The Online Library of Liberty

A project of Liberty Fund, Inc.

• Preface.
• The Discourses of Epictetus.
• Arrian to Lucius Gellius Wisheth All Happiness.
• Book I.
• Chapter I.: Of the Things Which Are, and the Things Which Are Not In Our Own Power.
• Chapter II.: In What Manner, Upon Every Occasion, to Preserve Our Character.
• Chapter III.: How, From the Doctrine That God Is the Father of Mankind, We May Proceed to Its Consequences.
• Chapter IV: Of Progress.
• Chapter V.: Concerning the Academics. †
• Chapter VI.: Of Providence.
• Chapter VII.: Of the Use of the Forms of Right Reasoning.
• Chapter VIII.: That Logical Subtleties Are Not Safe to the Uninstructed.
• Chapter IX.: How From the Doctrine of Our Relationship to God, We Are to Deduce Its Consequences.
• Chapter X.: Concerning Those Who Seek Preferment At Rome.
• Chapter XI.: Of Natural Affection.
• Chapter XII.: Of Contentment.
• Chapter XIII.: How Everything May Be Performed to the Divine Acceptance.
• Chapter XIV.: That All Things Are Under the Divine Supervision.
• Chapter XV.: What Philosophy Promises.
• Chapter XVI.: Of Providence.
• Chapter XVII.: That the Art of Reasoning Is Necessary.
• Chapter XVIII.: That We Ought Not to Be Angry With the Erring.
• Chapter XIX.: Of the Right Treatment of Tyrants.
• Chapter XX.: In What Manner Reason Contemplates Itself.
• Chapter XXI.: Of the Desire of Admiration.
• Chapter XXII.: Of General Principles.
• Chapter XXIII.: Against Epicurus.
• Chapter XXIV.: How We Ought to Struggle With Difficulties.
• Chapter XXV.: On the Same Subject.
• Chapter XXVI.: What the Rule of Life Is.
• Chapter XXVII.: Of the Varied Appearances of Things to the Mind, and What Means Are At Hand By Which to Regulate Them.
• Chapter XXVIII.: That We Ought Not to Be Angry With Mankind. What Things Are Little, What Great, Among Men.
• Chapter XXIX.: Of Courage.
• Chapter XXX.: Weapons Ready For Difficult Occasions.
• Book II.
• Chapter I.: That Courage Is Not Inconsistent With Caution.
• Chapter II.: Of Tranquillity.
• Chapter III.: Concerning Such As Recommend Persons to the Philosophers
• Chapter IV.: Concerning a Man Who Had Been Guilty of Adultery.
• Chapter V.: How Nobleness of Mind May Be Consistent With Prudence.
• Chapter VI.: Of Circumstances. *
• Chapter VII.: Of Divination.
• Chapter VIII.: Wherein Consists the Essence of Good.
• Chapter IX.: That Some Persons, Failing to Fulfil What the Character of a Man Implies, Assume That of a Philosopher.
• Chapter X.: How We May Infer the Duties of Life From Its Nominal Functions.
• Chapter XI.: The Beginning of Philosophy.
• Chapter XII.: Of Disputation.
• Chapter XIII.: Of Anxiety.
• Chapter XIV.: Concerning Naso.
• Chapter XV.: Concerning Those Who Obstinately Persist In Whatever They Have Determined.
• Chapter XVI.: That We Do Not Study to Make Use of the Established Principles Concerning Good and Evil.
• Chapter XVII.: How to Apply General Principles to Particular Cases.
• Chapter XVIII.: How the Semblances of Things Are to Be Combated.
• Chapter XIX.: Concerning Those Who Embrace Philosophy Only In Words.
• Chapter XX.: Concerning the Epicureans and Academics.
• Chapter XXI.: Of Inconsistency.
• Chapter XXII.: Of Friendship.
• Chapter XXIII.: Of Eloquence.
• Chapter XXIV.: Concerning a Person Whom He Treated With Disregard.
• Chapter XXV.: That Logic Is Necessary.
• Chapter XXVI.: What Is the Test of Error.
• Book III.
• Chapter I.: Of Personal Adornment.
• Chapter II.: In What a Well-trained Man Should Exercise Himself; and That We Neglect the Principal Things.
• Chapter III.: What Is the Chief Concern of a Good Man; and In What We Chiefly Ought to Train Ourselves.
• Chapter IV.: Concerning One Who Made Himself Improperly Conspicuous In the Theatre.
• Chapter V.: Concerning Those Who Plead Sickness.
• Chapter VI.: Miscellaneous.
• Chapter VII.: Concerning a Certain Governor Who Was an Epicurean.
• Chapter VIII.: How We Are to Exercise Ourselves Against the Semblances of Things.
• Chapter IX.: Concerning a Certain Orator, Who Was Going to Rome On a Lawsuit.
• Chapter X.: In What Manner We Ought to Bear Sickness.
• Chapter XI.: Miscellaneous.
• Chapter XII.: Of Training.
• Chapter XIII.: What Solitude Is; and What a Solitary Person.
• Chapter XIV.: Miscellaneous.
• Chapter XV. *: That Everything Is to Be Undertaken With Circumspection.
• Chapter XVI.: That Caution Should Be Used, As to Personal Familiarity.
• Chapter XVII.: Of Providence.
• Chapter XVIII.: That We Ought Not to Be Alarmed, By Any News That Is Brought Us.
• Chapter XIX.: What Is the Comparative Condition of the Philosopher, and of the Crowd.
• Chapter XX.: That Some Advantage May Be Gained From Every Outward Circumstance.
• Chapter XXI.: Concerning Those Who Readily Set Up For Sophists.
• Chapter XXII.: Of the Cynic Philosophy.
• Chapter XXIII.: Concerning Such As Read and Dispute Ostentatiously.
• Chapter XXIV.: That We Ought Not to Be Affected By Things Not In Our Own Power.
• Chapter XXV.: Concerning Those Who Waver In Their Purpose.
• Chapter XXVI.: Concerning Those Who Are In Dread of Want.
• Book IV.
• Chapter I.: Of Freedom.
• Chapter II.: Of Complaisance.
• Chapter III.: What Things Are to Be Exchanged For Others.
• Chapter IV.: Concerning Those Who Earnestly Desire a Life of Repose.
• Chapter V.: Concerning the Quarrelsome and Ferocious.
• Chapter VI.: Concerning Those Who Are Annoyed At Being Pitied.
• Chapter VII.: Of Fearlessness.
• Chapter VIII.: Concerning Such As Hastily Assume the Philosophic Dress.
• Chapter IX.: Concerning a Person Who Had Grown Immodest.
• Chapter X.: What Things We Are to Despise, and What Chiefly to Value.
• Chapter XI.: Of Purity.
• Chapter XII.: Of Taking Pains.
• Chapter XIII.: Concerning Such As Are Too Communicative.
• The Enchiridion, Or Manual.
• Part I
• From StobÆus, Antonius, and Maximus. *
• The Following Fragments Are Ascribed Jointly to Epictetus and Other Authors.
• I.
• II.
• III.
• IV.
• V.
• VI.
• VII.
• VIII.
• IX.
• X.
• XI.
• XII.
• XIII.
• XIV.
• XV.
• XVI.
• XVII.
• XVIII.
• XIX.
• XX.
• XXI.
• XXII.
• XXIII.
• XXIV.
• XXV.
• XXVI.
• XXVII.
• XXVIII.
• XXIX.
• XXX.
• XXXI.
• XXXII.
• The Following Fragments Are Omitted By Mr. Upton; But As They Stand Under the Name of Arrian, and Seem to Be In the Spirit of Epictetus, They Are Added Here.
• I.
• II.
• III.
• IV.
• V.
• VI.

CHAPTER XIX.

OF THE RIGHT TREATMENT OF TYRANTS.

WHEN a person is possessed of some personal advantage, either real or imaginary, he will necessarily be puffed up with it, unless he has been well instructed. A tyrant openly says, “I am supreme over all.” And what can you bestow on me? Can you exempt my desires from disappointment? How should you? For do you never incur what you shun? Are your own aims infallible? Whence came you by that privilege? Pray, on shipboard, do you trust to yourself, or to the pilot? In a chariot, to whom but the driver? And to whom in all other arts? Just the same. In what, then, does your power consist?

“All men pay regard to me.”

So do I to my desk. I wash it, and wipe it; and drive a nail for my oil-flask.

“What, then, are these things to be valued beyond me?”

No; but they are of some use to me, and therefore I pay regard to them. Why, do I not pay regard to an ass? Do I not wash his feet? Do I not clean him? Do not you know, that every one pays such regard even to himself; and that he does it to you, just as he does to an ass? For who pays regard to you as a man? Show that. Who would wish to be like you? Who would desire to imitate you, as he would Socrates?

“But I can take off your head?”

You say rightly. I had forgot, that one is to pay regard to you as to a fever, or the cholera; and that there should be an altar erected to you, as there is to the goddess Fever at Rome.

What is it, then, that disturbs and terrifies the multitude? The tyrant and his guards? By no means. What is by nature free, cannot be disturbed or restrained by anything but itself. But its own convictions disturb it. Thus, when the tyrant says to any one, “I will chain your leg,” he who chiefly values his leg, cries out for pity; while he who chiefly values his own free will, says, “If you imagine it for your interest, chain it.”

“What! do not you care?”

No; I do not care.

“I will show you that I am master.”

You? How should you? Zeus has set me free. What! do you think he would suffer his own son to be enslaved? You are master of my carcass; take it.

“So that, when you come into my presence, you pay no regard to me?”

No, but to myself; or, if you will have me recognize you also, I will do it as if you were a piece of furniture. This is not selfish vanity; for every animal is so constituted, as to do everything for itself. Even the sun does all for himself; and for that matter so does even Zeus himself. But when he would be styled the dispenser of rain and plenty, and the father of gods and men, you see that he cannot attain these offices and titles, unless he contributes to the common good. And he has universally so constituted the nature of every reasonable creature, that no one can attain its own good without contributing something for the good of all. And thus it becomes not selfish to do everything for one’s self. For, do you expect, that a man should desert himself, and his own concerns; when all beings have one and the same original instinct, self-preservation? What follows then? That where we recognize those absurd convictions, which treat things outward as if they were the true good or evil of life, there must necessarily be a regard paid to tyrants; and I wish it were to tyrants only, and not to the very officers of their bed-chamber too. For how wise doth a man grow on a sudden, when Cæsar has made him his flunkey? How immediately we say, “Felicio talked very sensibly to me!” I wish he were turned out of office, that he might once more appear to you the fool he is.

Epaphroditus owned a shoemaker; whom, because he was good for nothing, he sold. This very fellow being, by some strange luck, bought by a courtier, became shoemaker to Cæsar. Then you might have seen how Epaphroditus honored him. “How is good Felicio, pray?” And, if any of us asked, what the great man himself was about, it was answered, “He is consulting about affairs with Felicio.” Did not he sell him previously as good for nothing? Who then, has all on a sudden, made a wise man of him? This it is to reverence externals.

Is any one exalted to the office of tribune? All who meet him congratulate him. One kisses his eyes, another his neck, and the slaves his hands. He goes to his house; finds it illuminated. He ascends the capitol; offers a sacrifice. Now, who ever offered a sacrifice for having good desires? For conforming his aims to Nature? Yet we thank the gods for that wherein we place our good.

A person was talking with me to-day about applying for the priesthood in the temple of Augustus. I said to him, let the thing alone, friend; you will be at great expense for nothing. “But my name,” said he, “will be written in the annals.” Will you stand by, then, and tell those who read them, “I am the person whose name is written there?” And even if you could tell every one so now, what will you do when you are dead? — “My name will remain.” — Write it upon a stone, and it will remain just as well. And, pray, what remembrance will there be of you out of Nicopolis? — “But I shall wear a crown of gold.” — If your heart is quite set upon a crown, make and put on one of roses; for it will make the prettier appearance.