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• The Rights of War and Peace Book Iii
• Chapter I: Certain General Rules, Shewing What, By the Law of Nature, Is Allowable In War; Where Also the Author Treats of Deceit and Lying.
• Chapter II: How Subjects Goods, By the Law of Nations, Are Obliged For Their Prince’s Debts: and of Reprisals.
• Chapter III: Of a Just Or Solemn War, According to the Right of Nations, and of Its Denunciation.
• Chapter IV: The Right of Killing Enemies In a Solemn War; and of Other Hostilities Committed Against the Person of the Enemy.
• Chapter V: Of Spoil and Rapine In War.
• Chapter VI: Of the Right to the Things Taken In War.
• Chapter VII: Of the Right Over Prisoners.
• Chapter VIII: Of Empire Over the Conquered.
• Chapter IX: Of the Right of Postliminy.
• Chapter X: Advice Concerning Things Done In an Unjust War.
• Chapter XI: Moderation Concerning the Right of Killing Men In a Just War.
• Chapter XII: Concerning Moderation In Regard to the Spoiling the Country of Our Enemies, and Such Other Things.
• Chapter XIII: Moderation About Things Taken In War.
• Chapter XIV: Of Moderation Concerning Captives.
• Chapter XV: Moderation In Obtaining Empire.
• Chapter XVI: Moderation Concerning Those Things Which, By the Law of Nations, Have Not the Benefit of Postliminy.
• Chapter XVII: Of Neuters In War.
• Chapter XVIII: Concerning Things Privately Done In a Publick War.
• Chapter XIX: Concerning Faith Between Enemies.
• Chapter XX: Concerning the Publick Faith Whereby War Is Finished; of Treaties of Peace, Lots, Set Combats, Arbitrations, Surrenders, Hostages, and Pledges.
• Chapter XXI: Of Faith During War, of Truces, of Safe-conduct, and the Redemption of Prisoners.
• Chapter XXII: Concerning the Faith of Inferior Powers In War.
• Chapter XXIII: Of Faith Given By Private Men In War.
• Chapter XXIV: Of Faith Tacitly Given.
• Chapter XXV: The Conclusion, With Admonitions to Preserve Faith and Seek Peace.
• Passages of Scripture, Illustrated, Examined, Or Corrected In This Treatise . †
• Appendix Prolegomena to the First Edition of De Jure Belli Ac Pacis
• Bibliography of Postclassical Works Referred to By Grotius
• Bibliography of Works Referred to In Jean Barbeyrac’s Notes

CHAPTER I

Certain General Rules, shewing what, by the Law of Nature, is allowable in War; where also the Author treats of Deceit and Lying.

I.The Subject and Design of this Book.I. We have already seen, not only who may make War, but for what Reasons too they are permitted to engage in it. We are now to enquire1 what is allowable in War, and how far, and in what Circumstances it is so. And this we must consider, either simply in itself, or with Regard to some antecedent Promise. What is simply in itself allowable in War, shall be considered first from the Law of Nature, and then from that of Nations. To begin with what Nature allows.

II.In War all Things necessary to the End are lawful.II. 1. And here we must observe, First, That in Things of a moral Nature, as we have often said before,1 thosea Means which conduce to a certain End, do assume the very Nature of that End: And therefore we are supposed to be authorised to employ those<517> Things, which are (in a moral, not a physical Sense)2 necessary to the obtaining our just Rights. By Right I understand what is strictly so called, and imports that3 Power of acting which is intirely founded on the Good of Society. Wherefore, as we have remarked elsewhere,b if I cannot otherwise save my Life, I may, by any Force whatever, repel him who attempts it, tho’, perhaps, he who does so is not any ways to blame. Because this Right does not properly arise from the other’s Crime, but from that Prerogative with which Nature has invested me, of defending myself.

2. By which also I am impowered to invade and seize upon what belongs to another, without considering whether he be in fault or no, whenever what is his threatens mec with any imminent Danger; but I am not to claim a Property in it, for that is not necessary to the End in Question, but only to detain it till my Security be sufficiently provided for; as we have elsewhered declared. So by the Law of Nature I have a Right to take from any one what he has of mine,4 and if this cannot easily be effected, I may take what is equivalent to it; ande this I may do too for the Recovery of Debt. And in those Cases I become Proprietor of what I have taken, because there is no other Way of redressing the Inequality that was to my Disadvantage.

3. So likewise where the Punishment is just, there all Manner of Violence and Force, and whatever is a Means necessary to execute that Punishment, or is a Part of it, is just too; as Devastations by Fire, or otherwise, provided that they exceed not the Bounds of Equity, but bear a Proportion to the Offence committed.

III.What is lawful and right does not arise only from the Occasion of the War, but also from incident Causes in the Course of it.III. We must remember, Secondly, That this our Right is not to be accounted for only by the first Occasion of the War, but also from other subsequent Causes; as in a Suit of Law, where the contending Party does often acquire and find out a new Right, after the Process is commenced, which was not thought of before. Thus they, who join with him that invades me, whether they be Allies or Subjects, do give me a Right of defending myself against them likewise. Thus they who engage with others in an unjust War, especially in a War which they might or ought to have known to be unjust, are thereby obliged to reimburse the Charges, and to repair the Damages of it, because it is through their Fault that they are sustained. Thus too, those who come into the Measures of a War, undertaken without any warrantable Reason, are themselves culpable, and obnoxious to Punishment, in Proportion to the Injustice that accompanies their so doing; according to Plato’s1 Opinion, who justifies the Continuance of a War, Till the Guilty are compelled to undergo the Punishment which the Party offended shall inflict upon them.

IV.Some Things may by Consequence be acted without any Injustice, which would be no Ways lawful had they been purposely and originally designed.IV. 1. We must observe, Thirdly,1 That many Things sometimes fall in indirectly, and beyond our Design, to be lawful to us, to which, in the Nature of the Things, simply considered, we have no Pretence. How this holds good in the Case of Self-Defence, we have elsewherea shewn. Thus, in the getting of our own,b if just so much as is precisely our Due, cannot be had, we have a Right to take more, but under the Obligation of restoring the Value of the Overplus. Thus a Ship full of Pirates, or a House of Thieves, may be sunk and fired, tho’ within the Ship, or the House, there may be Children, or Women, or other innocent Persons, who from such an Assault must needs be exposed to manifest Dan-<518>ger.2Nor is he guilty of Murder, says St. Austin, who has inclosed his Estate with a Wall, if any one by the Fall of it shall be wounded and die.

2. But, as we have frequently advised before, every Thing that is conformable to Right properly so called, is not always absolutely lawful; for sometimes our Charity to our Neighbour will not suffer us to use this rigorous Right. Wherefore, in such Cases, we ought to take all possible Care to prevent all such Accidents, which may fall out beyond what we aim at; unless the Good we design be far greater than the Evil we fear, or unless, where the Good and the Evil being equal, our Hopes of obtaining the Good be greater than our Fears of the Evil, which Prudence must determine; yet so, that always in a doubtful Case we incline, as the safer Side, to that Part which provides rather for another’s Advantage than our own. Let the Tares grow up, (says our best Teacher, Matt. xiii. 29.) lest whilst you gather up them, ye root up also the Wheat with them.3To destroy whole Multitudes, says Seneca, without Distinction, looks like the Rage of Fire, or the Fall of Buildings. History tells us how much Sorrow and Repentance such an immoderate Revenge cost the Emperor Theodosius, upon the Reproof of St. Ambrose.

3. Nor tho’ GOD does so sometimes, ought it to be an Example to us, because of that absolute Right of Dominion which he has over us, which he has not granted us to have over one another, asc I have observed elsewhere. And yet even GOD himself, who is the just Sovereign of Mankind, does often spare a Multitude of wicked Men, for the Sake of a Few that are good; thereby declaring his Equity, as he is a Judge; as fully appears from Abraham’s interceding with GOD for Sodom. (Gen. xviii. 23.) And from these general Rules we may easily perceive, how far our Right extends against our Enemies, by the Law of Nature.

V.What we may do against them that supply our Enemies with Necessaries, explained by Distinction.V. 1. Here also there uses to arise another Question, what we may lawfully do to those, who are not our Enemies, nor are willing to be thought so, and yet supply our Enemies with certain Things. There have been formerly, and still are, great Disputes about this Matter, some contending for the Rigour of the Laws of War, and others for a Freedom of Commerce.

2. But first we must distinguish between the Things themselves. For there are some Things which are of use only in War, as Arms, &c. Some that are of no Use in War, as those that serve only for Pleasure; and lastly, there are some Things that are useful both in Peace and War, as Money, Provisions,1 Ships, and naval Stores. Concerning the first, (viz. Things useful only in War) it is true what2Amalasontha said to the Emperor Justinian, he is to be reputed as siding with the Enemy, who supplies him with Things necessary for War. As to the second Sort of Things, there is no just Cause of Complaint. Thus Seneca says,3 I will be grateful to a Tyrant,a if what I present him with neither encreases, nor confirms his Power of ruining the State, for such Things a Man may give him without contributing to the common Calamity; which he thus explains, I will not supply him with Money to<519> pay his Guards, but if he wants Marble, or Robes of State, I shall injure nobody, by procuring him such Things, to gratify his Luxury. I will supply him with neither Soldiers, nor Arms; but if he will take it as a Kindness, I will help him to Comedians, and other Things that may contribute to the softening of his fierce Temper. I would not send him Gallies and Men of War, but I would procure him Pleasure Boats, Galliots, and other such Vessels, for Diversion and Recreation. So also Saint Ambrose,4It is not a commendable Liberality to assist him that conspires against his own Country.

3. As to the third Sortb of Things that are useful at all Times, we must distinguish the present State of the War. For if I cannot defend myself without intercepting those Things that are sent to my Enemy, Necessity5 (as I saidc before) will give me a good Right to them, but upon Condition of Restitution, unless I have just Cause to the contrary. But if the Supply sent hinder the Execution of my Designs, and the Sender might have known as much; as if I have besieged a Town, or blocked up a Port, and thereupon I quickly expect a Surrender, or a Peace, that Sender is obliged to make me Satisfaction for the Damaged that I suffer upon his Account, as much as he that shall take a Prisoner out of Custody, that was committed for a just Debt, or helps him to make his Escape, in order to cheat me; and proportionably to my Loss I may seize on his Goods, and take them as my own, for recovering what he owes me. If he did not actually do me any Damage, but only designed it, then have I a Right, by detaining those Supplies, to oblige him to give me Security for the future, by Pledges, Hostages, or the like. But further, if the Wrongs done to me by the Enemy be openly unjust, and he by those Supplies puts him in a Condition to maintain his unjust War, then shall he not only be obliged to repair my Loss, but also be treated as a Criminal, as one that rescues a notorious Convict out of the Hands of Justice; and in this Case it shall be lawful for me to deal with him agreeably to his Offence, according to those Rules which we have set down for Punishments; and for that Purpose I may deprive him even of his Goods.

4. For these Reasons, those that make War6 publish Manifesto’s, and send out Declarations to other Nations, as well to signify the Justice of their Cause, as also what probable Hopes they have to obtain their Right.<520>

5. Now the Reason why we refer this Case to the Law of Nature, is7 because we find nothing in Histories decreed by the voluntary Law of Nations concerning it.<521> The Carthaginians sometimes took the Romans Prisoners, who carried Provisions to their Enemies,e but upon demand set them at Liberty. When Demetrius had entered Attica with an Army, and had taken the adjoining Towns of Eleusis, and Rhamnus,f designing to starve Athens, he took a Ship, attempting to relieve it, with Provisions,8 and hanged up the Master and Pilot of it, and by that Means deterring others from doing the like, he quickly took the City.

VI.Whether Fraud be lawful in War.VI. 1. As to the manner of acting against an Enemy; Force and Terror are the proper Characteristick of War, and the Method most commonly used: The Query is, whether Deceit be lawful; for Homer said an Enemy might be annoyed,

• 1Ἢ δόλῳ ἤε βίη, ἤ ἀμϕαδὸν, ἤ κρυϕηδὸν,
• By Fraud, or Force, openly or secretly.

And Pindar,2

• Χρὴ δὲ πα̂ν ἓρ ——
• δοντ’ ἀμαυρω̂σαι τὴν ἐχθρόν.
• Whether by Craft or Force we overthrow,
• All Means allow’d to crush the daring Foe.

And Virgil’s3 Direction,

• Let Fraud supply the want of Force in War.

• Dryd.

Is strictly followed even by Riphaeus,

• Just of his Word, observant of the Right.

• Dryd.

And Solon,4 so famous for Wisdom, also observes this Maxim; so did Fabius Maximus,5 commended for it by Silius:

• Who to Force join’d Artifice.

2. In Homer, Ulysses, a very wise Prince, was famous for Stratagems of War; whence6Lucian makes this Inference, that Deceit in War is commendable. There is nothing more profitable in War, than Fraud, said7Xenophon; and Brasidas<522> in8Thucydides gives the greatest Honour in War to cunning Stratagems. And in9Plutarch, Agesilaus said, It is both just and lawful to deceive an Enemy. And Polybius,10 Military Exploits performed by open Force are less considerable than what is done by Stratagem and making good Use of Opportunity. And from him Silius brings in Corvinus speaking thus,11

• Bellandum est astu; levior laus in duce dextra.
• Ambush in War is still by Fortune crown’d,
• The Captain’s most for Policy renown’d.

So also thought the rigid Spartans, as12Plutarch observes, therefore they offered greater Victims for a Victory obtained by Policy, than by plain Force.13 The same Author highly commends14Lysander, ἀπάταις τὰ πολλὰ διαποικίλλοντα τον̂ πολέμου, versed in all the Arts and Skill of War. He also praises Philopoemen,15 that being instructed in the Cretan Discipline, he united the plain and open Way of fighting with Slights and Stratagems. And16Ammianus was of Opinion, that Without any Distinction of Valour, or Cunning, all prosperous Successes in War deserve Commendation.

3. The Roman Lawyers17 accounted all Fraud used against an Enemy, innocent; and that it mattered not,18 whether a Man baffled his Enemy by Force or Fraud. Eustathius on the 15th of the Iliad observes that Deceit is not to be blamed, as be-<523>longing to a Soldier. And among the Divines,19 St. Augustine, If the War be just, it concerns not Justice, whether it be managed by Force or Craft. And St.20Chrysostom says that those Generals, that overcame by Subtilty, are most commended.

4. But there are Opinions which seem to maintain the contrary, of which I shall mention some hereafter. To decide this Question, it must be considered, whether Deceit be one of those Things that are always Evil, and in which the Maxim takes Place, that we must not do Evil, that Good may come of it; or whether Deceit be to be reckoned among such as are not Evil in their own Nature, but that it may sometimes happen, that they may be good.

VII.Fraud in its negative Act is not of its self unlawful.VII. We must then observe, that some Fraud consists in a negative Act,1 and some in a Positive; and here I enlarge the Word even to include those Things which consist in a negative Act, according to Labeo,2 who referred it to that Fraud which is not Evil, when a Man by Dissimulation preserves either his own, or another’s.3Cicero overstretched the Point, when he said, Disguise and Dissimulation should be banished out of human Life. For since we are not obliged to discover to others all we know, or desire; it follows, that it is lawful to dissemble some Things before some Men, that is, to hide and conceal them. We may sometimes wisely conceal the Truth (said4 St. Austin) under some Disguise. And that this5 is sometimesa necessary and unavoidable especially in Governors, Cicero confesses in many Places. We have a remarkable Instance of this in the Prophet Jeremy, Chap. xxxviii. 27. where the Prophet being asked of the King concerning the Event of the Siege, by the King’s Advice, wisely concealed it from the Princes, alledging another Cause of their talking together,Gen. xx. 2. which yet was not false. So Abraham told Abimelech true, when he said Sarah was his Sister, according to the Custom of speaking in those Days, being his near Kinswoman, wisely concealing that6 she was his Wife.<524>

VIII.Fraud in its positive Act distinguished either into such outward Acts as admit of several Constructions, or such as always signify the same by Agreement. Fraud in the former Sense lawful.VIII. 1. But Fraud, which consists in a positive Act, if in Actions is called a Feint; if in Words, a Lye. Some make this Difference between these two, that Words naturally signify the Intent of our Minds, but Actions do not. But on the contrary it is true, that Words of their own Nature, and independently of the Will of Men, signify nothing, unless it be such a confused and inarticulate Noise as is caused by Pain, which comes rather under the Denomination of an Action than a Speech. But if it be objected, that it is peculiar to the Nature of Man, above all other Creatures, that he can discover the Conceptions of his Mind to others, to which End Words were invented; which is certainly true; yet this also should be added, that such a Discovery is not made by Words only,1 but by Gestures, &c. as among Persons that are dumb. Whether those Gestures have naturally something common with the Thing signified, or have only a Signification by human Institution. Like to which are those Characters which (as Paulus2 the Lawyer says) signify not Words formed by the Tongue, but the Things themselves, either from some Likeness, as the Egyptian Hieroglyphicks, or from mere Fancy, as among the Chinese.

2. There is therefore another Distinction to be observed in this Place, which we made Use of to take away all Doubtfulness and Obscurity, concerning the Term of the Law of Nations. For we then said, that the Law of Nations signified, either what was allowed of by every Nation without mutual Obligation, or that which implied a mutual Obligation.3 In like manner, Words, Gestures and Characters (as<525>we have said) were invented to signify by mutual Obligation, which4Aristotle calls κατὰ συνθήκην, according to common Agreement, but other Things are not so. Hence it follows that it is lawful for me to use other Things as I please, tho’a I foresee that another may place a wrong Construction upon it; I speak of the Use of those Things in itself, and not of the accidental Consequences that it may have. Therefore we must here suppose Cases,5 where no Harm can ensue, or where the Harm itself, setting aside the Consideration of the Deceit, is lawful.

Of the first we have an Example in our Saviour, who to the two Disciples at Emaus, (Luke xxiv. 28.) προσεποιει̑το, made as tho’ he would have gone farther, unless we had rather believe he really intended so, if they had not importuned him to stay: As GOD himself is said to will many Things conditionally, which yet come not to pass, the Condition being not performed. And in another Place, (Mark vi. 48.) CHRIST himself made as tho’ he would have passed by his Apostles sailing on the Sea, that is, unless they entreated him to come up into the Ship. Another Example may be given in St. Paul, (Acts xvi. 3.) who circumcised Timothy,6 tho’ he well knew what Sense the Jews would put upon it, viz. that the Law of Circumcision (tho’ it was now really abolished) did still oblige the Children of Israel, in the Opinion of St. Paul and Timothy; whereas St. Paul had something else in View, that he and Timothy might obtain a greater Opportunity of a familiar Conversation with the Jews. For neither did Circumcision, the ceremonial Law being abolished, by its Institution any longer signify such a Necessity, neither was the Evil, which followed upon the Error, in which the Jews would continue for a while, (tho’ afterwards to be laid aside) so great, as that Good which St. Paul designed, which was a more easy Propagation of the Doctrine of the Gospel. The Greek Fathers often call this dissembling οἰκονομία,7good Management, of which we have an excellent Sentence of Clemens Alexandrinus, who discoursing of a good Man, says, ἐπὶ τω̂ν πλησίων ὀϕελείᾳ μόνῃ ποιήσει τινὰ ἃ οὐκ ἂν προηγουμένως αὐτῷ πραχθείη, &c.8He will do some Things for the Benefit of his Neighbour, which otherwise he would not of his own free Will, and first Intention. Such was the Act of the Romans,b who when they were besieged, threw Loaves of Bread from the Capitol, into the Enemies Camp, that they might not be thought to have any want of it.

An Example of the other Case, is the pretended Flight of Joshuac before the Inhabitants of Ai, which is often practised by other Generals. For we suppose here the consequent Harm to be lawful, from the Justice of the War. But such a pretended Flight signifies nothing by Institution, tho’ the Enemy may take it as a Sign of Fear, which the other is not bound to guard against, using his own Liberty of going this way or that way, faster or slower, and with such or such a Countenance, as he pleases. The same Thing may be said of those, who use the Enemies Arms or Habits, or set up his Standards or Flag, as we read in many Histories.

For all these Things every Man may make use of, as he pleases, tho’ contrary to the general Custom; because that very Custom is established by the Pleasure of particular Persons, not as by common Consent, and therefore obliges none.<526>

IX.Of that in the latter Sense, the Question is difficult.IX. There is a greater Dispute concerning those Signs which enter, if I may say so, into the Commerce of Men, and in the wrong Use of which a Lye does properly consist; much is found in Holy Writ against Lying, A righteous Man hateth Lying, Prov. xiii. 5. Remove far from me Falshood and Lyes, Prov. xxx. 8. Thou shalt destroy all those that speak Lies, Psal. v. 7. Lie not one to another, Colos. iii. 9. And this St. Austin stiffly defends; with him agree many Poets and Philosophers. Remarkable is that of Homer,

• 1Hated to Death may that grand Villain be,
• Whose Heart and Tongue do ever disagree.

And Sophocles,

• 2’Tis never handsome to report a Lye;
• But if on Truth a certain Mischief wait,
• You may dissemble.

And Cleobulus,

• 3The truly wise abhor a shameful Lie.

4Aristotle said, κατ’ αὐτὸ τὸ μὲν ψεν̂δος, ϕαν̂λον καὶ ψεκτὸν, τὸ δὲ ἀληθὲς καλὸν καὶ ἐπαινετὸν, Lying in itself is vile and base, but Truth is beautiful and commendable. Neither does the other Side want its Defenders: As first in Holy Writ,5 it has the Precedents of Men, whose Probity is commended, who nevertheless have sometimes lied, without being any where blamed for it: As also the formal Decision of many antient6 Doctors of the Christian Church, as Origen, Clemens, Tertullian, Lactantius, Chrysostom, St. Jerome and Cassianus; and indeed almost all of the primitive Christian Writers, as St. Austin7 himself confesses, herein dissenting from them, but owning8it to be a very difficult and intricate Question, and by the Learned variously disputed, for these are his very Words.

Among the Philosophers, the open Maintainers of this Opinion are Socrates,9 and<527> his Disciples10Plato and11Xenophon; as also12Cicero; and, if we believe Plutarch13 and14Quintilian, the Stoicks, who reckon this among the Accomplishments of a wise Man, to lie in a proper Place and Manner. Neither does15Aristotle himself seem to differ from them in some Places, whose καθ’ αὐτὸ, in itself, which we have cited, may be interpreted commonly speaking, or the Thing considered in itself, without respect to Circumstances. His Expositor, Andronicus Rhodius, said thus of a Physician that told a Lye to his Patient,16 ἀπατἀ̑ μὲν, ἀπατεὼν δὲ οὐκ ἐστὶν, He deceives indeed, but yet he is not a Deceiver. And he gives the Reason, οὐ γὰρ τέλος ἔχει τὴν ἀπάτην τον̂ νοσον̂ντος, ἀλλὰ τὴν σωτηρίαν, Because he has no Design to deceive his Patient, but to cure him.17Quintilian before mentioned defending this Opinion said, Many Things are honest, or dishonest, not simply from the Fact, but from the Motives of it. So18Diphilus,

• If a kind Lye the Life of Man can save,
• Where is the Crime to rescue from the Grave?

When Neoptolemus in19Sophocles asked Ulysses,

• What! not asham’d by Falshood to offend?

Ulysses answered,

• No, if our Safety thereupon depend.

The like may be brought out of20Pisander and Euripides;21 so in Quintilian also we find, it is allowable in a wise Man sometimes to tell a Lye. And22Eustathius upon the second of the Odysses, said ψεύσεται κατὰ καιρὸν ὁ σοϕὸς, A wise Man will tell a Lye upon Occasion. He also produces Testimonies out of23Herodotus and Isocrates.<528>

X.The Use of Words in another Sense, than that wherein we know they are understood, not always unlawful.X. These so different Opinions may perhaps be reconciled by the common Distinction of Lies, taken either in a stricter or a looser Sense. For we do not here take the Word Lye so largely, asa comprehending every Untruth that one says, without knowing it to be such, as Gellius1 distinguished between mendacium dicere, and mentiri, to tell an Untruth, and to Lye. But here we take it to signify a Falsehood spoken knowingly, in a Sense contrary either to what we think or design. For what is first, καὶ ἀμέσως, and immediately declared by Words, or any other Signs, are the Conceptions of the Mind: Therefore he does not lie, who tells a Thing that is false, yet supposing it to be true; but he that tells Truth, at the same Time thinking it to be false, does certainly lye. It is the Falshood therefore of the Expression which is requisite to the common Nature of a Lye. Whence it follows, when any Word or Sentence is πολύσηγος, of divers Significations, either by common Use, or by the Custom of Art, or by any Figure that is intelligible, then if our inward Meaning agree with any of these Significations, it is not to be reputed a Lye,2 tho’ the Person to whom we speak may take it in a different Sense.

But these ambiguous Expressions are not rashly to be allowed, but yet may upon Occasions be justified. As if it relates to the instructing of one committed to our Charge, or to avoid some captious Questions.3 Of the former CHRIST gave us an Example in himself, when he said our Friend Lazarus sleepeth, John xi. 11. which his Disciples understood of his taking rest in Sleep. And when he said, John ii. 20, 21. Destroy this Temple, and in three Days I will raise it up, meaning that of his Body, he knew very well that the Jews understood it of the real Fabrick of the Temple. So again, when he promised his Disciples, Luke xxii. 30. That they should sit on twelve Thrones, judging the twelve Tribes of Israel; and Mat. xxvi. 25. That they should drink new Wine with him in his Father’s Kingdom, he knew very well, that they understood it of a Temporal Kingdom, whereof they were full of Hopes even to the very Moment of his Ascension, Acts i. 6. Thus he speaks to the People in Parables, that hearing they might not understand, Mat. xiii. 3. that is, unless they came with such Attention and Docility (or Willingness to be<529> taught) as was requisite. An Instance of the latter Case we meet with from prophane History in the Person of L. Vitellius, who being importuned by Narcissus to explain himself, and to speak freely (in regard to the loose Life of Messalina) would not be prevailed upon, but still gave such doubtful and uncertain Answers,4 as would admit of various Senses. Hither we shall refer the Hebrew Saying,5 מוטב ראם לא זשתוק אס יורע ארסלחמיר עתרברג, If a Man can speak ambiguously let him, if not, let him say nothing.

3.† On the contrary it may happen, that to use this kind of speaking may not only be discommendable, but wicked,6 as when either the Honour of GOD,7 or our Charity to our Neighbour, or Reverence to our Superiors, or the Nature of the Thing in Question requires, that we should plainly declare the Truth; so in Contracts (as we have saidb already) whatsoever the Nature of the Contract requires to be understood, should be declared. In which Sense we may very well understand that of Cicero,8That a Lye should be banished from all human Commerce, borrowed from the old Attick Law,9No lying in a Market. In which Places the Word Mendacium is to be taken so largely, as to include even obscure Expressions, which we, properly speaking, do not comprehend under the Notion of Lying.

XI.The form of a Lye, as it is unlawful, consists in a Repugnancy to another’s Right. This explained.XI. 1. It is then required to the common Notion of a Lye, that what is either spoken, written, intimated by Characters, or declared by any Gesture, cannot be otherwise understood than in such a Sense1 as differs from the Mind of the Person who expresses it; but to a Lye strictly taken, as it is naturally unlawful, there is necessarily required some peculiar Difference; which if rightly considered, at least according to the common Opinion of Nations, can be nothing else than, the Violation of a real Right, and that subsisting without any Diminution, belonging to him, to whom we make a Sign, or direct our Discourse. For it is certain, that in Respect of himself, let him speak ever so falsly, no Man can lye. I do not here mean every Right, and what is foreign to the present Affair; but that Right which is proper and essential to the Matter in Hand, which is nothing else,2 but the Freedom of him, with whom we discourse to judge of the Conceptions of our Minds, a Freedom which, as by a silent Contract, we are supposed to owe him.3 For this, and no other, is<530> that mutual Obligation, which Men intended to introduce by establishing the Use of Speech, and such other Signs; for without that such an Establishment had been to no Purpose.

2. It is also requisite, that this Right to judge should subsist without any Diminution, while we discourse.4 For it may happen, that tho’ there were such a Right, it ceases or may be taken away, by some other supervening Right, as a Debt may cease by an Acquittance, or Non-Performance of some Condition. It is moreover required, that the Right that is violated be his, with whom we discourse, and not any other’s; as in Contracts there arises no Injustice, but by the violating the Right of the Contracters. Hence perhaps it is, that after Simonides, Plato5 refers the speaking of Truth to Justice; and that the Lying which is forbidden, Holy Writ often describes by bearing6 false Witness against our Neighbour, and what7 St. Austin himself puts into the Definition of a Lye,8A Purpose to deceive; and Cicero9 will have the speaking of Truth referred to the Fundamentals of Justice.

3. But as this Right may be taken away by the express Consent of him, with whom we deal; as if any one shall declare before hand that he will speak false, and the other allows it, so also by a tacit Consent, or a Presumption founded upon just Reason, or by the Opposition of another’s Right, which by the Judgment of all Men is far more considerable; from these Principles rightly understood many Inferences may be drawn, which may be of Use to reconcile those different Opinions formerly mentioned.<531>

XII.That it is lawful to speak what is false to Children and Madmen.XII. First, when we talk to Children or Madmen, if what we say be false, yet it cannot be reputed a criminal Lye. Because it is generally allowed,

• 1Ut puerorum aetas improvida ludificetur.
• That imprudent Youth may be thus deceived.

And2Quintilian says, speaking of Children, We make them believe many Things for their Advantage. But the immediate Reason is, because Children and Madmen not having a freedom of Judgment, they cannot be injured in that Liberty which they have not.

XIII.Also when he is deceived, to whom our Speech is not directed, and whom without Speech we may lawfully deceive.XIII. Secondly, whilst we discourse with one Man that is not deceived, if a third Person be thereby deceived, it is no Lye; no Lye in Respect of him to whom it was spoken, because his Judgment continues unperverted, as does his who hearing a Fable, takes it as such, or his who hears a figurative Speech, whether κατ’ εἰρωνειὰν by way of Irony, or καθ’ ὑπερβολὴν, by an Hyperbole, which Figure brings us to the Truth1 by something which is not true; as Seneca speaks, and Quintilian calls it, A lying Exaggeration. Neither is it a Lye in respect of him, that hears it by the by; because he is not concerned in the Discourse, and therefore we are not any ways obliged to inform him right; but if that Person mistake our Meaning, he may thank himself, and not any Body else, for his being deceived. For (if we consider it rightly) the Discourse between ourselves is no Discourse at all in respect to a Stander by, but a meer Sound that may indifferently signify any Thing. Therefore neither was Cato the Censor to be blamed fora promising Assistance to his Confederates, tho’ falsly, nor Flaccusb in reporting to others, that Aemilius had taken the Enemies City by Storm; tho’ the Enemies were deceived by it. Plutarch relates the like of Agesilaus. For nothing was here said to the Enemy, and the consequent Damage was an accidental Thing, and not in itself unlawful to wish, or cause to an Enemy. And to this Kind do2 St. Chrysostom and St.3Hierom refer that Sayingc of St. Paul, wherein he reproved St. Peter at Antioch for too much judaizing, supposing that St. Peter well understood, that he did it not seriously, but to accommodate himself to the Weakness of those who heard him.

XIV.And when our Speech is directed to him, that is willing to be deceived.XIV. 1. Thirdly, When we are certain that he with whom we discourse will not only not be offended, tho’ his Judgment be for that Time imposed upon, but on the contrary will be thankful for it, on account of the Advantage, that he shall get by it, there is no Lye properly so called, or unjust Deceit, committed, no more than he can be charged with Theft, who presuming the Owner’s Consent spends something of his of small Value to obtain him a great Profit. For in such Cases, where we have so much Reason to be assured of what we think, a Presumption of another’s Will has the same Force as an express Consent. And it is an incontestable Maxim that no Wrong is done to him that is willing. Wherefore a Person seems<532> not to be culpable, when he comforts his sick Friend, by making him believe what is false, as Arria did Paeteus upon the Death of their Son, which Story is inaPliny’s Epistles; or he that in a Danger encourages the Soldiers with false News, whereby he occasions their Safety and Victory; and so the deceived is not catched, as Lucretius speaks.

2. And1Democritus, ἀληθομυθεύειν χρεὼν, ὅπου λώϊον We must speak Truth, when it is for our Interest; and Xenophon,2 ϕίλους δίκαιον ἐξαπατἀ̑ν, ἐπὶ δὲ ἀγαθῷ, It is lawful to deceive our Friends, for their Advantage; and3Clemens Alexandrinus allows, ψεύδεσθαι ἐν θεραπείας μέρει, To use a Lye for a Remedy:4 So Maximus Tyrius, καὶ ἰατρος νοσον̂ντα ἐξαπατἀ̑, καὶ στρατηγὸς, καὶ κυβερνήτης νάυτας, καὶ δεινὸν οὐδὲν, The Physician deceives his Patient, the General his Soldiers, and the Pilot his Mariners, and yet no Injury. And Proclus5 on Plato gives this Reason, τὸ γὰρ ἀγαθὸν κρει̑ττόν ἐστι τη̂ς ἀληθείας, Goodness is preferable to Truth. The like we have in Xenophon,6 that their Confederates were coming to their Assistance; and of Tullus Hostilius, thatb he ordered the Alban Army to withdraw, in order to surround the Enemy; (tho’ he knew it was an Effect of the Alban General’s Treachery) and that Salubre Mendacium,7 that wholesome Lye of Quinctius the Consul (as Historians call it) to encourage his Army, gave out, that his left Wing had routed their Enemies; and of many others. But we must observe, that the Injury done to the Judgment in this Case, is of less Concern, because it is but as for a Moment, and the Truth immediately appears.

XV.And when he that speaks, uses that Sovereign Power that he has over his own Subjects.XV. 1. Fourthly, Another Consequence which has an Affinity with the former is this, that it is not a criminal Lye, when he who1 has an absolute Right over all the Rights of another, makes use of that Right, in telling something false, either for his particular Advantage, or for the publick Good. And Plato seems to have respect to this,2 when he allows Princes the Liberty to speak false. And yet3 when he sometimes grants, and sometimes takes away this Privilege to, and from Physicians, he seems to make this Difference, that he gave it to the publickly authorized ones, and took it away from such as assumed it to themselves. Yet the same Plato does justly acknowledge,4 that it is not suitable to the Nature of GOD to lye, notwithstanding the Sovereign Power that he has over Men, because it is an5 Argument of Weakness to fly to such Shifts.<533>

2. An Example of this, perhaps, innocent Falshood we have6 in Joseph, and commended by Philo,a who being Viceroy, pretends, tho’ against his Knowledge, to charge his Brethren, first with being Spies, and afterwards Thieves. And in Solomon, who gave a remarkable Demonstration of his divine Wisdom, when to discover the true Mother, he commanded the living Child to be divided, when he intended nothing less [[sic: of the kind. 1 Kings iii. 25, 26, 27. True is that Saying of Quintilian,7 Sometimes the common Good requires that some Falshoods should be maintained.

XVI.Or perhaps, when the Life of an innocent Person, or something equal to it, cannot otherwise be preserved.XVI. Fifthly,1 When the Life of an innocent Person, or something equal to it, cannot otherwise be preserved, or the Execution of a dishonest Act be otherwise prevented; as was the Fact of Hypermnestra,2 commended by Horace.<534>

• Splendide mendax, & in omne Virgo
• Nobilis aevum.

• Lib. 3. Od. 11.

• A Virgin famous for her pious Lye,
• Whose glorious Memory shall never die.

XVII.That it is lawful by speaking false to deceive an Enemy, by whom asserted.XVII. 1. What we have now laid down, does not extend so far as the common Maxim of some wise Men, who assert in general, and without Restriction, that it is lawful to lye to an Enemy: ThusaPlato andbXenophon among the Greeks,1Philo among the Jews, and St. Chrysostom among2 the Christians, to the Rule given against Lying, add this Exception, Unless we have to do with an Enemy. Hither we may perhaps refer that Message sent by the Men of Jabesh Gilead to the Ammonites, by whom they were besieged, 1 Sam. xi. 10. And that of3Elisha<535> the Prophet, 2 Kings vi. 19. as also that of Valerius4Laevinus, who boasted that he killed Pyrrhus.

2. To the third, fourth, and fifth of the Observations abovementioned, we may refer that of Eustratius Archbishop of Nice,5 Ὁεν̂̔ βουλευόμενος οὐκ ἐξ ἀνάγκης ὁ ἀληθεύων ἐστιν· ἐστὶ γάρ πὸτε τὸν ὀρθω̂ς, βουλευόμενον καὶ περὶ αὐτον̂ τον̂ ψεύδους βουλεύσασθαι, ἵν· ἐπιτηδὲς ψεύδηται πρός τινα ἢ ἐχθρὸν ὄντα, ἵνα σϕάλη αὐτὸν, ἢ ϕίλον ἵν’ ἐκκόψῃ αὐτὸν ἀπὸ κακον̂, καὶ τούτων τὰ παραδείγματα ἐν ταις ἱστορίαις πολλὰ. There is not always a Necessity that a good Counsellor should speak Truth; for possibly a good Councellor may consult how he may designedly tell a Lye, whereby either to deceive his Enemy, or save his Friend from Harm. Examples of these Kinds are common in all Histories. And Quintilian6 says, that a Lye, otherwise blameable, even in a Slave, will deserve Commendation, when a wise Man makes Use of it to hinder one from being murdered by Highwaymen, or to save his country by deceiving an Enemy.

3. I know the Schoolmen of some Ages past will not allow of this,c who out of all the primitive Fathers have generally chose7 St. Austin for their Guide in almost every Thing; yet, tho’ they are scrupulous of admitting false Speaking in any Case, they allow of tacit Interpretations, so contrary to all Use, that it is doubtful whether it be not better to admit of false Speaking to some Persons, in the fore-mentioned Cases, or some of them (for I do not here pretend to determine any Thing) than so generally to distinguish them from Falshood, as when they say I know not, they mean, I know not how to tell you so. Or, I have nothing, they mean, I have nothing to give you. And many such like mental Reservations, which even common Sense is ashamed of; and which, if allowed, will introduce plain Contrarieties; so that he that affirms any Thing, may be said to deny it, and he that denies a Thing, may be said to affirm it.

4. For it is certain, that there is no Word8 but may admit of a double Interpretation, because every Word, besides the primitive9 Signification, 10 has also a derivative one, and that divers,d according to the Diversity of Arts, and also others by Metaphor, or some such Figure. Neither do I like their Device better, who, as if<536> they quarrelled more with the Word than the Thing, call that Jest which they speak with a Countenance and Pronunciation very serious.

XVIII.This is not to be extended to Words promissory.XVIII. But we must observe, that what we have here said concerning false Speaking, is to be referred to assertory (or affirming) Speech, (and that too so far only as to hurt Nobody, but a publick Enemy)1 but not to promissory. For every Promise, as I said before, confers a new and special Right to the Person promised: And this is in Force, even among Enemies, notwithstanding their open Hostility, and that not only in express Promises, but also in tacit ones, as when an Interview is demanded, of which we shall treat more here after, when we come to speak of publick Faith to be preserved amongst Enemies.

XIX.Nor to Oaths.XIX. Neither is it to be extended to Oaths, either as sertory or promissory, for Oaths have a Power to exclude1 all Exceptions which may arise from the Party we deal with, because therein we treat not only with Men, but with GOD, to whom we stand obliged by our Oaths, tho’ there should arise no Right at all to Man: And, as I have said already, it is not so in other Speeches, as in Oaths, for in others it is enough to clear us of a Lye, if the Words be true in any Sense, not altogether unusual; but in Things sworn2 it is necessary that our Words be true in that Sense, in which we sincerely believe those to whom we swear, understand them; so that we perfectly abhor3 their Impiety, who scruple not to affirm, that it is as lawful to deceive Men with Oaths, as Children with Toys.

XX.It is more generous, and more agreeable to Christian Simplicity to abstain from Falshood, even to our Enemies, illustrated.XX. 1. We know there are some Kinds of Fraud, which, tho’ naturally permitted, yet are rejected by some Nations and Persons, not so much on the Account of any Injustice in them, as out of either a Greatness of Spirit, or sometimes a Confidence of our own Strength. There is in1Aelian a remarkable Saying of Pythagoras, that Man comes near to GOD in two Things, in always speaking Truth, and in doing Good to all Men. And in Jamblicus,2Truth is the Guide to all Good, both divine and human. And in Aristotle,3 Ὁ μεγαλόψυχος παῤῥησιαστικὸς, καὶ ἀληθευτικὸς, A Man of a great Soul delivers himself with Freedom and Truth. And in4Plutarch, Τὸ ψεύδὲσθαι δουλοπρεπὲς, It is base and servile to lye. And5Arrianus of King Ptolemey, καὶ αὐτῷ βασιλει̑ ὄντι αἰσχρότερον ἢ τῷ ἀλλῳ ψεύσασθαι ἠ̂ν, It is much worse in a King to lye, than in another.6 So the same Author, of Alexander, Οὐ χρη̂ναι τὸν βασιλέα ἄλλο τι ἢ ἀληθεύειν, πρὸς τοὺς ὑπηκόους, A Prince should speak nothing to his Subjects but Truth. And7Mamertine speaks of Julian. Admirable is the Agreement between our Prince’s Tongue and his Heart; he is sensible that Lying argues a base and mean Spirit, and is a servile Vice; and whereas Fear or Want makes Men Lyars, that Prince is ignorant of his own Majesty that lyes. Plutarch8 records of Aristides, Φύσις ἱδρυμένη ἐν ἠ̂θει βεβαίῳ καὶ πρὸς τὸ δίκαιον ἀτενὴς, ψεν̂δος δ’ οὐδ’ ἐν παιδια̂ς τινι τρόπῳ προσιεμένη, He was naturally so great an Admirer of Truth, that he would not allow of a Lye in Jest. And Probus of Epaminondas,9So great a Lover of Truth, that he would not tell a Lye, tho’ but<537> for Sport. Which ought the more religiously to be observed by10 Christians, who are not only commanded to use Simplicity, Matt. x. 16. but are also forbidden idle11 Talk, Matt. xii. 36. having him for an Example in whose Mouth was found no Guile. Wherefore, as12Lactantius said, he that is truly honest and just will not say with Lucilius, Homini amico ac familiari non est mentiri meum, It is not my Custom to tell a Lye to my Friend; but also will think it his Duty not to lye to a Stranger, or an Enemy; nor will his Tongue ever speak what his Heart does not think. Such a one was Neoptolemus, says Sophocles,13 ὑπερβάλλων ἁπλότητι, καὶ εὐγενείᾳ, Excelling for his generous Candor: As Dion Prusaeensis rightly observed, who being urged by Ulysses to use Treachery, replied,

• I grieve to hear your secret Treacheries,
• But should do more to act as you advise.
• 14If I (Ulysses) were not nobly born,
• I yet should base unmanly Actions scorn:
• But it would ever shame Achilles Son,
• To steal by Craft what should by Force be won.

And Euripides,15

• A gallant Soul will gallant Actions do,
• And scorns by Treachery to kill his Foe.

3. Thus16Alexander said he would not steal a Victory; and Polybius17 writes, that the Achaeans hated to use Fraud against an Enemy, esteeming that the surest Victory, which, to use Claudian’s Words,

• 18Confessus animo quoque subjugat Hostes.
• A Victory confess’d by Enemies is true.

So were the Romans till the second Punick War; so that19Aelian said, ἴσασι Ῥωμαι̑οι ἀγαθοὶ ει̑ναι καὶ οὐ μὲν διὰ τέχνης καὶ ἐπιβουλη̂ς καταγωνίσασθαι τοὺς ἐχθροὺς, The Romans are truly valiant, overcoming their Enemies, not by Craft and Subtilty, but by plain Force. And when Perseus the Macedonian King was deceived by the Hopes of Peace,20 the old Senators disallowed the Act, as inconsistent with Roman Bravery, saying, that their Ancestors prosecuted their Wars by Valour, not Craft, not like the subtil Carthaginians, nor cunning Grecians, among whom it was greater Glory to overcome their Enemies by Treachery, than by true Valour. To which they added, That sometimes Cunning might for a little While prevail against Valour, but his Courage was for ever lost, who was convinced that in a regular and<538> just War, he was neither by Fraud, nor by Chance, but engaging closely in Battle, with his whole Strength, fairly vanquished. So in later Times we read in Tacitus,21That the Roman People avenged themselves on their Enemies, not by Craft or Cunning, but openly, and by Force of Arms. Such also were the22Tibarenes (a People of Cappadocia) who always proclaimed the Time and Place of Battle. The like does Mardonius in Herodotus23 testify of the Grecians in his Time.

XXI.That it is not lawful for us to force another to do what is lawful for us to do, but not for him.XXI. As to the Manner of prosecuting a War, this Rule is also necessary,1 that whatsoever is unlawful for a Man to do, is also unlawful for another to force or persuade him to. As for Example,2 it is unlawful for a Subject to kill his Prince, or to deliver up a Town without the Consent of a Council of War, or to plunder his Countrymen. Therefore it is also unlawful to persuade him, who continues a Subject, to do so; for he that causes another to sin, always sins himself; neither is it enough to say, that it is lawful for him who tempts another to a base Act to do it himself, as to kill an Enemy, suppose; he may kill him, it is true, but not in such a Manner. And St. Augustine3 says true, It signifies nothing, whether a Man commit a Crime himself, or employ another to do it for him.

XXII.Yet we may use his Service that freely offers it.XXII. But it is another Thing if a Person shall freely offer himself, without any Persuasion to it; for it is not unlawful for us then to make use of him, as an Instrument, to do that which it is lawful for us to do. As we have proved already,a by the Example of GOD himself. We receive a Deserter by the Law of War, said Celsus,1 that is, it is not contrary2 to the Law of War, to receive him, who quitting the Enemy’s Party, embraces ours.

[1 ]St. Augustin says, that in the midst of War itself, Faith is to be observed, and Peace endeavoured, Ut in ipsis bellis, &c. Ad Bonifac. Comit. Epist. LXX. Esto ergo, etiam bellando, pacificus, Epist. CCV. Ad eundum Bonifac. There is in Procopius, Vandalic. Lib. I. (Cap. XVI.) a fine Discourse of Belisarius to his Soldiers, wherein he shews, that those who make War, ought not to abandon Justice. Paulus Orosius says, that Civil Wars are made in this Manner, when unavoidable, by Christian Princes, in the Times of Christianity. Ecce, Regibus & temporibus Christianis, &c. Lib. VII. The same Historian, speaking of Theodosius, defies all the World to instance, from the first founding of Rome, a single War undertaken so justly and so necessarily, and so successfully terminated, through the divine Providence, that neither the Battles, during it, had been very bloody, nor Victory attended with cruel Revenge. Grotius.

[1 ]See B. II. Chap. V. § 24. Num. 2. and Chap. VII. § 2. Num. 3.

[a ]Victor. De jure belli, n. 15.

[2. ]Our Author does not mean Things essentially bad, and which, as such, cannot be lawful in any Case, or to any End whatsoever; but only those, which a Man could not do otherwise, without the necessary Connection they have with a lawful End. See what he says afterwards, at the End of Paragraph 6. Things bad in their Nature are indeed generally not necessary, with Regard to the Necessity in Question. But, admitting they were, as that is not impossible; and that a Person, for Instance, could not obtain or preserve his just Rights but by Adultery, Blasphemy, Sacrilege, Abjuration of the Religion he believes true; the Innocence of the End would neither hinder the Means from being utterly unlawful, nor discharge him from the Obligation of renouncing the most lawful Pretensions, rather than to employ such Means.

[3. ]Facultatem agendi in solo Societatis respectu. See our Author’s Preliminary Discourse, § 7, 8. Not that the other Kinds of Rights which impose an imperfect Obligation, do not contribute to the Good of Society. But they are not absolutely necessary to maintain it in Peace; and therefore they cannot be pursued by the Methods of Force.

[b ]B. ii. ch. 1. § 3. n. 3.

[c ]Victor. ubi supra, n. 18, 39, 55.

[d ]B. ii. ch. 2. § 10.

[4. ]See above, B. II. Chap. VII. § 2.

[e ]Sylv. in verb. bellum, part 1. n. 10. ver. prima.

[1 ]This Passage has been cited above, B. II. Chap. XX. § 8. Num. 8. at the End.

[1 ]See Thomas Aquinas, II. 1. Quaest. LXXIII. Art. 8. and Molina, Tract. II. Disp. CXXI. Grotius.

[a ]B. ii. ch. 1.

[b ]Victor. de jure belli, n. 27.

[2. ]Unde nec reus est mortis, alienae, qui quum suae possessioni murorum ambitum circumduxit, aliquis ex ipsorum usu percussus interiit. Epist. ad Publicol. CLIV. Our Author cites this Passage thus in the first Edition, and in those of 1632, and 1642, the last in his Life Time. The later Editions have been changed, I know not by whom, according to the Original, in which there is murum instead of murorum ambitum, and si aliquis —— intereat for aliquis —— interiit. Our Author had followed the Reading in the Canon Law, Caus. XXIII. Quaest. V. Cap. VIII. But the Corrector of the Edition of Rome has since inserted, upon the Authority of a Manuscript in the Vatican, ex lapidibus murum circumduxerit; which is better. In the Words that follow, some Editions of the Original have ex ipsiusRuinis, instead of ex ipsorum usu. The latter Reading seems to be the best, provided it be corrected, and Casu be put for Usu, as it ought in my Opinion; it being easy for such an Error to have crept in. The Sense plainly requires it; and Gronovius, who is for reading prolapsus instead of percussus, was not aware that it would then be clearly and directly the Fault of him who should get upon the Wall; whereas the Question relates to certain Cases, wherein Damage seems to arise from what a Person does in Consequence of his Right; as in this Example, wherein St. Austin means, that a Man has not the less Power to build a Wall, for the enclosing his Possessions, because that Wall may happen to fall down and kill somebody. Which Sense is followed in the Translation of this Passage.

[3. ]Multos autem occidere & indiscretos, &c. De Clement. Lib. I. Cap. XXVI. in fin.

[c ]B. ii. ch. 21. § 14.

[1 ]At Athens it was prohibited to export Cordage, Casks, Timber, Wax, Pitch &c. See the Commentator upon Aristophanes’s Comedy of the Frogs, (ver. 365.) and that of the Knights, (ver. 282.) Grotius.

[2. ]It is in that Princess’s Answer to Justinian’s Letter, both which Procopius recites, whom our Author quotes in the Margin. Gotthic. Lib. I. Cap. III.

[3. ]Sed quamvis hac ita sit, &c. De Benefic. Lib. VII. Cap. XX.

[a ]See Paruta, l. 7.

[4. ]Officere enim istud est, &c. Offic. Lib. I. Cap. XXX.

[b ]See the Decretals, l. 5. tit. 6. De Judaeis. Can. 6. and 17.

[5. ]Our Author here supposes the Case of being reduced to the last Extremity; and then his Decision is well founded, whatever Mr. Cocceius says, Dissert. De Jure Belli in Amicos, § 12. wherein he only criticizes our Author, in Regard to what he advances elsewhere, that, in a Case of Necessity, the Effects become common. It is true it suffices, that at such a Time the Goods of another may be used, without even the Proprietor’s Consent. But as to the following Cases, that Lawyer has Reason, in my Opinion, to say, § 15, 17. that provided that in furnishing Corn, for Instance, to an Enemy besieged, and pressed by another, it is not done with Design to deliver him from that unhappy Extremity, and the Party is ready to sell the same Goods also to the other Enemy; the State of Neutrality and Liberty of Commerce, leave the Besieger no Room for Complaint. I add, that there is the more Reason for this, if the Seller had been accustomed to traffick in the same Goods with the Besieged before the War.

[c ]B. ii. ch. 2. § 10.

[d ]Sylvest. verb. Restitutio. part 3. § 12.

[6. ]See Examples of such Declarations, in the League of Christian Princes against the Aegyptians, Saracens, and others, Can. ult. de Transact. C. signific. de Judaeis, Extrav. Copios. de Judaeis, and Can. I. Lib. V. Extravag. de Judaeis. A Book is written in Italian, entitled, Liber Consulatus Maris, in which are related the Constitutions of the Emperors of Greece and Germany, of the Kings of France, Spain, Syria, Cyprus, Majorca, and Minorca, and also of the Venetians and Genoese on this Subject. In Tit. CCLXXIV. of that Work, such Questions are treated of; and thus it is adjudged, if both the Ship and Freight belong to the Enemy, then, without Dispute, they become lawful Prize to the Captor; but if the Ship belong to those that be at Peace with us, and the Cargo be the Enemies, they may be forced by the Persons at War, to put into any of their Ports, but yet the Master must be satisfied for the Expences of the Voyage. But on the contrary, if the Ship belongs to the Enemy, and the Goods to Neuters, we must then agree for the Ship; but if the Ship-Men will not treat, they shall be forced to carry the Ship into some Port of the Captor’s Party, and to pay what they owed for the Use of the Ship. In the Year 1438, there being War between the Dutch and the City of Lubec, and other Towns lying on the Baltick Sea, and the River Elb, it was adjudged in a full Assembly in Holland, that the Goods found in an Enemy’s Ship, which appeared to belong to others, were not to be reputed as good Prize; and this was from that Time established there for a Law. So the King of Denmark was of the same Opinion, when in the Year 1597 he sent Embassadors to the Hollanders, and their Allies, challenging a Liberty for his Subjects to carry their Goods into Spain, with which the Dutch had the most cruel War. In France it has always been permitted for Nations at Peace to carry on Trade, even with the Enemies of the Kingdom; and that with so little Reserve, that the Enemies have often, under other Mens Names, concealed their own Goods, as appears by an Edict in the Year 1543, Chap. XLII. which was renewed in that of the Year 1584, &c. In which Edicts it is expressly provided, that their Friends might, in Time of War, exercise a free Trade, so that they did it in their own Ships, and by their own Men, and carry their Ships and Goods where so ever they pleased; provided that those Goods were not Belli instrumenta, war like Instruments, which might assist the Enemy; in which Case the French were then allowed to take them themselves, paying a just Price for them. Here are two Things to be observed, First, That warlike Ammunitions were not made Prize, much more were indifferent Merchandizes free from this Danger. I cannot deny but that the Northern Nations have sometimes acted otherwise; but the Practice there has been variable, and accommodated to the Circumstances of Times, rather than regulated by the perpetual Maxims of Equity: For when the English, upon Pretence of their Wars, stopt the Danish Traffick, there arose a War between those Nations long since, which had this Conclusion, that the Danes should lay a Tribute upon the English, called the Danish Penny, which, tho’ the Cause was changed, retained its Name even to the Time of William the Conqueror, who founded the present Royal Family in England, as Thuanus, an Author of great Credit, relates in his History, on the Year 1589. Again, in the Year 1575, Sir William Winter, and Mr. Robert Beal, Secretary to the Privy Council, were sent by Queen Elizabeth, a very wise Princess, to remonstrate, that the English could not bear that the Dutch should, in the very Heat of the War between Spain and the United Provinces, detain the English Ships trading to the Spanish Ports; as Rhedanus, in his Dutch History, on the Year 1575, and Mr. Cambden, an Englishman, on the Year following. But when the English, being themselves at War with Spain, disturbed the Cities of Germany in their Trade with Spain, with what a disputable Right they did it, appears from the Writings published on both Sides, worth the Reading, in Order to understand this Controversy. And it is observable, that the English themselves acknowledged this in their own Writings; where they chiefly alledge two Things for their Cause, viz. that they were Instruments of War that were transported by the Germans into Spain; and that their antient Treaties had made it unlawful to be done: As afterwards the Dutch, and their Confederates, agreed with the Lubeckers, and their Allies, in the Year 1613, that neither Party should permit the Subjects of their Enemies to traffick within their Territories, or assist the Enemy with Money, Men, Ships, or Provisions. And after that, in the Year 1627, it was agreed between the Kings of Sweden and Denmark, that the Dane should prevent all trading with the Dantzickers, then at War with the Swede, and that he should not permit any Merchandizes to pass through Mare Cimbrium, the Sound, (or the Baltick) to any of the Swede’s Enemies, for which the King of Denmark, on the other Side, had Advantages allowed him; but these are particular Agreements, from whence nothing can be inferred that may be obligatory to all; for the Germans also alledged in their Writings, that all Merchandizes were not prohibited by Agreements, but those which had been once imported into England, or were procured in England. Neither did only the Germans blame the English, for denying them to trade with their Enemies, but the Poles also complained by their Embassador, that the Law of Nations was violated, because, on England’s War with Spain, they were denied the Liberty of trading with the Spaniard, as the aforesaid Cambden and Rhedanus relate, on the Year 1597. But the French, after the Peace of Vervins, Elizabeth, Queen of England, still continuing the War, being importuned by the English, that it might be lawful to search the French Ships trading to Spain, lest any warlike Stores might be concealed, would by no Means grant it, alledging, that it was only a Pretence for Rapine, and to disturb Trade. And in that Treaty which the English made with the Dutch, and their Allies, in the Year 1525 [[sic: 1625, it was agreed, that other Nations, whom it concerned to lessen the Power of the Spaniard, should be asked to forbid all Commerce with Spain; and if they did not do it freely, then that the Ships should be searched, whether they had in them any warlike Stores; but further than this, that neither the Ships nor Goods should be detained, or any Hurt done upon that Pretence, to those in Peace. And it happened in the same Year, that some Hamburgers were going with a Ship into Spain, laden, for the most Part, with warlike Provisions, all which was challenged by the English (as Prize) but they paid the just Value for the other Goods. But the French, when their Ships going into Spain were confiscated by the English, declared that they would not endure it. We had Reason therefore to say, that publick Declarations are requisite, which also the English themselves were sensible of; by whom there is an Instance of such a Declaration made, in Cambden, about the Year 1591, and 1598. Neither are such Notifications always regarded, but Times, Places, and Causes are distinguished: For, in the Year 1458, the City of Lubeck did not think itself obliged to take Notice of the Declaration the Dantzickers made to them, not to traffick with the Malgenses and Memelenses, then at Enmity with Dantzick. Neither did the Dutch observe it in the Year 1551, when the Lubeckers declared to them, that they should not trade with Denmark, with which they were then at War. But in the Year 1522, when there was War between the Swedes and Danes, when the Danes desired of the Hanse Towns to have no Commerce with Sweden, some Cities indeed that stood in need of his Friendship complied with him, but the others did not. The Dutch, when the War was hot between the Swede and the Pole, never suffered trafficking with either Nation to be interrupted, but always restored to the French what Ships the Holland Vessels had intercepted, either returning from Spain or going to Spain, with which they were then at War. See the Discourse of Ludovicus Servinus, formerly the King’s Advocate, which he made in the Year 1592, in the Affair of the Hamburgers. But the same Dutch would not suffer the English to carry any Goods into Dunkirk, where they had then a Fleet: As the Dantzickers declared to the Dutch, in the Year 1455, that they should carry nothing into the City of Koningsberg, according to Gaspar Soutzius, in his Prussian History. See Cabet. Decis. XLIII. Num. 2. and Seraphin. De Freitas, in Lib. de justo Imper. Lusitan. Asiat. where he quotes several other Authors. Grotius.]]

[7. ]The most learned Johannes Meursius has many Things of this Subject, in his Danish History, B. I. and XI. where you will find the Lubeckers and the Emperor for Commerce, and the Danes against it. See also Crantzius, Vandal. B. XIV. Thuanus, on the aforesaid Year 1589, B. of Hist. XCVI. Cambden, besides the abovementioned Places on the Years 1589 and 1595 where that Dispute between the English and the Hanse Towns is treated of. Grotius.

[e ]Polyb. l. 1. c. 73.

[f ]Plut. Demetr.

[8. ]Not much unlike to this is what Plutarch relates of Pompey, in his History of the Mithridatick War, He set Guards at the Bosphorus, to observe if any sailed into the Bosphorus, and whosoever were caught were put to Death. Vit. Pomp. (p. 639.) Grotius.

[1 ]VI. (1) Ἠ δόλῳ, &c. So our Author quotes that Verse from Homer. But all he says is:

• Ἀυτὰρ ἐπεὶ μνηστη̂ρας ἐνὶ μεγάροισι τεοι̑σι
• Κτείνης, ἠὲ δόλῳ ἤ ἀμϕαδὸν ὀξέϊ χαλκῷ, &c.

Odyss. Lib. XI. Ver. 118, 119. It is the Shade of Tiresias who tells Ulysses, that when he returns Home he will kill his Wife’s Suitors, either by Fraud or open Force. See also B. I. Ver. 295, 296. where Minerva says the same Thing to Telemachus. Our Author has taken the Verse he recites from the Collections of Stobaeus, who ascribes it to Antigonus, as made by him in Imitation of the antient Poet: Ἀντίγονος ἐρωτηθεὶς, πω̂ς ἄν τις ἐπιθη̂το τοι̑ς πολεμίοις, εἰ̂πεν Ἢ δόλω, &c. Florileg. Tit. LIV. (or LII.). De Imperatoribus, &c. p. 365. Edit. Gesner 1549.

[2. ]Isthm. Od. IV. 81, 82.

[3. ]Upon Occasion of some Trojans who had put on the Arms of the Greeks their Enemies:

• Mutemus clypeos, Danaumque insignia nobis
• Aptemus. Dolus, an virtus, quis in hoste requirat?

Aeneid. Lib. II. Ver. 389, 390. And one of those who uses this Strategem, is ranked amongst the justest and most virtuous of the Trojans:

• Hoc Riphaeus, hoc ipse Dymas, omnisque juventus
• Laeta facit ——
• —— Cadit & Riphaeus justissimus unus,
• Qui fuit in Teucris, & servantissimus aequi.

(Ver. 394, 426, 427.)

[4. ]Our Author no doubt speaks of the Stratagem used by Solon for taking the Island of Salamis. See his Life in Plutarch, p. 82. Vol. I. Edit. Wech.

[5. ]

• —— Tacitusque quiete
• Exin virtuti placuit dolus ——
• De bello Punic.
• II. Lib. XV. Ver. 326, 327.

[6. ]He not only speaks of War, but of all Cases, in which Fraud is the means, or Remedy, for extricating People out of Danger, as the Falshoods made use of by Ulysses for his own Preservation, and to obtain the return of his Companions. In Philopseud. circa init. p. 326, 327. Edit. Amstel. Vol. II.

[7. ]De Magister. Equit. Cap. V. Num. 9. Edit. Oxon. See also his De Cyr. Institut. Lib. I. Cap. VI.

[8. ]Lib. V. Cap. IX. Edit Oxon. What Thucydides expresses here by the Word κλέμματα, Virgil calls also Belli furta, Aen. Lib. XI. (Ver. 515.) upon which the Grammarian Servius cites a like Passage in Sallust : Gentis ad furta belli peridoneae.Grotius.

The last Passage is a Fragment which I find in Nonius Marcellus at the Word Furtum, p. 310. Edit. Paris. Mercer. See Mr. Wasse’s Note upon that Fragment, Addend. p. 291. col. 2. It is in Lib. I. Cap. XX. of the Collection.

[9. ]Apophthegm. Laconic. p. 209. B. Vol. II. Edit. Wech.

[10. ]Lib. IX. Cap. XI. p. 766, 767. Isaac Casaubon translates the Word ἐλάττω in this Passage, in a Manner which would render the Application of it not very just, pauciora esse, &c. But that learned Interpreter does not seem to have given sufficient Attention to the Connection of the Discourse, and was led into the Mistake by the Word πλείω in the following Period, which in Reality implies the Number, and not the Quality of the Actions in Question; from whence he probably believed that the Word ἐλάττω should be taken in the same Sense in the preceding Period: Whereas the Historian’s Thought is, that the Conduct of a Stratagem in War is not only of greater Consequence, but more difficult; Experience proving, that People more often miscarry than succeed in it: Ὅτι γε μὴν αυτω̂ν, &c. By all which he intends to prove, that the Use of Stratagems is very laudable. So that our Author was in the right to translate, quae vi fiunt in bello minoris censenda, &c. And I find, that Justus Lipsius understood this Passage in the same Sense, which he quotes in his Politic, Lib. V. Cap. XVII. where he expresses it thus: Facinorum militarium ea esse minoris laudis ac momenti, &c.

[11. ]Thus our Author cites this Verse with Reason, which agrees with the best Manuscript unless it be better to read dextrae than dextra, as the last Editor Mr. Drakenborg, Professor at Utrecht, has done in his Text. The vulgar Editions have indice dextrae; of which Cellarius has made, indice dextrâ, and explains it in this Manner: Si actiones bellicae, prius quam fiant, quasi indice digito hostibus praemonstrentur. But this Explication is contrary to the Design of the General, who speaks. He intends to shew, as appears by what goes before, that the Resolution he takes to make use of Stratagem, is not only necessary with regard to the Conjuncture, but that it will not be less glorious for him to succeed that Way than by mere Force. Whereas according to Cellarius, he would say on the contrary, that Exploits are more glorious, when performed by open Force. Besides, this Interpretation is somewhat forced, and is not supposed by any Example of an Expression, that seems extraordinary enough. What our Author observes with great Probability, that this is an Imitation of a Passage in Polybius, which we have seen in Note 10. serves also to confirm the Manner, in which he gives the Verse. He cites here also in a Note a like Thought from the Alcoran, in which Mahomet says, that War makes Deceit necessary. He remarks further that Virgil puts not only Anger, but Ambuscades in the Retinue of the God Mars:

• —— Circumque atrae Formidinis ora
• Iraeque insidia que Dei comitatus aguntur.

Aeneid. XII. 335, 336. Upon which Servius the Grammarian says, that the Poet intends to signify, that Stratagem is necessary in War, as well as Valour: Non tantùm virtute, sed insidiis comitatum se ostendit.

[12. ]Vit. Marcell. p. 311. A. B. Vol. I. Edit. Wech.

[13. ]Vit. Lysandr. p. 437. The Historian does not speak there of his own Head, and those whose Opinion he gives blamed on the contrary that Conduct, as appears by what follows and goes before.

[14. ]Plutarch compares him to Sylla, in whose Mind Carbo said, there was the Lion and the Fox. Vit. Syll. p. 469. F.

[15. ]Vit. Philopoem. p. 363. E.

[16. ]It is in Sapores’s Letter to the Emperor Constantius, where that Prince says, this Maxim of the Romans had never been received by his People: Illud apud nos nunquam, &c. Lib. XVII. Cap. V. p. 179. Edit. Vales. Gron.

[17. ]Non fuit autem contentus, &c. Digest, Lib. IV. Tit. III. De dolo malo, Leg. l. § 3. See Mr. Noodt’s Treatise, De forma emendandi doli mali, Cap. I.

[18. ]Digest, Nihil interest, &c. Lib. LXIX. Tit. XV. De Captiv. & Postlim. &c. Leg. XXVI.

[19. ]Quum autem justum bellum suscipitur, &c. Quaest. X. super Joshua. Our Author has changed some Terms in this Place, from having followed the Summary of a Canon, in which this Passage is recited. Caus. XXIII. Quaest. II. Can. II.

[20. ]The Passage will be cited below, § 17. Note 2.

[1 ]That is to say, when by not saying or doing a Thing, we designedly give room to others to believe, what we know is false. From whence may easily be discerned wherein deceiving by a positive Act consists.

[2. ]Labeoautem posse & sine dissimulatione, &c. Digest, Lib. IV. Tit. III. De Dolo malo, Leg. I. § 2.

[3. ]Quod si Aquiliana definitio vera est, &c. De Offic. Lib. III. Cap. XV. I have already observed upon Law of Nature and Nations, B. IV. Chap. I. § 9. Note 5. that Cicero speaks only of a Feint and Dissimulation attended with Injustice and Breach of Faith. Our Author himself cites that great Orator below, § 9. amongst those who believed some Lies innocent.

[4. ]Licet veritatem occultare, &c. Lib. contra Mendacium, Cap. X. The same Father says in another Place, that there is a Difference between lying and concealing the Truth. Quoniam aliud est, &c. In Psalm v. vers. Perdes omnes. The Passage is cited in the Canon Law, Caus. XXII. Quaest. II. Cap. XIV. See Thomas Aquinas II. 2 Quaest. LXXI. Art. III. in Resp. ad tertium: As also Sylvest. in verb. Bellum, Part I. Num. 9. Grotius.

The first Passage of St. Austin, cited here by our Author, is not totidem verbis in the two Treatises of that Father contra Mendacium: But I find the Sense of it in the Chapter of the second Treatise, to which he refers, where the Example of our Saviour JESUS CHRIST is alledged; who did not lie in telling his Disciples that he had many Things to say to them, but that they could not yet bear them: non autem hoc est occultare veritatem, &c. Lib. contra Mendac. Cap. X.

[5. ]Our Author refers us here in the Margin to Orat. pro Milon. and that pro Plancio, & Lib. VII. Epist. IX. The last Citation is false as well as many others, which I correct without taking Notice, for the Passage is in Letter VIII. of B. X. and moreover the Letter is not Cicero’s but Plancius’s who in giving an account of the Conduct he had observed during the Troubles of the Republick, says, that he had been obliged against his Will to feign and dissemble many Things to attain his Ends: Ita nunquam diffitebor, multa me, ut ad effectum horum consiliorum, &c. The Passage of the Oration for Milo, relates to a different Thing. The Orator endeavours to excuse Pompey, for having given Credit, upon too slight Grounds, to the false Reports, which had been spread concerning Milo: He says for that Purpose, that those who have the Government of the State in their Hands are obliged to hear too many Things, and that they cannot avoid doing so: Laudabam equidem incredibilem, &c. Cap. XXIV. I am deceived if this Mistake of our Author did not arise from his having the Politicks of Justus Lipsius before him, when he quoted this Passage; which Author, in this, as he does in many other Places, applies the last Words to a Subject different from that upon which they were writ. For he also quotes the two other Passages; of which the last, that remains to be examined, is more to the Purpose. Cicero says, that the People are pleased to give their Suffrages in such a manner, as will leave them at Liberty to carry fair with every Body, and to conceal their Inclination to favour some Competitors more than others: Etenim si populo grata est tabella, &c. Orat. pro Plancio, Cap. VI.

[a ]See St. Chrysostom, De Sacerdot. l. 1.

[6. ]St. Austin says, that the Patriarch did not lie, and that he only concealed the Truth: Sed veritatem voluit celari, non mendacium dici. In Genes. Quaest. XXVI. This Passage is quoted in the Canon Law, Caus. XXII. Quaest. II. Can. XXII. Grotius.

See Pufendorf, Law of Nature and Nations, B. IV. Chap. I. § 11. That Chapter with the Notes should be always compared with this Place, as it treats the same Subject with more Extent and Exactness. As to the Words of St. Austin, which our Author cites, they are indeed so conceived in the Canon referred to; but they are not to be found in Question XXVI. upon Genesis. Which proceeds, as is remarked upon that Canon, from its being composed of different Passages of St. Austin, which Gratian has joined together. That Father expresses himself in this manner upon the same Subject in his second Treatise cont. Mendac. Aliquid ergo veri tacuit, non falsi aliquid dixit, quando tacuit uxorem, dixit sororem. Ad Constantium, Cap. X. Clemens Alexandrinus observes, that Abraham intimates that it was not lawful in those Times to marry a Sister by the same Mother; by which he evidently supposes, that Sarah was actually the Sister of that Patriarch by the Father, and not merely a Relation in some more remote Degree. Strom. Lib. II. Cap. XXIII. p. 502. Edit. Oxon. I find the Passage has been already cited by Mr. Le Clerc, upon the twentieth Chapter of Genesis, where the Story is related. The late Mr. Bayle relates it also in the Article Sarah of his Historical and Critical Dictionary, (p. 2536. col. 2. of the third Edition) but he explains the Word ὁμομητρίους, as only signifying an Uterine Sister. And indeed that is the proper Sense of the Term. But I do not know whether Clemens Alexandrinus has not improperly taken it for a Sister both by Father and Mother. Thus he understands by the Word Polygamy, the Condition both of those who have Wives at the same Time, and of those who have several one after another, as appears from the Passage recited below, Chap. IV. of this B. III. § 2. Note 3.

[1 ]There was a People of Ethiopia according to Pliny, who had not the Use of Speech, and conveyed their Meaning to each other by nodding their Heads, and by various Motions of the other Parts of the Body: Quibusdam pro sermone nutus motusque membrorum est. Hist. Natural. Lib. VI. Cap. XX. The Roman Lawyers have decided, that if those who cannot speak express their Thoughts by the Efforts, which they make to be understood in some other Manner, and by an inarticulate Voice, such Endeavours ought to be deemed a sufficient Declaration of their Will, which otherwise ought to be declared in Words: Nam etsi prior atque potentior est, quam vox, mens dicentis, &c. Digest, Lib. XXXIII. Tit. X. De Supellectile legata, Leg. VII. § 2. in fin. In the Decretals, it is said that a deaf, and a dumb Person may enter into a Contract of Marriage, by making known their Consent by Signs: Nam Surdi & Muti possunt, &c. Lib. IV. Tit. I. De Sponsalib. & Matrim. Cap. XXV. Grotius.

[2. ]It is in a Law, where he says; It is not by the Figure of the Letters used in writing, but by the Words they represent, that an Obligation is contracted; insomuch as it has been thought fit, that the Writing should have the same Force, as what is signified by Word of Mouth: Non figura literarum, sed oratione, quam exprimunt literae obligamur, &c. Digest, Lib. XLIV. Tit. VII. De obligat. & action. Leg. XXXVIII. The Lawyer expresses himself in a very philosophical Manner in saying placuit, it has been thought fit, &c. for he thereby insinuates that the Use of Signs is the Effect of a Convention, ἐκ συνθήκης. Grotius.

[3. ]This Distinction is scarce better founded than that of the Law of Nations, with which our Author compares it, and in which we have elsewhere shewn the want of Solidity. All the Obligation that is here consists in this; that when a Person is bound to declare his Thoughts, as that cannot be done but by Signs capable of making them known to those he is concerned with, it is commonly necessary for him to employ such as are most used, because there are none more known by all the World, nor consequently more suitable to that Purpose. See what I have said in the Chapter of Pufendorf, which answers to this, § 5. So that the Difference between Words, Characters, Gestures and other Signs, consists in this, that the Use of the latter being less common; or rather, Use not having given them a determinate Signification, they are not of themselves proper to convey clearly the Sense of the Person that employs them: So that whilst they have no fixed and determinate Meaning either one way or other, they cannot be considered as Signs, upon which there is room to rely. And if it be incumbent on Persons not to use them, when they foresee that others will explain them in a certain Sense, contrary to their Intent, it is not upon account of the Error considered in itself, but of the accidental Consequence, of which our Author speaks, and which we are otherwise obliged to prevent by Virtue of a Law of Nature, whereby we are to avoid all Things that may occasion Evil, directly or indirectly, to those who have not deserved it. Now this would also take Place, admitting that the same Effect should result from the Use of Speech; if, for Instance, we had Reason to believe, that a Person, either thro’ Ignorance, Distraction, or otherwise, should take in a wrong Sense what we say to him in the most common and clear Terms.

[4. ]De Interpret. Cap. IV.

[a ]St. Aug. De Doct. Christ. l. 2. c. 24.

[5. ]As Michal did to save David her Husband. 2 Samuel xix. 16. Grotius.

[6. ]Clemens Alexandrinus reasons almost in the same Manner upon this Example; and I am surprized that our Author has not made Use of that Authority. That Father says that St. Paul thus became all Things to all Men out of Condescension; and that without departing from the fundamental Principles of the Christian Religion, he gained all the World by such Management, which cannot be treated as Falshood, properly so called. Stromat. Lib. VI. Cap. XV. p. 802. Edit. Oxon.

[7. ]Thus St. Chrysostom says it ought to be called, and not ἀπάτην Deceit, in his first Book De Sacerdot. And again, the same Author upon 1 Cor. iv. 6. This was no Cheat but a certain Compliance and Condescension. And again, on ix. 20. That he might convert those that are really so, he became such in Appearance only, and did the same Things as they, but not with the same Intention. To this we may refer the counterfeit Madness of David, (1 Sam. xxi. 13.) Grotius.

See a Passage of St. Cyril, which will be cited below, § 13. Note 2. and that of Clemens Alexandrinus quoted in Note 6.

[8. ]These Words that our Author quotes without mentioning the Place from which he takes them, are in Stromat. Lib. VII. Cap. IX. p. 863. Edit. Oxon. a little after the Passage, which he cites below, § 14. Note 10. in as loose a Manner. The Father speaks in both of his Gnostick.

[b ]Liv. Lib. 5: c. 48.

[c ]See Sylvest. verb. Bellum. Part 1. n. 8.

[1 ]

• Ἔχθρος γὰρ μοὶ κει̑νος, &c.
• Iliad. Lib. IX. Ver. 312, 313.

[2. ]

• Καλὸν μὲν ον̂̔ν, &c.

This is a Fragment of a Tragedy that is lost, intitled Creusa, preserved by Stobaeus, Florileg. Tit. XII.

[3. ]

• ψεν̂δος δὲ μισει̑ πα̂ς ὁ ϕρόνιμος καὶ σοϕός

Stobaeus has also preserved us this Verse in the same Place, Tit. XII. where is also another very like it, which immediately follows, attributed by the common Editions to Menander; but in that of our Author, which he revised upon the Manuscript it is called anonymous.

• ψεν̂δος δὲ μισει̑ πα̂ς σοϕὸς καὶ χρήσιμος

[4. ]Ethic. Nicomach. Lib. IV. Cap. XIII. p. 55. C. Vol. II. Edit. Paris.

[5. ]St. Irenaeus tells us, he was taught this Maxim by an old Priest; that we ought not to condemn those Things which the holy Scriptures relate simply, without censure: De quibus Scripturae non increpant, sed simpliciter sunt positae, nos non debere fieri accusatores, Lib. IV. Cap. L. Grotius.

The Maxim laid down by this good Priest so generally, is undoubtedly false. But it is certain that of all those Things, on which the Scripture decides nothing clearly and incontestably in regard to their Nature, there is not one, whereof we find so many Examples in holy Writ, as of those innocent Lies, practised by virtuous Persons without scruple of Conscience. Besides, as Moses Amyraut observes in his Christian Morals, “There are many Places where the Faults of the faithful are related without blame in the Word of GOD; but it is only in the History of these officious Lies, that the Holy Spirit has commended them, in regard to Rahab and the Midwives of Egypt, who were praised and rewarded.” Vol. III. p. 283.

[6. ]Some of those Passages will be cited below.

[7. ]He confesses this in his Questions upon Leviticus : Sed utrum haec aliqua compensatione, &c. Quaest. LXVIII.

[8. ]Magna quaestio, latebrosa tractatio, dispensatio inter doctos alternans. De Mendacio, Cap. I. Our Author himself, after the first Edition of his Book, in a Letter wherein he asks the Advice of the celebrated Gerard John Vossius, concerning a new Edition he was preparing, confesses that the Question about Lying was one of those that puzzled him most: Aestuo enim in nonnullis quaestionibus, maxime illa de Mendacio, &c. Part I. Epist. CCXVIII. But this Difficulty arose from his not knowing perfectly the Topick of the Question, because he had not sufficiently dived into the Nature of the Thing, and the simple Principles of natural Right.

[9. ]It is Xenophon who has preserved the Thoughts of that great Philosopher, in his Memoirs of his remarkable Actions and Sayings. He makes Euthydemus, with whom he discourses, agree, that there is no Injustice either in deceiving an Enemy or even a Friend for his good: And he proposes, by way of Example, a General of an Army, who to raise the drooping Courage of his Soldiers, tells them, that Aid will soon arrive; tho’ he knows that it is not true; and a Father, who seeing his Son’s Aversion for a Remedy necessary to his Health, makes him take it by way of Food, Lib. IV. Cap. II. § 16, 17.

[10. ]Some Passages of this Philosopher will be cited below, upon Paragraph XV. Note 2, 4.

[11. ]The Passage cited in Note 9. suffices to shew the Opinion of this Philosopher, who, as the Disciple of Socrates, approved without doubt all the Sentiments of his Master which he has given us. See also those cited above, upon § 6. Note 6.

[12. ]AlicubiCicero, says our Author. See the Passage, which he cites below, Note 15. and those recited in Pufendorf, B. IV. Chap. I. § 21. with what I say there in Note 1.

[13. ]De Stoicorum repugnant. p. 1055, 1056. Vol. II. Edit. Wech. The Opinion of these Philosophers may be seen explained at large in Stobaeus, Eclog. Ethic. Cap. IV.

[14. ]This Orator gives by way of Example the small Lies told to a sick Child; those invented to preserve the Life of a Person fallen into the Hands of Robbers, or to deceive an Enemy, when the Safety of a Man’s Country requires it: Ac primum concedant mihi, &c. Instit. Orat. Lib. XII. Cap. I. p. 1054. Edit. Burman.

[15. ]I shall give the Passages quoted by our Author in the Margin, where the Figures are a little faulty in the Editions before mine. The Philosopher speaking of the Vices opposite to Veracity, gives as one of the Extremes, the pretending to have advantageous Qualities which we have not, or not to have what we have. Ethic. Nicomach. Lib. II. Cap. VII. p. 25. Vol. II. Edit. Paris. By which he gives us to understand, that Feigning and Dissimulation are not always vicious, but only from the Excessor Defect in the Things feigned or disguised. And he says in so many Words in the other Passage upon this Head, that those who dissemble with Moderation, and in Things that are not obvious, pass for polite People, Lib. IV. Cap. XIII. in fin. p. 56. B.

[16. ]Paraph. in Lib. V. Cap. VIII. Ethic. Nicomach. p. 297. Edit. Heins.

[17. ]Sic judicet, pleraque esse, &c. Institut. Orator. (Lib. XII. Cap. I. p. 1054. Edit. Burm.) He says in another Place, Nam & Mendacium dicere, &c. (Lib. II. Cap. XVII. p. 127.) Grotius.

[18. ]

• Ὑπολαμβάνω τὸ ψεν̂δος, &c.

These Verses have been preserved by Stobaeus, Florileg. Tit. XII.

[19. ]

• ΝΕ. Οὐκ αἰσχρὸν ἡγη̂ δη̂τα τὰ ψευδη̂ λέγειν;
• ΟΔ. Οὐκ, εἰ τὸ σωθη̂ναί γε τὸ ψεν̂δος ϕέρει.
• Philoctet. Ver. 107, 108.

[20. ]

• Οὐ Νέμεσις καὶ ψεν̂δος, &c.

This Verse is also in Stobaeus, Tit. XII.

[21. ]This perhaps is what he makes Ulysses say, that, when he was discovered as a Spy in Troy, he invented a thousand Things to avoid Death:

• ΕΚ. Τί δη̂τ’ ἔλεξας, δον̂λος ὢν ἔμος τότε:
• ΟΔ. Πολλω̂ν λόγων εὑρήmαθ’ ὡς μὴ θανει̑ν.

Hecub. Ver. 249, 250. In Mr. Barnes’s Collection of Fragments there is one which might be applied here, Incert. Ver. 73. But it is Menander’s and is in p. 208. Ver. 57. Collect. Cleric.

[22. ]What he calls there κατὰ καιρὸν, the Grammarian Donatus expresses by in tempore, adding, that some Moralists approve of Deceit when reasonable: Quamquam & ipsum fallere in tempore, quidam de Officiis scribentes, rectum putant. In Adelph. Act IV. Scen. III. (Ver. 18.) Cicero insinuates, that there are honest and charitable Lies, as those by which we endeavour to save the Life of an unfortunate Citizen: Si honesto & misericordi saluti civi calamitoso esse vellemus, &c. Orat. pro Ligar. (Cap. V.) Grotius.

[23. ]The Historian makes Otanes say; it is necessary to lie when some Reason requires it: Ἔνθα γὰρ τι δει̑ ψεν̂δος λέγεσθαι, λεγέσθω, Lib. III. Cap. LXXII.

[a ]Thom. ii. 2. Quaest. 110. Art. 1. in Resp.

[1 ]He cites upon it the Words of P. Nigidius, contemporary with Julius Caesar, and Cicero : Verba sunt haec ipsa P. Nigidii, &c. Lib. XI. Cap. XI. St. Austin observes also, that Nobody is guilty of Lying, when he believes what he says to be true: Ream linguam non facit, nisi mens rea. De verbis Apostoli, Serm. XXVIII. Nemo mentiens judicandus est, &c. Enchirid. Cap. XVIII. These two Passages are quoted in the Canon Law, Caus. XXII. Quaest. II. (Can. III. IV.) Grotius.

[2. ]Thus Abraham when he was going to sacrifice his Son upon the Mountain Morijah, said to his Servants: Abide you here with the Ass; and I and the Lad will go yonder and worship, and come again to you. In which he spoke ambiguously according to St. Ambrose, lest, if those People had known his Design, they should have endeavoured to hinder him from executing it, or importuned him against it with Cries and Tears. Captiose autem loquebatur, &c. Lib. I. De Abrahamo, (Cap. VIII.) That Father of the Church approves the Patriarch’s Conduct, and Gratian after him, Caus. XXII. Quaest. II. post Can. XX. Grotius.

This Example includes more than a simple Ambiguity. “Every one sees that if Abraham did not speak contrary to his Desire, he spoke at least contrary to his Hope, and by his Words put other Ideas into the Minds of his Servants, than he had in his own, as Amyraut says very well, Morale Chretienne. ” Vol. IV. p. 523. It does not suffice in order to say there is no Lie, that the Words we use are susceptible of a Sense which answers to what we think; it is moreover necessary, that in the present State of Things, and the manner the Persons to whom we speak, are disposed, they have room to take our Words in that Sense; otherwise a Door would be opened for Deceit in Relation to Affairs, wherein all the World agrees, that we ought to speak sincerely what we think. This our Author was well aware of, since he observes immediately after, talem locutionem usurpatam temere non probandam. See Pufendorf, § 13. of the Chapter which answers to this. Now could Abraham’s Servants, ignorant as they were of the Order of Heaven to that Patriarch, ever imagine, that the Words we will come again to you, could mean only the Father, and not the Father and Son, whom Abraham mentioned just before? I go farther to maintain, that tho’ the Words are conceived in such a manner, that those to whom they are spoke could with good Attention, see thro’ the Ambiguity, and know the Sense that the Speaker has in his Mind; if however the latter has Reason to believe, that they will take them in a Sense quite different from his Thoughts, it is then, with regard to them, a downright Lie, since it produces the same Effect as if he had used Terms, that were susceptible only of one Sense, contrary to the Thought of him that employs them. So that not only Abraham, and many other holy Persons, but also our Saviour JESUS CHRIST, having used, as our Author observes a little lower, Expressions, which they well knew, would be understood in a different Sense from what they had in their Minds; hence results, I conceive, an invincible Argument against those of the contrary rigid Opinion, who assert, that we are always guilty of a criminal Lie, when we speak, or act, in a manner, whereby we would make others understand something different from our own Thoughts. It signifies nothing to say, that it was for a good End our Saviour spoke in this manner; for the End does not make the Use of a Means, bad in itself, innocent.

[3. ]See my Reflection upon the preceding Note 2.

[4. ]Instabat quidem Narcissus, &c. Tacit. Annal. Lib. XI. (Cap. XXXIV. Num. 2.) The same Historian says, that there are many People, who express their meaning in ambiguous Terms, that they may afterwards have it in their Power to explain them according to their Interest. Non, ut plerique incerta disseruit, &c. Histor. Lib. III. (Cap. III. Num. 2.) He gives elsewhere an Example of it in the Person of Mucianus, Governor of Syria, who writing to the Generals Antonius Primus and Arrius Varus sometimes talked to them of the Necessity of hastening the Execution of the concerted Projects, and sometimes of the Advantage, that would arise from delaying it; composing his Discourses in such a Manner, that he might according to the Event either condemn the Generals, if unsuccessful; or arrogate Honour to himself, if otherwise: Namque Mucianus tam celeri, &c. Ibid. (Cap. LII. Num. 3.) Grotius.

[5. ]And also thisלשגזח מפנו תשלים מיחר One may speak ambiguously for Advantage, quoted byManasses Ben-Israel, In suo Conciliat. Quaest. 27. and St. Chrysostom, he is also called a Deceiver, that uses such a Thing to injure one, not he that does it to a good End. De Sacerdot. Lib. I. Grotius.

[† ][[This is the only numbered paragraph in the English edition; in the Latin, the other paragraphs in this chapter are also numbered.]]

[6. ]Philo of the Life of Moses, I speak of Facts that relate to the Honour of GOD, in which only we ought to speak Truth, even if a Man were otherwise given to Lying; for Truth is the Attendant of GOD; and St. Austin, Epist. VIII. It is one Thing to know, Whether a good Man may sometimes lye; and another Whether a Writer of the Holy Scriptures should lye. See hereafter, § 15. (Num. 2.) Grotius.

[7. ]Aeschylus in his Prometheus, λέξω τορω̂ς, &c. (p. 39. Edit. H. Steph).

• I’ll shew you plainly what you want to learn,
• Nor will I wrap in dark Disguise the Truth;
• But tell it with a Frankness that the talk of Friends
• Does always justly claim.
• Grotius.

[b ]B. 2. c. 12. § 9.

[8. ]Tollendum est igitur ex rebus contrahendis omne mendacium. De Offic. Lib. III Cap. XV.

[9. ]Demosthenes speaks of this Law. Orat. adversus Leptin. p. 363. A. Edit Basil 1572.

[1 ]See what I have said upon Note 2. of the preceding Paragraph.

[2. ]Wherefore he that deprives a Man of the Means of knowing certain Things, is said in the Hebrew Tongue, Furari cor, to steal away his Heart. See Genes. Chap. XXXI. Ver. 26, 27. with the Chaldaick Paraphrase of Onkelos, and the Version of the LXX. See also the Rabbi David in his Book De Radicib. The Rabbi Solomon in his Commentary, and Aben Ezra another Rabbi. Grotius.

[3. ]Our Author said a little lower in his first Edition, That the Obligation Men are under to discover to each other by their Words what they have in their Thoughts, arises from a tacit, tho’ not particular Convention; and which is made only when they begin to speak, as in the Case of Promises: But from a Kind of general and antient Convention; like that, which we have said above, took place in the Establishment of Property, with regard to the Restitution of Things belonging to another, which we have in our Hands: A Convention however, which is of such a Nature, that the Compensation of a Debt, and other such Things hinder it from having its Effects. These Words, which are retrenched in the later Editions, serve for our better comprehending the Ideas of our Author. He founds the Obligation we are under to speak Truth, upon the tacit Agreement Men entered into amongst themselves, in introducing the Use of Speech, that this, and other such Signs, should be used, so as to make known reciprocally what they thought. But this Agreement is no better founded than the other with which he compares it, and of which we have shewn the Uselessness in the Notes upon Pufendorf, Law of Nature and Nations, B. IV. Chap. XIII. § 3. Note. 1. The Establishment itself of the Signification of Words, tho’ it is made by a kind of Consent of Mankind, is not made by a Convention properly so called, and of an obligatory Force, as we have proved in the same Notes, B. IV. Chap. 1. § 1. Note 1. And it is not at all necessary to suppose, that Men have agreed amongst themselves to manifest their Thoughts to each other by the Use of Words, and that in a manner proper for making them known. Men being often obliged to communicate their Thoughts reciprocally, in order to discharge what they owe to each other; and having no other Means to do that, than Words used in a certain Sense, which is generally the most common; it follows from that alone, that they ought to make such an Use of them, by Virtue of the known and incontestable Rule, that whoever is bound to procure an End, is also bound to employ the Means necessary to obtain that End. Neither, in my Opinion, is there any need to suppose, that when we begin to speak to another, we make a particular Agreement, by which we profess our Consent to enter into the general Agreement. Which however is pretended by the ingenious Author of a Piece, published in the Journal Literaire of the Hague, Vol. V. Part II. p. 256 & seq. which the Reader will do well to peruse, and wherein the vicious Extremes are avoided. But it seems to me more simple to say, without so many turnings and windings, that the Question about Lying is reduced to this, whether there be always some Reason, which obliges us to make known our Thoughts to those with whom we discourse: For suppose there are Cases, in which there is no such Obligation, we may then make what Use we please of Speech. Now the greatest Partisans of the rigid Opinion, confess, that we may sometimes conceal what we think from others; and thence it is, that they would have us get off either by saying nothing, or by declaring we will not speak what we think. Now what does it signify to others in those Cases, whether they are left in their Ignorance, or made to believe Things which are not? When the Question is about any Thing, which we are not obliged to tell them, it is the worse for them if they rely upon our Words; and much more when there is good Reason to hinder their knowing what we think. So that there being many Cases, wherein neither the Laws of Justice, nor those of Humanity or Charity, lay us under any Obligation to discover our real Thoughts to others, it is often allowable to disguise them, without the Inconveniences I have spoken of in my great Note upon Pufendorf, B. IV. Chap. I. § 7. Note. 1. on account of which we ought not to indulge ourselves in it, but for some considerable Reason; yet those Inconveniences do not hinder, but that there may be certain Cases wherein we not only may, but ought to use some innocent Falshood either to procure ourselves or others some great Good, or to avoid some great Evil. The Advantage of human Society makes both the one and the other equally requisite.

[4. ]All this is manifestly superfluous according to the System laid down in the foregoing Note.

[5. ]The Passage has been cited before, B. II. Chap. XI. § 1. Num. 8.

[6. ]In all the Editions without excepting the first, the Text here has only, Describunt testimonio sive elocutione adversus proximum. But it is plain, that either the Copist, or the Printers, have left out the Word falso, which is absolutely necessary to denote the Idea of Lying in the Expression of the Scripture, of which the Decalogue gives us an Instance in the ninth Commandment. I have therefore ventured to correct this evident Omission in my Edition of the Original.

[7. ]The Passage is: Omnis autem, qui mentitur contra id quod animo sentit, loquitur voluntate fallendi. Enchirid. Cap. XXII. This is recited in the Canon Law, Caus. XXII. Quaest. II. Can. IV.

[8. ]A Christian should never tell a Lye, with a Design to deceive or hurt: Ut non mentiatur umquam. &c.Lactant. Institut. Lib. VI. Cap. XVIII. (num. 4. Edit. Cellar.) Grotius.

[9. ]Ut reddere depositum, &c. De Offic. Lib. I. Cap. X.

[1 ]Lucret. Lib. I. Ver. 939.

[2. ]The Passage in which this is has been cited above, § 9. Note 13.

[1 ]In hoc omnis hyperbole extenditur, ut ad verum mendacio veniat —— incredibilia adfirmat, ut ad credibilia perveniat. De Benefic. Lib. VII. Cap. XXIII.

The Passage of Quintilian, is in Institut. Orator. Lib. VIII. Cap. VI. towards the End. But in Obrecht’s Edition, in which he follows that of Oxford, and has corrected it exactly after several Manuscripts, it is read, (p. 500.) in a manner that conveys a quite different Sense. Est haecdecenssermonis superjectio. That is to say, the Hyperbole is a reasonable Exaggeration, or which is not carried too far. The last Editor, Mr. Burman, only recites the various Readings, most of them evidently faulty, of the Manuscripts and Editions. Had Obrecht found his in some Manuscript, it ought certainly to be preferred to all others. But, to consider it only as a Conjecture, it may be easily drawn from the Vestiges of those corrupt Readings, and is confirmed by what Quintilian says afterwards: Sed hujus quoque rei servatur mensura quaedam. Quamvis enim est omnis Hyperbole ultra fidem, non tamen esse debetUltra Modum —— nec ita ut mendacio fallere velit. Quo magis intuendum est, quousqueDeceatextollore, quod nobis non creditur, p. 753. Edit. Burman.

[a ]Liv. l. 32. c. 12.

[b ]Appian. Bell. Hispan. p. 513. Edit. Amst. (301. H. Steph.)

[2. ]Add also St. Cyril in his Work against the Emperor Julian, Lib. IX. in fin. [“St. Peter did not differ in Opinion with St. Paul : But by adapting his Conduct to Occasions, he endeavoured to obtain by all Sorts of Methods the Advantage of those, who were desirous of being his Disciples. Whereas St. Paul acting in a uniform Manner, thought himself obliged to give St. Peter Advice upon that Head; lest the Intention of the latter should not be understood, and some should take Offence at his Behaviour.” P. 325. C. D. Edit. Spanheim.] Tertullian is almost in the same Opinion, Lib I. contra Marcion (Cap. XX.) and Lib. IV. (Cap. III.) Lib. V. Cap. III. [Add also, De praescript. advers. Haereticos, Cap. XXIII.] Grotius.

[3. ]See his Letter to St. Austin, Vol. II. p. 336. & seqq. Edit. Froben.

[c ]Galat. ii. 14.

[a ]Lib. 3. Epist. 16. n. 3, 4, 5, 6.

[1 ]This Saying is preserved by Stobaeus, Florileg. Serm. XII.

[2. ]I do not know from whence our Author took these Words. The Passage cited above, § 9. Note 9. includes the Sense, but not in the same Terms.

[3. ]He maintains, that in this Case it is rather telling a Lie than Lying, and all edges the Example of a Physician who deceives his Patient in order to cure him. Stromat. Lib. VII. Cap. IX. p. 873. Edit. Oxon. See a like passage of Origen which Gronovius relates upon § 9. and what Philo says, De Cherubim, p. 110. D. Edit. Paris. a Passage which I find also quoted by the Bishop of Oxford.

[4. ]Dissert. III. p. 30. Edit. Cantab. Davis. St. Chrysostom, Lib. I. all edges also the Example of Physicians. Grotius.

[5. ]There is the same Thought in this Verse of Menander’s:

• Κρει̑ττον δ’ ἑλέσθαι ψεν̂δος, ἤ ἀληθὲς κακόν
• Ex incert. Comoed. apudStob. Tit. XII.

[6. ]And when Agesilaus came into Boeotia, and there understood that Pisander was vanquished in a Sea fight by Pharnabazus and Conon, he published the contrary in his Army, and putting on a Crown, offered Sacrifices for the Victory.Plutarch in the Life of Agesilaus, p. 605. C. Grotius.

[b ]Liv l. 1. c. 27. n. 8.

[7. ]Et Romani, quia paucitas, &c.Liv. Lib. II. Cap. LXIV. Num. 6.

[1 ]Homer tells us, that Agamemnon, General of the Greeks, in order to sound his Army, pretended that he would have them return Home, and he speaks of this Feint as of an innocent Artifice, allowable for him to use:

• Πρω̂τα δ’ ἐγὼν ἔπεσιν, &c.
• Iliad. Lib. II. Ver. 73, 74. Grotius.

But it is another Question, whether the Feint of that General was seasonable or not; on which Point, as well as many others, the Abbé Terrasson has cut out Work enough for the excessive Admirers of Homer, in his judicious Critical Dissertation upon the Iliad, Vol. I. p. 357. & seqq.

[2. ]De Repub. Lib. III. p. 389. B.

[3. ]But see what I have said upon Pufendorf, Law of Nature and Nations, B. IV. Chap. I. § 17. Note 1. Second Edition.

[4. ]That Philosopher thus proves, that it is not consistent with the Divine Nature to lie. GOD, says he, has no Occasion to lie, either to represent like the Poets, antient Things under ingenious Fictions, as if he was ignorant how all Things have passed: Or to deceive his Enemies, as if he feared them: Or to prevent the Effects of the Folly of his Friends; for no foolish or mad Person is the Friend of GOD. De Repub. Lib. I. p. 382. D. E. Vol. II. Edit. H. Steph.

[5. ]For GOD, having an infinity of Means for the Attainment of his Ends, has no need of this to which Men are obliged to have recourse, because they cannot otherwise effect certain Things they propose to themselves. From whence it appears that Men are no more obliged to imitate GOD in this Respect, than to desire to be omnipotent like him. This might suffice to answer the specious Objection which is deduced from the Example of the Supreme Being, and which opens a fine Field for Declamation. But let us say something more, in Order to set the Weakness of such an Argument in its full Light. It is with Pleasure I find that the learned and judicious Mr. Noodt has answered this Difficulty in a few Words, in an Addition made by him to the second Edition of his Treatise, De forma emendandi doli mali, &c. “It will be objected, says he, that GOD, whose Perfections Men ought to imitate as much as possible, is true in his Words. Be it so; but who does not know, that the same GOD, who is true, is also, above all Things, a Lover of the Good and Preservation of Mankind? Why therefore should not Man, to whom the Example of GOD is proposed, continually labour to make himself useful in all Respects to the Rest of his Species; if that can be, by telling them the Truth; if not, by using Disguise and Dissimulation necessary to their Good?” Let us add some Reflections, which will serve more clearly to shew, that those who make the Objection under Consideration, extend too far what is here truly imitable in the Divine Perfections. The Veracity of GOD engages us to love Truth; but not all Sorts of Truths; and still less to speak always whatever is true. We are obliged to love and seek after those Truths only which are useful in Regard to our Condition; as for those which are not so, we may neglect them, and are even obliged to do so sometimes, because the searching after them would injure the Knowledge of useful Truths. When we have discovered these useful Truths, we ought to communicate them to others; but we are not obliged to do it at all Times, and in all Places: There are Conjunctures wherein the Discovery of this Kind of Truths would produce no good Effect, or even sometimes occasion more Hurt than Good; they may then be concealed. Our Saviour JESUS CHRIST has set us an Example of it, which his Apostles have imitated. If this may take Place in Regard to Truths the most useful to others, why is it not allowable in Relation to Things, of which the Knowledge is of no Service to those we speak to, or which might give them Occasion to hurt either our selves or others, whether with or without Design, and thereby to commit an Imprudence, or a Sin; why, I say, is it not allowable to conceal, not only the Truth, but even to tell them positively something false? It is not necessary to push these Reflections any further; those who will consider them without Prejudice, and give Attention to all that has been said above, and in the great Work of Pufendorf, will easily be convinced, that there is no Subject on which all the Evidence of common sense is more visibly contradicted, than it is by those who maintain the Opinion I oppose. But I cannot help referring the Reader further to some Passages of an Author which I have cited above, and which I again direct to, because, in the Judgment of some People, there are Authorities which add great Force to Arguments, and even sometimes make more Impression upon them than the best Reasons in the World. This Author is Moses Amyraut, whose Morale Chrétienne may be seen, Vol. III. p. 249, 307. and Vol. IV. p. 514, 532. Tho’ he has not cleared up the Point so well as has been done since, he has however abundance of judicious Reflections, and solid Answers to divers Objections, deduced either from Reason or the Holy Scriptures. Since I wrote this Note I have an Opportunity to add a more modern Authority, and which will strike no less a great Number of Persons: It is that of the celebrated Mr. Saurin, Pastor of the Hague, in his Historical, Critical, Theological, and Moral Discourses, upon the most memorable Events of the Old and New Testament, where he treats of the innocent Artifice of the Aegyptian Midwives, tho’ he does not venture to determine, whether what they told Pharaoh was true, or an officious Lye; he declares however, that admitting the latter, No one can justly blame their Behaviour, or maintain the Thesis, that they would have acted with more Sanctity, had they observed a different Conduct. He afterwards rejects, (as I do below, and as I have already done, in my great Note upon the Chapter of Pufendorf which answers to this) The Distinction made between their Intention, and the Means they employed to put it in Execution. Disc. XLIII. p. 7. Edit. in Octav. But I know this Author will explain himself still better upon the Question of Lying, in the Sequel of his Work, where, on the Occasion of Rahab’s History, related in the Book of Joshua, he will give the World a Dissertation in Form upon that Subject.

[6. ]Cassiodorus calls this a wise Dissimulation of Severity. Quum fratribus dispensatoria, &c. De Amicitia. Grotius.

[a ]De Joseph. p. 550. & seq. Ed. Paris.

[7. ]Non semper autem, etiam si frequentissime, &c. Institut. Orator. Lib. II. Cap. XVII. p. 131. Edit. Obrecht.

[1 ]St. Austin on the fifth Psalm, related by Gratian, in Caus. XXII. Quaest. II. C. nequis, There are two Sorts of Lyes, not much to be blamed, yet not wholly blameless, when we either jest, or tell a Lye to serve our Neighbour. The jocular one is not pernicious, because it does not deceive, for he to whom it is directed knows it was spoken in Jest. And the other, the officious Lye, is the less faulty, because it has in it something of Kindness (or Charity).Tertullian, in his Book De pudic. among our daily Sins of Infirmity, to which we are all subject, puts also this, To Lye out of Necessity. Cap. XIX. Grotius.

[2. ]The Commentator says decently; for it is a brave Thing to lye for Justice. Like to that of St. Chrysostom, on Rahab, O excellent Lye! O laudable Deceit! Not of one that betrayed the Interests of Religion, but that did an Act of true Piety. And St. Austin, of the Aegyptian Midwives, O brave Invention of Humanity! O pious Lye to save Life! St. Jerome also commends those Midwives, and believes the Rewards given them to be eternal, upon Ezekiel xvii. and Isaiah lvi. St. Ambrose, on Syagrius, B. VI. and St. Austin himself, to Consentius, Against a Lye, Cap. XV. varying here, according to Custom, are of the same Opinion. Tostatus says there is no Sin in it. And St. Austin doubts of it, B. II. Quaest. super Exod. And Thomas, II. 2. Quaest. XC. Art. LV. Ad. IV. And also Cajetan. See also Erasmus’s Moriae Encomium, and the learned Masius upon Joshua ii. 5. Grotius.

St. Ambrose should not be named amongst those, who praise the Conduct of the Aegyptian Midwives; for that Father, on the contrary, speaks as if he doubted whether they did well. The Passage our Author had in View is this, Qui locus, ut superioriutilis ad Hebraeorum salutem, ita reliquo confragosus ad obstetricum fidem, quae didicerunt mentiri pro salute, & fallere pro excusatione. Lib. VIII. Epist. LXIV. p. 625. A. Edit. Paris. 1569. In regard to Rahab’s Lye, see what is said upon Pufendorf, Law of Nature and Nations, B. IV. Chap. I. § 16. Note 2. The first Example of the Aegyptian Midwives is very remarkable, and furnishes an Argument to which it would be very difficult to say any Thing plausible by Way of Answer. I have spoke of it in the great Note upon Paragraph 7. of the Chapter now cited, and shall add two weak Evasions used, after other Writers, by the late Mr. Bernard, whose Knowledge and Judgment I otherwise respect, and for which we ought, without Doubt, to honour his Memory. One of these Subterfuges is, that GOD rewards the Actions of Men, tho’ imperfect; otherwise he would not reward any; because our best Works are attended with a thousand Imperfections. The other is, that the Rewards conferred upon the Midwives were proportioned to their Works, which being only materially good, were in Consequence rewarded only with some temporal Blessings. Discourse upon Lying, at the End of the Treatise Of the Excellency of Religion, Vol. II. p. 813. I say, with Respect to the first of these Answers, that the Imperfection of our Actions, which does not hinder GOD’s being pleased with, or rewarding them, does not regard the Nature of the Things we would do, or of the Means employed in Order to succeed; but the Disposition with which we do them. When we do a good Action, and employ only lawful Means to that Purpose, tho’ we are not actuated with all the Ardor we ought; and even tho’ some human Consideration has a Share in it, GOD, however, approves it, as if there were no Imperfection at all: This is worthy of his Goodness, and does not clash with any of his Perfections. But the Holiness of GOD does not permit him to give the least Sign of Approbation, in Regard to an Action bad in itself, or that has been effected by Means bad in themselves; such as Lying would be, according to the Principles of those against whom we dispute. However good the Intention may have been, that does not hinder the Action, upon the Whole, from being bad, and, consequently, punishable, rather than worthy of Reward. GOD may not punish, and may pardon it, in Consideration of the other Part of the Person’s Conduct who has acted thus; but to pretend, that the most holy Being authorizes and approves in the least such an Action, upon Account of the good Intention of the Agent in doing it, is opening a Door for the most pernicious Maxims of the loosest Morality. So that those who affect to be so rigid on the Question of Lying, run into an extreme Looseness of Principle, without perceiving it. The other Subterfuge, to which they have Recourse on this Occasion, is no less frivolous. Does the Nature or Degree of the Reward prevent its being a Reward; and, consequently, a Thing which necessarily supposes an Approbation? And where do we find, that the temporal Blessings with which GOD vouchsafes to reward Men, are dispensed indifferently to those who do Evil and those who do Good? If he makes his Sun to rise upon the Righteous and upon the Wicked, and his Rain to fall upon the Lands of the Just and the Unjust, it is, with Regard to the latter, an Effect of his Goodness, which waits their Repentance; and of his Wisdom, which does not permit him to suspend every Day, by sensible Miracles, the Laws it has established in Nature.

[a ]De Rep. l. 2.

[b ]Memor. Socrat. l. 4. c. 2. § 16. Ed. Oxon. & de Cyr. Inst. l. 2.

[1 ]Our Author quotes in the Margin, the Book intitled De migratione Abraham, in which I find nothing that is to the Purpose. But there is something upon this Subject in a Passage which I have already referred to, § 14. Note 10. De Cherubim, p. 110. D. Edit. Paris.

[2. ]That Father says, that if we examine the Actions of the most celebrated Captains in all Ages, we shall find that most of their Victories were the Effect of some Fraud; and that such as have obtained Advantages in that Manner, are more praised than those who have performed Exploits by open Force. De sacerdot. Lib. I. Grotius.

[3. ]The same Prophet gives us another Example, in the second Book of Kings, Chap. VIII. ver. 10. according to the Correction of the Massorethes, followed by the vulgar Translation; for Elisha says thus to Hazael, Go, say to him [King Benhadad] thou mayest certainly recover: Howbeit, the LORD hath shewed me that he shall surely die.Grotius.

Elisha, as has been observed, speaks of the Disease which the King of Syria actually had, and of which, in Truth, he did not die. This was a very true Answer to the Question that Prince had sent to ask him. But at the same Time the Prophet foretold that he should die in another Manner, as the Event verified.

[4. ]Our Author cites Nobody here: But he has undoubtedly taken this from Frontinus, who does not say, however, that Valerius Laevinus boasted of having killed Pyrrhus; but only, that a Soldier of Pyrrhus’s Army having been killed, Valerius Laevinus, shewing the Sword all bloody with which he had been slain, made both Armies believe that it was the King. Valerius Laevinus adversus Pyrrhum Epirotarum regem, occiso quodam gregali, tenens gladium cruentum, exercitui utrique persuasit, Pyrrhum interemtum. Stratagemat. Lib. II. Cap. IV. Num. 9. This happened, as we may see in Plutarch, from Pyrrhus’s having caused Megacles, one of his Men, to put on his Armour and Habit; he was killed by a Roman, who believed him to be the King. Vit. Pyrrh. p. 393. E. F. So that here was no Lye, as our Author imagined, upon Frontinus’s Authority. Quamobrem hostes, destitutos se ducis morte credentes, consternati a mendacio, se pavidi in castra receperunt. The Example of Jugurtha might have been alledged with more Propriety, which follows, Num. 10. who boasted falsely, that he had killed Marius. See Sallust, Bell. Jugurth. Cap. Cl. (CVII Edit. Wass.)

[5. ]In Ethic. ad Nicomach. Lib. VI. Cap. IX.

[6. ]The Passage has already been cited, upon Paragraph 9. Note 14.

[c ]Thom. Summ. Theol. ii. 2. qu. 110. art. 1. & 3. Covarr. in cap. Quamvis, de pactis, in vi. part. 1. § 1. n. 15. Soto de Justit. 5. qu. 6. art. 2. Tolet. l. 4. c. 21. & l. 5. c. 58. Less. l. 2. de Justit. c. 42. Dub. 9.

[7. ]The Abbe Rupert has writ against the Opinion of that Father, who had himself been formerly of another. Grotius.

[8. ]This the Philosopher Chrysippus maintained, according to Aulus Gellius ; Chrysippus ait, omne verbum ambiguum natura esse, quoniam ex eodem duo vel plura accipi possunt. Noct. Attic. Lib. XI. Cap. XII. Seneca says there are a great many Things that have no peculiar Names, and which we are obliged to express by borrowed Names. Ingens copia est rerum sine nomine, &c. De. Benefic. Lib. II. Cap. XXXIV. Grotius.

[9. ]Primae notionis. This is what Cicero calls Domicilium proprium; and derived Significations, Secundae notionis, he terms Migrationes in alienum; according to the learned Gronovius’s Remark, Unde illud tam ἄκυρον, valetudini fideliter inserviendo? Unde in istum locum fideliter venit? Cui verbo Domicilium est proprium in officio, migrationes in alienum multae. Nam & doctrina, & domus, & ars, & ager fidelis dici potest, &c. Lib. XVI. Ad familiar. Epist.

[10. ]St. Austin, De mag. That we have found out no Sign, which among the other Things that it denotes, does not also signify itself. Nullum nos signum, &c. DeMagistro. Cap. VII. Grotius.

[d ]See above, § 10. and l. 2. c. 16. § 9.

[1 ]Agesilaus, in Plutarch, distinguishes thus, To break Leagues is to despise the Gods; but otherwise to deceive an Enemy, is not only just but glorious, and a Pleasure with Profit.Grotius.

The Original of this Passage has been given above, § 6. Note 8. All the Difference is, that here our Author quotes it, as it is in the Life of Agesilaus, where the Terms are a little different, but the Sense exactly the same.

[1 ]See what is said upon B. II. Chap. XIII. § 14. & seq.

[2. ]This is not peculiar to an Oath; but we ought to express ourselves in that Manner as often as those we speak to have a Right to require a faithful Discovery of our Thoughts; in a Word, as often as Lying cannot be innocent. See what I have said upon Note 2. of § 10. of this Chapter. So that Swearing would then only make the Lye more criminal.

[3. ]Δει̑ τοὺς παι̑δας, &c. Some ascribe this Saying to Lysander, some to Philip of Macedon, and others to Dionysius the Tyrant. See Aelian, Var. Hist. Lib. VII. Cap. XII. and the Commentators upon that Place.

[1 ]Var. Hist. Lib. XII. Cap. LIX.

[2. ]Protrept. Cap. XX.

[3. ]Ethic. Nicomach. Lib. IV. Cap. VIII.

[4. ]De educatione liberor. p. 11. C. Vol. II. Edit. Wech. See Philo the Jew, Lib. Quod omnis probus est liber, (p. 888. B. Edit. Paris.)

[5. ]For which Reason he considers Ptolemy as an Historian most to be relied on, with Regard to the Actions of Alexander the Great. De Expedit. Alexand. Lib. I. (init.)

[6. ]Lib. VII. (Cap. V.)

[7. ]Mira est in principe nostro [Juliano], &c. Panegyr. Julian. (Cap. XXVI. Num. 3. Edit. Cellar.)

[8. ]Plutarch, Vit. Aristid. Vol. 1. p. 319. D. Edit. Wech.

[9. ]Adeo veritatis diligens, &c.Cornelius Nepos, Vit. Epaminond. Cap. III. Num. 1. Edit. Cellar.

[10. ]Christianity, rightly understood, prescribes no thing upon this Head more than the Law of Nature. It is not probable that our Saviour intended, for Instance, to render the Condition of Christian Nations more unhappy than that of Pagan States, by prohibiting them to use the Stratagems of War; by the Means of which great Advantages may be obtained, and great Dangers avoided.

[11. ]The Term in the Original signifies more than Idle and useless Talk; it imports inconsiderate or malicious Words, which produce some bad Effect. See Hammond and Le Clerc upon this Passage.

[12. ]Itaque viator ille verus ac justus, &c. Instit. Divin. Lib. VI. Cap. XVIII. Num. 6. Edit. Cellar.

[13. ]Philoctet. (ver. 85. & seq.)

[14. ]What Neoptolemus says of his Father Achilles, is confirmed by Horace,

• Ille non inclusus equo, Minervae,
• Sacra mentito, &c.
• Lib. IV. Od. VI. (ver. 13. & seq.)

• Not he in great Minerva ’s Horse
• Had cheated Troy, and Priam’s heedless Court,
• Dissolv’d in Wine and Sport;
• But hot, and deaf to all Remorse,
• Had fiercely storm’d our Walls with open Force.
• Creech.

Upon which the Scholiast remarks, that the Aversion of Achilles to the Stratagems of War, arose from the Confidence he had in his own Valour and Strength. Achillem nihil fraude, sed semper palam, virtutis fiducia, dimicasse.

[15. ]Rhes. ver. 510, 511.

[16. ]Plutarch, Vit. Alex. p. 683. D. Vol. I. Edit. Wechel. See Quintius Curtius, Lib. IV. Cap. XIII. Num. 9. and the Commentators there.

[17. ]Polybius, Lib. XIII. (Cap. I.)

[18. ]In VI. Consul. Honor. ver. 248, 249.

[19. ]Var. Hist. Lib. XII. Cap. XXXIII.

[20. ]Haec, ut summa ratione acta, &c.Livy, Lib. XLII. Cap. XLVII. Num. 4, 8.

[21. ]Reperio apud Scriptores, &c. Annal. Lib. II. (Cap. LXXXVIII. Num. 1.) Aelian says the same.

[22. ]This we learn from the antient Scholiast upon Apollonius, in Argonautic. Lib. II. &c. in ver. 1112.

[23. ]This last Example is not very clear. All that Mardonius says in his Speech, to persuade Xerxes to make War upon the Greeks, is, “The Greeks, as I am informed, generally make War in a very rash Manner, on Account of their Ignorance, and Want of Ingenuity: For after having declared War against each other, if they find a fine level Country, they go thither, in Order to fight.” Herodotus, Lib. VII. Cap. IX. Our Author might have here applied the Passage of Livy, Note 20. with more Propriety than this.

[1 ]So Maimonides teaches, חוכל הלוכת, Chap. V. Sect. X. Grotius.

[2. ]See upon this Pufendorf, B. VIII. Chap. VI. § 16. and what will be said below, Chap. IV. of this Book, § 18.

[3. ]Nihil interest, utrum ipse scelus admittas, an alium propter te admittere velis. This is in his Treatise De moribus Manichaeorum, where the last Words are conceived in this Manner, Anpropter teabalio admittivelis. But our Author quotes after Albericus Gentilis, who gives the Passage in those Words, De Jure Belli, Lib. II. Cap. IX.

[a ]B. ii. ch. 26. § 5.

[1 ]Transfugam jure belli recipimus. Digest, Lib. XLI. Tit. 1. Deadquir. rerum Domin. Leg. LI. See upon this Law, Cujas, Observ. Lib. IV. Cap. IX. and Peter du Faure, Semest. Lib. II. Cap. III. p. m. 13.

[2. ]Neither are we to deliver them up, unless it be so stipulated by the Articles of Peace, as in the Peace with Philip, the Aetolians, and Antiochus,Polybius, In Excerpt. Legat. IX. XXVIII. XXXV. Menander, Protect. is of the same Opinion. Grotius.