- Gerry, Eldridge. Observations / On the New Constitution, and On the Federal / and State Conventions. / By a Columbian Patriot. / Sic Transit Gloria Americana. / [boston: 1788.]
- Webster, Noah. an / Examination / Into the / Leading Principles / of the / Federal Constitution / Proposed By the Late / Convention / Held At Philadelphia. / With / Answers to the Principal Objections / That Have Been Raised Against the System. / By a Cit
- Jay, John. an / Address / to the / People / of the / State of New-york / On the Subject of the / Constitution, / Agreed Upon At Philadelphia, / the 17th of September, 1787. / New-york: / Printed By Samuel Loudon, / Printer to the State. .
- Smith, Melanchthon. an / Address / to the / People / of the / State of New-york: / Showing the Necessity of Making / Amendments / to the / Constitution, Proposed For the United States, / Previous to Its Adoption. / By a Plebeian. / Printed In the State of
- Webster, Pelatiah. the Weakness of Brutus Exposed: / Or, Some / Remarks / In / Vindication of the Constitution / Proposed By the Late / Federal Convention, / Against the / Objections and Gloomy Fears of That Writer / Humbly Offered to the Public, / By / a
- Coxe, Tench. an / Examination / of the / Constitution / For the / United States / of / America, / Submitted to the People / By the / General Convention, / At Philadelphia, the 17th Day of September, 1787, / and Since Adopted and Ratified / By the / Conven
- Wilson, James. Substance of an Address to a Meeting of the Citizens of Philadelphia, Delivered, October Sixth, Mdcclxxxvii , 1787
- Dickinson, John. the / Letters / of / Fabius, / In 1788, / On the Federal Constitution; / …. / Copy-right Secured. / From the Office of the Delaware / Gazette, Wilmington, / By W. C. Smith./1797. /
- Hanson, Alexander, Contee. Remarks / On the / Proposed Plan / of a / Federal Government, / Addressed to the Citizens of the / United States of America, / and Particularly to the People of Maryland, / By Aristides. / “as a Confederated Government Is Compos
- Randolph, Edmund. Letter On the Federal Constitution, October 16, 1787, By Edmund Randolph [richmond: Printed By Augustin Davis, 1787.]
- Lee, Richard Henry. Observation / Leading to a Fair Examination / of the / System of Government, / Proposed By the Late / Convention; / and to Several Essential and Neces- / Sary Alterations In It. / In a Number of / Letters / From the / Federal Farmer to
- Mason, George. the Objections of the / Hon. George Mason, / to the Proposed Federal Constitution. / Addressed to the Citizens of Virginia. / ….. / Printed By Thomas Nicholas.
- Iredell, James. [answers to Mr. Mason's Objections to the New Constitution, Recommended By the Late Convention. By Marcus. Newbern: Printed By Hodge and Wills, 1788.]
- Ramsay, David. an / Address / to the / Freemen / of / South Carolina, / On the Subject of the / Federal Constitution, / Proposed By the Convention, Which Met In / Philadelphia, May, 1787. / Charleston, / Printed By Bowen and Co., No. 31, Bay.
- Bibliography and Reference List of the History and Literature of the United States Constitution 1787–1788.
An / Examination / of the / Constitution / for the / United States / of / America, / Submitted to the People / by the / General Convention, / At Philadelphia, the 17th Day of September, 1787, / and since adopted and ratified / by the / Conventions of Eleven States, / chosen for the purpose of considering it, being all / that have yet decided on the subject. / By an American Citizen. / To which is added, / A Speech / of the / Honorable James Wilson, Esquire, / on the same subject. / Philadelphia: / Printed by Zachariah Poulson, Junr. in Fourth- / Street, between Market and Arch-Street. / M. DCC. LXXXVIII.
8vo., pp. 33.
“An American Citizen” was the pseudonym of Tench Coxe, of Pennsylvania, a member of the Annapolis Convention and the Continental Congress, and author of a number of pamphlets on the finances and commerce of the United States. The four letters written over that signature were among the first to appear in favor of the Constitution, and were reprinted in many of the newspapers of the day.
I have seen three copies with “Tench Coxe, Esq.,” interlined on the title page in his own handwriting below “By an American Citizen.”
P. L. F.
Every person, who desires to know the true situation of the United States of America, in regard to the freedom and powers of their governments, must carefully consider together the constitution of the state in which he lives and the new constitution of fœderal or general government. The latter alone is treated of in the following pages. The former, it is presumed, are sufficiently understood by the citizens who live under them.
On the Federal Government, and first on the safety of the people, from the restraints imposed on the President.
It is impossible for an honest and feeling mind, of any nation or country whatever, to be insensible to the present circumstances of America. Were I an East Indian, or a Turk, I should consider this singular situation of a part of my fellow creatures as the most curious and interesting. Intimately connected with the country, as a citizen of the union, I confess it entirely engrosses my mind and feelings.
To take a proper view of the ground on which we stand, it may be necessary to recollect the manner in which the United States were originally settled and  established. Want of charity in the religious systems of Europe, and of justice in their political governments, were the principal moving causes, which drove the emigrants of various countries to the American continent. The Congregationalists, Quakers, Presbyterians and other British dissenters, the Catholics of England and Ireland, the Hugonots of France, the German Lutherans, Calvinists and Moravians, with several other societies, established themselves in the different colonies, thereby laying the ground of that liberality in ecclesiastical affairs, which has been observable since the late revolution. Religious liberty naturally promotes corresponding dispositions in matters of government. The constitution of England as it stood on paper, was one of the freest, at that time, in the world, and the American colonies considered themselves as entitled to the fullest enjoyment of it. Thus, when the ill-judged discussions of late times in England brought into question the rights of this country, as it stood connected with the British crown, we were found more strongly impressed with their importance, and accurately acquainted with their extent, than the wisest and most learned of our brethren beyond the Atlantic. When the greatest names in parliament insisted on the power of that body over the commerce of the colonies, and even the right to bind us in all cases whatsoever, America, seeing that it was only another form of tyranny, insisted upon the immutable truth, that taxation and representation are inseparable; and, while a desire of harmony and other considerations induced her into an acquiescence in the commercial relations of Great Britain, it was done from the declared necessity of the case, and with a cautious, full, and absolute saving of our voluntarily-suspended rights. The parliament was persevering, and America continued firm, till hostilities and open war commenced, and finally the late revolution closed the contest forever.
 It is evident, from this short detail, and the reflections which arise from it, that the quarrel between the United States and the parliament of Great Britain did not arise so much from objections to the form of government, though undoubtedly a better one by far is now within our reach, as from a difference concerning certain important rights, resulting from the essential principles of liberty, which their constitution actually preserved to all the subjects residing within the realm. It was not asserted by America, that the people of the island of Great Britain were slaves, but that we, though possessed absolutely of the same rights, were not admitted to enjoy an equal degree of freedom.
When the declaration of independence compleated the separation between the two countries, new governments were necessarily established. Many circumstances led to the adoption of the republican form, among which was the predilection of the people. In devising the frames of government, it may have been difficult to avoid extremes opposite to the vices of that we had just rejected; nevertheless, many of the state constitutions we have chosen are truly excellent. Our misfortunes have been, that in the first instance we adopted no national government at all; but were kept together by common danger only; and that in the confusions of a civil war, we framed a fœderal constitution, now universally admitted to be inadequate to the preservation of liberty, property, and the union. The question is not, then, how far our state constitutions are good, or otherwise—the object of our wishes is, to amend and supply the evident and allowed errors and defects of the fœderal government. Let us consider awhile, that which is now proposed to us—let us compare it with the so much boasted British form of government, and see how much more it favours the people, and how completely it secures their rights, remembering, at the same time, that we did not dissolve our connection  with that country so much on account of its constitution, as the perversion and maladministration of it.
In the first place, let us look at the nature and powers of the head of that country, and those of the ostensible head of ours.
The British king is the great bishop or supreme head of an established church, with an immense patronage annexed. In this capacity he commands a number of votes in the house of lords, by creating bishops, who, besides their great incomes, have votes in that assembly, and are judges in the last resort. These prelates have also many honorable and lucrative places to bestow, and thus from their wealth, learning, dignities, powers, and patronage, give a great lustre and an enormous influence to the crown.
In America, our president will not only be without these influencing advantages, but they will be in the possession of the people at large, to strengthen their hands in the event of a contest with him. All religious funds, honors and powers, are in the gift of numberless unconnected, disunited and contending corporations, wherein the principle of perfect equality universally prevails. In short, danger from ecclesiastical tyranny, that long standing and still remaining curse of the people—that sacreligious engine of royal power in some countries—can be feared by no man in the United States. In Britain their king is for life—in America, our President will always be one of the people at the end of four years. In that country, the king is hereditary, and may be an ideot, a knave, or a tyrant by nature, or ignorant from neglect of his education, yet cannot be removed, for “he can do no wrong.” This is a favorite maxim of their constitution. In America, as the President is to be one of the people at the end of his short term, so will he and his fellow citizens remember, that he was originally one of the people; and he is created by their breath. Further, he cannot be  an ideot, probably not a knave or tyrant, for those whom nature makes so discover it before the age of thirty-five, until which period he cannot be elected. It appears, we have not admitted that he can do no wrong, but have rather pre-supposed he may, and sometimes will do wrong, by providing for his impeachment, his trial, and his peaceable and complete removal.
In England the king has a power to create members of the upper house, who are judges in the highest court, as well as legislators. Our President not only cannot make members of the Senate, but their creation, like his own, is by the people, through their representatives: and a member of Assembly may and will be as certainly dismissed at the end of his year, for electing a weak or wicked Senator, as for any other blunder or misconduct.
The king of England has complete legislative power, while our President can only use it when the other servants of the people are divided. But in all great cases affecting the national interests or safety, his modified and restrained power must give way to the sense of two-thirds of the legislature. In fact it amounts to no more, than a serious duty imposed upon him to request both houses to re-consider any matter on which he entertains doubts or feels apprehensions; and here the people have a strong hold upon him from his sole and personal responsibility.
The President of the upper-house (or the chancellor) in in England, is appointed by their king, while our Vice-President, who is chosen by the people, through the electors and the Senate, is not at all dependant on the President, but may exercise equal powers on some occasions. In all royal governments, an helpless infant or an inexperienced youth may wear the crown. Our President must be matured by the experience of years, and being born among us, his character at thirty-five must be fully understood. Wisdom, virtue and active  qualities of mind and body can alone make him the first servant of a free and enlightened people.
Our President will fall very much short indeed of any prince in his annual income, which will not be hereditary, but the absolute allowance of the people, passing through the hands of their other servants from year to year, as it becomes necessary. There will be no burdens on the nation, to provide for his heir, or other branches of his family. It is probable, from the state of property in America, and other circumstances, that many citizens will exceed him in show and expense,—those dazzling trappings of kingly rank and power. He will have no authority to make a treaty, without two-thirds of the senate, nor can he appoint ambassadors or other great officers without their approbation, which will remove the idea of patronage and influence, and of personal obligation and dependence. The appointment of even the inferior officers may be taken out of his hands by an act of congress at any time; he can create no nobility or titles of honor, nor take away offices during good behaviour. His person is not so much protected as that of a member of the house of representatives; for he may be proceeded against like any other man in the ordinary course of law. He appoints no officer of the separate states. He will have no influence from placemen in the legislature, nor can he prorogue or dissolve it. He will have no power over the treasures of the state; and, lastly, as he is created through the electors, by the people at large, he must ever look up to the support of his creators. From such a servant, with powers so limited and transitory, there can be no danger, especially when we consider the solid foundations on which our national liberties are immoveably fixed, by the other provisions of this excellent constitution. Whatever of dignity or authority he possesses, is a delegated part of their majesty and their political omnipotence, transiently vested in him by the people themselves, for their own happiness.
 NUMBER II.
On the safety of the people, from the restraints imposed upon the Senate.
We have seen that the late honorable convention, in designating the nature of the chief executive office of the United States, having deprived it of all the dangerous appendages of royalty, and provided for the frequent expiration of its limited powers—As our president bears no resemblance to a king, so we shall see the senate have no similitude to nobles.
First, then, not being hereditary, their collective knowledge, wisdom, and virtue are not precarious, for by these qualities alone they are to obtain their offices; and they will have none of the peculiar follies and vices of those men, who possess power merely because their fathers held it before them, for they will be educated (under equal advantages, and with equal prospects) among and on a footing with the other sons of a free people. If we recollect the characters, who have, at various periods, filled the seats of congress, we shall find this expectation perfectly reasonable. Many young men of genius, and many characters of more matured abilities without fortunes, have been honored with that trust. Wealth has had but few representatives there, and those have been generally possessed of respectable personal qualifications. There have also been many instances of persons not eminently endowed with mental qualities, who have been sent thither from a reliance on their virtues, public and private—As the senators are still to be elected by the legislatures of the states, there can be no doubt of equal safety and pro priety in their future appointment, especially as no further pecuniary qualification is required by the constitution.
 They can hold no other office civil or military under the United States, nor can they join in making provision for themselves, either by creating new places, or encreasing the emoluments of old ones. As their sons are not to succeed them, they will not be induced to aim at an increase or perpetuity of their powers, at the expence of the liberties of the people, of which those sons will be a part. They possess a much smaller share of the judicial power than the upper house in Britain, for they are not, as there, the highest court in civil affairs. Impeachments alone are the cases cognizable before them, and in what other place could matters of that nature be so properly and safely determined? The judges of the federal courts will owe their appointments to the president and senate, therefore may not feel so perfectly free from favour, affection and influence, as the upper house who receive the power from the people, through their state representatives, and are immediately responsible to those assemblies, and finally to the nation at large—Thus we see, when a daring or dangerous offender is brought to the bar of public justice, the people, who alone can impeach him by their immediate representatives, will cause him to be tried, not by judges appointed in the heat of the occasion, but by two-thirds of a select body, chosen a long time before, for various purposes, by the collective wisdom of their State legislatures. From a pretence or affectation of extraordinary purity and excellence of character, their word of honour is the sanction under which these high courts, in other countries, have given their sentence—But with us, like the other judges of the union, like the rest of the people, of which they are never to forget they are a part, it is required that they be on oath.
No ambitious, undeserving or inexperienced youth can acquire a seat in this house by means of the most enormous wealth, or most powerful connections, till  thirty years. have ripened his abilities, and fully discovered his merits to his country—a more rational ground of preference surely than, mere property.
The senate, though more independent of the people, as to the free exercise of their judgment and abilities, than the house of representatives, by the longer term of their office, must be older and more experienced men, and are vested with less effective power; for the public treasures, the sinews of the state, cannot be called forth by their original motion. They may indeed restrain the profusion or errors of the house of representatives, but they cannot take any of the necessary measures to raise a national revenue.
The people, through the electors, prescribe them such a president as shall be best qualified to controul them.
They can only, by conviction or impeachment, remove and incapacitate a dangerous officer, but the punishment of him as a criminal remains within the province of the courts of law, to be conducted under all the ordinary forms and precautions, which exceedingly diminishes the importance of their judicial powers. They are detached, as much as possible, from local prejudices in favor of their respective states, by having a separate and independent vote, for the sensible and conscientious use of which every member will find his person, honor and character seriously bound—He cannot shelter himself, under a vote in behalf of his state, among his immediate colleagues.
As there are only two, he cannot be voluntarily or involuntarily governed by the majority of the deputation—He will be obliged, by wholesome provisions, to attend his public duty, and thus in great national questions must give a vote, of the honesty of which he will find it is necessary to convince his constituents.
The senate must always receive the exceptions of the president against any of their legislative acts, which, without  serious deliberation and sufficient reasons, they will seldom disregard. They will also feel a considerable check from the constitutional powers of the state legislatures, whose rights they will not be disposed to infringe, since they are the bodies to which they owe their existence, and are moreover to remain the immediate guardians of the people.
And lastly, the Senate will feel the mighty check of the House of Representatives—a body so truly popular and pure in its election, so intimately connected, by its interests and feelings, with the people at large, so guarded against corruption and influence—so much, from its nature, above all apprehensions, that it must ever be able to maintain the high ground assigned to it by the fœderal constitution.
On the safety of the people, from the nature of the House of Representatives.
In pursuing the consideration of the new fœderal constitution, it remains now to examine the nature and powers of the House of Representatives—the immediate delegates of the people.
Each member of this truly popular assembly will be chosen by about six thousand electors, by the poor as well as the rich. No decayed or venal borough will have an unjust share in their determinations—no old Sarum will send thither a representative by the voice of a single elector As we shall have no royal ministers to purchase votes, so we shall have no votes for sale; for the suffrages of six thousand enlightened and independent freemen are above all price. When the increasing population of the country shall render the body too  large at the rate of one member for every thirty thousand persons, they will be returned at the greater rate of one for every forty or fifty thousand, which will render the electors still more incorruptible. For this regulation is only designed to prevent a smaller number than thirty thousand from having a representative. Thus we see a provision follows, that no state shall have less than one member, for if a new and greater number than thirty thousand should hereafter be fixed on, which should exceed the whole of the inhabitants of any state, such state, without this wholesome provision, would lose its voice in the House of Representatives—a circumstance which the constitution renders impossible.
The people of England, whose House of commons is filled with military and civil officers and pensioners, say their liberties would be perfectly secured by triennial Parliaments. With us no placeman can sit among the representatives of the people, and two years are the constitutional term of their existence. Here, again, lest wealth, powerful connections, or even the unwariness of the people should place in this important trust an undeserving, unqualified or inexperienced youth, the wisdom of the Convention has proposed an absolute incapacity till the age of twenty-five. At twenty-one a young man is made the guardian of his own interest, but he cannot, for a few years more be intrusted with the affairs of the nation. He must be an inhabitant of the state that elects him, that he may be intimately acquainted with their particular circumstances—The house of Representatives is not, as the senate, to have a President chosen for them from without their body, but are to elect their speaker from their own number—They will also appoint all their other officers. In great state cases, they will be the grand inquest of the nation, for they possess the sole and uncontroulable power of impeachment. They are neither to wait the call, nor abide the prorogations and dissolutions  of a perverse or ambitious Prince, for they are to meet at least once in every year, and to sit on adjournments to be agreed on between themselves and the other servants of the people. Should they differ in opinion, the President, who is a temporary fellow-servant, and not their hereditary master, has a mediatorial power to adjust it for them, but cannot prevent their constitutional meeting within the year. They can compel the attendance of their members, that their public duty may not be evaded in times of difficulty or danger—The vote of each representative can be always known, as well as the proceedings of the house, that so the people may be acquainted with the conduct of those in whom they repose so important a trust. As was observed of the Senators, they cannot make new offices for themselves, nor increase, for their own benefit, the emoluments of old ones, by which the people will be exempted from needless additions to the public expences, on such sordid and mercenary principles—They are not to be restrained from the firm and plain language, which becomes the independent representatives of freedom, for there is to be a perfect liberty of speech. Without their consent, no monies can be obtained, no armies raised, no navies provided. They, alone, can originate bills for drawing forth the revenues of the union, and they will have a negative upon every legislative act of the other house.—So far, in short, as the sphere of fœderal jurisdiction extends, they will be controulable only by the people, and, in contentions with the other branch, so far as they shall be right, they must ever finally prevail.
Such, my Countrymen, are some of the cautionary provisions of the frame of government your faithful convention have submitted to your consideration—such the foundations of peace, liberty and safety, which have been laid by their unwearied labors—They have guarded you against all servants but those “whom choice and common good ordain,” against all masters, “save preserving Heaven.”
 NUMBER IV.
The security for national safety and happiness, resulting from other parts of the fœderal Government.
In considering the respective powers of the President, the Senate and the House of Representatives, under the federal constitution, we have seen a part of the wholesome precautions, which are contained in the new system. Let us examine what further securities for the safety and happiness of the people are contained in the general stipulations and provisions.
The United States guarantee to every state in the union a separate republican form of government. From thence it follows, that any man or body of men, however rich or powerful, who shall make an alteration in the form of government of any state, whereby the powers thereof shall be attempted to be taken out of the hands of the people at large, will stand guilty of high treason; or should a foreign power seduce or over-awe the people of any state, so as to cause them to vest in the families of any ambitious citizens or foreigners the powers of hereditary governors, whether as Kings or Nobles, that such investment of powers would be void in itself, and every person attempting to execute them would also be guilty of treason.
No religious test is ever to be required of any officer or servant of the United States. The people may employ any wise or good citizen in the execution of the various duties of the government. In Italy, Spain, and Portugal, no protestant can hold a public trust. In England every Presbyterian, and other person not of their established church, is incapable of holding an office. No such impious deprivation of the rights of men can take place under the new fœderal constitution. The convention  has the honour of proposing the first public act, by which any nation has ever divested itself of a power, every exercise of which is a trespass on the Majesty of Heaven.
No qualification in monied or landed property is required by the proposed plan; nor does it admit any preference from the preposterous distinctions of birth and rank. The office of the President, a Senator, and a Representative, and every other place of power or profit, are therefore open to the whole body of the people. Any wise, informed and upright man, be his property what it may, can exercise the trusts and powers of the state, provided he possesses the moral, religious and political virtues which are necessary to secure the confidence of his fellow citizens.
The importation of slaves from any foreign country is, by a clear implication, held up to the world as equally inconsistent with the dispositions and the duties of the people of America. A solid foundation is laid for exploding the principles of negro slavery, in which many good men of all parties in Pennsylvania, and throughout the union, have already concurred. The temporary reservation of any particular matter must ever be deemed an admission that it should be done away. This appears to have been well understood. In addition to the arguments drawn from liberty, justice and religion, opinions against this practice, founded in sound policy, have no doubt been urged. Regard was necessarily paid to the peculiar situation of our southern fellow-citizens; but they, on the other hand, have not been insensible of the delicate situation of our national character on this subject.
The people will remain, under the proposed constitution, the fountain of power and public honour. The President, the Senate, and the House of Representatives, will be the channels through which the stream  will flow—but it will flow from the people, and from them only. Every office, religious, civil and military will be either their immediate gift, or it will come from them through the hands of their servants. And this, as observed before, will be guaranteed to them under the state constitution which they respectively approve; for they cannot be royal forms, cannot be aristocratical, but must be republican.
The people of those states which have faithfully discharged their duty to the union will be no longer subjected alone to the weight of the public debts. Proper arrangements will call forth the just proportion of their sister states, and our national character will again be as unstained as it was once exalted. Elevation to independence, with the loss of our good name, is only to be conspicuous in disgrace. The liberties of a people involved in debt are as uncertain as the liberty of an individual in the same situation. Their virtue is more precarious. The unfortunate citizen must yield to the operation of the laws, while a bankrupt nation too easy annihilates the sacred obligations of gratitude and honour, and becomes execrable and infamous. I cannot refrain from reminding my fellow-citizens of our near approach to that deplorable situation, which must be our miserable condition, if the defects of the old confederation remain without amendment. The proposed constitution will cure the evil, and restore us to our rank among mankind.
Laws, made after the commission of the fact, have been a dreadful engine in the hands of tyrannical governors. Some of the most virtuous and shining characters in the world have been put to death, by laws formed to render them punishable, for parts of their conduct which innocence permitted, and to which patriotism impelled them. These have been called ex post facto laws, and are exploded by the new system. If a time of public contention shall hereafter arrive,  the firm and ardent friends to liberty may know the length to which they can push their noble opposition, on the foundation of the laws. Should their country's cause impel them further, they will be acquainted with the hazard, and using those arms which Providence has put into their hands, will make a solemn appeal to “the power above.”
The destruction of the ancient republics was occasioned in every instance by their being ignorant of a great political position, which was left for America to discover and and establish. Self-evident as the truth appears, we find no friend to liberty in ancient Greece or Rome asserting, that taxation and representation were inseparable. The Roman citizens, proud of their own liberty, imposed, in the freest times of the commonwealth, the most grievous burdens on their wretched provinces. At other times we find thousands of their citizens, though residing within the walls of Rome, deprived of legislative representatives. When America asserted the novel truth, Great Britain, though boasting herself as alone free among the modern nations, denied it by her legislature, and endeavoured to refute it by her arms—the reasoning of tyrants. But the attempt was vain, for the voice of truth was heard above the thunders of the war, and reached the ears of all nations. Henceforth the people of the earth will consider this position as the only rock on which they can found the temple of liberty, that taxation and representation are inseparable. Our new constitution carries it into execution on the most enlarged and liberal scale, for a Representative will be chosen by six thousand of his fellow-citizens, a Senator by half a sovereign state, a President by a whole nation.
The old fœderal constitution contained many of the same things, which from error or disingenousness are urged against the new ones. Neither of them have a bill of rights, nor does either notice the liberty of the press, because they are already provided for by the  state constitutions; and relating only to personal rights, they could not be mentioned in a contract among foreign states.
Both the old and new fœderal constitutions, and indeed the constitution of Pennsylvania, admit of courts in which no use is made of a jury. The board of property, the court of admiralty, and the high court of errors and appeals, in the state of Pennsylvania, as also the court of appeals under the old confederation, exclude juries. Trial by jury will therefore be in the express words of the Pennsylvania constitution, “as heretofore,”—almost always used, though sometimes omitted. Trials for lands lying in any state between persons residing in such state, for bonds, notes, book debts, contracts, trespasses, assumptions, and all other matters between two or more citizens of any state, will be held in the state courts by juries, as now. In these case the fœderal courts cannot interfere. But when a dispute arises between the citizens of any state about lands lying out of the bounds thereof, or when a trial is to be had between the citizens of any state and those of another, or the government of another, the private citizen will not be obliged to go into a court constituted by the state, with which, or with the citizens of which, his dispute is. He can appeal to a disinterested fœderal court. This is surely a great advantage, and promises a fair trial, and an impartial judgment. The trial by jury is not excluded in these fœderal courts. In all criminal cases, where the property, liberty or life of the citizen is at stake, he has the benefit of a jury. If convicted on impeachment, which is never done by a jury in any country, he cannot be fined, imprisoned or punished, but only may be disqualified from doing public mischief by losing his office,  and his capacity to hold another. If the nature of his offence, besides its danger to his country, should be criminal in itself—should involve a charge of fraud, murder or treason—he may be tried for such crime, but cannot be convicted without a jury. In trials about property in the fœderal courts, which can only be as above stated, there is nothing in the new constitution to prevent a trial by jury. No doubt it will be the mode in every case, wherein it is practicable. This will be adjusted by law, and it could not be done otherwise. In short, the sphere of jurisdiction for the fœderal courts is limited, and that sphere only is subject to the regulations of our fœderal government. The known principles of justice, the attachment to trial by jury whenever it can be used, the instructions of the state legislatures, the instructions of the people at large, the operation of the fœderal regulations on the property of a president, a senator, a representative, a judge, as well as on that of a private citizen, will certainly render those regulations as favorable as possible to property; for life and liberty are put more than ever into the hands of the juries. Under the present constitution of all the states, a public officer may be condemned to imprisonment or death on impeachment, without a jury; but the new fœderal constitution protects the accused, till he shall be convicted, from the hands of power, by rendering a jury the indispensible judges of all crimes.
The influence which foreign powers may attempt to exercise in our affairs was foreseen, and a wholesome provision has been made against it; for no person holding an office under the United States is permitted to enjoy any foreign honours, powers or emoluments.
The apprehensions of the people have been excited, perhaps by persons with good intentions, about the powers of the new government to raise an army. Let us consider this point with moderation and candour. As enemies will sometimes insult us, invade our country  and capture our property, it is clear a power in our government to oppose, restrain or destroy them, is necessary to our honor, safety and existence. The military should, however, be regarded with a watchful eye; for it is a profession that is liable to dangerous perversion. But the powers vested in the fœderal government do not go the length which has been said. A standing army is not granted or intended, for there can be no provision for its continuing three years, much less for its permanent establishment. Two years are the utmost time for which the money can be given. It will be under all the restrictions which wisdom and jealousy can suggest, and the original grant of the supplies must be made by the House of representatives, the immediate delegates of the people. The Senate and President, who also derive their power from the people, appoint the officers; and the heads of the departments, who must submit their accounts to the whole legislature, are to pay and provide them, as shall be directed by the laws that shall contain the conditions of the grant. The militia, who are in fact the effective part of the people at large, will render many troops quite unnecessary. They will form a powerful check upon the regular troops, and will generally be sufficient to over-awe them—for our detached situation will seldom give occasion to raise an army, though a few scattered companies may often be necessary. But whenever, even on the most obvious reasons, an army shall be raised, the several states will be called, by the nature of things, to attend to the condition of the militia. Republican jealousy, the guardian angel of these states, will watch the motions of our military citizens, even though they will be the soldiers of a free people. There is a wide difference however between the troops of such commonwealths as ours, founded on equal and unalterable principles, and those of a regal government, where ambition and oppression are the profession of the king. In the first case, a military officer is the occasional servant of the people, employed for their defence; in  the second, he is the ever ready instrument to execute the schemes of conquest or oppression, with which the mind of his royal master may be disturbed.
Observations have been made on the power given to the fœderal Government in regard to the elections of Representtives and Senators. The regulations of these elections are, by the first part of the clause, to be prescribed by the state legislatures, who are certainly the proper bodies, if they will always execute the duty. But in case the union or the public safety should be endangered by an omission of this duty, as in the case of Rhode-Island, then the legislature of the United States can name for the people a convenient time, and do other matters necessary to insure the free exercise of their right of election. The exception, in regard to the places of chusing Senators, was made from due respect to the sovereignty of the state legislatures, who are to elect the senators, and whose place of meeting ought not to be prescribed to them by any authority, except, indeed, as we always must, by the authority of the people. This power given to the fœderal legislature is no more than what is possessed by the governments of all the states. The constitution of Pennsylvania permits two thirds of such cities and counties, as shall elect representatives, to exercise all the powers of the General Assembly, “as fully and amply as if the whole were present,” should any part of the state neglect or refuse to perform their duty in this particular. In short, it is a power necessary to preserve the social compact of each state and the confederation of the United States.
Besides the securities for the liberties of the people arising out of the fœderal government, they are guarded by their state constitutions, and by the nature of things in the separate states. The Governor or President in each commonwealth, the Councils, Senates, Assemblies, Judges, Sheriffs, Grand and Pettit Juries, Officers of Militia, Clergy and Lay Officers of all churches, state and county Treasurer, Prothonotaries, Registers,  Presidents and other officers of Universities, Colleges and Academies, Wardens of ports and cities, Burgesses of towns, Commissioners of counties, County Lieutenants, and many other officers of power and influence, will still be chosen within each state, without any possible interference of the fœderal Government. The separate states will also choose all the members of the legislative and executive branches of the United States. The people at large in each state will choose their fœderal representative, and, unless ordered otherwise by state legislatures, may choose the electors of the President and Vice-President of the Union. And lastly, the legislature of the state will have the election of the senate, as they have heretofore had of the Members of Congress. Let us then, with a candor worthy of the subject, ask ourselves, whether it can he feared, that a majority of the Representatives, each of whom will be chosen by six thousand enlightened freemen, can betray their country?—Whether a majority of the Senate, each of whom will be chosen by the legislature of a free, sovereign and independent state, without any stipulations in favour of wealth or the contemptible distinctions of birth or rank, and who will be closely observed by the state legislatures, can destroy our liberties, controuled as they are too by the house of representatives? or whether a temporary, limited, executive officer, watched by the fœderal Representatives, by the Senate, by the state legislatures, by his personal enemies among the people of his own state, by the jealousy of the people of rival states, and by the whole of the people of the Union, can ever endanger our Freedom
 Permit me, my fellow-citizens, to close these observations by remarking, that there is no spirit of arrogance in the new fœderal constitution. It addresses you with becoming modesty, admitting that it may contain errors. Let us give it a trial; and when experience has taught its mistakes, the people, whom it preserves absolutely all powerful, can reform and amend them. That I may be perfectly understood, I will acknowledge its acceptance by all the states, without delay, is the second wish of my heart. The first is, that our country may be virtuous and free.
An American Citizen.