The Online Library of Liberty

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• Introduction
• Note On the Text
• Acknowledgments
• Volume 1: The Principles of Natural Law
• Part I: General Principles of Right.
• Chapter I: Of the Nature of Man Considered With Regard to Right: of the Understanding, and Whatever Is Relative to This Faculty.
• Chapter II: Continuation of the Principles Relative to the Nature of Man. of Will and Liberty.
• Chapter III: That Man Thus Constituted, Is a Creature Capable of Moral Direction, and Accountable For His Actions.
• Chapter IV: Further Inquiry Into What Relates to Human Nature, By Considering the Different States of Man.
• Chapter V: That Man Ought to Square His Conduct By Rule; the Method of Finding Out This Rule; and the Foundations of Right In General.
• Chapter VI: General Rules of Conduct Prescribed By Reason. of the Nature and First Foundations of Obligation.
• Chapter VII: Of Right Considered As a Faculty, and of the Obligation Thereto Corresponding.
• Chapter Viii *: of Law In General.
• Chapter IX: Of the Foundation of Sovereignty, Or the Right of Commanding.
• Chapter X: Of the End of Laws; of Their Characters, Differences, &c.
• Chapter XI: Of the Morality of Human Actions. *
• Part II: Of the Law of Nature.
• Chapter I: In What the Law of Nature Consists, and That There Is Such a Thing. First Considerations Drawn From the Existence of God and His Authority Over Us.
• Chapter II: That God, In Consequence of His Authority Over Us, Has Actually Thought Proper to Prescribe to Us Laws Or Rules of Conduct.
• Chapter III: Of the Means By Which We Discern What Is Just and Unjust, Or What Is Dictated By Natural Law; Namely, 1. Moral Instinct, and 2. Reason.
• Chapter IV: Of the Principles From Whence Reason May Deduce the Law of Nature. *
• Chapter V: That Natural Laws Have Been Sufficiently Notified; of Their Proper Characteristics, the Obligation They Produce, &c.
• Chapter VI: Of the Law of Nations.
• Chapter VII: Whether There Is Any Morality of Actions, Any Obligation Or Duty, Antecedent to the Laws of Nature, and Independent of the Idea of a Legislator? 1
• Chapter VIII: Consequences of the Preceding Chapter: Reflections On the Distinctions of Just, Honest, and Useful.
• Chapter IX: Of the Application of Natural Laws to Human Actions; and First of Conscience. †
• Chapter X: Of the Merit and Demerit of Human Actions; and of Their Imputation Relative to the Laws of Nature. *
• Chapter XI: Application of Those Principles to Different Species of Actions, In Order to Judge In What Manner They Ought to Be Imputed.
• Chapter XII: Of the Authority and Sanction of Natural Laws † and 1. of the Good Or Evil That Naturally and Generally Follows From Virtue Or Vice.
• Chapter XIII: Proofs of the Immortality of the Soul. That There Is a Sanction, Properly So Called, In Respect to Natural Law. 1
• Chapter XIV: That the Proofs We Have Alledged Have Such a Probability and Fitness, As Renders Them Sufficient to Fix Our Belief, and to Determine Our Conduct.
• Volume 2: The Principles of Politic Law
• Part I: Which Treats of the Origin and Nature of Civil Society, of Sovereignty In General, of Its Peculiar Characteristic, Limitations, and Essential Parts.
• Chapter I: Containing a Few General and Preliminary Reflections, Which Serve As an Introduction to This and the Following Parts.
• Chaper II: Of the Real Origin of Civil Societies.
• Chapter III: Of the Right of Congruity Or Fitness With Regard to the Institution of Civil Society, and the Necessity of a Supreme Authority: of Civil Liberty; That It Is Far Preferable 1 to Natural Liberty, and That the State Is of All Human Conditions
• Chapter IV: Of the Essential Constitution of States, and of the Manner In Which They Are Formed.
• Chapter V: Of the Sovereign, Sovereignty, and the Subjects.
• Chapter VI: Of the Immediate Source, and Foundation of Sovereignty.
• Chapter VII: Of the Essential Characters of Sovereignty, Its Modifications, Extent, and Limits.
• Chapter VIII: Of the Parts of Sovereignty, Or of the Different Essential Rights Which It Includes.
• Part II: In Which Are Explained the Different Forms of Government, the Ways of Acquiring Or Losing Sovereignty, and the Reciprocal Duties of Sovereigns and Subjects.
• Chapter I: Of the Various Forms of Government.
• Chapter II: An Essay On This Question, Which Is the Best Form of Government?
• Chapter III: Of the Different Ways of Acquiring Sovereignty.
• Chapter IV: Of the Different Ways of Losing Sovereignty.
• Chapter V: Of the Duties of Subjects In General.
• Chapter VI: Of the Inviolable Rights of Sovereignty, of the Deposing of Sovereigns, of the Abuse of the Supreme Power, and of Tyranny.
• Chapter VIII: Of the Duty 1 of Sovereigns.
• Part III: A More Particular Examination of the Essential Parts of Sovereignty, Or of the Different Rights of the Sovereign, With Respect to the Internal Administration of the State, Such As the Legislative Power, the Supreme Power In Matters of Religion,
• Chapter I: Of the Legislative Power, and the Civil Laws Which Arise From It.
• Chapter II: Of the Right of Judging the Doctrines Taught In the State: of the Care Which the Sovereign Ought to Take to Form the Manners of His Subjects.
• Chapter III: Of the Power of the Sovereign In Matters of Religion.
• Chapter IV: Of the Power of the Sovereign Over the Lives and Fortunes of His Subjects In Criminal Cases.
• Chapter V: Of the Power of Sovereigns Over the Bona Reipublicae, 1 Or the Goods Contained In the Commonwealth.
• Part IV: In Which Are Considered the Different Rights of Sovereignty With Respect to Foreign States; the Right of War, and Every Thing Relating to It; Public Treaties, and the Right of Ambassadors.
• Chapter I: Of War In General, and First of the Right of the Sovereign, In This Respect, Over His Subjects.
• Chapter II: Of the Causes of War.
• Chapter III: Of the Different Kinds of War.
• Chapter IV: Of Those Things Which Ought to Precede War.
• Chapter V: General Rules to Know What Is Allowable In War.
• Chapter VI: Of the Rights Which War Gives Over the Persons of the Enemy, and of Their Extent and Bounds.
• Chapter VII: Of the Rights of War Over the Goods of an Enemy.
• Chapter VIII: Of the Right of Sovereignty Acquired Over the Conquered.
• Chapter IX: Of Public Treaties In General.
• Chapter X: Of Compacts Made With an Enemy.
• Chapter XI: Of Compacts With an Enemy, Which Do Not Put an End to the War.
• Chapter XII: Of Compacts Made, During the War, By Subordinate Powers, As Generals of Armies, Or Other Commanders.
• Chapter XIII: Of Compacts Made With an Enemy By Private Persons.
• Chapter XIV: Of Public Compacts Which Put an End to War.
• Chapter XV: Of the Right of Ambassadors.

CHAPTER III

That man thus constituted, is a creature capable of moral direction, and accountable for his actions.

Man is capable of direction in regard to his conduct.I. After having seen the nature of man, considered in respect to right, the result is, that he is a creature really susceptible of choice and direction in his conduct. For since he is capable, by means of his faculties, of knowing the nature and state of things, and of judging from this knowledge; since he is invested with the power of determining between two or several offers made to him; in fine, since, with the assistance of liberty, he is able, in certain cases, to suspend or continue his actions, as he judges proper; it evidently follows, that he is master of his own actions, and that he exercises a kind of authority and command over them, by virtue of which he can direct and turn them which way he pleases. Hence it appears how necessary it was for us to set out, as we have done, with inquiring previously into the nature and faculties of man. For how could we have<34> discovered the rules by which he is to square his conduct, unless we antecedently know in what manner he acts, and what are the springs, as it were, that put him in motion?

He is accountable for his actions: they can be imputed to him.II. Another remark, which is a consequence of the foregoing, is, that since man is the immediate author of his actions, he is accountable for them; and in justice and reason they can be imputed to him. This is a point of which we think it necessary to give here a short explication.

The term of imputing is borrowed of arithmetic, and signifies properly, to set a sum down to somebody’s account. To impute an action therefore to a person, is to attribute it to him as to its real author, to set it down, as it were, to his account, and to make him answerable for it. Now it is evidently an essential quality of human actions, as produced and directed by the understanding and will, to be susceptible of imputation; that is, it is plain that man can be justly considered as the author and productive cause of those actions, and that for this very reason it is right to make him accountable for them, and to lay to his charge the effects that arise from thence as natural consequences. In fact, the true reason why a person cannot complain of being made answerable for an action, is that he has produced it himself knowingly and willingly. Every thing almost that is said and done in human society, supposes this principle generally received, and every body acquiesces in it from an inward conviction.<35>

Principle of imputability. We must not confound it with imputation.III. We must therefore lay down, as an incontestable and fundamental principle of the imputability of human actions, that every voluntary action is susceptible of imputation; or, to express the same thing in other terms, that every action or omission subject to the direction of man, can be charged to the account of the person in whose power it was to do it or let it alone; and on the contrary, every action, whose existence or non-existence does not depend on our will, cannot be imputed to us. Observe here, that omissions are ranked by civilians and moralists among the number of actions; because they apprehend them as the effect of a voluntary suspension of the exercise of our faculties.

Such is the foundation of imputability, and the true reason why an action or omission is of an imputable nature. But we must take particular notice, that though an action is imputable, it does not ensue from thence only, that it merits actually to be imputed. Imputability and imputation are two things, which we should carefully distinguish. The latter supposes, besides the imputability, some moral necessity of acting or not, after a certain manner; or, which amounts to the same, some obligation that requires a thing to be done or omitted that can be really done or omitted.

Puffendorf* does not seem to have sufficiently distinguished between these two ideas. It is enough for our present purpose to point out the distinction,<36> deferring to treat of actual imputation, and to establish the principles thereof, till we have explained the nature of obligation, and shewn that man is actually obliged to conform his actions to rule.

What has been hitherto advanced, properly regards the nature of the human mind; or the internal faculties of man, as they render him capable of moral direction. But in order to complete our knowledge of human nature, we should view it likewise in its extrinsic condition, in its wants and dependancies, and in the various relations wherein it is placed; in fine,1 in what we may call the different states of man. For it is our situation in life that decides the use we ought to make of our faculties.

[* ]See the Law of nature and nations, book i. chap. v. § 5. and the Duties of man and a citizen, book i. chap. i. § 17. [Burlamaqui’s critical comments on Pufendorf are from Barbeyrac’s note 1 to the paragraph in DHC I.1 §17.]

[1. ]The original has “in a word” (“en un mot”).