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• Preface.
• The Discourses of Epictetus.
• Arrian to Lucius Gellius Wisheth All Happiness.
• Book I.
• Chapter I.: Of the Things Which Are, and the Things Which Are Not In Our Own Power.
• Chapter II.: In What Manner, Upon Every Occasion, to Preserve Our Character.
• Chapter III.: How, From the Doctrine That God Is the Father of Mankind, We May Proceed to Its Consequences.
• Chapter IV: Of Progress.
• Chapter V.: Concerning the Academics. †
• Chapter VI.: Of Providence.
• Chapter VII.: Of the Use of the Forms of Right Reasoning.
• Chapter VIII.: That Logical Subtleties Are Not Safe to the Uninstructed.
• Chapter IX.: How From the Doctrine of Our Relationship to God, We Are to Deduce Its Consequences.
• Chapter X.: Concerning Those Who Seek Preferment At Rome.
• Chapter XI.: Of Natural Affection.
• Chapter XII.: Of Contentment.
• Chapter XIII.: How Everything May Be Performed to the Divine Acceptance.
• Chapter XIV.: That All Things Are Under the Divine Supervision.
• Chapter XV.: What Philosophy Promises.
• Chapter XVI.: Of Providence.
• Chapter XVII.: That the Art of Reasoning Is Necessary.
• Chapter XVIII.: That We Ought Not to Be Angry With the Erring.
• Chapter XIX.: Of the Right Treatment of Tyrants.
• Chapter XX.: In What Manner Reason Contemplates Itself.
• Chapter XXI.: Of the Desire of Admiration.
• Chapter XXII.: Of General Principles.
• Chapter XXIII.: Against Epicurus.
• Chapter XXIV.: How We Ought to Struggle With Difficulties.
• Chapter XXV.: On the Same Subject.
• Chapter XXVI.: What the Rule of Life Is.
• Chapter XXVII.: Of the Varied Appearances of Things to the Mind, and What Means Are At Hand By Which to Regulate Them.
• Chapter XXVIII.: That We Ought Not to Be Angry With Mankind. What Things Are Little, What Great, Among Men.
• Chapter XXIX.: Of Courage.
• Chapter XXX.: Weapons Ready For Difficult Occasions.
• Book II.
• Chapter I.: That Courage Is Not Inconsistent With Caution.
• Chapter II.: Of Tranquillity.
• Chapter III.: Concerning Such As Recommend Persons to the Philosophers
• Chapter IV.: Concerning a Man Who Had Been Guilty of Adultery.
• Chapter V.: How Nobleness of Mind May Be Consistent With Prudence.
• Chapter VI.: Of Circumstances. *
• Chapter VII.: Of Divination.
• Chapter VIII.: Wherein Consists the Essence of Good.
• Chapter IX.: That Some Persons, Failing to Fulfil What the Character of a Man Implies, Assume That of a Philosopher.
• Chapter X.: How We May Infer the Duties of Life From Its Nominal Functions.
• Chapter XI.: The Beginning of Philosophy.
• Chapter XII.: Of Disputation.
• Chapter XIII.: Of Anxiety.
• Chapter XIV.: Concerning Naso.
• Chapter XV.: Concerning Those Who Obstinately Persist In Whatever They Have Determined.
• Chapter XVI.: That We Do Not Study to Make Use of the Established Principles Concerning Good and Evil.
• Chapter XVII.: How to Apply General Principles to Particular Cases.
• Chapter XVIII.: How the Semblances of Things Are to Be Combated.
• Chapter XIX.: Concerning Those Who Embrace Philosophy Only In Words.
• Chapter XX.: Concerning the Epicureans and Academics.
• Chapter XXI.: Of Inconsistency.
• Chapter XXII.: Of Friendship.
• Chapter XXIII.: Of Eloquence.
• Chapter XXIV.: Concerning a Person Whom He Treated With Disregard.
• Chapter XXV.: That Logic Is Necessary.
• Chapter XXVI.: What Is the Test of Error.
• Book III.
• Chapter I.: Of Personal Adornment.
• Chapter II.: In What a Well-trained Man Should Exercise Himself; and That We Neglect the Principal Things.
• Chapter III.: What Is the Chief Concern of a Good Man; and In What We Chiefly Ought to Train Ourselves.
• Chapter IV.: Concerning One Who Made Himself Improperly Conspicuous In the Theatre.
• Chapter V.: Concerning Those Who Plead Sickness.
• Chapter VI.: Miscellaneous.
• Chapter VII.: Concerning a Certain Governor Who Was an Epicurean.
• Chapter VIII.: How We Are to Exercise Ourselves Against the Semblances of Things.
• Chapter IX.: Concerning a Certain Orator, Who Was Going to Rome On a Lawsuit.
• Chapter X.: In What Manner We Ought to Bear Sickness.
• Chapter XI.: Miscellaneous.
• Chapter XII.: Of Training.
• Chapter XIII.: What Solitude Is; and What a Solitary Person.
• Chapter XIV.: Miscellaneous.
• Chapter XV. *: That Everything Is to Be Undertaken With Circumspection.
• Chapter XVI.: That Caution Should Be Used, As to Personal Familiarity.
• Chapter XVII.: Of Providence.
• Chapter XVIII.: That We Ought Not to Be Alarmed, By Any News That Is Brought Us.
• Chapter XIX.: What Is the Comparative Condition of the Philosopher, and of the Crowd.
• Chapter XX.: That Some Advantage May Be Gained From Every Outward Circumstance.
• Chapter XXI.: Concerning Those Who Readily Set Up For Sophists.
• Chapter XXII.: Of the Cynic Philosophy.
• Chapter XXIII.: Concerning Such As Read and Dispute Ostentatiously.
• Chapter XXIV.: That We Ought Not to Be Affected By Things Not In Our Own Power.
• Chapter XXV.: Concerning Those Who Waver In Their Purpose.
• Chapter XXVI.: Concerning Those Who Are In Dread of Want.
• Book IV.
• Chapter I.: Of Freedom.
• Chapter II.: Of Complaisance.
• Chapter III.: What Things Are to Be Exchanged For Others.
• Chapter IV.: Concerning Those Who Earnestly Desire a Life of Repose.
• Chapter V.: Concerning the Quarrelsome and Ferocious.
• Chapter VI.: Concerning Those Who Are Annoyed At Being Pitied.
• Chapter VII.: Of Fearlessness.
• Chapter VIII.: Concerning Such As Hastily Assume the Philosophic Dress.
• Chapter IX.: Concerning a Person Who Had Grown Immodest.
• Chapter X.: What Things We Are to Despise, and What Chiefly to Value.
• Chapter XI.: Of Purity.
• Chapter XII.: Of Taking Pains.
• Chapter XIII.: Concerning Such As Are Too Communicative.
• The Enchiridion, Or Manual.
• Part I
• From StobÆus, Antonius, and Maximus. *
• The Following Fragments Are Ascribed Jointly to Epictetus and Other Authors.
• I.
• II.
• III.
• IV.
• V.
• VI.
• VII.
• VIII.
• IX.
• X.
• XI.
• XII.
• XIII.
• XIV.
• XV.
• XVI.
• XVII.
• XVIII.
• XIX.
• XX.
• XXI.
• XXII.
• XXIII.
• XXIV.
• XXV.
• XXVI.
• XXVII.
• XXVIII.
• XXIX.
• XXX.
• XXXI.
• XXXII.
• The Following Fragments Are Omitted By Mr. Upton; But As They Stand Under the Name of Arrian, and Seem to Be In the Spirit of Epictetus, They Are Added Here.
• I.
• II.
• III.
• IV.
• V.
• VI.

CHAPTER IV.

CONCERNING ONE WHO MADE HIMSELF IMPROPERLY CONSPICUOUS IN THE THEATRE.

WHEN the Governor of Epirus had exerted himself with improper eagerness in favor of a comedian, and was upon that account publicly railed at; and, when he came to hear it, was highly displeased with those who railed at him; Why, what harm, said Epictetus, have these people done? They have shown favoritism; which is just what you did.

“Is this a proper manner then, of expressing their favor?”

Seeing you, their governor, and the friend and vicegerent of Cæsar, express it thus, was it not to be expected that they would express it thus too? For, if this zealous favoritism is not right, do not show it yourself; and if it is, why are you angry at them for imitating you? For whom have the many to imitate, but you, their superiors? From whom are they to take example, when they come into the theatre, but from you? “Do but look how Cæsar’s vicegerent sees the play? Has he cried out? I will cry out too. Has he leaped up from his seat? I too will leap up from mine. Do his slaves sit in different parts of the house, making an uproar? I indeed have no slaves; but I will make as much uproar as I can unaided.”

You ought to consider, then, that when you appear in the theatre, you appear as a rule and example to others, how they ought to see the play. Why is it that they have railed at you? Because every man hates what hinders him. They would have one actor crowned; you, another. They hindered you; and you them. You proved the stronger. They have done what they could; they have railed at the person who hindered them. What would you have, then? Would you do as you please, and not have them even talk as they please? Where is the wonder of all this? Does not the husbandman rail at Zeus when he is hindered by him? Does not the sailor? Do men ever cease railing at Cæsar? What then, is Zeus ignorant of this? Are not the things that are said reported to Cæsar? How then does he act? He knows that, if he were to punish all railers, he would have nobody left to command.

When you enter the theatre, then, ought you to say, “Come, let Sophron be crowned?” No. But rather, “Come, let me at this time regulate my Will in a manner conformable to Nature. No one is dearer to me than myself. It is ridiculous, then, that because another man gains the victory as a player, I should be hurt. Whom do I wish to gain the victory? Him who does gain it; and thus he will always be victorious whom I wish to be so.” — “But I would have Sophron crowned.” — Why, celebrate as many games as you will at your own house, Nemean, Pythian, Isthmian, Olympic, and proclaim him victor in all; but in public do not arrogate more than your due, nor seek to monopolize what belongs to all; or if otherwise, bear to be railed at, for if you act like the mob, you reduce yourself to an equality with them.