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• Preface.
• The Discourses of Epictetus.
• Arrian to Lucius Gellius Wisheth All Happiness.
• Book I.
• Chapter I.: Of the Things Which Are, and the Things Which Are Not In Our Own Power.
• Chapter II.: In What Manner, Upon Every Occasion, to Preserve Our Character.
• Chapter III.: How, From the Doctrine That God Is the Father of Mankind, We May Proceed to Its Consequences.
• Chapter IV: Of Progress.
• Chapter V.: Concerning the Academics. †
• Chapter VI.: Of Providence.
• Chapter VII.: Of the Use of the Forms of Right Reasoning.
• Chapter VIII.: That Logical Subtleties Are Not Safe to the Uninstructed.
• Chapter IX.: How From the Doctrine of Our Relationship to God, We Are to Deduce Its Consequences.
• Chapter X.: Concerning Those Who Seek Preferment At Rome.
• Chapter XI.: Of Natural Affection.
• Chapter XII.: Of Contentment.
• Chapter XIII.: How Everything May Be Performed to the Divine Acceptance.
• Chapter XIV.: That All Things Are Under the Divine Supervision.
• Chapter XV.: What Philosophy Promises.
• Chapter XVI.: Of Providence.
• Chapter XVII.: That the Art of Reasoning Is Necessary.
• Chapter XVIII.: That We Ought Not to Be Angry With the Erring.
• Chapter XIX.: Of the Right Treatment of Tyrants.
• Chapter XX.: In What Manner Reason Contemplates Itself.
• Chapter XXI.: Of the Desire of Admiration.
• Chapter XXII.: Of General Principles.
• Chapter XXIII.: Against Epicurus.
• Chapter XXIV.: How We Ought to Struggle With Difficulties.
• Chapter XXV.: On the Same Subject.
• Chapter XXVI.: What the Rule of Life Is.
• Chapter XXVII.: Of the Varied Appearances of Things to the Mind, and What Means Are At Hand By Which to Regulate Them.
• Chapter XXVIII.: That We Ought Not to Be Angry With Mankind. What Things Are Little, What Great, Among Men.
• Chapter XXIX.: Of Courage.
• Chapter XXX.: Weapons Ready For Difficult Occasions.
• Book II.
• Chapter I.: That Courage Is Not Inconsistent With Caution.
• Chapter II.: Of Tranquillity.
• Chapter III.: Concerning Such As Recommend Persons to the Philosophers
• Chapter IV.: Concerning a Man Who Had Been Guilty of Adultery.
• Chapter V.: How Nobleness of Mind May Be Consistent With Prudence.
• Chapter VI.: Of Circumstances. *
• Chapter VII.: Of Divination.
• Chapter VIII.: Wherein Consists the Essence of Good.
• Chapter IX.: That Some Persons, Failing to Fulfil What the Character of a Man Implies, Assume That of a Philosopher.
• Chapter X.: How We May Infer the Duties of Life From Its Nominal Functions.
• Chapter XI.: The Beginning of Philosophy.
• Chapter XII.: Of Disputation.
• Chapter XIII.: Of Anxiety.
• Chapter XIV.: Concerning Naso.
• Chapter XV.: Concerning Those Who Obstinately Persist In Whatever They Have Determined.
• Chapter XVI.: That We Do Not Study to Make Use of the Established Principles Concerning Good and Evil.
• Chapter XVII.: How to Apply General Principles to Particular Cases.
• Chapter XVIII.: How the Semblances of Things Are to Be Combated.
• Chapter XIX.: Concerning Those Who Embrace Philosophy Only In Words.
• Chapter XX.: Concerning the Epicureans and Academics.
• Chapter XXI.: Of Inconsistency.
• Chapter XXII.: Of Friendship.
• Chapter XXIII.: Of Eloquence.
• Chapter XXIV.: Concerning a Person Whom He Treated With Disregard.
• Chapter XXV.: That Logic Is Necessary.
• Chapter XXVI.: What Is the Test of Error.
• Book III.
• Chapter I.: Of Personal Adornment.
• Chapter II.: In What a Well-trained Man Should Exercise Himself; and That We Neglect the Principal Things.
• Chapter III.: What Is the Chief Concern of a Good Man; and In What We Chiefly Ought to Train Ourselves.
• Chapter IV.: Concerning One Who Made Himself Improperly Conspicuous In the Theatre.
• Chapter V.: Concerning Those Who Plead Sickness.
• Chapter VI.: Miscellaneous.
• Chapter VII.: Concerning a Certain Governor Who Was an Epicurean.
• Chapter VIII.: How We Are to Exercise Ourselves Against the Semblances of Things.
• Chapter IX.: Concerning a Certain Orator, Who Was Going to Rome On a Lawsuit.
• Chapter X.: In What Manner We Ought to Bear Sickness.
• Chapter XI.: Miscellaneous.
• Chapter XII.: Of Training.
• Chapter XIII.: What Solitude Is; and What a Solitary Person.
• Chapter XIV.: Miscellaneous.
• Chapter XV. *: That Everything Is to Be Undertaken With Circumspection.
• Chapter XVI.: That Caution Should Be Used, As to Personal Familiarity.
• Chapter XVII.: Of Providence.
• Chapter XVIII.: That We Ought Not to Be Alarmed, By Any News That Is Brought Us.
• Chapter XIX.: What Is the Comparative Condition of the Philosopher, and of the Crowd.
• Chapter XX.: That Some Advantage May Be Gained From Every Outward Circumstance.
• Chapter XXI.: Concerning Those Who Readily Set Up For Sophists.
• Chapter XXII.: Of the Cynic Philosophy.
• Chapter XXIII.: Concerning Such As Read and Dispute Ostentatiously.
• Chapter XXIV.: That We Ought Not to Be Affected By Things Not In Our Own Power.
• Chapter XXV.: Concerning Those Who Waver In Their Purpose.
• Chapter XXVI.: Concerning Those Who Are In Dread of Want.
• Book IV.
• Chapter I.: Of Freedom.
• Chapter II.: Of Complaisance.
• Chapter III.: What Things Are to Be Exchanged For Others.
• Chapter IV.: Concerning Those Who Earnestly Desire a Life of Repose.
• Chapter V.: Concerning the Quarrelsome and Ferocious.
• Chapter VI.: Concerning Those Who Are Annoyed At Being Pitied.
• Chapter VII.: Of Fearlessness.
• Chapter VIII.: Concerning Such As Hastily Assume the Philosophic Dress.
• Chapter IX.: Concerning a Person Who Had Grown Immodest.
• Chapter X.: What Things We Are to Despise, and What Chiefly to Value.
• Chapter XI.: Of Purity.
• Chapter XII.: Of Taking Pains.
• Chapter XIII.: Concerning Such As Are Too Communicative.
• The Enchiridion, Or Manual.
• Part I
• From StobÆus, Antonius, and Maximus. *
• The Following Fragments Are Ascribed Jointly to Epictetus and Other Authors.
• I.
• II.
• III.
• IV.
• V.
• VI.
• VII.
• VIII.
• IX.
• X.
• XI.
• XII.
• XIII.
• XIV.
• XV.
• XVI.
• XVII.
• XVIII.
• XIX.
• XX.
• XXI.
• XXII.
• XXIII.
• XXIV.
• XXV.
• XXVI.
• XXVII.
• XXVIII.
• XXIX.
• XXX.
• XXXI.
• XXXII.
• The Following Fragments Are Omitted By Mr. Upton; But As They Stand Under the Name of Arrian, and Seem to Be In the Spirit of Epictetus, They Are Added Here.
• I.
• II.
• III.
• IV.
• V.
• VI.

CHAPTER VIII.

THAT LOGICAL SUBTLETIES ARE NOT SAFE TO THE UNINSTRUCTED.

IN as many ways as equivalent syllogisms may be varied, in so many may the logical forms be varied likewise. As for instance: “If you had borrowed, and not paid, you owe me money. But you have not borrowed, and not paid; therefore you do not owe me money.” To perform these processes skilfully, is the peculiar mark of a philosopher. For if an enthymema be an imperfect syllogism; he who is versed in the perfect syllogism, must be equally ready to detect an imperfect one.

“Why then do not we exercise ourselves and others, after this manner?”

Because, even now, though we are not absorbed in these things, nor diverted, by me at least, from the study of morality; yet we make no eminent advances in virtue. What is to be expected then if we should add this avocation too? Especially as it would not only withdraw us from more necessary studies, but likewise afford a capital occasion of conceit and insolence. For the faculty of arguing, and of persuasive reasoning is great; and particularly, if it be constantly practised, and receive an additional ornament from rhetoric. For, in general, every such faculty is dangerous to weak and uninstructed persons, as being apt to render them arrogant and elated. For by what method can one persuade a young man, who excels in these kinds of study, that he ought not to be an appendage to these accomplishments, but they to him? Will he not trample upon all such advice; and walk about elated and puffed up, not bearing that any one should touch him, to put him in mind where he is wanting, and in what he goes wrong?

What then, was not Plato a philosopher?

Well, and was not Hippocrates a physician? Yet you see how he expresses himself. But what has his style to do with his professional qualities? Why do you confound things, accidentally united in the same men? If Plato was handsome and well made, must I too set myself to becoming handsome and well made; as if this was necessary to philosophy, because a certain person happened to be at once handsome and a philosopher? Why will you not perceive and distinguish what are the things that make men philosophers, and what belong to them on other accounts? Pray, if I were a philosopher, would it be necessary that you should be lame too?

What then? Do I reject these special faculties? By no means; — neither do I reject the faculty of seeing. But if you ask me, what is the good of man; I know not where it lies, save in dealing wisely with the phenomena of existence.