The Online Library of Liberty

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• Miscellaneous Papers
• Cincinnati 1
• Speeches In the New York Assembly, 1787 1
• Speech On Acceding to the Independence of Vermont
• Eulogium On Major-general Greene Delivered Before the Society of the Cincinnati
• Presidential Etiquette: Hamilton to Washington
• Public Lands: Report of a Uniform System For the Disposition of the Lands, the Property of the United States
• Heads of Topics For President’s Speech of December 8, 1790 1
• Apportionment of Representatives
• Indian Affairs
• President’s Speech 1
• Indian Affairs Cabinet Opinion.
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• Explanation 1
• Washington’s Speech to Congress 1
• Message For Washington to Congress, In Reply to a Call For Papers Relating to the Treaty With Great Britain 1
• Farewell Address 1
• Washington’s Farewell Address 1
• Part of Washington’s Speech to Congress 3
• Address to the Electors of the State of New York
• Examination of Jefferson’s Message to Congress of December 7, 1801 1
• Lansing Or Burr 1
• Law Briefs
• Carriage Tax 1
• The Law of Libel 1
• Speech In the Case of Harry Croswell 1
• Fragment On the French Revolution 1
• Defence of the Funding System 1

SPEECH IN THE CASE OF HARRY CROSWELL1

May it please the Court:

In rising to address your honors at so late a period of the day, and after your attention has been so much fatigued, and the cause has been so ably handled, I may say, so exhausted, I feel a degree of embarrassment which it is with difficulty I can surmount. I fear lest it should not be possible for me to interest the attention of the court on the subject on which I have to speak. Nevertheless, I have a duty to perform, of which I cannot acquit myself, but by its execution. I have, however, this consolation, that though I may fail in the attempt, I shall be justified by the importance of the question. I feel that it is of the utmost magnitude; of the highest importance viewed in every light. First, as it regards the character of the head of our nation; for, if indeed the truth can be given in evidence, and that truth can, as stated in the indictment, be established, it will be a serious truth, the effect of which it will be impossible to foresee. It is important also as it regards the boundaries of power between the constituent parts of our constitutional tribunals, to which we are, for the law and the fact, to resort—our judges and our juries. It is important, as it regards settling the right principles that may be applied to the case, in giving to either the one or the other the authority destined to it by the spirit and letter of our law. It is important on account of the influence it must have on the rights of our citizens. Viewing it, therefore, in these lights, I hope I shall, in the arduous attempt, be supported by its importance, and if any doubt hangs on the mind of the court, I shall, I trust, be able to satisfy them that a new trial ought to be had.

The question branches itself into two divisions. The first as to the truth—whether, under a general issue of not guilty, it ought to be given in evidence. The other, as to the power of the court—whether it has a right, exclusively, over the intent, or whether that and the law do not constitute one complicated fact, for the cognizance of the jury, under the direction of the judge. The last, I trust, can be made to appear, on the principle of our jurisprudence, as plainly as it is possible to evince anything to a court; and that, in fact, there are no precedents which embrace the doctrines of the other side, or rather that they are so diverse and contrarient that nothing can arise from them to make an application to this case.

After these preliminary observations, and before I advance to the full discussion of this question, it may be necessary for the safety and accuracy of investigation, a little to define what this liberty of the press is, for which we contend, and which the present doctrines of those opposed to us, are, in our opinions, calculated to destroy.

The liberty of the press consists, in my idea, in publishing the truth, from good motives and for justifiable ends, though it reflect on the government, on magistrates, or individuals. If it be not allowed, it excludes the privilege of canvassing men, and our rulers. It is in vain to say, you may canvass measures. This is impossible without the right of looking to men. To say that measures can be discussed, and that there shall be no bearing on those who are the authors of those measures, cannot be done. The very end and reason of discussion would be destroyed. Of what consequence to show its object? Why is it to be thus demonstrated, if not to show, too, who is the author? It is essential to say, not only that the measure is bad and deleterious, but to hold up to the people who is the author, that, in this our free and elective government, he may be removed from the seat of power. If this be not to be done, then in vain will the voice of the people be raised against the inroads of tyranny. For, let a party but get into power, they may go on from step to step, and, in spite of canvassing their measures, fix themselves firmly in their seats, especially as they are never to be reproached for what they have done. This abstract mode, in practice, can never be carried into effect. But if, under the qualifications I have mentioned, the power be allowed, the liberty for which I contend will operate as a salutary check. In speaking thus for the freedom of the press, I do not say there ought to be an unbridled license; or that the characters of men who are good will naturally tend eternally to support themselves. I do not stand here to say that no shackles are to be laid on this license.

I consider this spirit of abuse and calumny as the pest of society. I know the best of men are not exempt from the attacks of slander. Though it pleased God to bless us with the first of characters, and though it has pleased God to take him from us and this band of calumniators, I say that falsehood eternally repeated would have affected even his name. Drops of water, in long and continued succession, will wear out adamant. This, therefore, cannot be endured. It would be to put the best and the worst on the same level.

I contend for the liberty of publishing truth, with good motives and for justifiable ends, even though it reflect on government, magistrates, or private persons. I contend for it under the restraint of our tribunals. When this is exceeded, let them interpose and punish. From this will follow none of those consequences so ably depicted. When, however, we do look at consequences, let me ask whether it is right that a permanent body of men, appointed by the executive, and, in some degree, always connected with it, should exclusively have the power of deciding on what shall constitute a libel on our rulers, or that they shall share it, united with a changeable body of men chosen by the people. Let our juries still be selected, as they now are, by lot. But it cannot be denied, that every body of men is, more or less, liable to be influenced by the spirit of the existing administration; that such a body may be liable to corruption, and that they may be inclined to lean over towards party modes. No man can think more highly of our judges, and I may say personally so of those who now preside, than myself; but I must forget what human nature is, and how her history has taught us that permanent bodies may be so corrupted, before I can venture to assert that it cannot be. As then it may be, I do not think it safe thus to compromise our independence. For though, as individuals, the judges may be interested in the general welfare, yet, if once they enter into these views of government, their power may be converted into the engine of oppression. It is in vain to say that allowing them this exclusive right to declare the law, on what the jury has found, can work no ill; for, by this privilege, they can assume and modify the fact, so as to make the most innocent publication libellous. It is therefore not a security to say, that this exclusive power will but follow the law. It must be with the jury to decide on the intent; they must in certain cases be permitted to judge of the law, and pronounce on the combined matter of law and of fact. Passages have been adduced from Lord Mansfield’s declarations to show that judges cannot be under the influence of an administration. Yet still it would be contrary to our own experience, to say that they could not. I do not think that even as to our own country it may not be. There are always motives and reasons that may be held up. It is therefore still more necessary, here, to mingle this power, than in England. The person who appoints there, is hereditary. That person cannot alone attack the judiciary; he must be united with the two Houses of Lords and of Commons, in assailing the judges. But, with us, it is the vibration of party. As one side or the other prevails, so of that class and temperament will be the judges of their nomination. Ask any man, however ignorant of principles of government, who constitute the judiciary, he will tell you the favorites of those at the head of affairs. According then to the theory of this our free government, the independence of our judges is not so well secured as in England. We have here reasons for apprehension not applicable to them. We are not, however, to be now influenced by the preference to one side or the other. But of which side soever a man may be, it interests all, to have the question settled, and to uphold the power of the jury, consistently however with liberty, and also with legal and judicial principles, fairly and rightly understood. None of these impair that for which we contend—the right of publishing the truth, from good motives and justifiable ends, though it reflect on government, on magistrates, or individuals.

Some observations have, however, been made in opposition to these principles. It is said, that as no man rises at once high into office, every opportunity of canvassing his qualities and qualifications is afforded, without recourse to the press; that his first election ought to stamp the seal of merit on his name. This, however, is to forget how often the hypocrite goes from stage to stage of public fame, under false array, and how often, when men obtain the last object of their wishes, they change from that which they seemed to be; that men, the most zealous reverers of the people’s rights, have, when placed on the highest seat of power, become their most deadly oppressors. It becomes, therefore, necessary to observe the actual conduct of those who are thus raised up.

I have already shown that, though libelling shall continue to be a crime, it ought to be so only when under a restraint, in which the court and the jury shall co-operate. What is a libel that it should be otherwise? Why take it out of the rule that allows, in all criminal cases, when the issue is general, the jury to determine upon the whole? What is then a libel to produce this? That great and venerable man, Lord Camden, already cited with so much well-deserved eulogy, says that he has never yet been able to form a satisfactory definition. All essays made towards it are neither accurate nor satisfactory; yet, such as they are, I shall cite them and animadvert.

Blackstone and Hawkins declare that it is any malicious defamation, with an intent to blacken the reputation of any one, dead or alive.

The criminal quality is its maliciousness. The next ingredient is, that it shall have an intent to defame. I ask, then, if the intent be not the very essence of the crime. It is admitted that the word falsity, when the proceedings are on the statute, must be proved to the jury, because it makes the offence. Why not then the malice, when, to constitute the crime, it must necessarily be implied? In reason there can be no difference.

A libel is, then, a complicated matter of fact and law, with certain things and circumstances to give them a character. If so, then the malice is to be proved. The tendency to provoke is its constituent. Must it not be shown how and in what manner? If this is not to be the case, must every one who does not panegyrize be said to be a libeller? Unless the court are disposed to go to that extreme length, it is necessary that the malice and intent must be proved. To this it is certain the definition of Lord Coke may, in some degree, be opposed. He does seem to super-add “the breach of the peace.” Lord Coke, however, does not give this as a specific definition; and even then the defamatory writing, which he particularizes, includes the question both of intent and malice. The breach of the peace, therefore, is not made the sole, but only one of the qualities. The question is not on the breaking of the peace, but depends on time, manner, and circumstances, which must ever be questions of fact for jury determination. I do not advocate breaking the peace; observations may be made on public men, which are calculated merely to excite the attention of the community to them; to make the people exercise their own functions, which may have no tendency to a breach of the peace, but only to inspection. For surely a man may go far in the way of reflecting on public characters, without the least design of exciting tumult. He may only have it in view to rouse the nation to vigilance and a due exertion of their right to change their rulers. This, then, being a mere matter of opinion, can it be not a matter for them to judge of to whom it is addressed? The court, to be sure, may, like a jury, and in common with them, have the legal power and moral discernment to determine on this; yet it does not arise out of the writing, but by adverting to the state of things and circumstances. It, therefore, answers no purpose to say it has a tendency to a breach of the peace.

Lord Loughborough, in the Parl. Chron., 644, 657, instances that passages from holy writ may be turned into libels.

Lord Thurlow admits that this may happen, and that time and circumstances may enter into the question. He, it is true, sanctioned the doctrines of our opponents, but allowed time and circumstances to be ingredients; and, strange to say, though these are extrinsic to the record, was of opinion for the old law. Lord Thurlow says, however, that it might be something more than a bare libel—intimating here that it may be even treason; and is it not, then, to confess that intent is a matter of fact? If so, who or where shall be the forum but the jury?

My definition of a libel is, and I give it with all diffidence after the words of Lord Camden—my definition, then, is this: I would call it a slanderous or ridiculous writing, picture, or sign, with a malicious or mischievous design or intent, towards government, magistrates, or individuals. If this definition does not embrace all that may be so called, does it not cover enough for every beneficial purpose of justice? If it have a good intent, it ought not to be a libel, for it then is an innocent transaction; and it ought to have this intent, against which the jury have, in their discretion, to pronounce. It shows itself to us as a sentence of fact. Crime is a matter of fact by the code of our jurisprudence. In my opinion, every specific case is a matter of fact, for the law gives the definition. It is some act in violation of law. When we come to investigate, every crime includes an intent. Murder consists in killing a man with malice prepense. Manslaughter, in doing it without malice, and at the moment of an impulse of passion. Killing may even be justifiable, if not praiseworthy, as in defence of chastity about to be violated. In these cases the crime is defined, and the intent is always the necessary ingredient. The crime is matter of law, as far as definition is concerned; fact, as far as we are to determine its existence.

But it is said the judges have the right, on this fact, to infer the criminal intent, that being matter of law. This is true; but what do we mean by these words, unless the act dependent on and united with its accessories, such as the law has defined, and which when proved constitute the crime? But whether the jury are to find it so with all its qualities, is said to be a question; no act, separate from circumstances, can be criminal, for without these qualities it is not a crime. Thus, as I have before instanced, murder is characterized by being with malice prepense; manslaughter, by being involuntary; justifiable homicide, by having some excuse. Killing, therefore, is not a crime; but it becomes so in consequence of the circumstances annexed. In cases that are, in the general opinion of mankind, exceptions to the explanations I have given, the law contemplates the intent. In duelling, the malice is supposed, from the deliberate acts of reflecting, sending a challenge, and appointing the time and place of meeting. Here, it is true, the law implies the intent; but then, let it be remembered that it is in consequence of its having previously defined the act, and forbidden its commission. This too is on the principle of natural justice, that no man shall be the avenger of his own wrongs, especially by a deed alike interdicted by the laws of God and of man. That, therefore, the intent shall in this case constitute the crime, is because the law has declared it shall be so. It is impossible to separate a crime from the intent. I call on those opposed to us to say what is a libel. To be sure they have told us that it is any scandalous publication, etc., which has a tendency to a breach of the peace. This, indeed, is a broad definition, which must, for the purpose of safety, be reduced to a positive fact, with a criminal intent. In this there is no violation of law: it is a settled maxim, that mens facit reum; non reus, nisi sit mens rea.

When a man breaks into a house it is the intent that makes him a felon. It must be proved to the jury that it was his intention to steal; they are the judges of whether the intent was such, or whether it was innocent. Then so, I say, should it be here; let the jury determine, as they have the right to do, in all other cases, on the complicated circumstances of fact and intent. It may, as a general and universal rule, be asserted that the intention is never excluded in the consideration of the crime. The only case resorted to, and which is relied on by the opposite side (for all the others are built upon it), to show a contrary doctrine, was a star-chamber decision. To prove how plainly the intent goes to the constituting the crime of libel, the authority cited by the counsel associated with me, is fully in point. In that, the letter written to the father, though (as far as words were concerned) perfectly a libel, yet having been written for the purpose of reformation, and not with an intent to injure, was held not to amount to a libel. Suppose persons were suspected of forging public papers, and this communicated by letter to the Secretary of State, with a good design, still if the doctrines contended for were to prevail, it would be libellous and punishable, though the party not only did it with the best of motives, but actually saved the State. In madness and idiocy, crimes may be perpetrated, nay, the same malicious intent may exist, but the crime does not. These things tend to show that the criminality of an act is a matter of fact and law combined, and on which it cannot belong to the exclusive jurisdiction of the court to decide the intent; for the question is forever a question of fact.

The criminal intent, says Lord Mansfield, in the Dean of St. Asaph’s case, is what makes the crime.

Here, that truly great man—for great he was, and no one more fully estimates him than I do, yet he might have some biases on his mind not extremely favorable to liberty,—here, then, he seems to favor the doctrine contended for; but he will be found to be at times contradictory, nay, even opposed to himself. “A criminal intent in doing a thing in itself criminal, without a lawful excuse, is an inference of law.” How can that be in itself criminal which admits of a lawful excuse? Homicide is not in itself a crime, therefore it is not correct to say a criminal intent can be inferred, because a lawful excuse may be set up. A thing cannot be criminal which has a lawful excuse, but as it may have a certain quality which constitutes the crime. To be sure you may go on to say that where the intent bestows the character of criminality on an act indifferent, then it is a matter of fact, and not where the act is bad in itself. But this is begging the question. We contend that no act is criminal, abstracted and divested of its intent. Trespass is not in itself innocent. No man has a right to enter another’s land or house. Yet it becomes in this latter case felony only in one point of view, and whether it shall be holden in that point is a subject of jury determination. Suppose a man should enter the apartments of a king; this, in itself, is harmless, but if he do it with intent to assassinate, it is treason. To whom must this be made to appear in order to induce conviction? To the jury. Let it rather be said that crime depends on intent, and intent is one parcel of the fact. Unless, therefore, it can be shown that there is some specific character of libel that will apply in all cases, intent, tendency, and quality must all be matters of fact for a jury. There is therefore, nothing which can be libel, independent of circumstances; nothing which can be so called in opposition to time and circumstances. Lord Loughborough, indeed, in the parliamentary debates on this very subject, to which I have referred the court, admits this to be the case. Lord Mansfield, embarrassed with the truth and strength of the doctrine, endeavors to contrast meaning with intent. He says that the truth may be given in evidence to show the meaning, but not the intent. If this can be done to show the application where the person is imperfectly described, why not to prove the intent, without which the crime cannot be committed? Whatever is done collaterally must show this, and in all cases collateral facts are for the jury. The intent here has been likened to the construction of a deed, or any unwritten instrument, in all of which the intent is for the court. But the comparison will not hold; for even there the intent may be inquired aliunde. When you go to quality and explain, what is this but to decide on the intent by matters of fact? Lord Mansfield is driven into this contradiction when, on one occasion, he says it is a matter on which the jury may exercise their judgment, and in another that it is not. I am free to confess, that in all difficult cases, it is the duty of a jury to hearken to the directions of a judge with very great deference. But if the meaning must be either on the face of the libel or from any thing aliunde, then it must be a matter of fact for the jury. That the quo animo affects the constitution of libel, cannot be disputed, and must be inquired of by somebody. Now, unless this is tried by the jury, by whom is it to be determined? Will any man say, that in the case of the star chamber, respecting the letter written to the child’s father, the intent was not the reason why it was held innocent, and the quo animo not gone into? Did they not then endeavor to prove the guilt by the intent? Now, if you are to show things malicious aliunde, you may defend by the same means. The mens is the question, and in common parlance it is that to which we resort to show guilt. II. Mod., the Queen vs. Brown, will explain how it is to be found. Nay, in this very case, when the counsel for the defendant objected to the attorney-general reading passages from the prospectus of the Wasp, and from other numbers, he expressly avowed that he thus acted in order that the jury might see it to be “manifest that the intent of the defendant was malicious.” This, I here observe, is a mistake that law officers would not be very apt to slide into. Yet, on this very intent, this malicious intent thus proved to the jury, and on which they founded their verdict, is the court now asked to proceed to judgment. To demonstrate how fully this matter of intent is by our law a subject of jury determination, suppose the grand jury had, in the present case, returned to the bill ignoramus; on what would they have founded their return? Is not this, then, a precedent that the quo animo is for a jury? If it be necessary only to find the publication, why is not the grand jury competent for the whole? For if the supposition is that the grand jury may decide on the finding of the bill, surely the petit jury may acquit. If so, then is the case I have mentioned an important precedent. In Rex vs. Horne, an authority that has been justly urged, the principle is allowed. It appears there that the jury are to exercise their judgment from the nature of the act, what is its intent. Into a confession of this is Lord Mansfield himself driven. Regina vs. Fuller, we are told from the other side, was a case on the statute for scandalum magnatum. Of this, however, I can find no trace in the books, and there Lord Holt, repeatedly interrogated as to the truth, would have allowed it to be given in evidence, and directed the jury that if they did not believe the allegations false, they were not to find the defendant guilty. This, then, is a decision, as we contend, that not only the intent, but the truth is important to constitute the crime, and nothing has been shown against it. Nay, Lord Holt goes on still further; he bids the jury consider whether the papers have not a tendency to beget sedition, riot, and disturbance. Surely this authority of that great man demonstrates that intent and tendency are matters of fact for a jury. This argument will be further strengthened when I enumerate those cases where truth has been permitted to be shown. But before I do that, I must examine how far truth is to be given in evidence. This depends on the intent being a crime. Its being a truth is a reason to infer that there was no design to injure another. Thus, not to decide on it would be injustice, as it may be material in ascertaining the intent. It is impossible to say that to judge of the quality and nature of an act, the truth is immaterial. It is inherent in the nature of things, that the assertion of truth cannot be a crime. In all systems of law this is a general axiom, but this single instance, it is attempted to assert, creates an exception, and is therefore an anomaly. If, however, we go on to examine what may be the case that shall be so considered, we cannot find it to be this. If we advert to the Roman Law, we shall find that Paulus and Pereizius take a distinction between those truths which relate to private persons and those in which the public are interested. Vinnius lays it down in the doctrine cited by the associate counsel who last spoke. If, then, we are to consider this a doctrine to be adopted in all that relates to public men, it ought now to be received. When we advert to the statutes they confirm our positions. Those statutes are indisputably declaratory of the early law. We know that a great part of the common law has been, for certainty, reduced to statutes. Can we suppose that the common law did not notice that no punishment was to be inflicted for speaking the truth, when we see a statute thus enacting?

Therefore, the fair reasoning is, that they are declaratory of the common law. That, by our code, falsehood must be the evidence of the libel. If we apply to precedents, they are decidedly for us. In the case cited from 7 D. and E. this is admitted, for there it is allowed that the word false is contained in all the ancient forms. This, then, is a strong argument for saying that the falsity was, by the common law, considered a necessary ingredient. It is no answer to say that in declarations for assaults we use the words “sticks,” “staves,” etc. When instruments are named, this imports only one or the other which might be used; but when a word by way of epithet, that it means a precise idea, and we are to take it as if introduced for the purpose of explaining the crime. As to the practice on this occasion, we must take various epochs of the English history into consideration. At one time, that the law was as we have shown, is proved by the statutes. At that time the truth was clearly drawn into question, and that since the period of Lord Raymond a different practice has prevailed, is no argument against the common law. The authority from the third institute is conclusive, at least satisfactory, to show that it was then necessary to show the words were true. Et quid, etc., quœ litera in se continet nullum veritatem ideo, etc. It is to be supposed that the truth in this case was not inquired into, when the want of it is the reason of the judgment. Unless this had been gone into, the court would not nor could not have spoken to it. The insertion of that, then, is a strong argument that this was the old law, and it shows us what that law was. In the case of the seven bishops, they were allowed to go into all the evidence they wanted. The court permitted them to read every thing to show it.

On that occasion Halloway and all agreed as to the admissibility of the truth. But this case is important in another view, as it shows the intent ought to be inquired into, for the bishops might have done it either with a seditious or an innocent motive. They declare that by the law they could not do the act required. They exculpated themselves by an appeal to their consciences. This shows the necessity of inquiring into the intent of the act.

In Rex vs. Fuller, this very atrocious offender was indicted for a most infamous libel, and yet Lord Holt at every breath asked him, Can you prove the truth? At the time, then, when this was done, there were some things in favor of the truth. It stands, then, a precedent for what we contend. I shall now notice some intermediate authorities between that day and those in which a contrary principle has been endeavored to be supported. It is true that the doctrine originated in one of the most oppressive institutions that ever existed; in a court whose oppressions roused the people to demand its abolition, whose horrid judgments cannot be read without freezing the blood in one’s veins. This is not used as declamation, but as argument. If doctrine tends to trample on the liberty of the press, and if we see it coming from a foul source, it is enough to warn us against polluting the stream of our own jurisprudence. It is not true that it was abolished merely for not using the intervention of juries, or because it proceeded ex parte, though that, God knows, would have been reason enough, or because its functions were discharged by the court of king’s bench. It was because its decisions were cruel and tyrannical; because it bore down the liberties of the people, and inflicted the most sanguinary punishments. It is impossible to read its sentences without feeling indignation against it. This will prove why there should not be a paramount tribunal to judge of these matters.

Want’s case is the first we find on this subject; but even then we do not meet the broad definition of Lord Coke, in the case of de famosis libellis. I do not deny this doctrine of the immateriality of the truth as a universal negative to a publication’s being libellous, though true. But still I do say, that in no case may you not show the intent; for, whether the truth be a justification will depend on the motives with which it was published.

Personal defects can be made public only to make a man disliked. Here, then, it will not be excused; it might, however, be given in evidence to show the libellous degree. Still, however, it is a subject of inquiry. There may be a fair and honest exposure. But if he uses the weapon of truth wantonly; if for the purpose of disturbing the peace of families; if for relating that which does not appertain to official conduct, so far we say the doctrine of our opponents is correct. If their expressions are, that libellers may be punished though the matter contained in the libel be true, in these I agree. I confess that the truth is not material as a broad proposition respecting libels. But that the truth cannot be material in any respect, is contrary to the nature of things. No tribunal, no codes, no systems can repeal or impair this law of God, for by his eternal laws it is inherent in the nature of things. We first find this large and broad position to the contrary in 5 Rep. And here it is to be noticed that when Lord Coke himself was in office, when he was attorney-general, and allowed to give his own opinion, he determines the truth to be material. But when he gets into that court, and on that bench, which had pronounced against it, when he occupies a star-chamber seat, then he declares it is immaterial. I do not mention this as derogating from Lord Coke, for, to be sure, he may be said to have yielded; but this, I say, is the first case on this point in which he seems to be of a contrary opinion. We do not, in every respect, contend even against his last ideas, we only assert that the truth may be given in evidence. But this we allow is against the subsequent authorities, which, in this respect, overturn the former precedents. These latter, however, are contrary to the common law; to the principles of justice and of truth. The doctrine, that juries shall not judge on the whole matter of law and fact, or the intent and tendency of the publication, is not to be found in the cases before the time of Lord Raymond; and it is contrary to the spirit of our law, because it may prevent them from determining on what may, perhaps, be within their own knowledge. It was only by Lord Raymond that this was first set up and acted upon, and this has been followed by Lord Mansfield and his successors. Here, then, have been a series of precedents against us. Blackstone, too, says that the truth may not be given in evidence so as to justify; and so, with the qualifications I have before mentioned, do we. Prior, indeed, to his time, Lord Holt had laid down the law, in one or two cases, in conformity to that of the other side, and later times have given this a currency by a coincidence of precedents in its favor. A reflection may, perhaps, be here indulged, that, from what I have before remarked on Lord Coke, it is frequent for men to forget sound principles, and condemn the points for which they have contended. Of this, the very case of the seven bishops is an example, when those, who there maintained the principles for which we contend, supplanted the persons then in power, they were ready to go the whole length of the doctrine that the truth could not be given in evidence on a libel. This is an admonition that ought at all times to be attended to; that at all times men are disposed to forward principles to support themselves. The authority of Paley had been adduced, if indeed he may be called an authority. That moral philosopher considers every thing as slanderous libels whether true or false, if published with motives of malice.

In these cases he does not consider the truth a justification. Nor do we; we do not say that it is, alone, always a justification of the act; and this we say, consistent with sound morality, is good law and good sense. On what ought a court to decide on such an occasion as this? Shall they be shackled by precedents, weakened in that very country where they were formed? Or rather, shall they not say, that we will trace the law up to its source? We consider, they might say, these precedents as only some extraneous bodies engrafted on the old trunk; and as such I believe they ought to be considered. I am inclined to think courts may go thus far, for it is absolutely essential to right and security that the truth should be admitted. To be sure, this may lead to the purposes suggested. But my reply is, that government is to be thus treated, if it furnish reasons for calumny. I affirm that, in the general course of things, the disclosure of truth is right and prudent, when liable to the checks I have been willing it should receive as an object of animadversion.

It cannot be dangerous to government, though it may work partial difficulties. If it be not allowed, they will stand liable to encroachments on their rights. It is evident that if you cannot apply this mitigated doctrine, for which I speak, to the cases of libels here, you must forever remain ignorant of what your rulers do. I never can think this ought to be; I never did think the truth was a crime; I am glad the day is come in which it is to be decided, for my soul has ever abhorred the thought that a free man dared not speak the truth; I have forever rejoiced when this question has been brought forward.

I come now to examine the second branch of this inquiry—the different provinces of the court and the jury. I will introduce this subject by observing that the trial by jury has been considered, in the system of English jurisprudence, as the palladium of public and private liberty. In all the political disputes of that country, this has been deemed the barrier to secure the subjects from oppression. If, in that country, juries are to answer this end, if they are to protect from the weight of state prosecutions, they must have this power of judging of the intent, in order to perform their functions; they could not otherwise answer the ends of their institution. For, under this dangerous refinement of leaving them to decide only the fact of composing and publishing, any thing on which they may decide, may be made a libel. I do not deny the well-known maxim—that to matters of fact the jury, and to matters of law the judges, shall answer. I do not deny this, because it is not necessary, for the purpose of this or any other case, that it should be denied. I say, with this complicated explanation, I have before given of the manner in which the intent is necessarily interwoven in the fact, the court has the general cognizance of the law. In all cases of ancient proceedings the question of law must have been presented.

It was in civil cases alone that an attaint would lie. They have, it is said, the power to decide in criminal cases, on the law and the fact. They have then the right, because they cannot be restricted in its exercise; and, in politics, power and right are equivalent. To prove it, what shall we say to this case? Suppose the Legislature to have laid a tax, which, by the Constitution, they certainly are entitled to impose, yet still the Legislature may be guilty of oppression; but who can prevent them, or say they have not authority to raise taxes? Legal power, then, is the decisive effect of certain acts without control. It is agreed that the jury may decide against the direction of the court, and that their verdict of acquittal cannot be impeached, but must have its effect. This, then, I take to be the criterion, that the Constitution has lodged the power with them, and they have the right to exercise it. For this I could cite authorities. It is nothing to say, in opposition to this, that they, if they act wrong, are to answer between God and their consciences. This may be said of the Legislature, and yet, nevertheless, they have the power and the right of taxation. I do not mean to admit that it would be proper for jurors thus to conduct themselves, but only to show that the jury do possess the legal right of determining on the law and the fact. What, then, do I conceive to be true doctrine? That in the general distribution of power in our Constitution, it is the province of the jury to speak to fact, yet, in criminal cases, the consequences and tendency of acts, the law and the fact are always blended. As far as the safety of the citizen is concerned, it is necessary that the jury shall be permitted to speak to both. How, then, does the question stand? Certainly not without hazard; because, inasmuch as in the general distribution of power, the jury are to be confined to fact, they ought not wantonly to de-depart from the advice of the court; they ought to receive it, if there be not strong and valid reasons to the contrary; if there be, they should reject. To go beyond this is to go too far. Because, it is to say, when they are obliged to decide, by their oath, according to the evidence, they are bound to follow the words of the judge. After they are satisfied from him what the law is, they have a right to apply the definition. It is convenient that it should be so. If they are convinced that the law is as stated, let them pronounce him guilty; but never let them leave that guilt for the judge; because, if they do, the victim may be offered up, and the defendant gone. Will any one say, that under forms of law we may commit homicide? Will any directions from any judge excuse them? I am free to say, I would die on the rack, were I to sit as a juror, rather than confirm such a doctrine, by condemning the man I thought deserved to be acquitted; and yet I would respect the opinion of the judge, from which, however, I should deem myself at liberty to depart, and this I believe to be the theory of our law.

These are the propositions I shall endeavor to maintain. I have little more to do than examine how far precedents accord with principles, and whether any establish a contrary doctrine. I do not know that it is necessary to do more than has already been done by my associate counsel, and yet, perhaps, I should not complete my duty without adverting to what has fallen, on this point, from our opponents. There is not one of the ancient precedents in which our doctrine has not in general prevailed, and it is, indeed, to be traced down to one of a modern date. The case of the seven bishops is that to which I allude. There it was permitted to go into the truth, and all the court submitted the question to the jury. This case deserves particular attention. If, on the one hand, it was decided at a time when the nation was considerably agitated, it was, on the other hand, at a time when great constitutional precedents and points were discussed and resolved. The great one was, the power of the jury; and this power was submitted to, to extricate the people, for the salvation of the nation, from the tyranny with which they were then oppressed. This was one of the reasons which brought about their glorious revolution, and which, perhaps, tended to the maturing those principles which have given us ours. This ought to be considered as a landmark to our liberties, as a pillar which points out to us on what the principles of our liberty ought to rest; particularly so if we examine it as to its nature, and the nature of the attempts then made to set up and support the endeavors to construe an act of duty a libel—a deed in which conscience did not permit those reverend characters to act in any other way than what they did, a respect to which they held a bounden duty. It is a precedent then on which we should in every way fasten ourselves. The case of Fuller is of minor importance. Yet that is one in which Lord Holt called on the defendant to enter into the truth. In the King vs. Tutchin, Lord Holt expressly tells the jury, You are to consider whether the tendency of this writing be not to criminate the administration; you, the jury are to decide on this. Owen’s case is to the same effect. There Lord Camden was of counsel, and in the discussion, in the House of Lords, he tells us, and surely his testimony is good, that being of counsel for the defendant, he was permitted to urge to the jury a cognizance of the whole matter of libel; that in the case of Shepherd, where, by his official situation, he was called on to prosecute for the Crown, where the interests of government called on him to maintain an opposite doctrine, yet then he insisted for a verdict on the whole matter, from the consideration of the jury. In the King vs. Horne, Lord Mansfield himself tells the jury they have a right to exercise their judgment from the nature of the intent. This surely, then, is a precedent down to a late period. It is not, however, to be denied, that there is a series of precedents on the other side. But as far as precedents of this kind can be supported, they can rest on precedents alone, for the fundamental rights of juries show, that as by their power they can affect a question of this nature, so, politically speaking, they have the right. To ascertain this, it is necessary to inquire, whether this law, now contended for, uniformly and invariably formed the practice of all the judges in Westminster Hall. For, if so, then an argument may, with more propriety, be raised; but if it was disputed, then it is to be doubted. Precedents ought to be such as are universally acknowledged, and this, if we are to credit the highest authority, was not the invariable practice. Lord Loughborough says, that his practice was the other way. He declares that he invariably left the whole to the jury; and Lord Camden gives us to understand the same thing. Here, then, is proof that it was not universally acquiesced in, and this, by some of the most respected characters that ever sat on a bench.

Can we call this a settled practice—a practice which is contradicted by other precedents? Have they not varied? I consider nothing but a uniform course of precedents, so established that the judges invariably conform to it in their judicial conduct, as forming a precedent. When this is not the case, we must examine the precedent, and see how far it is conformable to principles of general law. If, then, they have not that character of uniformity, which gives force to precedents, they are not to be regarded, for they are too much opposed to fundamental principles. The court may, therefore, disregard them, and say the law was never thus settled. It was a mere floating of litigated questions. Different conduct was pursued by different men, and, therefore, the court is at liberty to examine the propriety of all; and if it be convenient that a contrary mode should be adopted, we ought to examine into what has been done, for we have a right so to do, and it is our sacred duty. When we pass from this to the declaratory law of Great Britain, the whole argument is enforced by one of the first authorities. I do not consider it as binding, but as an evidence of the common law. If so, I see not why we may not now hold it as evidence of another evidence, that the law had not been settled by a regular course of judicial precedents. In all the debates on this question, it is denied to have been so settled. It must then be confessed that it was so; the law was one thing, and the practice another; that to put it out of doubt was the end and object of Mr. Fox’s bill. Therefore it is in evidence that the law was not settled in that country. I notice another fact, or historical evidence of this; it is what was mentioned by Lord Lansdowne, in the very debates to which I have before alluded. It is, that twenty years before, a similar act was brought forward and dropped. Here then is a matter of fact to show that, in the consideration of that nation, the doctrines of Lord Mansfield were never palatable nor settled, and that the opinions of judges and lawyers were considered by many as not the law of the land. Let it be recollected, too, that with that nation the administration of justice in the last resort is in the House of Lords. That being so it gives extreme weight to a declaratory act, as it shows the sense of the highest branch of the judicature of that country. It is in evidence that what we contend for was and had been the law, and never was otherwise settled. It is a very honorable thing to that country, in a case where party passions had been excited to a very great height, to see that all united to bring it in. It was first introduced by Mr. Fox; the principal officers of the crown acquiesced; the Prime-Minister gave it his support, and in this they were aided by many of the great law lords. All parties concurred in declaring the principles of that act to be the law, and not only does the form prove it to be declaratory, but when the court read the debates on that subject they will see this to be the fact. Adding the word “enacted” to a bill does not vary the conclusion of its being declaratory. The word “enacted” is commonly super-added, but the word “declared” is never used but when it is intended that the act shall be considered as declaratory; and when they insert the word “declare” it is because they deem it important that it should be so understood. This I deem conclusive evidence of the intent. Thus also it was understood by all the judges except Lord Kenyon, and he does not say that it was not declaratory. To be sure he makes use of some expressions that look that way, such as, “that the act had varied the old law.” But not one word to show that it was not intended by Parliament to be a declaratory law. But it would not be surprising that Lord Kenyon, who opposed the passage of the act, should, in a judicial decision, still adhere to his old ideas. This, however, does not affect the evidence which arises from the words of the act. I join in issue, then, whether this be sufficient evidence to the court. For I contend, that notwithstanding the authority of Lord Kenyon and the cases on the other side, the conclusions they maintain would be unfair. For if these conclusions necessarily tend to the subversion of fundamental principles, though they be warranted by precedents, still the precedents ought not to weigh. But should they have settled the law by their precedents, still this court will admit any evidence to show that the facts are otherwise, and the law never was as they have settled it. In this case, then, I say, as matters of evidence, these precedents shall not prevail and shall not have any effect. In practice on this declaratory act they have gone into a construction important to our argument. But previously to entering into this I shall make one observation to show the nature of this act to be declaratory; the recital states it to be so.

Spencer, Attorney-General—The whole matter in issue are the words.

Hamilton—Is it to be doubted that every general issue includes law and fact? Not a case in our criminal code in which it is otherwise. The construction, the publication, the meaning of the innuendoes, the intent and design, are all involved in the question of libel, and to be decided on the plea of not guilty, which puts the whole matter in issue. It is, therefore, a subtlety to say that the fact and law are not in issue. There can be no distinction taken, even by judges, between libels and other points. But will it be said, that when this question was before the Parliament, whether the law and the fact should be in issue, that the Parliament did not mean to give the power to decide on both? It is a mere cavil to say that the act did not mean to decide on this very point. The opposition of the twelve judges has been much insisted on. But in my opinion they have given up the point as to the right of the jury to decide on the intent. They in some part of their answer assert the exclusive power of the court; they deny in terms the power of the jury to decide on the whole. But when pressed on this point as to a letter of a treasonable nature, how do they conclude? Why, the very reverse of all this. Here, then, we see the hardship into which the best of men are driven, when compelled to support a paradox. Can the jury do it with power, and without right? When we say of any forum that it can do and may hazard the doing a thing, we admit the legal power to do it. What is meant by the word “hazard”? If they choose to do it, they have then the legal right; for legal power includes the legal right. This is really only a question of words. But in the exercise of this right, moral ideas are no doubt to restrain; for the conscience ought to decide between the charge and the evidence which ought to prevail, one side or the other. The moment, however, that question as to the power is admitted, the whole argument is given up. I consider the judges driven to yield up, at the conclusion of their opinion, that point for which they had in the former parts contended. Thus, then, stands the matter, on English conduct, and on English precedent. Let us see if any thing in the annals of America will further the argument. Zenger’s case has been mentioned as an authority. A decision in a factitious period, and reprobated at the very time.

A single precedent never forms the law. If in England it was fluctuating in an English court, can a colonial judge, of a remote colony, ever settle it? He cannot fix in New York what was not fixed in Great Britain. It was merely one more precedent to a certain course of practice. But because a colonial governor, exercising judicial power, subordinate to the judges of the mother country, decides in this way, can it be said that he can establish the law, and that he has, by a solitary precedent, fixed what his superior could not? The most solemn decisions of the court of king’s bench are at one time made and at another time overruled. Why are our courts to be bound down by the weight of only one precedent? Is a precedent, like the laws of the Medes and Persians, never to be changed? This is to make the colonial precedent of more weight than is in England allowed to a precedent of Westminster Hall. To pursue the precedents more emphatically our own, let us advert to the sedition law, branded indeed with epithets the most odious, but which will one day be pronounced a valuable feature in our national character. In this we find not only the intent but the truth may be submitted to the jury, and that even in a justificatory manner. This, I affirm, was on common-law principles. It would, however, be a long detail to investigate the applicability of the common law to the Constitution of the United States. It is evident, however, that parts of it use a language which refers to former principles. The habeas corpus is mentioned, and as treason, it adopts the very words of the common law. Not even the Legislature of the Union can change it. Congress itself cannot make constructive or new treasons. Such is the general tenor of the Constitution of the United States, that it evidently looks to antecedent law. What is, on this point, the great body of the common law? Natural law and natural reason applied to the purposes of society. What are the English courts now doing but adopting natural law?

What have the court done here? Applied moral law to constitutional principles, and thus the judges have confirmed this construction of the common law; and therefore, I say, by our Constitution it is said the truth may be given in evidence. In vain it is to be replied that some committee met, and in their report gave it the name of amendment. For when the act says declared, I say the highest legislative bodies in this country have declared that the common law is, that the truth shall be given in evidence; and this I urge as a proof of what that common law is. On this point a fatal doctrine would be introduced if we were to deny the common law to be in force according to our federal Constitution. Some circumstances have doubtless weakened my position. Impeachments of an extraordinary nature have echoed through the land, charging as crimes things unknown, and although our judges, according to that Constitution, must appeal to the definitions of the common law for treasons, crimes, and misdemeanors, this, no doubt, was that no vague words might be used. If, then, we discharge all evidence of the common law, they may be pronounced guilty ad libitum, and the crime and offence being at once their will, there would be an end of that Constitution.

By analogy a similar construction may be made of our own Constitution, and our judges thus got rid of. This may be of the most dangerous consequences. It admonishes us to use with caution these arguments against the common law; to take care how we throw down this barrier which may secure the men we have placed in power; to guard against a spirit of faction, that great bane to our community, that mortal poison to our land. It is considered by all great men as the natural disease of our form of government, and therefore we ought to be careful to restrain that spirit. We have been careful that when one party comes in it shall not be able to break down and bear away the others. If this be not so, in vain have we made constitutions; for if it be not so, then we must go into anarchy, and from thence to despotism and to a master. Against this I know there is an almost insurmountable obstacle in the spirit of the people. They would not submit to be thus enslaved. Every tongue, every arm would be uplifted against it; they would resist, and resist, and resist, till they hurled from their seats those who dared make the attempt. To watch the progress of such endeavors is the office of a free press—to give us early alarm, and put us on our guard against the encroachments of power. This, then, is a right of the utmost importance; one for which, instead of yielding it up, we ought rather to spill our blood. Going on, however, to precedents, I find another in the words of Chief-Justice Jay, when pronouncing the law on this subject. The jury are, in the passage already cited, told the law, and the fact is for their determination; I find him telling them that it is their right. This admits of no qualification. The little, miserable conduct of the judge in Zenger’s case, when set against this, will kick the beam; and it will be seen that even the twelve judges do not set up, with deference, however, to their known ability, that system now insisted on. If the doctrine for which we contend is true in regard to treason and murder, it is equally true in respect to libel. For there is the great danger. Never can tyranny be introduced into this country by arms; these can never get rid of a popular spirit of inquiry; the only way to crush it down is by a servile tribunal. It is only by the abuse of the forms of justice that we can be enslaved. An army never can do it. For ages it can never be attempted. The spirit of the country, with arms in their hands, and disciplined as a militia, would render it impossible. Every pretence that liberty can be thus invaded is idle declamation. It is not to be endangered by a few thousand of miserable, pitiful military. It is not thus that the liberty of this country is to be destroyed. It is to be subverted only by a pretence of adhering to all the forms of law, and yet by breaking down the substance of our liberties; by devoting a wretched but honest man as the victim of a nominal trial. It is not by murder, by an open and public execution that he would be taken off. The sight of this, of a fellow-citizen’s blood, would at first beget sympathy; this would rouse into action, and the people, in the madness of their revenge, would break, on the heads of their oppressors, the chains they had destined for others.

One argument was stated to the court of a most technical and precise kind. It was that which relates to putting on the record a part only of the libel. That on this, no writ of error would lie. What was the answer given? That it could not be presumed judges could be so unjust. Why, it requires neither prejudice nor injustice, it may be matter of opinion. The argument goes to assert that we are to take for granted the infallibility of our judges. The court must see that some better reason must be given, that it must be shown that this consequence cannot ensue. If not, it is decisive against the argument. Surely this question deserves a further investigation. Very truly and righteously was it once the intention of the attorney-general that the truth should have been given in evidence. It is desirable that there should be judicial grounds to send it back again to a jury. For surely it is not an immaterial thing that a high official character should be capable of saying any thing against the father of this country.

It is important to have it known to the men of our country, to us all, whether it be true or false; it is important to the reputation of him against whom the charge is made, that it should be examined. It will be a glorious triumph for truth; it will be happy to give it a fair chance of being brought forward; an opportunity, in case of another course of things, to say that the truth stands a chance of being the criterion of justice. Notwithstanding, however, the contrary is asserted to be the doctrine of the English courts, I am, I confess, happy to hear that the freedom of the English is allowed; that a nation with king, lords, and commons, can be free. I do not mean to enter into a comparison between the freedom of the two countries. But the attorney-general has taken vast pains to celebrate Lord Mansfield’s character. Never, till now, did I hear that his reputation was high in republican estimation; never, till now, did I consider him as a model for republican imitation. I do not mean, however, to detract from the fame of that truly great man, but only conceived his sentiments were not those fit for a republic. No man more truly reveres his exalted fame than myself; if he had his faults, he had his virtues; and I would not only tread lightly on his ashes, but drop a tear as I passed by. He, indeed, seems to have been the parent of the doctrines of the other side. Such, however, we trust, will be proved not to be the doctrines of the common law nor of this country, and that in proof of this, a new trial will be granted.

[1]This speech in the celebrated case of the People against Harry Croswell, on an indictment for libel on Thomas Jefferson, President of the United States, was delivered before the Supreme Court of the State of New York, in the year 1804, by Mr. Hamilton, for the defendant, on a motion for a new trial.

The indictment in this case charged that Harry Croswell, late of the city of Hudson, in the county of Columbia, New York, printer, being a malicious and seditious man, of a depraved mind, and wicked and diabolical disposition; and also deceitfully, wickedly, and maliciously devising, contriving, and intending Thomas Jefferson, Esq., President of the United States of America, to detract from, scandalize, traduce, vilify, and to represent him, the said Thomas Jefferson, as unworthy of the confidence, respect, and attachment of the people of the said United States, and to alienate and withdraw from the said Thomas Jefferson, Esq., President as aforesaid, the obedience, fidelity, and allegiance of the citizens of the State of New York, and also of the said United States; and wickedly and seditiously to disturb the peace and tranquillity, as well of the people of the State of New York, as of the United States; and also to bring the said Thomas Jefferson, Esq. (as much as in him, the said Harry Croswell, lay), into great hatred, contempt, and disgrace, not only with the people of the State of New York, and the said people of the United States of America, but also with the citizens and subjects of other nations, and for that purpose the said Harry Croswell did, on the ninth of September, in the year of our Lord 1802, with force and arms, at the said city of Hudson, in the said county of Columbia, wickedly, maliciously, and seditiously print and publish, and cause and procure to be printed and published, a certain scandalous, malicious, and seditious libel, in a certain paper or publication entitled The Wasp; containing therein, among other things, certain scandalous, malicious, inflammatory, and seditious matters of and concerning the said Thomas Jefferson, Esq., then and yet being President of the United States of America; that is to say, in one part thereof according to the tenor and effect following, that is to say Jefferson (the said Thomas Jefferson, Esq., meaning) paid Callendar (meaning one James Thompson Callendar) for calling Washington (meaning George Washington, Esq., deceased, late President of the United States) a traitor, a robber, and a perjurer; for calling Adams (meaning John Adams, Esq., late President of the United States) a hoary-headed incendiary, and for most grossly slandering the private characters of men whom he (meaning the said Thomas Jefferson) well knew to be virtuous, to the great scandal and infamy of the said Thomas Jefferson, Esq., in contempt of the people of the State of New York, in open violation of the laws of the said State, to the evil example of all others in like case offending, and against the peace of the people of the State of New York, and their dignity.

All that need be said in addition is that Hamilton won the case, which attracted great attention, both from its political bearings and the important principles of law which it involved.