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• Introduction
• A Note On the Present Translation
• A Philosophical Commentary On These Words of the Gospel According to St. Luke, Chap. XIV. Ver. 23: Advertisement of the English Publisher.;
• Part the First.
• Chapter I: That the Light of Nature, Or the First Principles of Reason Universally Receiv’d, Are the Genuin and Original Rule of All Interpretation of Scripture; Especially In Matters of Practice and Morality.
• Chapter II: First Argument Against the Literal Sense of the Words, Compel ’em to Come In, Drawn From Its Repugnancy to the Distinctest Ideas of Natural Light.
• Chapter III: Second Argument Against the Literal Sense, Drawn From Its Opposition to the Spirit of the Gospel.
• Chapter IV: The Third Argument Against the Literal Sense, Drawn From Its Cancelling the Differences of Justice and Injustice, and Its Confounding Vertue and Vice, to the Total Dissolution of Society.
• Chapter V: The Fourth Argument Against the Literal Sense, Drawn From Its Giving Infidels a Very Plausible and Very Reasonable Pretence For Not Admitting Christians Into Their Dominions, and For Dislodging ’em Wherever They Are Settl’d Among ’em.
• Chapter VI: The Fifth Argument Against the Literal Sense, Drawn From the Impossibility of Putting It In Execution Without Unavoidable Crimes. That It’s No Excuse to Say, Hereticks Are Punish’d Only Because They Disobey Edicts.
• Chapter VII: The Sixth Argument Against the Literal Sense, Drawn From Its Depriving the Christian Religion of a Main Objection Against the Truth of Mahometism.
• Chapter VIII: The Seventh Argument Against the Literal Sense, Drawn From Its Being Unknown to the Fathers of the Three First Centurys.
• Chapter IX: The Eighth Argument Against the Literal Sense, Drawn From Its Rendring the Complaints of the First Christians Against Their Pagan Persecutors All Vain.
• Chapter X: The Ninth and Last Argument Against the Literal Sense, Drawn From Its Tending to Expose True Christians to Continual Violences, Without a Possibility of Alledging Any Thing to Put a Stop to ’em, But That Which Was the Ground of the Contest Betw
• The Second Part.: Containing a Full Answer to All the Objections Which May Be Rais’d Against What Has Bin Before Demonstrated.the Second Part.: Containing a Full Answer to All the Objections Which May Be Rais’d Against What Has Bin Before Demonstrated.
• Chapter I: First Objection, That Violence Is Not Design’d to Force Conscience, But to Awaken Those Who Neglect to Examine the Truth. the Illusion of This Thought. an Inquiry Into the Nature of What They Callopiniatreté.58
• Chapter II: Second Objection, the Literal Sense Appears Odious, Only By Our Judging of the Ways of God From Those of Men. Tho the State That Men Are In, When They Act From Passion, Seems Likely to Lead ’em to Wrong Judgments, It Does Not Follow But God, B
• Chapter III: Third Objection: They Aggravate the Matter Maliciously, By Representing the Constraint Enjoin’d Byjesus Christ,under the Idea of Scaffolds, Wheel, and Gibbet; Whereas They Should Only Talk of Fines, Banishment, and Other Petty Grievances. the
• Chapter IV: The Fourth Objection: We Can’t Condemn the Literal Sense of the Words, Compel ’em to Come In, But We Must At the Same Time Condemn Those Laws Which God Gave the Jews, and the Conduct of the Prophets On Several Occasions. the Disparity, and Par
• Chapter V: The Fifth Objection: Protestants Can’t Reject the Literal Sense of the Parable, Without Condemning the Wisest Emperors and Fathers of the Church, and Without Condemning Themselves; Since They In Some Places Don’t Tolerate Other Religions, and H
• Chapter VI: Sixth Objection: the Doctrine of Toleration Can’t Chuse But Throw the State Into All Kinds of Confusion, and Produce a Horrid Medly of Sects, to the Scandal of Christianity. the Answer. In What Sense Princes Ought to Be Nursing Fathers to the
• Chapter VII: The Seventh Objection: Compulsion In the Literal Sense Cannot Be Rejected Without Admitting a General Toleration. the Answer to This, and the Consequence Allow’d to Be True But Not Absurd. the Restrictions of Your Men of Half-toleration Exami
• Chapter VIII: Eighth Objection: Compulsion In the Literal Sense Is Maliciously Misrepresented, By Supposing It Authorizes Violences Committed Against the Truth. the Answer to This; By Which It Is Prov’d, That the Literal Sense Does In Reality Authorize Th
• Chapter IX: An Answer to Some Objections Against What Has Bin Advanc’d In the Foregoing Chapter Concerning the Rights of an Erroneous Conscience. Some Examples Which Prove This Right.
• Chapter X: A Continuation of the Answer to the Difficultys Against the Rights of an Erroneous Conscience. an Examination of What They Say, That If Hereticks Retaliate On Those Who Persecute ’em, They Are Guilty of Injustice. Arguments to Prove, That a Fal
• Chapter XI: The Result From What Has Bin Prov’d In the Two Foregoing Chapters; and a Confutation of the Literal Sense, Let the Worst Come to the Worst.
• Part III.
• I.: St. Austin’s Words
• II.: St. Austin’s Words
• III.: St. Austin’s Words
• IV.: St. Austin’s Words
• V.: St. Austin’s Words
• VI.: St. Austin’s Words
• VII.: St. Austin’s Words
• VIII.: St. Austin’s Words
• IX.: St. Austin’s Words
• X.: St. Austin’s Words
• XI.: St. Austin’s Words
• XII.: St. Austin’s Words
• XIII.: St. Austin’s Words
• XIV.: St. Austin’s Words
• XV.: St. Austin’s Words
• XVI.: St. Austin’s Words
• XVII.: St. Austin’s Words
• XVIII.: St. Austin’s Words
• XIX.: St. Austin’s Words
• XX.: St. Austin’s Words
• XXI.: St. Austin’s Words
• XXII.: St. Austin’s Words
• XXIII.: St. Austin’s Words
• XXIV.: St. Austin’s Words
• XXV.: St. Austin’s Words
• XXVI.: St. Austin’s Words
• XXVII.: St. Austin’s Words
• XXVIII.: St. Austin’s Words
• XXIX.: St. Austin’s Words
• XXX.: St. Austin’s Words
• XXXI.: St. Austin’s Words
• XXXII.: St. Austin’s Words
• XXXIII.: St. Austin’s Words Letter 164,148 to Emeritus.
• XXXIV.: St. Austin’s Words Letter 166,152 to the Donatists.
• XXXV.: St. Austin’s Words Ibid.
• XXXVI.: St. Austin’s Words Letter 204,154 to Donatus.
• XXXVII.: St. Austin’s Wordsibid.
• XXXVIII.: St. Austin’s Words Ibid.
• XXXIX.: St. Austin’s Words Ibid.
• Xl.: St. Austin’s Words Letter 167,160 to Festus.
• The Fourth Part, Or a Supplement to the Philosophical Commentary On These Words of Jesus Christ,compel ’em to Come In.
• The Preface<503>
• Chapter I: General Considerations On St. Austin’s Argument In Defence of Persecution; Shewing, That He Offers Nothing Which May Not Be Retorted, With Equal Force, Upon the Persecuted Orthodox.
• Chapter II: A Confirmation of the Foregoing Chapter, Chiefly By a New Confutation of the Answer Alledg’d At Every Turn Against My Reasonings; to Wit, That the True Church Alone Has a Right to Dispense With the Natural Rule of Equity, In Her Proceedings Ag
• Chapter III: The New Confutation of the Fore-mention’d Answer Continu’d, and Supported By Two Considerable Examples.
• Chapter IV: Another Way of Considering This Second Example.
• Chapter V: An Answer to the First Disparity Which May Be Alledg’d Against My Examples; to Wit, That Hereticks, In Giving an Alms, Do Well, Because They Give It to Those to Whom God Intended It Shou’d Be Given; But Do Ill, In Compelling to Come In, Because
• Chapter VI: A Parallel Between a Judg Who Shou’d Punish the Innocent, and Acquit the Guilty, From an Error In Point of Fact, and a Heretick Judg Who Shou’d Condemn the Orthodox.
• Chapter VII: Whether Heretical Ecclesiasticks May Be Blam’d For Having a Hand In the Trials and Condemnation of the Orthodox.
• Chapter VIII: An Abstract of the Answer to the First Disparity.
• Chapter IX: That a Judg Who Condemns an Innocent Person, and Acquits a Malefactor, Sins Not, Provided He Act According to Law.
• Chapter X: An Answer to a Second Disparity; to Wit, That When a Judg Gives Sentence Against a Person Falsly Accus’d of Murder, It’s an Ignorance of Fact; Whereas If He Condemns As Heresy What Is Really Orthodox, It’s an Ignorance of Right. I Shew That It’
• Chapter XI: An Answer to a Third Disparity; Which Is, That In Criminal Trials, the Obscurity Arises From the Thing It Self; Whereas In Those of Heresy, It Proceeds From the Prepossession of the Judges. I Answer, That Even Disinterested Judges, As the Chin
• Chapter XII: A Particular Consideration of One of the Causes Which Renders the Controversys of These Times So Cross and Intricate; to Wit, That the Same Principles Which Are Favorable Against One Sort of Adversarys, Are Prejudicial In Our Disputes With Ot
• Chapter XIII: An Answer to the Fourth Disparity; Which Is, That When a Judg Is Deceiv’d In a Cause of Heresy, He Is Guilty In the Sight of God; Because the Error In This Case Proceeds From a Principle of Corruption, Which Perverts the Will: an Evil Not In
• Chapter XIV: Examples Shewing That Men Continue In Their Errors Against the Interests of Flesh and Blood, and Their Own Inclinations.
• Chapter XV: That the Persuasion of the Truth of a Religion, Which Education Inspires, Is Not Founded On a Corruption of Heart.
• Chapter XVI: That the Strong Belief of a Falshood, Attended Even With the Rejecting Those Suspicions Which Sometimes Arise In Our Minds, That We Are In an Error, Does Not Necessarily Proceed From a Principle of Corruption.
• Chapter XVII: An Answer to What Is Objected, That All Errors Are Acts of the Will, and Consequently Morally Evil. the Absurdity of This Consequence Shewn; and a Rule Offer’d For Distinguishing Errors, Which Are Morally Evil, From Those Which Are Not.
• Chapter XVIII: A Discussion of Three Other Difficultys.first Difficulty. Knowing the Obliquity of the Motive, Is Not Necessary Towards Denominating an Action Evil.
• Chapter XIX: The Conclusion of the Answer to the Fourth Disparity.
• Chapter XX: The Conclusion and Summary View of the General Consideration, Hinted At In the Title of the First Chapter.
• Chapter XXI: An Answer to a New Objection: It Follows From My Doctrine, That the Persecutions Rais’d Against the Truth Are Just; Which Is Worse Than What the Greatest Persecutors Ever Pretended.
• Chapter XXII: That What Has Bin Lately Prov’d, Helps Us to a Good Answer to the Bishop of Meaux Demanding a Text, In Which Heresys Are Excepted Out of the Number of Those Sins, For the Punishing of Which God Has Given Princes the Sword.
• Chapter XXIII: A Summary Answer to Those Who Fly to Grace For a Solution of These Difficultys.
• Chapter XXIV: Whether the Arguments For the Truth Are Always More Solid Than Those For Falshood.
• Chapter XXV: A New Confutation of That Particular Argument of St. Austin, Drawn From the Constraint Exercis’d By a Good Shepherd On His Sheep.
• Chapter XXVI: A Small Sketch, Representing the Enormitys Attending the Doctrine of Compulsion By Some New Views, As the Destroying the Rights of Hospitality, Consanguinity, and Plighted Faith.
• Chapter XXVII: That Sodomy Might Become a Pious Action, According to the Principles of Our Modern Persecutors.
• Chapter XXVIII: An Examination of What May Be Answer’d to the Foregoing Chapter.
• Chapter XXIX: The Surprizing Progress Which the Doctrine of Compulsion Has Made In the World Over Many Centuries, Tho So Impious and Detestable. Reflections On This.
• Chapter XXX: That the Spirit of Persecution Has Reign’d, Generally Speaking, More Among the Orthodox, Since Constantine’s Days, Than Among Hereticks. Proofs of This From the Conduct of the Arians.
• Chapter XXXI: That the First Reformers In the Last Age Retain’d the Doctrine of Compulsion.
• Appendixes
• The Language of the Translation
• Obsolete Or Unusual Words Or Meanings
• Bayle’s Use of Logic
• Religious and Philosophical Controversies
• Faith and Heresy
• Trinity and Incarnation
• Grace, Original Sin, Predestination
• The Eucharist
• Church and State
• The Rule of Faith
• Reason the Fundamental Rule
• The Bible
• Philosophical Controversies
• Alterations to the 1708 Translation

X.

ST. AUSTIN’S WORDS

The Good and the Bad do and suffer very often the same things; nor ought we to judg of the nature of their Actions by what either does, or what either suffers, but from the Motives on which they act or suffer. Pharaoh oppress’d the People of God with excessive Labor. Moses, on the other hand, punish’d the Transgressions of the same People by the most severe Punishments. The Actions of each side were much alike, but their Ends very different: One was an errant Tyrant, bloated with Pride and Power; the other a Father, fill’d with Charity. Jezabel put the Prophets to death, and Elias the false Prophets; but that which put Arms into the hands of one and t’other, was no less different than that which drew on the deaths of each. In the same Book, where we find St. Paul scourg’d by the Jews, we find the Jew Sosthenes scourg’d by the Greeks for St. Paul; there’s no difference between ’em if we only look at the Surface of the Action, but there’s a great deal of difference if we look at the Occasion and Motive. St. Paul is deliver’d to the Jailer to be cast into Irons, and St. Paul himself delivers the incestuous Corinthian to Satan, whose Cruelty much exceeds that of the most barbarous Jailers; yet he delivers this Man to Satan only that his Flesh being buffeted his Soul might be sav’d.115When the same St. Paul deliver’d Philetus and Himeneus to Satan to teach ’em not to blaspheme,116he did not intend to render Evil for Evil, but judg’d it an Act of Goodness to redress one Evil by another.<405>

ANSWER

Here’s another new Flight of those little Reasonings which pass well enough in a Croud, where not one of a thousand has the Skill to distinguish where the Comparison holds, and where it does not. St. Austin breaks his heart to prove what no body living denys, That the same Action may be good or bad, according to the difference of Circumstance. If a Prince punishes a seditious Province to the rigor, from no other design than just to hinder its revolting anew, this is an Action of Justice; but it’s an Act of Cruelty and Avarice, if he rigorously punishes a slight Offence in the same Province, in hopes an unreasonable Severity may make it rebel, and give him a Pretence of reducing the People to Beggary. I’l allow St. Austin then, that Moses did well in punishing the Israelites, and Pharaoh as ill in oppressing ’em; a difference which arose not purely from Moses’s proposing, as his end, the Reformation of this People, and Pharaoh its Ruin; but from their being punish’d without any demerit by Pharaoh, and not by Moses. But to unhinge St. Austin’s Comparisons all at once, I need only shew, that he instances on one hand in certain violent Proceedings arising from Aversion, or some other unjust Passion, and compares these with other Actions, afflictive indeed to our Neighbor, but at the same time enjoin’d by a special Revelation from God, and consequently operating under Circumstances, in which the Agent or instrumental Cause might be sure of their producing a good Effect. I speak with relation to Moses, Elias, and St. Paul. These were all Pro-<406>phets, who understood by an immediate divine Inspiration that ’twas proper to proceed in a way of Punishment; and in this case ’twas allowable in them to exercise Severity, because there was no room to doubt but God, who ordain’d the means, had a purpose of turning it to his own Glory in a singular and extraordinary manner. In this case one has an assurance both of the Justice of the Action, and of the right Disposition of the Circumstances, and of the good Success. Can any one say as much for Theodosius’s persecuting the Arians, or Honorius the Donatists? What assurance had either, that God wou’d give a blessing to their Violences, or make ’em an efficacious means of enlightning the Understanding, or turning the Hearts of those in Error? It’s evident they had no such assurance, and that the Probability was much stronger on the other hand, that these methods wou’d rather rivet ’em in their Errors, and produce false Conversions rather than any real Change; so that ’twas the highest Temerity to venture on the ways of Violence in such a posture of Affairs. As to the Case of Sosthenes, I can’t imagine what St. Austin wou’d infer from it; since ’twas an Act of the Rabble, who without the least regard to the Proconsul there present, or the place they were in, rush’d in a tumultuous manner on the Head of the Synagogue.117

I have one Remark more at hand, which will absolutely demolish all these Arguments of St. Austin. It’s plain that the whole force of his Reasonings turns on this Supposition; That when Men treat Hereticks hardly in hopes of converting ’em, they act from a Principle of Charity, a<407> Motive which changes the nature of hard usage in such a manner, that it presently becomes a Good-work; whereas it’s downright Sin, if proceeding from Hatred, Insolence, or Avarice. It’s plain likewise, that the reason which makes Men imagine there’s a Motive of Charity in the case, can be no other than this, or something very near it, to wit, That they look on ill usage as a very proper means for making a Heretick think of getting instructed, and entring on a Search after Truth and the right way to Salvation. So that St. Austin’s Reasoning amounts to this:

Treating one’s Neighbor ill, from a Principle of Charity, is a Good-work.

Now it’s treating him ill from a Principle of Charity, to give him such ill Treatment of any kind, as may oblige him to get instructed and heal the Diseases of his Soul.

It’s therefore a Good-work to give him this sort of ill Treatment.

This is one of the most dangerous, and at the same time the most absurd Sophism in Morality that e’er was fram’d; for by this rule one might justify the most execrable Actions. Shou’d I see my Neighbor puff’d up with Pride, shou’d I see his Vanity fed by a vast Estate, and by an extraordinary Esteem and Respect for his Person; I might safely endeavor to lessen his Fortune and blast his Reputation: To this end I might set fire to his House, invent and raise a thousand Calumnys of him; and if one in a private station might not lawfully do this, yet the Prince may; as St. Austin maintains he may justly keep a Heretick poor, in hopes of awakening him out of his slumber. The Prince, I say, might justly beggar<408> this proud Man, and eat him up with his Soldiers, or get him falsly impeach’d of High Treason, declare him attainted in his Blood, and brand him as a Traitor. Shou’d any one murmur at this hard usage of the Man, we might tell him upon St. Austin’s Scheme, that truly it wou’d be unjust, if proceeding from any other Motive than that of Charity; but since it’s only design’d to rescue the Man from Damnation, into which his Vanity, founded on his Opulency and Honors, drove him head-long, it was perfectly just. I desire no more of my Readers, than calmly and impartially to compare the Effects which Jails, Fines, Chicanes, and a continual Anxiety of Life, might produce on a Heretick, in order to make him renounce his Opinions from Heart and Mouth; with the Effects which the taking away his Substance and Good Name might have upon this proud Man: and I persuade my self they’l allow, that if the Treatment in the first case be capable of changing the Heart of a Heretick, the Treatment in the second case must likewise change the Heart of this proud Man; and consequently he may be rob’d of his Goods and Good Name from a Principle of pure Charity (according to the Minor of my Syllogism) which will become a Good-work according to the Major of the same Syllogism. So that here’s a Sophism for justifying the most execrable Actions; which was the thing to be prov’d.

The more one examines this matter, the more he discovers the Illusion good St. Austin was under. He imagin’d, that as those things which are absolutely indifferent, and left to our own discretion, become good or evil according to the<409> Motive or Intention; so those which are expresly commanded or forbidden are subject to the same alteration, by virtue of the different Motives upon which we act. But as from hence it wou’d follow, that Robbery, Murder, Perjury, Adultery, wou’d cease to be Sins, when practis’d with a design of humbling our Neighbor, and bringing him to Repentance, or in general when practis’d from any Motive of Charity; it manifestly follows, that we must distinguish between Dutys of Obligation, and those which are left to our own Choice. Now refraining from the Goods or Good Name of our Neighbor, not swearing a false Oath, not debauching our Neighbor’s Wife or his Daughter, not smiting, reviling, or insulting him, are all matters of Obligation; and therefore whatever Benefit he may be suppos’d to reap from our calumniating, or from our smiting him, &c. what Benefit soever, I say, he may reap from hence with regard to Salvation, it’s by no means allowable to treat him after this manner. God does not require us to endeavor the Salvation of our Brethren at the expence of his Laws; and we wou’d do well to leave it intirely to his Providence to reclaim ’em if he sees fit, either by Poverty, or Sickness, or Shame, and make ’em sensible of the ill use which they have made of their good Fortune. This altogether shews how much of Illusion there is in this pretended Charity, which prompts us to do evil to our Neighbor with a design of bringing him to good; and consequently, that Princes are grosly misled when they ruin their Subjects, when they banish, imprison, and expose ’em to<410> a thousand Straits and Vexations, under pretence of obliging ’em to get themselves instructed. An Apology therefore for Persecution, built on so rotten a Foundation, can never stand.

There’s only one Case, as I can think of, in which a Man may dispense with the Precepts of the Decalogue in hopes of procuring the spiritual Good of his Neighbor; and that is, where the Party finds himself favor’d with the Gift of Prophecy and that of Miracles, and led immediately and extraordinarily by the Spirit of God. In this case he may kill a Man, as St. Peter kill’d Ananias and Saphira his Wife; he may maim him, he may cover from head to foot with Leprosy and Ulcers, get the Ship cast away in which he has all his Effects, &c. because, as I have already observ’d,118 he acts from the express Order of God, who by the transcendent Eminence of his Nature is exempted from all Rule, and by his Quality of Searcher of the Heart and Reins is able to perceive the Sutableness and Congruity of Circumstances and corporeal Actions, to the Inflexions and Modifications of the Soul; insomuch as there’s no room to doubt of the good Success of these violent and acute Remedys. And therefore it is that St. Paul positively assures us he deliver’d the incestuous Corinthian to Satan, only in order to save his Soul; and Himencus and Philetus, that he might teach ’em not to blaspheme. But as for any Underling, or mere common Man, confin’d within the Sphere of human Knowledg, and incapable of foreseeing what effects Poverty and Anguish may have upon the Mind of a Heretick; for him, I say, to take upon him to spurn the Commands against Stealing, against smiting<411> his Neighbor, &c. upon a pretence that the Party, to deliver himself from Hunger and Pain, will set about examining his Errors, and o’ course perceive ’em; is undoubtedly the greatest Presumption, and the most ridiculous Pretension in the world.

By the way ’twill be useful to observe, that in the case of Moses’s punishing the Israelites he had to deal with a People who were under no Error of Conscience; for they well knew that the Actions for which they were punish’d, were evil and unjustifiable. St. Paul in like manner did not excommunicate Persons who believ’d they had acted aright. The incestuous Corinthian was no such Fool as to maintain, that Incest was an Action commanded or indulg’d by Jesus Christ; and as for Himeneus and Philetus, the Apostle affirms they had not only cast away the Faith, but also a good Conscience: consequently their Error was not attended with Sincerity, as the Errors of those are whom Princes take upon ’em to persecute, at the abominable instigation of Priests and Monks.

I wou’d likewise have People once more to observe what I have said in other Parts of this Commentary,119 to wit, that Men having receiv’d a standing Rule of their Actions from God, are by no means allow’d to depart from this Rule, on pretence of imitating the ways of God himself, or the Methods he makes use of either by the Intervention of natural Causes, or of Men endu’d in an extraordinary manner with the Gift of Miracles. For example, God shall make use of Tempests, Earthquakes, Infections, Hail, Mists, Locusts, &c. for punishing the People of a Coun-<412>try, and awaking ’em to Repentance; or perhaps he shall commission a Moses to inflict all these Plagues. Does it therefore follow, that Kings or other Men may set whole Fields of Corn on fire, poison the Fountains, and create as much as in them lies a Dearth or Sickness, in a Country whose Inhabitants are wicked and impenitent? Another Example; God sends his Apostle a Thorn in the Flesh, he permits a Messenger of Satan to buffet him, and this for the good of his Servant, and most certainly knowing that his own Power shall be manifested thro the Apostle’s Infirmity. Have we now any right of imitating this Conduct towards those whom we see puff’d up with the great Talents which God has vouchsafed ’em? Is there a King upon earth, who hearing of a famous Doctor in his Dominions, admir’d for his Learning and Eloquence, and holy Life, has a right of sending him a Thorn in the Flesh to humble or to mortify him; such as suborning false Witnesses to blast his Reputation in some inferior Court, or giving him a Potion to weaken his Body and Mind? We make no doubt but there are Women in the world, who, thro the special Favor of God, have had the sad mortification in their Childhood of losing their Beauty by the Small-Pox. God who has a love for ’em, and who knows they wou’d make an ill use of their Beauty, and that the loss of this Jewel will engage ’em more intensly to the solid Contemplations of the World to come, disfigures ’em most justly, and from a Motion of pure Grace. May a King lawfully imitate this Conduct? And when he sees a fair Lady pride her self in her Beauty,<413> catching all the Men in her way, and caught her self in the Snares of Love, may he without a crime destroy all her natural Charms? May he in charity hire a Ruffian to mangle her Face; may he send her a Box, which in the opening shall set fire to a Preparation of Sulphur or Gunpouder, and for ever ruin her Bloom and lovely Complexion? May he bribe her Physician to prescribe her a Pouder or Potion, which shall throw her into a languishing Sickness, end in a frightful Jaundice, ghastly Looks, and an offensive Smell? It’s plain he cannot; and that this Prince wou’d make himself ridiculous to all the World, shou’d he gloss such a Conduct with the specious pretence of Charity; as that he design’d to preserve this fine Woman from the Dangers to which her Soul was expos’d, and sequester her from the Vanitys and Pleasures of the World to think only upon things above. There’s infinitely a greater probability, that the disfiguring such a Woman, and throwing her into a languishing Sickness, wou’d mortify her Vanity, and accomplish her Conversion, than that the quartering a hundred Dragoons on a Hugonot shou’d put him in the right way of perceiving he is a Heretick, and of sincerely embracing the Romish Faith. Yet the World wou’d hiss such a Prince, or his Directors of Conscience, who took these methods of converting the Ladys; and yet they applaud his endeavoring to convert Protestants the same way.

I shall conclude this Article with the following Remark; That nothing is more groundless than St. Austin’s Distinction of those Cudgellings, ransacking of Houses, and other ways of Violence<414> which proceed from a Motive of Charity, and those which are exercis’d without this Principle of Charity. True Charity is that which inclines us to keep those Laws of God which forbid Robbery, Blood-shed, and Battery: for by the same Distinction a Prince might innocently set fire to all the Citys in the Kingdom, and every year destroy a great part of the Harvest; still pretending that his Design was to humble his Subjects, who don’t think enough upon God in convenient Houses and great Plenty.

[115. ]1 Corinthians 5:5.

[116. ]1 Timothy 1:20, 2 Timothy 2:17.

[117. ]Acts 18:17.

[118. ]See above, p. 310.

[119. ]See above, p. 152, p. 302.