, 2, p. 36.
[13 ]See Aldrich, Artis Logicae Compendium, I, 1, 3, pp. 3-4.
[14 ]See Sanderson, Logicae Artis Compendium, II, 2, pp. 75-82.
[15 ]See Sanderson, Logicae Artis Compendium, I, 8, pp. 26-27, and Aldrich, Artis Logicae Compendium, I, 1, 3, p. 4.
[16 ]See Sanderson, Logicae Artis Compendium, I, 15, pp. 51-54.
[1 ]Compare Carmichael, “A Short Introduction to Logic,” in Natural Rights, p. 298, who had employed the same language in his definition of judgment.
[2 ]The distinction between noetic and dianoetic judgments was made by Loudon, “Compendium Logicae,” p. 51. Carmichael, “Short Introduction,” p. 304, made a similar distinction between immediate judgment, in which two ideas are compared, and mediate judgment, which requires the intervention of a third idea.
[3 ]In this chapter, Hutcheson followed Loudon’s classification of noetic judgments or propositions, set out in “Compendium Logicae.” He did not reiterate Loudon’s illustrations, which were designed to reinforce Presbyterian orthodoxy: for instance, as an example of an affirmative proposition, “a sincerely pious life leads to beatitude”; of a negative proposition, “a disgraceful life does not lead to beatitude” (pp. 18-19).
[4 ]The symbols (A, E, I, O) employed to denote the four classes of propositions are described by James Clow, “A System of Logic,” as “a Distich invented by the School-men,” p. 140. See also W. and M. Kneale, The Development of Logic, p. 56: “the vowels by which the four types have been distinguished since the Middle Ages [formed] no part of Aristotle’s work.” These symbols were widely used by logicians in the early modern period to illustrate the four figures of the syllogism. See Part III, chap. 5, p. 37.
[5 ]The dictum de omni et nullo (the saying concerning all and none) derives via scholastic logicians from Aristotle, “The Prior Analytics,” I, 1, 7, analyzed in Organon, II, p. 649. It was used by Hutcheson to explain subalternation, II, 7, p. 29, and the reduction of syllogisms, III, 6, p. 41.
[6 ]See Sanderson, Logicae Artis Compendium, II, 8, p. 103 ff.
[7 ]See Sanderson, Logicae Artis Compendium, II, 10, pp. 112-16; Arnauld, The Art of Thinking, II, 9, pp. 128-34.
[8 ]These terms are explained in Arnauld, The Art of Thinking, II, 10, pp. 134-42: “Sentences stating that something commences are inceptives; those stating that something ceases are desistives.”
[9 ]Carmichael, “A Short Introduction to Logic,” chap. 2, sec. 7, in Natural Rights, pp. 302-3, provides a more ample discussion of abstract, absolute hypothetical, and intuitive propositions.
[10 ]On subalternation and conversion of propositions, see Sanderson, Logicae Artis Compendium, II, 7, pp. 100-103, and Aldrich, Artis Logicae Compendium, I, 2, pp. 10-12.
[11 ]The Latin is a mnemonic in two hexameter verses: “FEc1 simpliciter convertitur, Ev A per accid./Ast O per contra; sic fit conversio tota.” See Aldrich, Artis Logicae Compendium, I, 2, 5, p. 12, for a slightly modified form of these verses.
[12 ]On contradictory, contrary, and subcontrary propositions, see Sanderson, Logicae Artis Compendium, I, 15, pp. 51-54, and Arnauld, The Art of Thinking, II, 4, pp. 113-14.
[1 ]See Part III, chap. 7, p. 43.
[2 ]See Aldrich, Artis Logicae Compendium, III, 2, p. 4.
[3 ]Aldrich, Artis Logicae Compendium, cites this mnemonic in the same form at III, 3, p. 16.
[4 ]This paragraph was a footnote in Hutcheson’s text.
[5 ]The letters used in this chapter to denote distributed terms are not found in the mss. of Hutcheson’s “Logica,” nor were they employed by Aldrich. James Clow, in his lectures on Hutcheson’s logic, “A System of Logic,” p. 179, offered the following clarification of the symbols used by Hutcheson:
[8 ]Clow also identified in his lectures the modes of the four figures which are excluded by an application of the rules and those modes which remain valid: “A System of Logic,” pp. 179-83. Those modes of the four figures which remain valid or useful are summarized by Hutcheson in the first paragraph of chap. 5.
[9 ]Hutcheson considered the five modes marked by asterisks to be redundant. They are represented as subaltern modes in the figures that follow.
[10 ]See Sanderson, Logicae Artis Compendium, III, 5, pp. 132-37, and Aldrich, Artis Logicae Compendium, I, 3, pp. 20-21. The reader may find it helpful to compare Hutcheson’s presentation with the more elaborate commentary on Aldrich’s logic provided in John Huyshe, A Treatise on Logic, on the Basis of Aldrich, with Illustrative Notes.
[11 ]Thus C in Cesare indicates that it may be reduced to Celarent, Ferison to Ferio, and so on.
[12 ]Literally, something retained in the mind: where the syllogism is reduced from three propositions to two, an antecedent and consequent, the implicit premise must be made explicit for the argument to be tested by the figures and modes outlined above.
[13 ]Literally, to move one’s hand to a thing and thereby confirm it or to make an inference from common experience.
[14 ]Hutcheson writes this in Greek (tou dioti ); the terminology goes back to Aristotle, “Analytica Posteriora,” I, 13, 3: Organon, vol. 2, p. 669.
[15 ]See Sanderson, Logicae Artis Compendium, III, 5, p. 132, and Aldrich, Artis Logicae Compendium, I, 5, p. 32.
[16 ]For example, Locke, Essay, IV, XV, and XVI, pp. 654-68.