The Online Library of Liberty

A project of Liberty Fund, Inc.

• Introduction
• Note On the Text
• Acknowledgments
• Volume 1: The Principles of Natural Law
• Part I: General Principles of Right.
• Chapter I: Of the Nature of Man Considered With Regard to Right: of the Understanding, and Whatever Is Relative to This Faculty.
• Chapter II: Continuation of the Principles Relative to the Nature of Man. of Will and Liberty.
• Chapter III: That Man Thus Constituted, Is a Creature Capable of Moral Direction, and Accountable For His Actions.
• Chapter IV: Further Inquiry Into What Relates to Human Nature, By Considering the Different States of Man.
• Chapter V: That Man Ought to Square His Conduct By Rule; the Method of Finding Out This Rule; and the Foundations of Right In General.
• Chapter VI: General Rules of Conduct Prescribed By Reason. of the Nature and First Foundations of Obligation.
• Chapter VII: Of Right Considered As a Faculty, and of the Obligation Thereto Corresponding.
• Chapter Viii *: of Law In General.
• Chapter IX: Of the Foundation of Sovereignty, Or the Right of Commanding.
• Chapter X: Of the End of Laws; of Their Characters, Differences, &c.
• Chapter XI: Of the Morality of Human Actions. *
• Part II: Of the Law of Nature.
• Chapter I: In What the Law of Nature Consists, and That There Is Such a Thing. First Considerations Drawn From the Existence of God and His Authority Over Us.
• Chapter II: That God, In Consequence of His Authority Over Us, Has Actually Thought Proper to Prescribe to Us Laws Or Rules of Conduct.
• Chapter III: Of the Means By Which We Discern What Is Just and Unjust, Or What Is Dictated By Natural Law; Namely, 1. Moral Instinct, and 2. Reason.
• Chapter IV: Of the Principles From Whence Reason May Deduce the Law of Nature. *
• Chapter V: That Natural Laws Have Been Sufficiently Notified; of Their Proper Characteristics, the Obligation They Produce, &c.
• Chapter VI: Of the Law of Nations.
• Chapter VII: Whether There Is Any Morality of Actions, Any Obligation Or Duty, Antecedent to the Laws of Nature, and Independent of the Idea of a Legislator? 1
• Chapter VIII: Consequences of the Preceding Chapter: Reflections On the Distinctions of Just, Honest, and Useful.
• Chapter IX: Of the Application of Natural Laws to Human Actions; and First of Conscience. †
• Chapter X: Of the Merit and Demerit of Human Actions; and of Their Imputation Relative to the Laws of Nature. *
• Chapter XI: Application of Those Principles to Different Species of Actions, In Order to Judge In What Manner They Ought to Be Imputed.
• Chapter XII: Of the Authority and Sanction of Natural Laws † and 1. of the Good Or Evil That Naturally and Generally Follows From Virtue Or Vice.
• Chapter XIII: Proofs of the Immortality of the Soul. That There Is a Sanction, Properly So Called, In Respect to Natural Law. 1
• Chapter XIV: That the Proofs We Have Alledged Have Such a Probability and Fitness, As Renders Them Sufficient to Fix Our Belief, and to Determine Our Conduct.
• Volume 2: The Principles of Politic Law
• Part I: Which Treats of the Origin and Nature of Civil Society, of Sovereignty In General, of Its Peculiar Characteristic, Limitations, and Essential Parts.
• Chapter I: Containing a Few General and Preliminary Reflections, Which Serve As an Introduction to This and the Following Parts.
• Chaper II: Of the Real Origin of Civil Societies.
• Chapter III: Of the Right of Congruity Or Fitness With Regard to the Institution of Civil Society, and the Necessity of a Supreme Authority: of Civil Liberty; That It Is Far Preferable 1 to Natural Liberty, and That the State Is of All Human Conditions
• Chapter IV: Of the Essential Constitution of States, and of the Manner In Which They Are Formed.
• Chapter V: Of the Sovereign, Sovereignty, and the Subjects.
• Chapter VI: Of the Immediate Source, and Foundation of Sovereignty.
• Chapter VII: Of the Essential Characters of Sovereignty, Its Modifications, Extent, and Limits.
• Chapter VIII: Of the Parts of Sovereignty, Or of the Different Essential Rights Which It Includes.
• Part II: In Which Are Explained the Different Forms of Government, the Ways of Acquiring Or Losing Sovereignty, and the Reciprocal Duties of Sovereigns and Subjects.
• Chapter I: Of the Various Forms of Government.
• Chapter II: An Essay On This Question, Which Is the Best Form of Government?
• Chapter III: Of the Different Ways of Acquiring Sovereignty.
• Chapter IV: Of the Different Ways of Losing Sovereignty.
• Chapter V: Of the Duties of Subjects In General.
• Chapter VI: Of the Inviolable Rights of Sovereignty, of the Deposing of Sovereigns, of the Abuse of the Supreme Power, and of Tyranny.
• Chapter VIII: Of the Duty 1 of Sovereigns.
• Part III: A More Particular Examination of the Essential Parts of Sovereignty, Or of the Different Rights of the Sovereign, With Respect to the Internal Administration of the State, Such As the Legislative Power, the Supreme Power In Matters of Religion,
• Chapter I: Of the Legislative Power, and the Civil Laws Which Arise From It.
• Chapter II: Of the Right of Judging the Doctrines Taught In the State: of the Care Which the Sovereign Ought to Take to Form the Manners of His Subjects.
• Chapter III: Of the Power of the Sovereign In Matters of Religion.
• Chapter IV: Of the Power of the Sovereign Over the Lives and Fortunes of His Subjects In Criminal Cases.
• Chapter V: Of the Power of Sovereigns Over the Bona Reipublicae, 1 Or the Goods Contained In the Commonwealth.
• Part IV: In Which Are Considered the Different Rights of Sovereignty With Respect to Foreign States; the Right of War, and Every Thing Relating to It; Public Treaties, and the Right of Ambassadors.
• Chapter I: Of War In General, and First of the Right of the Sovereign, In This Respect, Over His Subjects.
• Chapter II: Of the Causes of War.
• Chapter III: Of the Different Kinds of War.
• Chapter IV: Of Those Things Which Ought to Precede War.
• Chapter V: General Rules to Know What Is Allowable In War.
• Chapter VI: Of the Rights Which War Gives Over the Persons of the Enemy, and of Their Extent and Bounds.
• Chapter VII: Of the Rights of War Over the Goods of an Enemy.
• Chapter VIII: Of the Right of Sovereignty Acquired Over the Conquered.
• Chapter IX: Of Public Treaties In General.
• Chapter X: Of Compacts Made With an Enemy.
• Chapter XI: Of Compacts With an Enemy, Which Do Not Put an End to the War.
• Chapter XII: Of Compacts Made, During the War, By Subordinate Powers, As Generals of Armies, Or Other Commanders.
• Chapter XIII: Of Compacts Made With an Enemy By Private Persons.
• Chapter XIV: Of Public Compacts Which Put an End to War.
• Chapter XV: Of the Right of Ambassadors.

CHAPTER III

Of the different kinds of war.

I. Besides the division above-mentioned of war into just and unjust, there are several others, which it is proper now to consider. And first, war is distinguished into offensive and defensive.

II. Defensive wars are those undertaken for the defence of our persons, or the preservation of our properties. Offensive wars are those which are made to constrain others to give us our due, in virtue of a perfect right we have to exact it of them; or to obtain satisfaction for a damage unjustly done us, and to force them to give caution for the future.1

III. 1°. We must therefore take care not to confound this with the former distinction; as if every defensive war were just, and, on the contrary, every offensive war unjust. It is the present custom to excuse the most unjust wars, by saying they are purely defensive. Some people think that all unjust wars ought to be called offensive, which is not true; for if some offensive wars be just, as there is no doubt of it, there are also defensive wars unjust; as when we defend ourselves against a prince who has had sufficient provocation to attack us.2

IV. 2°. Neither are we to believe, that he who first injures another, begins by that an offensive war, and that the other, who demands satisfaction for the<249> injury, is always upon the defensive. There are a great many unjust acts which may kindle a war, and yet are not the war; as the ill treatment of a prince’s ambassador, the plundering of his subjects, &c. If therefore we take up arms to revenge such an unjust act, we commence an offensive, but a just war; while the prince who has done the injury, and will not give satisfaction, makes a defensive, but an unjust war. An offensive war is therefore unjust only, when it is undertaken without a lawful cause; and then the defensive war, which on other occasions might be unjust, becomes just.

V. We must therefore affirm, in general, that the first who takes up arms, whether justly or unjustly, commences an offensive war; and he who opposes him, whether with or without a reason, begins a defensive war. Those who look upon the word offensive war to be an odious term, as always implying something unjust; and who, on the contrary, consider a defensive war as inseparable from equity, confound ideas, and perplex a thing, which of itself seems to be sufficiently clear. It is with princes as with private persons. The plaintiff who commences a suit at law, is sometimes in the wrong, and sometimes in the right. It is the same with the defendant. It is wrong to refuse to pay a sum which is justly due; and it is right to forbear paying what we do not owe.

VI. In the third place, Grotius distinguishes war into private, public, and mix’d.3Public war he calls that which is made on both sides by the authority<250> of the civil power: Private war, that which is made between private persons, without any public authority: and, lastly, mix’d war, that which, on one side, is carried on by public authority, and, on the other, by private persons.

VII. We may observe concerning this division, that if we take the word war in the most general and extensive sense, and understand by it all taking up arms with a view to decide a quarrel, in contradistinction to the way of deciding a difference by recourse to a common judge, then this distinction may be admitted; but custom seems to explode it, and has restrained the signification of the word war to that carried on between sovereign powers. In civil society, private persons have not a right to make war; and as for the state of nature, we have already treated of the right which men have in that state to defend and preserve their persons and properties; so that as we are here treating only of the right of sovereigns, with regard to each other, it is properly public, and not private war, that falls under our present consideration.

VIII. 4°. War is also distinguished into solemn according to the laws of nations, and not solemn. To render a war solemn, two things are requisite; the first, that it be made by the authority of the sovereign; the second, that it be accompanied with certain formalities, as a formal declaration, &c. but of this we shall treat more fully in its proper place. War not solemn, is that which is made either with-<251>out a formal declaration, or against mere private persons. We shall here only hint at this division, deferring a more particular examination of it, and an enquiry into its effects, till we come to treat of the formalities which usually precede war.4

IX. But a question is moved, relating to this subject, which is, whether a magistrate, properly so called, and as such, has a power of making war of his own accord? Grotius answers, that judging independently of the civil laws, every magistrate seems to have as much right, in case of resistance, to take up arms in order to exercise his jurisdiction, and to see his commands executed, as to defend the people intrusted to his care. Puffendorf, on the contrary, takes the negative, and passes censure on the opinion of Grotius.

X. But it is easy to reconcile these two authors, the dispute between them being merely about words. Grotius fixes a more vague and general idea to the term war:* according to him, therefore, when a subordinate magistrate takes up arms to maintain his authority, and to reduce those to reason who refuse to submit to him, he is supposed to act with the approbation of the sovereign; who, by entrusting him with a share in the government of the state, has at the same time invested him with the power necessary to exercise it. And thus the question is only, whether every magistrate, as such, has need, on this occasion, of an express order from the sovereign; so that the constitution of civil societies in general re-<252>quire it, independently of the laws of each particular state.5

XI. Now if a magistrate can have recourse to arms for the reduction of one person, of two, ten, or twenty, who either refuse to obey him, or attempt to hinder the exercise of his jurisdiction, why may he not use the same means against fifty, a hundred, a thousand? &c. The greater the number of the disobedient, the more he will have occasion for force to overcome their resistance. Now this is what Grotius includes under the term war.

XII. Puffendorf agrees to this in the main; but he pretends that this coercive power, which belongs to a magistrate over disobedient subjects, is not a right of war; war seeming to be intirely between equals, or at least such as pretend to equality. The idea of Puffendorf ’s is certainly more regular, and agreeable to custom; but it is evident, that the difference between him and Grotius consists only in the greater or lesser extent which each of them gives to the word war.

XIII. If it be objected, that it is dangerous to leave so much power to a subordinate magistrate; this may be true: but then it proves only that the prudence of legislators requires they should set bounds in this respect to the power of magistrates, in order to prevent an inconveniency which should otherwise arise from the institution of magistracy.<253>

XIV. But to judge of the power of the magistrates, or of generals and leaders, in respect to war, properly so called, and which is carried on against a foreign enemy, we need only to attend to their commissions; for it is evident that they cannot lawfully undertake any act of hostility of their own head, and without a formal order of the sovereign, at least reasonably presumed, in consequence of particular circumstances.6

XV. Thus, for example, a general sent upon an expedition with an unlimited authority, may act against the enemy offensively, as well as defensively, and in such a manner as he shall judge most advantageous; but he can neither levy a new war, nor make peace of his own head. But if his power be limited, he ought never to pass the bounds prescribed, unless he is unavoidably reduced to it by the necessity of self-defence; for whatever he does in that case, is supposed to be with the consent and approbation of the sovereign. Thus, if an admiral has orders to be upon the defensive, he may, notwithstanding such a restraint, break in upon the enemy’s fleet, and sink and burn as many of their ships as he can, if they come to attack him: all that he is forbidden, is to challenge the enemy first.

XVI. In general, the governors of provinces and cities, if they have troops under their command, may by their own authority defend themselves against an enemy who attacks them; but they ought not to carry the war into a foreign country, without an express order from their sovereign.<254>

XVII. It was in virtue of this privilege, arising from necessity, that Lucius Pinarius,* governor of Enna in Sicily for the Romans, upon certain information that the inhabitants designed to revolt to the Carthaginians, put them all to the sword, and thus preserved the place. But, except in the like case of necessity, the inhabitants of a town have no right to take up arms, in order to obtain satisfaction for those injuries which the prince neglects to revenge.

XVIII. A mere presumption of the will of the sovereign, would not even be sufficient to excuse a governor, or any other officer, who should undertake a war, except in case of necessity, without either a general or particular order. For it is not sufficient to know what part the sovereign would probably act, if he were consulted, in such a particular posture of affairs; but it should rather be considered in general, what it is probable a prince would desire should be done without consulting him, when the matter will bear some delay, and the affair is dubious. Now certainly sovereigns will never consent that their ministers should, whenever they think proper, undertake, without their order, a thing of such importance as an offensive war, which is the proper subject of the present inquiry.7

XIX. In these circumstances, whatever part the sovereign would have thought proper to act, if he had been consulted; and whatever success the war, undertaken without his orders, may have had; it is left to the sovereign whether he will ratify, or con-<255>demn the act of his minister. If he ratifies it, this approbation renders the war solemn, by reflecting back, as it were, an authority upon it, so that it obliges the whole commonwealth. But if the sovereign should condemn the act of the governor, the hostilities committed by the latter ought to pass for a sort of robbery, the fault of which by no means affects the state, provided the governor is delivered up, or punished according to the laws of the country, and proper satisfaction be made for the damages sustained.

XX. We may further observe, that in civil societies, when a particular member has done an injury to a stranger, the governor of the commonwealth is sometimes responsible for it, so that war may be declared against him on that account. But to ground this kind of imputation, we must necessarily suppose one of these two things, sufferance, or reception; viz. either that the sovereign has suffered this harm to be done to the stranger, or that he afforded a retreat to the criminal.8

XXI. In the former case it must be laid down as a maxim, that a sovereign, who knowing the crimes of his subjects, as for example, that they practise piracy on strangers; and being also able and obliged to hinder it, does not hinder it, renders himself criminal, because he has consented to the bad action, the commission of which he has permitted, and consequently furnished a just reason of war.<256>

XXII. The two conditions above-mentioned, I mean the knowledge and sufferance of the sovereign, are absolutely necessary, the one not being sufficient without the other, to communicate any share in the guilt. Now it is presumed, that a sovereign knows what his subjects openly and frequently commit; and as to his power of hindering the evil, this likewise is always presumed, unless the want of it be clearly proved.

XXIII. The other way, in which a sovereign renders himself guilty of the crime of another, is by allowing a retreat and admittance to the criminal, and skreening him from punishment. Puffendorf pretends, that if we are obliged to deliver up a criminal who takes shelter among us, it is rather in virtue of some treaty on this head, than in consequence of a common and indispensable obligation.

XXIV. But Puffendorf, I think, has, without sufficient reasons, abandoned the opinion of Grotius, which seems to be better founded. The principles of the latter, in regard to the present question, may be reduced to these following.

1°. Since the establishment of civil societies, the right of punishing public offences, which every person, if not chargeable himself with such a crime, had in the state of nature, has been transferred to the sovereign, so that the latter alone hath the privilege of punishing, as he thinks proper, those transgressions of his subjects, which properly interest the public.9 <257>

XXV. But this right of punishing crimes is not so exclusively theirs, but that either public bodies, or their governors, have a right to procure the punishment of them in the same manner, as the laws of particular countries allow private people the prosecution of crimes before the civil tribunal.

XXVI. 3°. This right is still stronger with respect to crimes, by which they are directly injured, and which they have a perfect right of punishing, for the support of their honour and10 safety. In such circumstances, the state, to which the criminal retires, ought not to obstruct the right that belongs to the other power.

XXVII. 4°. Now as one prince does not generally permit another to send armed men into his territories, upon the score of exacting punishment (for this would indeed be attended with terrible inconveniencies) it is reasonable11 the sovereign, in whose dominions the offender lives, or has taken shelter, should either punish the criminal according to his demerits, or deliver him up, to be punished at the discretion of the injured sovereign. This is that delivering up, of which we have so many examples in history.

XXVIII. 5°. The principles here laid down, concerning the obligation of punishing or delivering up, regard not only the criminals who have always been subjects of the government they now live under, but also those who, after the commission of a crime, have taken shelter in the country.<258>

XXIX. 6°. In fine, we must observe that the right of demanding fugitive delinquents to punishment, has not for some ages last past been insisted upon by sovereigns, in most parts of Europe, except in crimes against the state, or those of a very heinous nature. As to lesser crimes, they are connived at on both sides, unless it is otherwise agreed on by some particular treaty.

XXX. Besides the kinds of war, hitherto mentioned, we may also distinguish them into perfect and imperfect. A perfect war, is that which entirely interrupts the tranquillity of the state, and lays a foundation for all possible acts of hostility. An imperfect war, on the contrary, is that which does not intirely interrupt the peace, but only in certain particulars, the public tranquillity being in other respects undisturbed.

XXXI. This last species of war is generally called reprisals, of the nature of which we shall give here some account. By reprisals then we mean that imperfect kind of war, or those acts of hostility which sovereigns exercise against each other, or, with their consent, their subjects, by seizing the persons or effects of the subjects of a foreign commonwealth, that refuseth to do us justice; with a view to obtain security, and to recover our right, and in case of refusal, to do justice to ourselves, without any other interruption of the public tranquillity.12

XXXII. Grotius pretends, that reprisals are not founded on the law of nature and necessity, but<259> only on a kind of arbitrary law of nations, by which most of them have agreed, that the goods belonging to the subjects of a foreign state should be a pledge or security, as it were, for what that state, or the governor of it, might owe us, either directly, and in their own names, or by rendering themselves responsible for the actions of others, upon refusing to administer justice.

XXXIII. But this is far from being an arbitrary right, founded upon a pretended law of nations, whose existence we cannot prove, depending on the greater or less extent of custom no way binding in the nature of a law. The right we here speak of, is a consequence of the constitution of civil societies, and an application of the maxims of the law of nature to that constitution.13

XXXIV. During the independence of the state of nature, and before the institution of civil government, if a person had been injured, he could come upon those only who had done the wrong, or upon their accomplices; because there was then no tie between men, in virtue of which a person might be deemed to have consented, in some manner, to what others did even without his participation.

XXXV. But since civil societies have been formed, that is to say, communities, whose members are all united together for their common defence, there has necessarily arisen from thence a conjunction of interests and wills; which is the reason, that as the<260> society, or the powers which govern it, engage to defend each other against every insult; so each individual may be deemed to have engaged to answer for the conduct of the society, of which he is a member, or of the powers which govern it.

XXXVI. No human establishment can supersede the obligation of that general and inviolable law of nature, that the damage we have done to another should be repaired; except those, who are thereby injured, have manifestly renounced their right of demanding reparation. And when such establishments hinder those who are injured, from obtaining satisfaction so easily as they might without them, this difficulty must be made up, by furnishing the persons interested with all the other possible methods of doing themselves justice.

XXXVII. Now it is certain that societies, or the powers which govern them, by being armed with the force of the whole body, are sometimes encouraged to laugh with impunity at strangers, who come to demand their due; and that every subject contributes, one way or other, to enable them to act in this manner; so that he may be supposed in some measure to consent to it. But if he does not in reality consent, there is, after all, no other manner of facilitating, to injured strangers, the prosecution of their rights, which is rendered difficult by the united force of the whole body, than to authorise them to come upon all those who are members of it.<261>

XXXVIII. Let us therefore conclude, that by the constitution of civil societies, every subject, so long as he continues such, is responsible to strangers for the conduct of the society, or of him who governs it; with this clause, however, that he may demand indemnification, when there is any fault or injustice on the part of his superiors. But if it should be any man’s misfortune to be disappointed of this indemnification, he must look upon it as one of those inconveniencies which, in a civil state, the constitution of human affairs renders almost inevitable. If to all these we add the reasons alledged by Grotius, we shall plainly see, that there is no necessity for supposing a tacit consent of the people to found the right of reprisals.

XXXIX. As reprisals are acts of hostility, and often the prelude or forerunner of a compleat and perfect war, it is plain that none but the sovereign can lawfully use this right, and that the subjects can make no reprisals but by his order and authority.14

XL. Besides, it is proper that the wrong or injustice done us, and which occasions the reprisals, should be clear and evident, and that the thing in dispute be of great consequence. For if the injury be dubious, or of no importance, it would be equally unjust and dangerous to proceed to this extremity, and to expose ourselves to all the calamities of an open war. Neither ought we to come to reprisals, before we have tried, by the ordinary means, to obtain justice for the injury committed. For this purpose we must apply to the prince, whose subject<262> has done us the injustice; and if the prince takes no notice, or refuses satisfaction, we may then make reprisals, in order to obtain it.

XLI. In a word, we must not have recourse to reprisals, except when all the ordinary means of obtaining satisfaction have failed; so that, for instance, if a subordinate magistrate has refused us justice, we are not permitted to use reprisals before we apply to the sovereign himself, who will perhaps grant us satisfaction. In such circumstances, we may therefore either detain the subjects of a foreign state, if they with-hold ours; or we may seize their goods and effects. But whatever just reason we may have to make reprisals, we can never directly, and for that reason alone, put those to death whom we have seized upon, but only secure them, and not use them ill, till we have obtained satisfaction; so that, during all that time, they are to be considered as hostages.

XLII. In regard to the goods seized by the right of reprisals, we must take care of them till the time, in which satisfaction ought to be made, is expired; after which we may adjudge them to the creditor, or sell them for the payment of the debt; returning to him, from whom they were taken, the overplus, when all charges are deducted.

XLIII. We must also observe, that it is not permitted to use reprisals, except with regard to subjects, properly so called, and their effects; for as to strangers, who do but pass through a country, or<263> only come to make a short stay in it, they have not a sufficient connection with the state, of which they are only members but for a time, and in an imperfect manner; so that we cannot indemnify ourselves by them, for the loss we have sustained by any native of the country, and by the refusal of the sovereign to render us justice. We must farther except ambassadors, who are sacred persons, even in the height of war. But as to women, clergymen, men of letters, &c. the law of nature grants them no privilege in this case, if they have not otherwise acquired it by virtue of some treaty.

XLIV. Lastly, some political writers distinguish those wars which are carried on between two or more sovereigns, from those of the subjects against their governors. But it is plain, that when subjects take up arms against their prince, they either do it for just reasons, and according to the principles established in this work, or without a just and lawful cause. In the latter case, it is rather a revolt or insurrection, than a war, properly so called. But if the subjects have just reason to resist the sovereign, it is strictly a war; since, in such a crisis, there are neither sovereign nor subjects, all dependance and obligation having ceased. The two opposite parties are then in a state of nature and equality, trying to obtain justice by their own proper strength, which constitutes what we understand properly by the term war.15 <264>

[1. ]This paragraph is based on DNG VIII.6 §3, while the next four are drawn from note 1 to the same.

[2. ]The translator’s “has had sufficient provocation” is not a good translation for the original “a raison.” The French “avoir raison” can mean either “have reason” or “have just cause.”

[3. ]In DGP I.3 §1.

[4. ]Based on DNG VIII.6 §9; the following paragraph is from §10 of the same chapter and on DGP I.3 §4.

[* ]See above, sect. vii. [i.e., §7 in this chapter.]

[5. ]This and the next paragraphs are taken from DGP I.3 §4 note 6. In paragraph 12 below, Burlamaqui expands on the issue before returning in paragraph 13 to his repetition of Barbeyrac’s footnote.

[6. ]This and the three following paragraphs are from DNG VIII.6 §10.

[* ]Livy, lib. xxi. cap. xviii.

[7. ]This paragraph is from DNG VIII.6 §11. The following is again from §10 of the same chapter.

[8. ]Read: “accused” rather than “responsible.” This paragraph and the three following are from DNG VIII.6 §12.

[9. ]Read: “which properly interest the body of which they are members.” Pufendorf ’s position is also rejected by Barbeyrac, who refers to the relevant passages in Grotius in DNG VIII.6 §12 note 2. These passages are in DGP II.20 §§3–6 and are summarized by Barbeyrac in DNG VIII.3 §4 note 3, which also contains a presentation of Locke’s similarly non-Pufendorfian approach. The main source for this and the next two paragraphs seems to be DGP II.21 §3.

[10. ]Read: “or.” At the end of this paragraph, read “all other powers” (“toute autre puissance”).

[11. ]Read: “necessary that.” This paragraph is from DGP II.21 §4.

[12. ]Based on DNG VIII.6 §13 and on note 1 to the same.

[13. ]This and the five following paragraphs are based on DGP III.2 §2 note 1.

[14. ]This and the five following paragraphs are (again very nearly word for word) from DNG VIII.6 §13 note 1.

[15. ]Compare this with DNG VII.8 §6 note 1.