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• Preface.
• The Discourses of Epictetus.
• Arrian to Lucius Gellius Wisheth All Happiness.
• Book I.
• Chapter I.: Of the Things Which Are, and the Things Which Are Not In Our Own Power.
• Chapter II.: In What Manner, Upon Every Occasion, to Preserve Our Character.
• Chapter III.: How, From the Doctrine That God Is the Father of Mankind, We May Proceed to Its Consequences.
• Chapter IV: Of Progress.
• Chapter V.: Concerning the Academics. †
• Chapter VI.: Of Providence.
• Chapter VII.: Of the Use of the Forms of Right Reasoning.
• Chapter VIII.: That Logical Subtleties Are Not Safe to the Uninstructed.
• Chapter IX.: How From the Doctrine of Our Relationship to God, We Are to Deduce Its Consequences.
• Chapter X.: Concerning Those Who Seek Preferment At Rome.
• Chapter XI.: Of Natural Affection.
• Chapter XII.: Of Contentment.
• Chapter XIII.: How Everything May Be Performed to the Divine Acceptance.
• Chapter XIV.: That All Things Are Under the Divine Supervision.
• Chapter XV.: What Philosophy Promises.
• Chapter XVI.: Of Providence.
• Chapter XVII.: That the Art of Reasoning Is Necessary.
• Chapter XVIII.: That We Ought Not to Be Angry With the Erring.
• Chapter XIX.: Of the Right Treatment of Tyrants.
• Chapter XX.: In What Manner Reason Contemplates Itself.
• Chapter XXI.: Of the Desire of Admiration.
• Chapter XXII.: Of General Principles.
• Chapter XXIII.: Against Epicurus.
• Chapter XXIV.: How We Ought to Struggle With Difficulties.
• Chapter XXV.: On the Same Subject.
• Chapter XXVI.: What the Rule of Life Is.
• Chapter XXVII.: Of the Varied Appearances of Things to the Mind, and What Means Are At Hand By Which to Regulate Them.
• Chapter XXVIII.: That We Ought Not to Be Angry With Mankind. What Things Are Little, What Great, Among Men.
• Chapter XXIX.: Of Courage.
• Chapter XXX.: Weapons Ready For Difficult Occasions.
• Book II.
• Chapter I.: That Courage Is Not Inconsistent With Caution.
• Chapter II.: Of Tranquillity.
• Chapter III.: Concerning Such As Recommend Persons to the Philosophers
• Chapter IV.: Concerning a Man Who Had Been Guilty of Adultery.
• Chapter V.: How Nobleness of Mind May Be Consistent With Prudence.
• Chapter VI.: Of Circumstances. *
• Chapter VII.: Of Divination.
• Chapter VIII.: Wherein Consists the Essence of Good.
• Chapter IX.: That Some Persons, Failing to Fulfil What the Character of a Man Implies, Assume That of a Philosopher.
• Chapter X.: How We May Infer the Duties of Life From Its Nominal Functions.
• Chapter XI.: The Beginning of Philosophy.
• Chapter XII.: Of Disputation.
• Chapter XIII.: Of Anxiety.
• Chapter XIV.: Concerning Naso.
• Chapter XV.: Concerning Those Who Obstinately Persist In Whatever They Have Determined.
• Chapter XVI.: That We Do Not Study to Make Use of the Established Principles Concerning Good and Evil.
• Chapter XVII.: How to Apply General Principles to Particular Cases.
• Chapter XVIII.: How the Semblances of Things Are to Be Combated.
• Chapter XIX.: Concerning Those Who Embrace Philosophy Only In Words.
• Chapter XX.: Concerning the Epicureans and Academics.
• Chapter XXI.: Of Inconsistency.
• Chapter XXII.: Of Friendship.
• Chapter XXIII.: Of Eloquence.
• Chapter XXIV.: Concerning a Person Whom He Treated With Disregard.
• Chapter XXV.: That Logic Is Necessary.
• Chapter XXVI.: What Is the Test of Error.
• Book III.
• Chapter I.: Of Personal Adornment.
• Chapter II.: In What a Well-trained Man Should Exercise Himself; and That We Neglect the Principal Things.
• Chapter III.: What Is the Chief Concern of a Good Man; and In What We Chiefly Ought to Train Ourselves.
• Chapter IV.: Concerning One Who Made Himself Improperly Conspicuous In the Theatre.
• Chapter V.: Concerning Those Who Plead Sickness.
• Chapter VI.: Miscellaneous.
• Chapter VII.: Concerning a Certain Governor Who Was an Epicurean.
• Chapter VIII.: How We Are to Exercise Ourselves Against the Semblances of Things.
• Chapter IX.: Concerning a Certain Orator, Who Was Going to Rome On a Lawsuit.
• Chapter X.: In What Manner We Ought to Bear Sickness.
• Chapter XI.: Miscellaneous.
• Chapter XII.: Of Training.
• Chapter XIII.: What Solitude Is; and What a Solitary Person.
• Chapter XIV.: Miscellaneous.
• Chapter XV. *: That Everything Is to Be Undertaken With Circumspection.
• Chapter XVI.: That Caution Should Be Used, As to Personal Familiarity.
• Chapter XVII.: Of Providence.
• Chapter XVIII.: That We Ought Not to Be Alarmed, By Any News That Is Brought Us.
• Chapter XIX.: What Is the Comparative Condition of the Philosopher, and of the Crowd.
• Chapter XX.: That Some Advantage May Be Gained From Every Outward Circumstance.
• Chapter XXI.: Concerning Those Who Readily Set Up For Sophists.
• Chapter XXII.: Of the Cynic Philosophy.
• Chapter XXIII.: Concerning Such As Read and Dispute Ostentatiously.
• Chapter XXIV.: That We Ought Not to Be Affected By Things Not In Our Own Power.
• Chapter XXV.: Concerning Those Who Waver In Their Purpose.
• Chapter XXVI.: Concerning Those Who Are In Dread of Want.
• Book IV.
• Chapter I.: Of Freedom.
• Chapter II.: Of Complaisance.
• Chapter III.: What Things Are to Be Exchanged For Others.
• Chapter IV.: Concerning Those Who Earnestly Desire a Life of Repose.
• Chapter V.: Concerning the Quarrelsome and Ferocious.
• Chapter VI.: Concerning Those Who Are Annoyed At Being Pitied.
• Chapter VII.: Of Fearlessness.
• Chapter VIII.: Concerning Such As Hastily Assume the Philosophic Dress.
• Chapter IX.: Concerning a Person Who Had Grown Immodest.
• Chapter X.: What Things We Are to Despise, and What Chiefly to Value.
• Chapter XI.: Of Purity.
• Chapter XII.: Of Taking Pains.
• Chapter XIII.: Concerning Such As Are Too Communicative.
• The Enchiridion, Or Manual.
• Part I
• From StobÆus, Antonius, and Maximus. *
• The Following Fragments Are Ascribed Jointly to Epictetus and Other Authors.
• I.
• II.
• III.
• IV.
• V.
• VI.
• VII.
• VIII.
• IX.
• X.
• XI.
• XII.
• XIII.
• XIV.
• XV.
• XVI.
• XVII.
• XVIII.
• XIX.
• XX.
• XXI.
• XXII.
• XXIII.
• XXIV.
• XXV.
• XXVI.
• XXVII.
• XXVIII.
• XXIX.
• XXX.
• XXXI.
• XXXII.
• The Following Fragments Are Omitted By Mr. Upton; But As They Stand Under the Name of Arrian, and Seem to Be In the Spirit of Epictetus, They Are Added Here.
• I.
• II.
• III.
• IV.
• V.
• VI.

CHAPTER IV.

CONCERNING A MAN WHO HAD BEEN GUILTY OF ADULTERY.

JUST as he was once saying, that man is made for fidelity, and that whoever subverts this, subverts the peculiar property of man; there entered one of the so-called literary men, who had been found guilty of adultery, in that city. — But, continued Epictetus, if, laying aside that fidelity for which we were born, we form designs against the wife of our neighbor, what do we? What else but destroy and ruin — what? Fidelity, honor, and sanctity of manners. Only these? And do not we ruin neighborhood? Friendship? Our country? In what rank do we then place ourselves? How am I to consider you, sir? As a neighbor? A friend? What sort of one? As a citizen? How shall I trust you? Indeed, if you were some potsherd, so noisome that no use could be made of you, you might be thrown on a dunghill, and no mortal would take the trouble to pick you up; but if, being a man, you cannot fill any one place in human society, what shall we do with you? For, suppose you cannot hold the place of a friend, can you hold even that of a slave? And who will trust you? Why, then, should not you also be contented to be thrown upon some dunghill, as a useless vessel, and indeed as worse than that? Will you say, after this, Has no one any regard for me, a man of letters? Why, you are wicked, and fit for no use. Just as if wasps should take it ill that no one has any regard for them; but all shun, and whoever can, beats them down. You have such a sting, that whoever you strike with it, is thrown into troubles and sorrows. What would you have us do with you? There is nowhere to place you.

“What, then, are not women made by nature common?”

I admit it; and so is food at table common to those who are invited. But, after it is distributed, will you go and snatch away the share of him who sits next you; or slyly steal it, or stretch out your hand, and taste; and, if you cannot tear away any of the meat, dip your fingers and lick them? A fine companion! A Socratic guest indeed! Again; is not the theatre common to all the citizens? Therefore come, when all are seated, if you dare, and turn any one of them out of his place. In this sense, only, are women common by nature; but when the laws, like a good host, have distributed them, cannot you, like the rest of the company, be contented with your own share, but must you pilfer, and taste what belongs to another?

“But I am a man of letters, and understand Archedemus.”

With all your understanding of Archedemus, then, you will be an adulterer, and a rogue; and instead of a man, a wolf or an ape. For where is the difference?