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• Introduction
• A Note On the Present Translation
• A Philosophical Commentary On These Words of the Gospel According to St. Luke, Chap. XIV. Ver. 23: Advertisement of the English Publisher.;
• Part the First.
• Chapter I: That the Light of Nature, Or the First Principles of Reason Universally Receiv’d, Are the Genuin and Original Rule of All Interpretation of Scripture; Especially In Matters of Practice and Morality.
• Chapter II: First Argument Against the Literal Sense of the Words, Compel ’em to Come In, Drawn From Its Repugnancy to the Distinctest Ideas of Natural Light.
• Chapter III: Second Argument Against the Literal Sense, Drawn From Its Opposition to the Spirit of the Gospel.
• Chapter IV: The Third Argument Against the Literal Sense, Drawn From Its Cancelling the Differences of Justice and Injustice, and Its Confounding Vertue and Vice, to the Total Dissolution of Society.
• Chapter V: The Fourth Argument Against the Literal Sense, Drawn From Its Giving Infidels a Very Plausible and Very Reasonable Pretence For Not Admitting Christians Into Their Dominions, and For Dislodging ’em Wherever They Are Settl’d Among ’em.
• Chapter VI: The Fifth Argument Against the Literal Sense, Drawn From the Impossibility of Putting It In Execution Without Unavoidable Crimes. That It’s No Excuse to Say, Hereticks Are Punish’d Only Because They Disobey Edicts.
• Chapter VII: The Sixth Argument Against the Literal Sense, Drawn From Its Depriving the Christian Religion of a Main Objection Against the Truth of Mahometism.
• Chapter VIII: The Seventh Argument Against the Literal Sense, Drawn From Its Being Unknown to the Fathers of the Three First Centurys.
• Chapter IX: The Eighth Argument Against the Literal Sense, Drawn From Its Rendring the Complaints of the First Christians Against Their Pagan Persecutors All Vain.
• Chapter X: The Ninth and Last Argument Against the Literal Sense, Drawn From Its Tending to Expose True Christians to Continual Violences, Without a Possibility of Alledging Any Thing to Put a Stop to ’em, But That Which Was the Ground of the Contest Betw
• The Second Part.: Containing a Full Answer to All the Objections Which May Be Rais’d Against What Has Bin Before Demonstrated.the Second Part.: Containing a Full Answer to All the Objections Which May Be Rais’d Against What Has Bin Before Demonstrated.
• Chapter I: First Objection, That Violence Is Not Design’d to Force Conscience, But to Awaken Those Who Neglect to Examine the Truth. the Illusion of This Thought. an Inquiry Into the Nature of What They Callopiniatreté.58
• Chapter II: Second Objection, the Literal Sense Appears Odious, Only By Our Judging of the Ways of God From Those of Men. Tho the State That Men Are In, When They Act From Passion, Seems Likely to Lead ’em to Wrong Judgments, It Does Not Follow But God, B
• Chapter III: Third Objection: They Aggravate the Matter Maliciously, By Representing the Constraint Enjoin’d Byjesus Christ,under the Idea of Scaffolds, Wheel, and Gibbet; Whereas They Should Only Talk of Fines, Banishment, and Other Petty Grievances. the
• Chapter IV: The Fourth Objection: We Can’t Condemn the Literal Sense of the Words, Compel ’em to Come In, But We Must At the Same Time Condemn Those Laws Which God Gave the Jews, and the Conduct of the Prophets On Several Occasions. the Disparity, and Par
• Chapter V: The Fifth Objection: Protestants Can’t Reject the Literal Sense of the Parable, Without Condemning the Wisest Emperors and Fathers of the Church, and Without Condemning Themselves; Since They In Some Places Don’t Tolerate Other Religions, and H
• Chapter VI: Sixth Objection: the Doctrine of Toleration Can’t Chuse But Throw the State Into All Kinds of Confusion, and Produce a Horrid Medly of Sects, to the Scandal of Christianity. the Answer. In What Sense Princes Ought to Be Nursing Fathers to the
• Chapter VII: The Seventh Objection: Compulsion In the Literal Sense Cannot Be Rejected Without Admitting a General Toleration. the Answer to This, and the Consequence Allow’d to Be True But Not Absurd. the Restrictions of Your Men of Half-toleration Exami
• Chapter VIII: Eighth Objection: Compulsion In the Literal Sense Is Maliciously Misrepresented, By Supposing It Authorizes Violences Committed Against the Truth. the Answer to This; By Which It Is Prov’d, That the Literal Sense Does In Reality Authorize Th
• Chapter IX: An Answer to Some Objections Against What Has Bin Advanc’d In the Foregoing Chapter Concerning the Rights of an Erroneous Conscience. Some Examples Which Prove This Right.
• Chapter X: A Continuation of the Answer to the Difficultys Against the Rights of an Erroneous Conscience. an Examination of What They Say, That If Hereticks Retaliate On Those Who Persecute ’em, They Are Guilty of Injustice. Arguments to Prove, That a Fal
• Chapter XI: The Result From What Has Bin Prov’d In the Two Foregoing Chapters; and a Confutation of the Literal Sense, Let the Worst Come to the Worst.
• Part III.
• I.: St. Austin’s Words
• II.: St. Austin’s Words
• III.: St. Austin’s Words
• IV.: St. Austin’s Words
• V.: St. Austin’s Words
• VI.: St. Austin’s Words
• VII.: St. Austin’s Words
• VIII.: St. Austin’s Words
• IX.: St. Austin’s Words
• X.: St. Austin’s Words
• XI.: St. Austin’s Words
• XII.: St. Austin’s Words
• XIII.: St. Austin’s Words
• XIV.: St. Austin’s Words
• XV.: St. Austin’s Words
• XVI.: St. Austin’s Words
• XVII.: St. Austin’s Words
• XVIII.: St. Austin’s Words
• XIX.: St. Austin’s Words
• XX.: St. Austin’s Words
• XXI.: St. Austin’s Words
• XXII.: St. Austin’s Words
• XXIII.: St. Austin’s Words
• XXIV.: St. Austin’s Words
• XXV.: St. Austin’s Words
• XXVI.: St. Austin’s Words
• XXVII.: St. Austin’s Words
• XXVIII.: St. Austin’s Words
• XXIX.: St. Austin’s Words
• XXX.: St. Austin’s Words
• XXXI.: St. Austin’s Words
• XXXII.: St. Austin’s Words
• XXXIII.: St. Austin’s Words Letter 164,148 to Emeritus.
• XXXIV.: St. Austin’s Words Letter 166,152 to the Donatists.
• XXXV.: St. Austin’s Words Ibid.
• XXXVI.: St. Austin’s Words Letter 204,154 to Donatus.
• XXXVII.: St. Austin’s Wordsibid.
• XXXVIII.: St. Austin’s Words Ibid.
• XXXIX.: St. Austin’s Words Ibid.
• Xl.: St. Austin’s Words Letter 167,160 to Festus.
• The Fourth Part, Or a Supplement to the Philosophical Commentary On These Words of Jesus Christ,compel ’em to Come In.
• The Preface<503>
• Chapter I: General Considerations On St. Austin’s Argument In Defence of Persecution; Shewing, That He Offers Nothing Which May Not Be Retorted, With Equal Force, Upon the Persecuted Orthodox.
• Chapter II: A Confirmation of the Foregoing Chapter, Chiefly By a New Confutation of the Answer Alledg’d At Every Turn Against My Reasonings; to Wit, That the True Church Alone Has a Right to Dispense With the Natural Rule of Equity, In Her Proceedings Ag
• Chapter III: The New Confutation of the Fore-mention’d Answer Continu’d, and Supported By Two Considerable Examples.
• Chapter IV: Another Way of Considering This Second Example.
• Chapter V: An Answer to the First Disparity Which May Be Alledg’d Against My Examples; to Wit, That Hereticks, In Giving an Alms, Do Well, Because They Give It to Those to Whom God Intended It Shou’d Be Given; But Do Ill, In Compelling to Come In, Because
• Chapter VI: A Parallel Between a Judg Who Shou’d Punish the Innocent, and Acquit the Guilty, From an Error In Point of Fact, and a Heretick Judg Who Shou’d Condemn the Orthodox.
• Chapter VII: Whether Heretical Ecclesiasticks May Be Blam’d For Having a Hand In the Trials and Condemnation of the Orthodox.
• Chapter VIII: An Abstract of the Answer to the First Disparity.
• Chapter IX: That a Judg Who Condemns an Innocent Person, and Acquits a Malefactor, Sins Not, Provided He Act According to Law.
• Chapter X: An Answer to a Second Disparity; to Wit, That When a Judg Gives Sentence Against a Person Falsly Accus’d of Murder, It’s an Ignorance of Fact; Whereas If He Condemns As Heresy What Is Really Orthodox, It’s an Ignorance of Right. I Shew That It’
• Chapter XI: An Answer to a Third Disparity; Which Is, That In Criminal Trials, the Obscurity Arises From the Thing It Self; Whereas In Those of Heresy, It Proceeds From the Prepossession of the Judges. I Answer, That Even Disinterested Judges, As the Chin
• Chapter XII: A Particular Consideration of One of the Causes Which Renders the Controversys of These Times So Cross and Intricate; to Wit, That the Same Principles Which Are Favorable Against One Sort of Adversarys, Are Prejudicial In Our Disputes With Ot
• Chapter XIII: An Answer to the Fourth Disparity; Which Is, That When a Judg Is Deceiv’d In a Cause of Heresy, He Is Guilty In the Sight of God; Because the Error In This Case Proceeds From a Principle of Corruption, Which Perverts the Will: an Evil Not In
• Chapter XIV: Examples Shewing That Men Continue In Their Errors Against the Interests of Flesh and Blood, and Their Own Inclinations.
• Chapter XV: That the Persuasion of the Truth of a Religion, Which Education Inspires, Is Not Founded On a Corruption of Heart.
• Chapter XVI: That the Strong Belief of a Falshood, Attended Even With the Rejecting Those Suspicions Which Sometimes Arise In Our Minds, That We Are In an Error, Does Not Necessarily Proceed From a Principle of Corruption.
• Chapter XVII: An Answer to What Is Objected, That All Errors Are Acts of the Will, and Consequently Morally Evil. the Absurdity of This Consequence Shewn; and a Rule Offer’d For Distinguishing Errors, Which Are Morally Evil, From Those Which Are Not.
• Chapter XVIII: A Discussion of Three Other Difficultys.first Difficulty. Knowing the Obliquity of the Motive, Is Not Necessary Towards Denominating an Action Evil.
• Chapter XIX: The Conclusion of the Answer to the Fourth Disparity.
• Chapter XX: The Conclusion and Summary View of the General Consideration, Hinted At In the Title of the First Chapter.
• Chapter XXI: An Answer to a New Objection: It Follows From My Doctrine, That the Persecutions Rais’d Against the Truth Are Just; Which Is Worse Than What the Greatest Persecutors Ever Pretended.
• Chapter XXII: That What Has Bin Lately Prov’d, Helps Us to a Good Answer to the Bishop of Meaux Demanding a Text, In Which Heresys Are Excepted Out of the Number of Those Sins, For the Punishing of Which God Has Given Princes the Sword.
• Chapter XXIII: A Summary Answer to Those Who Fly to Grace For a Solution of These Difficultys.
• Chapter XXIV: Whether the Arguments For the Truth Are Always More Solid Than Those For Falshood.
• Chapter XXV: A New Confutation of That Particular Argument of St. Austin, Drawn From the Constraint Exercis’d By a Good Shepherd On His Sheep.
• Chapter XXVI: A Small Sketch, Representing the Enormitys Attending the Doctrine of Compulsion By Some New Views, As the Destroying the Rights of Hospitality, Consanguinity, and Plighted Faith.
• Chapter XXVII: That Sodomy Might Become a Pious Action, According to the Principles of Our Modern Persecutors.
• Chapter XXVIII: An Examination of What May Be Answer’d to the Foregoing Chapter.
• Chapter XXIX: The Surprizing Progress Which the Doctrine of Compulsion Has Made In the World Over Many Centuries, Tho So Impious and Detestable. Reflections On This.
• Chapter XXX: That the Spirit of Persecution Has Reign’d, Generally Speaking, More Among the Orthodox, Since Constantine’s Days, Than Among Hereticks. Proofs of This From the Conduct of the Arians.
• Chapter XXXI: That the First Reformers In the Last Age Retain’d the Doctrine of Compulsion.
• Appendixes
• The Language of the Translation
• Obsolete Or Unusual Words Or Meanings
• Bayle’s Use of Logic
• Religious and Philosophical Controversies
• Faith and Heresy
• Trinity and Incarnation
• Grace, Original Sin, Predestination
• The Eucharist
• Church and State
• The Rule of Faith
• Reason the Fundamental Rule
• The Bible
• Philosophical Controversies
• Alterations to the 1708 Translation

XVI.

ST. AUSTIN’S WORDS

As to the solliciting the Emperors to make Laws against Schismaticks or Hereticks, or to enforce ’em, and enjoin their being put in Execution; you’l be pleas’d to remember the Violence with<434> which the other Donatists egg’d on, not only the Maximinasts, &c. but above all, you won’t forget how in the Petition, by which they implor’d the Authority of the Emperor Julian against us, they tell this Prince, whom they knew to be an Apostate and Idolater, That he was wholly mov’d by Justice, and that nothing else had any Power over him.

ANSWER

These words don’t at all concern me, seeing they are only an Argumentum ad hominem, or a Recrimination.125 The Donatists may have done all the irregular things he pleases, still this won’t excuse the Catholicks, except Sin is to be authoriz’d by Examples. Besides, as I propos’d to examine only the general Question, and the Arguments which St. Austin offers for forcing the Conscience; I have nothing to do with these Retorsions, or Reasons founded on Retaliation. I shall only say, that if I were not under some sort of Engagement to my self, not to charge St. Austin with Insincerity, I cou’d hardly forbear saying, that he here wou’d slur not only little Artifices of Rhetorick, but even downright Sophistry, upon us. For how else can we qualify his saying, that the Donatists, by giving Julian the Praises alledg’d, were either guilty of an abominable Lye, or own’d Idolatry to be a righteous thing? How little does this look, how strong does it smell of the Cavil! Had the Popish Priests, in a Petition to the late King, told his Majesty, that he hearken’d only to Reason and Justice; common Sense wou’d tell us, they did not hereby mean to say, the Church of England, which the King<435> was a Member of, was the rightful and true Church; but only, when the Question was about Settlement of a Dispute, that his Majesty consider’d the Rights of the Parties without any respect of Persons. So nice was the Emperor Julian in this particular, and in all other moral Dutys, that he might very safely be prais’d in a Petition, without the Partys touching upon the string of Religion, or importing, that even in this respect too, he suffer’d not himself to be struck by any other Light than that of Justice. Had St. Austin seen the Elogys of Pope Gregory the Great, on the Emperor Phocas, and the Queen Brunehaud, he’d perhaps have compounded with the Donatists, and engag’d never to reproach ’em more with their Petition to Julian, on condition they wou’d spare the great Flatterer St. Gregory.

Another Quibble of St. Austin’s, at least something very like it, is his arguing, A dicto simpliciter ad dictum secundum quid.126 His Adversarys complain’d of the methods of flying to the Secular Power, and oppressing ’em with the Imperial Penal Laws; and as it is usual to talk in general, or at least in indefinite Propositions, where we take a thing ever so little to heart, there’s no reason to doubt but their meaning was, that it was not proper to appeal to the Secular Power in Disputes about Religion, and that the Church ought not to have recourse thither. St. Austin, willing to ruin this Principle by the Absurdity of its Consequences, takes the Proposition in the strictness of the Letter, and the very utmost Extent; and from it wou’d conclude, that we must never appeal to the Secular Power, not even in criminal Cases, or for the determining Causes<436> purely Ecclesiastical: and as the Donatists themselves had had recourse to it in like Cases, he charges ’em with confuting their own Maxim. But with Submission to this great Bishop of Hippo, he takes the matter wrong; for tho the procuring an Order or Law for punishing a Bishop or Minister who abjures not his Belief, is a very bad Practice, yet it is very proper to apply to the temporal Power for the preventing any Man’s intruding into Ecclesiastical Preferments, and keeping ’em by wicked means; or appealing in any difference arising upon a matter of this nature, which cou’d not be decided by the ordinary course of Law. In a word, it’s lawful to desire the Prince, that he wou’d not suffer a Bishop, whether guilty, or only suspected of a Crime, to be exempted from clearing himself by due course of Law.

[125. ]See Appendixes, “Bayle’s Use of Logic,” p. 580, note 3.

[126. ]The fallacy of arguing “from something true in general to something said of a particular case,” which may be an exception.