Front Page Titles (by Subject) CHAP. I.: Concerning those Principles in Human Nature, which may serve as a Basis for any Species of Civil Government to stand upon, without the actual Choice, or personal Election of every Member of the Community either towards the first Erection, or the - A Treatise Concerning Civil Government in Three Parts
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CHAP. I.: Concerning those Principles in Human Nature, which may serve as a Basis for any Species of Civil Government to stand upon, without the actual Choice, or personal Election of every Member of the Community either towards the first Erection, or the - Josiah Tucker, A Treatise Concerning Civil Government in Three Parts 
A Treatise Concerning Civil Government in Three Parts (London: T. Cadell, 1781).
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Concerning those Principles in Human Nature, which may serve as a Basis for any Species of Civil Government to stand upon, without the actual Choice, or personal Election of every Member of the Community either towards the first Erection, or the Continuation of such a Government.
AS Mr. Locke, and his Followers have objected to our deducing Kingly Government, or indeed any Kind of Civil Government from the Authority of Parents over their Children [though the Out-Lines, and first Rudiments of all Governments had probably no other Origin,] and have taken such Pains to shew the Disparity of the Cases; we will gratify them to their Hearts Content in this particular: For we will endeavour to shew, that were Numbers of the Human Species to be brought together, (tho’ no otherwise connected than by being of the same Species) they would soon fall into some Kind of Subordination among themselves, and consequently into some Kind of, Government;—and that too without that personal, and particular Election, for which Mr. Locke and his Followers have so strenuously contended.
In order therefore to keep at a sufficient Distance from the Patriarchal System, and the indefeasible Right Lined Monarchy of Sir Robert Filmer;—Let us suppose, that, instead of one Pair, an Hundred Pair of Men and Women were at first created: And let us contemplate the various Instincts, Qualities, and Propensities (as far as the present Subject is concerned) with which this Tribe of Animals would be found to be endowed;—supposing them to be made of the same Sort of Materials, which we see Mankind to be of, at present.
And as we are now setting out on our Inquiries, be it carefully remembered, that the first Difference between the Lockians, and others seems to be this;—The Lockians maintain, that Mankind have a Capacity for becoming Members of a Civil Society;—but no natural Desire, or Inclination for entering into such a State of Life: [Indeed they do not say the latter in express Terms, but they do by necessary Consequences:] Whereas we maintain, that Human Nature is endowed with both Capacity, and Inclination:—And that the natural Instinct precedes the Capacity, much in the same Manner, tho’ not with the same Strength, or in the same Degree, as the innate Instincts of Individuals towards Food, or of the Species towards each other, precede the Arts of Cookery, and Brewery, of Marriage-Ceremonies, and Marriage-Settlements.
This therefore being the Question, we are now to endeavour to find out, how far Nature herself hath led the Way towards the Formation of Civil Government by means of various Instincts, Biasses, and Propensities implanted in Mankind before Art was introduced either to mend or mar her Handywork.
1. Therefore, the first Thing observable in the Class of Animals above-mentioned [the hundred Pair of adult Men and Women] is, That they are formed by Nature to be of the gregarious Kind. For most certainly the Individuals of the Human Species are so far from seeking Solitude, as their natural State, that such a Course of Life would be one of the forest Punishments which could be inflicted on them: And nothing can be a clearer Proof of a contrary Bias in Nature; than the strong Desire which not only Children manifest to associate together, but which adult Persons feel, to be acquainted even with Strangers, differing from themselves in Language, Manners, and in almost every Thing, excepting their being of the same Species, rather than not to enjoy any Company at all. Now this Disposition in Human Creatures to associate with their Like, is a leading Step towards Civil Society; because no Animals whatever, but the gregarious, can be fit to form a Community, or a Common-Wealth.
2. A second Thing observable is, That there is a prodigious Variety even in the natural Endowments, both of Body and Mind belonging to the several Individuals of the human Species: So that probably no two among them are altogether, and in every Respect alike. Far therefore, very far it is from being true, that all Mankind are naturally equal, or on a Par, respecting their several Endowments either mental, or corporeal. Indeed had this been the Case, it is hard to say, how any Kind of Subordination, and consequently Government, could have been introduced among such a Tribe of equal, independent, unconnected Beings: Wherefore
3. A third Observation is, that these Differences of Genius and Talents, these several Excellencies and Defects, these Capacities and Incapacities are found, for the most Part, to be relative and reciprocal; so that wheresoever one abounds, another is defective, and vice versa: By which Means all these Animals stand in Need of each other’s Assistance in some Respect, or in one Degree or other:—Surely this is another plain Proof, that they were not framed by Nature for an equal, independent, unconnected State of Life.
4. A fourth Remark is, That as these Animals mutually want each other’s Help and Assistance; so are they naturally endowed with a Power of making known their Wants to each other, and their mutual Willingness to relieve them. Now, as this is a Fact, which cannot be controverted, it is very immaterial to decide, whether the Manner of making known such mutual Wants, or Intentions, was at first by Means of dumb Signs and Gestures, and inarticulate Sounds, or thro’ the Medium of some primæval Language infused in, or communicated to them at the Time of their Creation. Therefore be that as it may, it is more material to observe in the
5th and last Place, That each of these human Animals feels, generally speaking, a strong Instinct to succour and relieve the Wants and Distresses of his Fellow-Creatures:—Inasmuch as, next to providing what is necessary for his own Preservation, and removing Pain from his own Person, he is prompted and spurred on to do the like good Offices for others. And he finds, that he receives great Pleasure both in the immediate Gratification of this benevolent, sympathizing Instinct, and in his subsequent Reflections on it.
Now from a Contemplation of this Sketch, or Out-line, if I may speak, of the Portrait of Human Nature, it is, I think, not very difficult to determine, what would be the probable Result of an Assemblage of an Hundred Pair of such Animals as these, after a short Acquaintance, respecting Society and Civil Government. For
1. They would not be long before they endeavoured to gratify the first, and the quickest in Succession, of all the Calls of Nature, the Appetites of Hunger and Thirst; and that too without having any distinct Knowledge, perhaps without the least Ideal that such a Gratification was necessary for the Preservation of the Individual. Nay, it is highly probable, that Nature at the first Creation of the Human Pairs, proceeded much farther in her instinctive Instructions, than she need do at present. For at the first, Men were not only impelled by the Appetites of Hunger and Thirst to seek for Meat and Drink, but were also taught, either by some Guardian Angel sent on purpose to instruct them, or were led by some extraordinary Impulse to discover and chuse what were proper Eatables and Drinkables in their peculiar Situation.—To suppose the contrary, would be to suppose, that this Hundred Pair of adult Men and Women, were left to themselves to make Experiments, as they could, on every thing around them,—by endeavouring to swallow perhaps Sand or Gravel, instead of Water, towards quenching Thirst, and to gnaw a Stone, or a Stick, instead of chewing a Root, a Fruit, or a Berry for appeasing Hunger. It cannot therefore reasonably be doubted, but that the first Race of Men were taught by Nature, or rather by Nature’s God, to distinguish, without the tedious Process of uncertain Experiments, the proper from the improper, the wholesome from the unwholesome in such a Situation.
[As to the Instinct between the Sexes for the Renovation of the Species (as the former was for the Preservation of the Individual) suffice it just to put the Reader in Mind, that as we have supposed the Creation to have been made in Conjugal Pairs, we have thereby avoided, at least for the present, all the Difficulties, that might otherwise have arisen in the Choice and Preference of Objects;—only this much is necessary to observe on this Head, as well as on the former, that ’till they had been taught by Experience, it was impossible for the wisest of them to have guessed what would have been the Consequence, at the Expiration of a certain Term, of such an Intercourse of one Sex with the other.]
2dly. These human Animals, when herding together, and beginning to eat and drink, would soon discover a vast Superiority, and Inferiority of Talents among themselves, in respect of making Provision for satisfying the Cravings of Thirst and Hunger. For some would be found to be much more ingenious, and perhaps more industrious and provident than others, either in the gathering of Viands, and the procuring and portage of drinkable Liquids;—or in storing them up, and preserving them sweet and wholesome. This Man would excel either in turning the Ground in search after Roots, or in climbing Trees for Fruit;—another in swimming and diving for Fish, or in the Pursuit of Game;—a third in the taming certain Beasts and Birds for domestic Use, or in the planting of such Vegetables, as were found to be good for Food, and so quick of Growth as soon to come to Maturity;—whilst a fourth perhaps would display a Dexterity and Genius in the Preparation of several Kinds of Victuals, and in the first Rudiments of the Arts of Cookery. Now in all these Cases, it is obvious to conceive, That the less ingenious, or adventurous, the less provident and frugal would naturally become, without any formal Contract, dependent on, and subservient to their Instructors and Benefactors, in one Degree or other.
3dly. The like Superiority of Parts and Talents would necessarily appear, tho’ at somewhat a later Period in the Cases of procuring Rayment, and of constructing Habitations. For no Man can pretend that all the Human Species are endowed with equal Powers, or equal Capacities in these Respects. And therefore in Proportion as the less adroit, or less provident, felt themselves incommoded by the Extremes either of Heat, or of Cold, and wished to free themselves from their Evils;—in nearly the same Proportion would they become the Ministers of those, who could, and would relieve them from their Distresses. For here it must be remembered once for all, that in such a Situation as we are now describing, and before Commerce and Money were introduced, the Person who felt himself inferior in any of these Respects, could make no other Compensation to his Superior, but by some Kind of personal Service.
4th. The Advantage arising from a peculiar Genius to abridge Labour by Means of Machines,—or to divide, and subdivide it into distinct Parts, or Portions for the Sake of greater Ease, Expertness, and Expedition, is another Cause, why some Men must rise in Society, without any Compact, or Election, and others as naturally sink;—and consequently, why Subordination at first, and Government afterwards, must take Place. For had there been no Difference of natural Genius between Man and Man;—and no Distinction of Talents and Powers both mental, and corporeal, between Males and Females,—it is hardly possible to conceive, how there could have existed any Distinction of Trades, or Diversity of Employments. And without them a regular Plan of Government cannot be supported.
To illustrate this Matter, be it observed, that tho’ Horses, and horned Cattle naturally herd together, as well as Men, being all of the gregarious Kind;—yet as none of these Individuals display any Genius either to abridge Labour, or to divide it into separate Parts or Portions,—so there is nothing approaching towards a Distinction of Trades, or a Diversity of Imployments to be found among them;—consequently they are total Strangers to any Forms of Government, Republican, or Monarchical; and they know nothing of the Rules of Justice or Equity, or of any Laws, but those of brutal Force. Whereas Bees, Ants, and Beavers, who are remarkable for dividing the Labour of the Whole into distinct Portions, assigning to each Individual a proper Share, become of Course a regular Community among themselves, wherein some preside, and others must obey. All Authors, who have favoured us with the natural History of these three Tribes of Animals, speak with Raptures of their admirable Police, Discipline, and Œconomy. Yet not one Writer, that I know of, hath once suggested the most distant Thought, that these Things are owing to any social Compact, or popular Form of Government:—No, not one hath hitherto dared to maintain, that each Bee, Ant, or Beaver is his own Law-giver, Governor, and Director.
[There are other Causes which might be mentioned, as greatly contributing towards the first Formation of Government, without any explicit Compact, or mutual Stipulation. And these are the Power of Language,—and the Power of saving, or protecting from impending Dangers. In regard to Language, some striking Observations might have been made, had we the Time, and Abilities to have done Justice to the Subject:—Suffice it for the present just to declare my Opinion, That at the first Creation of the human Kind, the Adams and Eves, spoke some certain Language (whatever it was) by mere Instinct, without any previous Teaching (excepting the instantaneous Teaching of Nature) and without Education, or Instruction. I know indeed, that the contrary is the prevailing Opinion, That all Words, and the Meaning of all Words were originally settled by mutual Consent, and at some certain Congress held for that Purpose. But here I should be glad to know, what particular Language was spoken by Adam and Eve, and their Sons and Daughters,—or by this hundred Pair of Adams and Eves, before they met in Congress?—In what Language or Dialect were they summoned to meet?—And even after they, had met, how came they to understand one another so readily before they had learnt to speak?—And how came they to speak at all, to define, and to agree about the Meaning of certain Words, before these, or any Words whatever had been known among them?—Away therefore with this absurd Notion: And let us believe, as we ought to do, that Nature was more benevolent to her Children at their first Appearance on the Theatre of the World, than this and such like Schemes represent her to be. She certainly infused the first Rudiments of Language,—she instilled the first Knowledge of Things proper for Meats and Drinks,—and she implanted the constituent Principles of Government into Mankind, without any previous Care or Thought on their Parts. But having done this, she left the rest to themselves; in order that they might cultivate and improve her Gifts and Blessings in the best Manner they could.
As to the Power of protecting from impending Danger,—if that should mean only the Power of rescuing, or preserving from the Injuries of the Weather, from the Attacks of wild Beasts, or from some other natural Evils, it is included, at least in Part, under some of the former Heads.—But if it is to signify a Power of protecting the Weak from the intended Violence of the Strong, it will include likewise the Right of Retaliation and Reprisal,—and in its Consequences, the Right of Conquest. Therefore if this should be the Thing meant, I shall not insist on such a Subject at present;—because I wish to shew, That Government can date its Origin from other Causes, besides those of popular Elections, or popular Defeats;—and because a Government founded on Conquest, however justifiable the Occasion of it might have been, is at first very odious, and requires a Length of Time to reconcile Men to it.]
Lastly, there is yet another Consideration, which when properly developed, greatly corroborates all the former. And that is this, That there is found to exist in Human Nature a certain Ascendency in some, and a Kind of submissive Acquiescence in others. The Fact itself, however unaccountable, is nevertheless so notorious, that it is observable in all Stations and Ranks of Life, and almost in every Company. For even in the most paltry Country Village, there is, generally speaking, what the French very expressively term, Le Coque de Village;—A Man, who takes the Lead, and becomes a Kind of Dictator to the rest. Now, whether this arises from a Consciousness of greater Courage, or Capacity,—or from a certain overbearing Temper, which assumes Authority to dictate and command,—or from a greater Address, that is, from a Kind of instinctive Insight into the Weaknesses, and blind Sides of others,—or from whatever Cause, or Causes, it matters not. For the Fact itself, as I said before, is undeniable, however difficult it may be to account for it. And therefore here again is another Instance of great Inequalities in the original Powers and Faculties of Mankind:—Consequently this natural Subordination (if I may so speak) is another distinct Proof, that there was a Foundation deeply laid in Human Nature for the political Edifices of Government to be built upon;—without recurring to, what never existed but in Theory, universal, social Compacts, and unanimous Elections.
Here therefore I will fix my Foot, and rest the Merits of the Cause. An hundred Pair of Adams and Eves are supposed (for the Sake of Argument in this Debate) to have been created at once, and to have been endowed with the various Instincts and Inclinations above described, all tending in one Degree or other, to the Formation of Civil Government. As soon as they see each other, they associate and converse. [N. B. Infants and Children do still the same in their Way.] The next Step they take, is to gratify those Desires and Inclinations towards which * Nature has most powerfully incited them. But they find almost instantaneously, that they are hardly able to satisfy any one of these Desires without the Help and Assistance of others of their Kind. And they feel also, that in whatsoever Sort of Talents, Geniusses, or Capacities they are deficient, others are generally abounding, and vice versa:—They perceive likewise that in receiving good Offices from others, there is a certain pleasing Temper of Mind excited, now called Gratitude,—and that in conferring good Offices, there is another very pleasing Sensation raised, now termed Benevolence.—And thus it came to pass, that a mutual Dependence and a mutual Connection were originally made by the wise Creator of all Things to pervade the Whole:—Yet with this remarkable Diversity, that the Power and Talents of winning and obliging, of influencing, persuading, or commanding, were imparted to some in a much greater Degree than they were to others.
Surely therefore in such Circumstances as these, every human Creature would fall into that Rank in Society, and that Station in Life, to which his Talents and his Genius spontaneously led him,—as naturally, I had almost said, as Water finds its Level. And be it ever remembered, that distinct Ranks and different Stations, would produce a Civil Government, of some Kind or other, in a new World much sooner than they could in an old one.—I said much sooner; because in a new World, there could be no Complaints made against former Mismanagements, no Fears about the Incroachments of Power on the one Hand, or the Intrigues and Declamation of Faction on the other, and consequently no Distrust arising from the Abuses either of former Governors, or of former Demagogues. In short, as in such a World there could be no Manner of Experience, there could hardly be any such Things as Caution and Reserve; and therefore all the Disputes of later Times about social Compacts, Contracts, and Conventions, about positive Stipulations, reciprocal Engagements, and Reservations of Rights, would have been probably as little understood at that Juncture, as the Terms of Art in Cookery, before Cookery became an Art, or the Orders in Building, before a single Building was erected. In short, and to sum up all in one Word, where Nature alone was the Guide, the Terms of Art, and the Additions, or Alterations of subsequent Times, whether for the better, or for the worse, must have been absolutely unknown, and consequently could not have been attended to, at the first Formation of Civil Government.
But after all, perhaps some will say, “We do not differ from you in real Sentiments, tho’ we express ourselves somewhat differently. We mean to say, that no Part of the human Species, has a Right to enslave the other; and we mean no more.” Very well, be it so, and we are agreed: But let us first know, what do you mean by Slavery? And what Ideas do you include under that Term?—For if you mean to say, that every Man is a Slave, who has not the Power of electing his own Lawgiver, his own Magistrate, his Colonel, Captain, or Judge, I deny the Position, and call on you to prove it by better Arguments, than your own bare Assertion. But if you only meant to say, that bad Laws, if any, ought to be repealed, and good Laws enacted, and faithfully and impartially executed;—and that when Governors shall abuse their Power to the Detriment of the People, they ought to be stopped in their Career, and even to be called to an Account for their Misconduct, in Proportion to the Detriment received.—If this be all you meant to say, when you talked about original, unalienable Rights, social Compacts, &c. &c. we are agreed again: But surely, surely, this is a very odd, and intricate Way of expressing the plainest, and most obvious Truths imaginable.
Moreover, if you intended to say, that tho’ Government in general did not derive its Existence from any personal Contract between Prince and People, between the Governors and the Governed;—yet, that it hath so much of what a Civilian would term a Quasi-Contract in the Nature of it, that the Duties and Obligations on both Sides of the Relation, are altogether to the same Effect, as if a particular Contract, and a positive Engagement had been entered into;—If this be your Meaning, we are ready to join Issue with you once more;—and this the rather, because the Ideas of a Quasi-Contract contain our own on this Head, and those of every Constitutional Whig throughout the Kingdom.
However, though we are ready to grant you all these Things, yet it is plain, that you meant a great deal more;—else, why do you cavil at the Phrases, implicit Consent, tacit Agreement, implied Covenant, virtual Representation, and the like?—All which naturally and necessarily imply the Idea of a Quasi-Contract. Moreover why so loud in your Exclamations, and bitter in your Invectives against supposing, that a Government may be good and lawful in itself, tho’ the People are not represented in it, according to your Mode of Representation? Recollect the several Extracts from Messrs. Locke, Molineux, Priestly, and Price, already produced in the former Part of this Work: And then you must maintain, in Conformity to the leading Principles of your Sect,—That throughout this whole Dispute, your grand Objection lies not so much against the mere Laws themselves, or against any supposed Culpability in the Manner of administering them,—as against the Right, Title, or Authority to make, or to execute any Laws at all, be they in themselves good, or bad. In one Word, according to your Doctrine, that Man is a Slave, who is obliged to submit to the best Laws that ever were made, and to the mildest Government, that ever existed, if he did not give his previous Consent towards establishing the one, and enacting the other: And that Man is free, who submits to no other Government but that which he himself hath chosen, and obeys no other Laws, but those, which he himself hath helped to make; tho’ they should be in themselves as tyrannical and cruel, as unjust, and unreasonable, as can be conceived. So that the great Good of political Liberty, and the intolerable Evil of political Slavery, are according to this blessed Doctrine, resolved at last into the single Words—CONSENT, or not Consent, What astonishing Absurdities are these!—And yet, alas! how prevalent, and contagious!
The Idea of a Quasi-Contract, instead of an actual Contract [which never existed] between any Sovereigns, and all, or even the major Part of their Subjects, would have prevented Men of good Intentions, and honest Minds, from falling into these gross Absurdities, and dangerous Mistakes. Therefore as the Term itself Quasi-Contract may be new to some Readers, tho’ the Sense it obvious to every one, when properly explained, I will beg Leave to beslow some Words upon it, before I conclude this Chapter.
In all human Trusts whatever, from the highest to the lowest, where there is a Duty to be performed, which is not actually expressed, specified, or contracted for,—but nevertheless is strongly implied in the Nature of the Trust;—the Obligation to perform that implied Duty, is of the Nature of a Quasi-Contract;—a Contract as binding in the Reason of Things, and in the Court of Conscience, as the most solemn Covenant that was ever made. This I think is a plain Case; at least I cannot make it plainer, and therefore tho’ I might illustrate this Matter by appealing to the Proceedings of the Courts of Equity, which are little more than the inforcing of the Performance of Quasi-Contracts, yet I will consine myself to Subjects, that are altogether political;—because I with to meet the Lockians on their own Ground, and to confute them by their favourite Principles.
Be it therefore allowed, for Argument’s Sake, that there is an actual, and not a Quasi-Contract, this Day subsisting in Great-Britain between Prince and People. The Question then is, When was this Contract made? And the Answer must be [for no other can be given] that it was made at his Majesty’s Coronation, when he took a solemn Oath to govern his People according to Law; and when they on their Parts expressed their Consent to his Accession to the Throne by loud Huzzas, and Shouts of Joy.—Well: To take no Advantage of one material Omission among many, that the Spectators on this Occasion were not a thousandth Part of the People of Great Britain and Ireland [not to say a Word about the Colonies.] Let it be granted, that this was a good Contract, fair, valid, and reciprocal.—Yet the difficulty is still to come,—What was the Case before this Contract was made? And how stood Matters during the long Interval, which elasped between his Accession, and Coronation? Or suppose, that he had not yet been crowned, Was the Prince in that Case, and during these nineteen Years of his Reign, not obliged to govern his People according to Law? Or were the People, on their Parts, not obliged to become his dutiful and loyal Subjects, ’till they had shouted and huzzaed at his Coronation? Resolve this Difficulty, if you can, on the Lockian Principle of an actual Contract: But if you will admit of a Quasi-Contract, the Difficulty vanishes at once: So that Reason and Common Sense, and the known Laws of the Land all co-incide in perfect Harmony: I said the known Laws of the Land, because it is notorious to all the World, that there was not one political Duty incumbent on either Prince, or People, after the Solemnity of a Coronation, but was equally incumbent before that Ceremony was performed.
Again: The Lockians stiffly maintain, that every Civil Government must be an Usurpation of unalienable Rights, if the People are neither permitted to assemble together in their personal Capacities, for the Purposes of making Laws, for seeing them executed, and the like,—* nor allowed to elect Deputies to represent them, and to act as their Attornies or Proxies. Well: Be this Position admitted for the present:—Nay, be it likewise admitted, that whenever the Freeholders or Freemen of any County, City, or Borough do appoint such Parliamentary Attornies, they have a Right to insist on their renouncing their own private Judgement (at least in Practice) in order to act in Conformity to the Instructions of their Constituents, and not according to the Dictates of their own Consciences. Such a Contract as this [for a Contract it must be of the Lockian Principle, if it be any thing at all] methinks, founds a little odd.—especially when considered as the diseriminating Characteristic of the professed Friends of Liberty! But let it pass at present among other odd Things.—And then comes the main Question to be resolved:—What Contract or Covenant have these Electors made with the other Members of Parliament, chosen by other Freemen or Freeholders, and for other Places, where they have no Concern, and no Right to interfere,—who nevertheless make Laws to bind them?—“Laws to bind them!” Yes to bind them in all [reasonable] Cases whatsoever, as much as the Members of their own electing. “Surely this is strange to tell:” And yet not more strange than true.—Therefore I ask again. What express Covenant or Stipulations have Mess. Priestly. or Price, made with the rest of the Members of Parliament,—perhaps not so few as 550 in Number, whom they did not elect,—and for whom they had no Votes to give?—I ask this Question even on a Supposition, that they had expresly covenanted with their own Members to act agreeably to those Instructions, which from Time to Time they were to have received from them?—Or do they indeed pretend to have an Authority to instruct all the Representatives of the united Kingdom, as well as their own?
But to return to the principal Subject. On the whole, and turn which Way you will, the Upshot of the Matter must come to this, that Civil Government is natural to Man;—and that at the Beginning, before the Human Heart was corrupted by the Tyranny of Princes, or the Madness and Giddiness of the People, by the Ambition of the Great, or the Crafts and Wiles of scheming Politicians, Civil Government as naturally took Place among Mankind, according to their respective Talents and Qualifications, as the Marriage Union between Adam and Eve so elegantly described by Milton.
In after Times we will readily allow, That the Scenes were greatly changed in both Cases:—But to argue from the present State of Things, occasioned either by the Mal-Administration of Governors on one Side, or by the false Pretensions of Demagogues on the other, or by the still greater Evils which the Public suffers by the Struggles and Conflicts, and Counter-Machinations of both;—to argue, I say, from these Corruptions and Adulterations to the Origin of Civil Government in its pure and uncorrupted State,—would be just as preposterous, as it would be to maintain, that Adam and Eve did not begin their domestic Government till the Marriage Portion was fixt and ascertained, till the Marriage-Articles were signed and sealed, the Jointure, Dowry, Pin-Money, &c. &c. all previously settled, and Trustees appointed for the due Execution of these several Contracts.
Therefore, to sum up all in one Word, let a thousand Revolutions happen in the Forms or Modes of Government, and ever so many Changes take Place in the Persons or Families of the Regents of the State, still Civil Government itself is no other than a public Trust, in whatever Shape it may appear, or in whose Hands soever it may be placed. In some few Instances [very few indeed] the Terms and Conditions of this important Trust may perhaps be ascertained and specified: But in Multitudes of others they cannot, tho’ of the highest Concern: Yet wherever they cannot, they are implied: And this Implication may be very justly termed a Quasi-Contract.
[* ]The Appetite between the Sexes can have no Place in this Question; because it is not of that Sort, or Kind, which renders Mankind gregarious. Indeed it is observable, that the most solitary Animals, which are not fond of herding together, yet, at certain Periods, converse in Pairs.
[* ]The proper Use, and great Advantages of Deputies from, or Representatives of the People, will be set forth at large in the 4th Chapter of the ensuing Work.