The Online Library of Liberty

A project of Liberty Fund, Inc.

• Preface.
• Four Tracts, On Political and Commercial Subjects.
• Tract I.
• Case I.
• Case II.
• Postscript.
• Tract II.
• Tract III.: A Letter From a Merchant In London to His Nephew In America.
• Tract IV.
• First Scheme.
• Scheme II.
• Third Scheme.
• Fourth Scheme.
• Fifth Scheme.
• The Manifold Advantages Attendant On Such a Scheme.

SCHEME II.

Wherefore the 2d Proposal is, To attempt to persuade the Colonies to send over a certain Number of Representatives to sit and vote in the British Parliaments, in order to incorporate America and Great-Britain into one common Empire.

*This is the Scheme of a very worthy Gentleman, eminently versed in the Laws and Constitution of Great-Britain, and what is still better, a real, not a pretended Patriot. Let us therefore examine it with as much Respect and Deference to his Opinion, as the Cause of Truth will permit; which I am well persuaded, is full as much as he would require.

He begins with observing very justly, Page 4, “That the Subjects of the Crown of Great-Britain, must (i. e. ought to) continue to be so in every Respect, in all Parts of the World, while they live under the Protection of the British Government; and that their crossing the Atlantic Ocean with the King’s Licence, and residing in America for the Purposes of Trade, cannot affect their legal Subjection to the governing Powers of the Community to which they belong.

“But yet he observes, that the total Want of Representatives in the great Council of the Nation, to support their Interests, and give an Assent on their Behalf to Laws and Taxes by which they are bound and affected, is a Misfortune, which every Friend to Liberty and equal Government must be sorry to see them labour under, and from which he must with them to be relieved in a regular and constitutional Manner, if such Relief can possibly be afforded them, without breaking the Unity of the British Government.”

He therefore proceeds, at Page 10, to propose his Scheme for remedying this Misfortune; viz. “That about eighty Persons might be admitted to sit in Parliament, as Members of the Commons House of Parliament for all the King’s Dominions in America, the West-Indies, as well as North America; and that their Stile and Title should be The Commissioners of the Colonies of America.” After this he goes on to fix the Numbers requisite to represent each Colony, their Qualification, and the Mode of their Election; also the Time of their continuing in Office, and the Manner of their being re-elected, or superseded by others, if that should be judged necessary: In all which, tho’ the Proposals are not quite consistent with the Unity of the British Government, yet as he has obviated the principal Difficulties, it would be both ill-natured and unjust to spy out every small Fault, or to magnify Objections.

But when he come to give us the Form, the Extent, and the Limitation of these Commissions; nay, when he proposes to circumscribe the Authority and Jurisdiction of the British Parliament itself, even after it hath been strengthened by the Accession of these Colony-Representatives; there, I humbly apprehend, the importance of the Subject should preponderate over mere Deference and Complaisance. Nay I will go still further, and add, that if the Measures proposed should be shewn to have a Tendency to beget endless Jealousies, Quarrels, and Divisions, between the Mother-Country and the Colonies, instead of proving a Means of Reconciliation, and a Center of Union, the Gentleman himself, I am fully persuaded, would be among the first in rejecting his own Plan. Let us therefore now descend into Particulars.

And 1st, it is proposed, Page 11, That they (the Commissioners) should receive a Commission in Writing from their Electors (viz. the * Assemblies in each Province) “impowering them to sit and vote in the British House of Commons, and consult with the King, and the Great Men of the Kingdom, and the Commons of the same in Parliament assembled, upon the great Affairs of the Nation, and to consent on the Behalf of the Province, for which they were chosen, to such Things as shall be ordained in Parliament, &c.

Now this Form might pass very well among ourselves at Home, where the Majority are not continually on the Watch to spy out every Flaw, real or imaginary: But in regard to the Colonists, and especially an Assembly of Colonists, the Case is widely different: For it is well known that their Wits are perpetually at work to avail themselves even of the Shadow of an Argument to oppose the Right and Authority of the Mother-Country. Therefore they will immediately seize on the Words impowering and Consent, and reason after the following fallacious Manner:—“The Assemblies who elected the Commissioners, have a Right to instruct them; and these Instructions, when properly drawn up, are no other than so many Trusts or Powers granted to them from Time to Time, by the Assembly which elected them; which Assembly hath therefore a Right to contract or enlarge their Commission, as they shall find it to be the Interest of the Province so to do. Consequently, if these Commissioners should at any Time vote contrary to their Instructions, that is, to their Commission, it follows, that in these Respects they have exceeded the Bounds prescribed by their Electors. Therefore, being themselves prohibited from voting, and having no Authority to vote in such a Question, every Law wherein they gave their Suffrage, affecting the Interests of the Colonies in general, or any Province in particular, is ipso facto null and void.”

Again,—“The Colony Commissioners are to give their Consent in Behalf of the Province for which they are chosen, to such Things as shall be ordained in Parliament. This is the Foundation and Corner-Stone of all the Building: And therefore, if such or such Commissioners did not give their Consent in Behalf of the Provinces for which they were chosen, then it follows, of Course, that no Law, affecting the Interests of such respective Provinces, is obligatory, no Tax due or payable, nor any Regulations made by the pretended Authority of the British Parliament without the Consent of such Commissioners, are to be at all regarded by the American Electors.”—These are a few of those blessed Conclusions, which the Politicians on the other Side of the Atlantic will certainly draw from the Terms and Expressions contained in such a Form. And what is still worse, both our own haired-brained Republicans, and our Mock-Patriots at Home will as certainly adopt the same Language, and echo back the same specious, tho’ false Allegations, from one End of the Kingdom to the other. Indeed many there are, even among ourselves, who, with the most honest and upright Intentions, are at a Loss at present how to disintangle themselves from these fallacious Reasonings. For having unhappily learnt in Newspaper Dissertations, and from Coffee house Harangues, that the Deputies sent to the great Council of the Nation, are the mere Attornies of those who elected them;—the Inference is but natural, that these Attornies ought to do as they are bid; and that in Case of Competition, they ought not to prefer their own private Opinions to the Judgment of their Constituents.—I say, this Inference is natural; nay it is necessary, just, and true, were the Premises but true from whence it is deduced.

Wherefore, having often had the Advantage of hearing no less a Person than the late excellent Judge Foster, that true Friend to all reasonable Liberty, Civil and Religious,—I say, having often heard him discoursing on the Rise and Origin of Parliaments, I will venture to lay his State of the Case before my Reader, hoping that it may remove all his Difficulties (if he has any) and work the same Fulness of Conviction in his Mind, which it did in mine.

“To reason accurately, said this upright and able Lawyer, on the Origin of Parliaments, we must trace the Matter up to its constituent Principles. Now the first Idea which strikes one on this Occasion is, that of a large Assembly of different Tribes of Warriors, either preparing for some military Expedition, or got together, after a Victory, to share the Booty, and divide the Lands among the Conquerers. When all are met together in one Place, they chuse a Committee for managing their Affairs; having found it impracticable to transact any Business of Consequence in any other Way. Now this Committee, chosen by the whole Nation, actually assembled, gives us the first rude Draught of a national Parliament, or a national Council. But in process of Time, and when the Nation had made large Conquests, and was cantoned into distant Provinces, it was found to be extremely inconvenient to assemble the whole Nation together into one Place. Therefore the next, and indeed the only Expedient, was, that each Canton, or each District, which could assemble, should be authorized to elect a Deputy, or Deputies, not for itself alone,that is the grandMistake, but for the Nation at large, which could not assemble; and the Powers to be granted to such Deputy, or Deputies, were just the same as the Nation would have granted to them had it been actually assembled. Hence therefore it comes to pass, that each Deputy represents the whole Nation in general, as much as if he had been elected by the whole Nation; and consequently such a Deputy is the Attorney (if he must be called by that Name) not of any one particular Tribe, Society, or District, but of the whole collectively: So that it becomes the Duty of his Office to take Care of the Interests of all the People in general, because he represents them all. In short, he cannot, consistently with the Duty which he owes to the whole, pay any Deference to the Request, Instruction, Remonstrance, or Memorial, of his particular Electors, except in such Cases only wherein he is convinced in his Conscience, that the Measures, which they require him to pursue, are not incompatible with the public Good.”

Thus far this great Judge of the British Constitution. And tho’ many important Inferences might be drawn from hence, which would effectually remove those Difficulties, with which the Subject has of late been artfully and studiously perplexed (and particularly in the Case of the Expulsion* of a Member of the House of Commons) yet I shall content myself with one general Remark at present; viz. That as each Class of Men, each Society or District, throughout the British Empire, are as much represented by those Deputies, whom they did not personally elect, as they are by those whom they did; it therefore follows, that there is no need, that the Deputies, particularly elected by them, should give their personal Consent to any Acts of the Legislature; because a Vote of the Majority is in fact a Vote of the Nation to all Intents and Purposes.

But it is now high Time to attend to another Part of this Gentleman’s Plan for admitting Commissioners from the Colonies to sit and vote in the British House of Commons.

And that is, 2dly, the Extent of their Commission, and indeed the boundary Line prescribed to the British Parliament itself, whenever it shall interfere in American Affairs. For it seems (see P. 14) “That this legislative Power of Parliament should be exercised but seldom, and on Occasions of great Necessity. Whatever related to the internal Government of any particular Colony (such as raising the necessary Taxes for the Support of its civil Government, and passing Laws for building Bridges, or Churches, or Barracks, or other public Edifices) should be left to the Governor and Assembly of that Colony to transact among themselves, unless in Cases where the domestic Dissentions of the Colony put a Stop to public Business, and created a Kind of Necessity for the Interposition of the supreme Legislature. But when any general Tax was to be imposed upon all the American Colonies for the Support of a War, or any other such general Purpose; or any new Law was to be made to regulate the Trade of all the Colonies; or to appoint the Methods by which Debts owing from the Inhabitants of one Colony to those of another, or of Great-Britain, should be recovered; or to direct the Manner of bringing Criminals to Justice who have fled from one Colony to another; or to settle the Manner of quartering the King’s Troops in the several Colonies; or of levying Troops in them, and the Number each Colony should contribute; or to settle the proportionable Values or different Coins that should be made current in the several provinces; or to establish a general Paper-Currency throughout America; or for any other general Purpose that relates to several Colonies:—In these Cases the Authority of Parliament should be employed.”

Here now is a Kind of Barrier set up between these two contending Powers, the British Parliament, and the Provincial Assemblies;—a Barrier, which must be held so sacred by both Parties, as to limit their respective Pretensions, and to extinguish all further Claims. Let us therefore see how well this Scheme is calculated to answer such good Purposes.

And first it is said, that the Parliament ought to interfere but seldom; and then only on Occasions of great Necessity. Now here permit me to ask, Who are to be the Judges of what is seldom, or what is frequent? Moreover, who is to determine between the Parliament and the Provincial Assemblies, when there is a great Necessity for the Interference of the former, and when there is but a little one, or none at all?—Obvious it is, to all the World, that these jealous Rivals will never settle such Points among themselves; and if they will not settle them, indeed if they cannot, who is to be their common Umpire or Referee? Besides, granting even that this Difficulty could be got over in some Degree, another formidable one immediately starts up, like another Hydra; viz. What are these Colony Agents to do in our House of Commons, when no Colony Business happens to be transacted? Are they to remain as so many Mutes, without speaking a Word, or giving a single Vote for Weeks, or Months, or perhaps for a whole Session together?—Or are they to sit and vote in all British Causes, great or small; notwithstanding that the British Senators are precluded from voting, excepting in extraordinary Cases, in respect to the Colonies? In either Case here seems to be something introduced into the British Constitution of a very heterogeneous Nature; something very repugnant to that Unity of Government, which the Gentleman himself allows ought to be preferred to every other Consideration: And I will add further, that if the Colony-Commissioners are to sit and vote in all our Causes, tho’ our British Representatives are restrained from voting in theirs, perhaps ninety-nine Times in an Hundred, this will be the setting up of one of the most partial, unequal, and unjust Systems of Pacification, that ever yet appeared in the World.

We therefore proceed to another weighty Objection against the present Plan.—The Terms of this new Compact are declared to be, That the Colony Assemblies shall be invested with the Right of internal and provincial Jurisdiction and Legislation; while the British Parliament, even after the Accession of these 80 Colony Commissioners, shall be content to retain only that which is external and general.—But here alas! the very same Difficulties return which pressed so hard before: For who is to judge between the British Parliament and the Provincial Assemblies in these Respects? Who will venture to ascertain in every Case what is external and general; and what is merely internal and provincial? Nay indeed, may not the very same Things justly pass under both Denominations, according as they are seen from different Points of View? Surely they may; and to convince any Man of this, let him attend to the very Catalogue of Articles, with which this Gentleman hath himself presented us. For at Page 14, he observes, “That whatever related to the internal Government of any particular Colony, should be left to the Governor and Assembly of that Colony to transact among themselves;” among which Articles belonging to internal Government, he enumerates the building of Barracks, and of other public Edifices; and yet both he and every Man must allow, that the building of Barracks, of Forts, and Fortresses, the making of King’s Docks and Careening Places for the Navy, the laying out of military Roads, and the providing of Magazines for Provisions and military Stores, considered in another View, are of a general Nature; in the Erection and Preservation of which, the whole British Empire is deeply interested. And yet were the British Parliament to frame Laws, and to levy Taxes on the Americans for these Purposes, what Outcries would immediately be raised against the Mother Country! Every Fortress, nay every Barrack, would be described as an odious Badge of Slavery; and every little Magazine would be termed a Monument of Tyranny and despotic Power, and a Preparative for destroying the few Liberties that were left. Again, at the Bottom of the same Page, he declares, that the Authority of Parliament should be employed in settling the Manner of quartering the King’s Troops in the several Colonies. I will not object to the Interposition of Parliament in such a Case: For well I know, that if the Parliament did not interfere, the Troops would very often have no Quarters at all; and yet this very Circumstance would afford an American Assembly the most inviting Opportunity for Exclamation and Opposition. “What! The British Parliament to take upon them to settle the Manner of quartering the Troops in our own Province, and on our own Inhabitants! Who so proper Judges as ourselves, when or where, or after what Manner, they should be quartered? And how came the Gentlemen, met at Westminster, to be acquainted with the Circumstances of our People, and the Situation of Places, better than we, who reside on the Spot? No! These Acts of the British Parliament are all barefaced Encroachments on our Liberties, and open Violations of our Rights and Properties: They are the Chains which our pretended Protectors, but in Reality our Egyptian Task-Masters, have been long forging for us. Let us therefore all unite, and manfully resist them; let us postpone the paying of Debts, and enter into a general Association to refuse their Goods, to distress their Trade, and to harrass our cruel Enemies by every Method in our Power; and if we are thus united, they must yield, as they did before.” In short it would be endless to recount all the Topics which such a Scheme as this Gentleman has proposed would certainly furnish to every popular Declaimer in every popular Assembly; and the more improbable, the more absurd and unjust his Harangues were in Point of sound Argument and just Reasoning; so much, generally speaking, the more greedily would they be received.

However, there is one Point more which I cannot omit, because it will throw a further Light on this Matter, and disclose a new Scene of patriotic Manœuvres, and the Wiles of Politicians. At Page 13, this Author lays down a general Rule for the Conduct of Parliament with Respect to America, viz. “That it ought to be made a standing Order of both Houses of Parliament, never to pass any Law, whether for imposing a Tax, or for regulating Trade, or for any other Purpose whatsoever relating to any of the American Colonies, ’till one whole Year after the first reading of the Bill; unless it be to renew some expiring Laws of great Importance, and of immediate and urgent Necessity, such as the Act for billeting the King’s Troops, and perhaps some few others that might be specially excepted in the Order.”

This is the Restriction in Point of Time, which our Author proposes to lay on the Parliament of Great-Britain. “They never must pass any Law for imposing a Tax ’till one whole Year after the first reading of the Bill:” Why?—“In order to give the several Colonies an Opportunity of making proper Representations against it, and to prevent the Parliament from making injudicious Laws, not suited to the Condition of the Colonies.” A fine Contrivance truly! and a most effectual Expedient to prevent the Parliament from ever making any Laws to oblige the Americans to discharge their Duty towards their Mother-Country: For this Gentleman might have known, indeed it is hardly possible, that the Fact could have escaped his Notice, had he recollected it, that this very Circumstance of aYear’s Procrastination was the main Engine employed to batter down the late Stamp-Act. When the Duty on Stamps was first proposed, the Americans made as little Objection to it, as could be supposed to be made to any new Tax whatever. Nay, several of their popular Orators and Leaders used considerable Interest to be employed as Agents in the Distribution of these Stamps. But when the Outs and the Pouters on this Side the Water, saw the Advantage which the Minister gave them by a whole Year’s Delay, they eagerly seized the Opportunity; Emissaries and Agents were dispatched into all Quarters;—the Newspapers were filled with Invectives against the new-intended Tax. It was injudicious!—it was ill-timed!—oppressive!—tyrannical!—and every Thing that was bad! Letters upon Letters were wrote to America to excite the People to associate, to remonstrate, and even to revolt. The most ample Promises were made from hence, of giving them all the Assistance which Faction, and Clamour, and Mock-patriotism, could muster up.

Well, their indefatigable Endeavours proved but too successful with an infatuated People: For a violent Storm was raised against the Minister for the Time being, and overset him, as they intended. Our patriotic Outs then became the ministerial Ins; and therefore the Storm having now done its Business, they had no further Occasion for it, were its most obedient humble Servants, and wished it to subside. But here they found themselves egregiously mistaken. For the Americans had, in their Turn, learnt the Art of making Tools of them, instead of being made Tools by them: So that having been taught by these Preceptors to feel their own Weight and Independence, they were not to be wheedled by soothing and cajoling Letters to give over their Enterprize, or to become a tractable, obedient People for the future. In short, hence it came to pass, that even during the Continuance of this new and favourite Administration, the American Spirit was rising all the while, instead of sinking. And as like Causes will always produce like Effects, especially since Things have been suffered to grow to such an Heighth, evident it is to common Sense, that any future Attempt of the British Parliament to levy a Tax on America, will meet with no better a Fate than the Stamp-Act has done. Moreover, a Year’s Delay in laying it on will be just so much Time given the Colonies to prepare for Battle; and Woe to that Administration which shall propose it; for they will certainly be overturned by the same Arts and Managements which the former were, and with much greater Ease.

I should now have done with this Gentleman’s Scheme, were it not that I find him, at Page 28, making a Kind of Apology to the Americans for the Conduct of our Parliament in paying the King’s Debts of his Civil List. And I own myself more hurt by this Paragraph, than by all the rest of his Pamphlet: For as I am thoroughly persuaded, he wrote from Conviction, and not from any sinister Views, one is sorry to find so able, so honest, and upright a Man, carried away by the Torrent of the Times to such a Degree, as to adopt Notions, which are almost too crude for a Club of Livery Politicians met in some blind Alley at a City Alehouse. His Words are these:—“It is certain, that no such (exorbitant) Grants as are above mentioned have been made, unless in the single Instance of the Sum of 513,000l. granted to his present Majesty for the Discharge of the Debts of his Civil List. And in this Case I can easily suppose, that a Motive of Compassion for a Number of innocent Person, who would otherwise have been Sufferers from that Load upon his Majesty’s Revenue, and an affectionate Desire of relieving their excellent Sovereign (who has in no Instance endeavoured to violate the Liberties of his Subjects) from the unworthy Streights and Inconveniences, ill becoming the Royal Dignity, into which some of his Ministers had brought him by the injudicious Management of his Revenue, may have induced many Members of the House of Commons to consent to this Grant, without any View to their own private Interest; though at the same Time I acknowledge it to be, considering all its Circumstances, a dangerous Compliance, and not worthy to be drawn into Example.”

Now if the Compliance of the Parliament in discharging this Debt was dangerous, the Reason must be, because the Circumstance of contracting the Debt itself was really infamous; therefore ought not to be avowed, but had better be suppressed in Tenderness to the Royal Cause. But can this Author point out any such infamous Circumstances, if he were minded to make the Discovery?—I dare answer for him, that he cannot. And as I will not suppose that he has more Tales to tell than any other private Gentleman, and much less that he himself was an Accomplice in, or privy to any such Scenes of Iniquity as are here insinuated,—I will now undertake to prove to him and the World, how as great a Debt as this, nay a much greater, might have been contracted in the Space of ten Years, without the least Impeachment of Waste, Profusion, Mismanagement, or any other Misapplication whatsoever.

Every Office, Dignity, Rank, or Station, has a certain Character to sustain, which necessarily requires a correspondent Train of Expences; so that whether you consider the Demands upon a King with a Salary of 800,000l. a Year, or the Demands on a private Gentleman with only a clear Rental of 800l. a Year, the Scale of Expences must be proportionate, the Demands and Expences being relative one to the other.

We will therefore reason on what we are most conversant with (and with Respect to which we may be allowed to be competent Judges) viz. on the Case of a young Gentleman of a respectable ancient Family, just come to take Possession of an Estate, which clears him 800l. a Year.

1st. Therefore, being appointed Sheriff of the County, he must and ought to go through that expensive Office in such a Manner as would reflect no Disgrace on himself, or the respectable Family from which he is descended (and the Office of Sheriff belonging to a private Gentleman is of much the same Import in Point of Expence, as the Circumstances of a Coronation in respect to Majesty.)

2dly. ManyDeaths and Funerals within the above-mentioned Period create another Article of Expence, which must be borne; with this peculiar Circumstance attending it, That tho’ he must bury a Grandfather suitable to his Rank, also an Uncle, Aunt, a Brother and Sisters,—yet he himself acquires no Addition of Fortune by their Deceases.

3dly. SeveralMarriages in the Family, and his own* in particular, bring on a third Charge, which surely in Reason and Conscience ought not to be objected to.

4thly. Six or seven Christenings and Lyingsin, expensive Articles in all Families, necessarily happen from the Circumstance of the Case, to be peculiarly expensive in this: And yet neither the young Gentleman himself, nor any of his Friends and Well wishers to the Family, ought to be supposed even to have wished to have saved these extraordinary Charges.

5thly. A Train of unexpected Visitants bring on another heavy Load; and though they were not invited, yet, as they chose to come, they must be received with an Hospitality suitable to his and their Dignity, and the Relation of Friendship and Family-Ties subsisting between them.

Add to all this, 6thly, The uncommon Dearness of all Sorts of Provisions, which for some Years past hath exceeded any Thing known in former Times; and which alone hath actually swelled the Amount of House-keeping in every Family to a very considerable Sum.

Now the young Gentleman having supported himself under these several Pressures and growing Expences for ten Years together, at last is obliged to request his nearest Friends and dearest Relations to grant him some Assistance; because he is 513l. or almost three Quarters of a Year in Debt. Heavens! What a Sum! And is this all against which such loud Outcries have been raised? Yes, this is all! Therefore, indignant Reader, whoever thou art, Englishman or American, lay thy Hand on thy Heart, and ask thyself this plain Question, What wouldst thou have thought of such a young Man, had he been thine own Son, thy Grandson, or the Heir-apparent of thy Fortune? And what Sort of Treatment would he have deserved at thy Hands? Therefore, mutato nomine.—But I will add no more: Let Nature and Humanity, Justice and Equity, plead their own Cause.

We have now, I think, very sufficiently discussed every Part of this Gentleman’s Plan: Nay, we have amply and particularly shewn, that his Apology to the Americans in Behalf of the British Parliament, for paying the Arrears of his Majesty’s Civil List, was quite a needless Thing. For if no stronger Proofs can be brought of their Venality and Corruption than this Instance, they still may be safely trusted with the Guardianship of those Liberties and Properties, which they have hitherto not only preserved, but also strengthened and encreased to a Degree unknown before in this, or any other Country. In one Word, the Scheme of an Union under our present Consideration, is of such a Nature, as would necessarily tend to exasperate both Parties, instead of mollifying or reconciling either. And as the Americans have already given us to understand, both in their Provincial Assemblies, and at their General Congresses, that they will not accept of an Union with us; and as Great-Britain ought not to petition for it; surely more need not be added for laying the Scheme aside. Indeed the Gentleman himself, towards the Close of his Pamphlet, expresses but little Hopes of its Success: For, after all, the best Use he can put it to, seems to be the Justification of the Mother-Country in declaring War against the Colonies, in order to oblige them to submit to her Authority, and to return to their Obedience. So that this Scheme of Pacification is to end in a War at last. Therefore we are now come to consider the

[* ]See a Pamphlet,—“Considerations on the Expediency of admitting Representatives from the American Colonies in to the British House of Commons.”—London, printed for B. White, 1770.

[* ]Quere, Whether it is intended that the lower Houses in each Assembly should have the sole Right of voting for these Commissioners; Or both Houses jointly? If the former, then the Colony Governments would become still more democratical than they now are, tho’ already so, to such an excessive Degree, as to be almost incompatible with any Idea of Monarchy: But if each House is to vote separately, what Jars and Factions, and reciprocal Reproaches, would this occasion! And how would they be able to agree? In short, either Way, the Prospect is alarming!

[* ]Surely the Nation might have expelled Mr. Wilkes, or have struck his Name out of the List of Committee, had it been assembled, and had it thought proper so to do. What then should hinder the Deputies of the Nation from doing the same Thing? And which ought to prevail in this Case, the Nation in general of the County or Middlesex?

[* ]Some shrewd Politicians have been wise enough to ask, Why did not his Majesty marry a large Fortune, in order to re-imburse some of these Expences?—What large Fortune would these Wiseacres have wished him to have married? A Dutchy or Principality on the Continent, in order to engage us still more in Continental Measures?—Or was it to be a large landed Estate at Home, to be annexed to the Crown, like another Dutchy of Lancaster?—This would have had a fine Influence on Electioneering, and English Liberties.—But perhaps they meant, that he should have gone into the City, and have paid his Addresses to Miss Plumbe, the rich Grocer’s Daughter, or to Miss Rescounters, the Heiress of the great Broker in Change-Alley. And to be sure, such a Match as this would have corresponded rarely well with the sublime Ideas of City-Politics. Our antient Nobility would have been delighted in giving the Precedency to such illustrious Princes of the Blood.