Front Page Titles (by Subject) LETTER XXXV. (XXII.): Blyenbergh to Spinoza. - The Chief Works of Benedict de Spinoza, vol. 2
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LETTER XXXV. (XXII.): Blyenbergh to Spinoza. - Benedict de Spinoza, The Chief Works of Benedict de Spinoza, vol. 2 
The Chief Works of Benedict de Spinoza, translated from the Latin, with an Introduction by R.H.M. Elwes, vol. 2 De Intellectus Emendatione - Ethica. (Select Letters). Revised edition (London: George Bell and Sons, 1901).
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LETTER XXXV. (XXII.)
Blyenbergh to Spinoza.
[This letter (extending over five pages) is only given here in brief summary.]
The tone of your last letter is very different from that of your first. If our essence is equivalent to our state at a given time, we are as perfect when sinning as when virtuous: God would wish for vice as much as virtue. Both the virtuous and the vicious execute God’s will—What is the difference between them? You say some actions are more perfect than others; wherein does this perfection consist? If a mind existed so framed, that vice was in agreement with its proper nature, why should such a mind prefer good to evil? If God makes us all that we are, how can we “go astray”? Can rational substances depend on God in any way except lifelessly? What is the difference between a rational being’s dependence on God, and an irrational being’s? If we have no free will, are not our actions God’s actions, and our will God’s will? I could ask several more questions, but do not venture.
P.S. In my hurry I forgot to insert this question: Whether we cannot by foresight avert what would otherwise happen to us?
Dordrecht, 19 Feb., 1665.