The Online Library of Liberty

A project of Liberty Fund, Inc.

• Foreword
• A Note On This Edition
• A Treatise of the Laws of Nature
• To His Excellency, John, Lord Carteret, Lord Lieutenant of Ireland . 1
• The Translator’s Preface
• Names of Subscribers
• Two Introductory Essays
• Essay I: Of the City, Or Kingdom, of God In the Rational World, and the Defects In Heathen Deism
• Essay II: Concerning the Imperfectness of the Heathen Morality
• The Introduction
• A Philosophical Inquiry Into the Laws of Nature , &c. and a Confutation of the Elements of Mr. Hobbes ’s Philosophy .
• Chapter I: Of the Nature of Things .
• Chapter II: Of Human Nature, and Right Reason .
• Chapter III: Of Natural Good .
• Chapter IV: Of the Practical Dictates of Reason .
• Chapter V: Of the Law of Nature, and Its Obligation.
• Chapter VI: Of Those Things Which Are Contain’d In the General Law of Nature.
• Chapter VII: Of the Original of Dominion, and the Moral Virtues.
• Chapter VIII: Of the Moral Virtues In Particular .
• Chapter IX: Corollaries.
• Editor’s Note
• Appendices
• Appendix I: A Summary of the Controversy Between Dr . Samuel Clark and an Anonymous Author, Concerning the Immateriality of Thinking Substance .
• Appendix II: A Treatise Concerning the Obligation, Promulgation, and Observance of the Law of Nature
• Appendix 1. Richard Cumberland’s Original Dedication to De Legibus Naturae
• Appendix 2: Hezekiah Burton’s “address to the Reader”

A PHILOSOPHICAL INQUIRY INTO THE LAWS of NATURE, &c. AND A Confutation of the Elements of Mr. Hobbes’s Philosophy.

CHAPTER I

Of the Nature of Things.

The Laws of Nature, defined. Altho’ the Scepticks and Epicureans of old denied, and others of like Principles still persist in denying, that there are any Laws of Nature;1 we are, nevertheless, on both sides agreed, what is intended by that Name; for we both understand thereby, certain Propositions of unchangeable Truth, which direct our voluntary Actions, about chusing Good and refusing Evil; and impose an Obligation to external Actions, even without Civil Laws, and laying aside all Consideration of those Compacts, which constitute Civil Government. “That some such Truths are, from the Nature of Things and of Men, necessarily suggested to the Minds of Men, and by them understood and remember’d, (whilst the Faculties of their Minds continue unhurt,) and that therefore they really exist there”; This is what we affirm, and our said Adversaries as expressly deny.

The Author’s Method of Inquiry, concerning their Existence.Wherefore, that the Nature of these Propositions may more plainly appear, it is necessary, that we first examine the Nature of Things universally, then, of Men, and lastly, of Good, as far as they relate to this Question. We must afterwards shew, what sort of Propositions direct Mens Actions, and naturally carry along with them the Force and Obligation of Laws, as pointing out what is necessary to be done, in order to obtain that End, which Nature has determin’d Men to pursue. Lastly, that there are such Laws, will sufficiently appear from the certainty and necessary influence of those Causes which produce them.

The Consideration of the Nature of Things, necessary in this Question;§II. Nor ought it to seem strange to any, that I said, “That the Nature of Things in the Universe ought first to be consider’d”; because the extensive Faculties of Man, which need many Things for their Preservation and Improvement, and are excited by all to Action, can’t be otherwise understood: For how can any one understand, what is most agreeable, or most hurtful, to the human Mind or Body, unless he considers (as far as he is able)2 all those Causes, as well remote, as near, which form’d, and now preserve, Man, and may hereafter support, or destroy, him? Nor is it possible to know, what is the best Thing a Man can do, in the present Case, unless the Effects, as well remote as near, which may proceed from him, in all variety of Circumstances, be foreseen and compar’d among themselves. But the Consideration of the Causes, upon which Men depend, and of those Effects, which may be produc’d by the Concurrence of their Powers, will necessarily lead every Man to consider, not only other Men, where soever dispers’d, and himself, as a small part of Mankind, but also this whole Frame of Nature, and God, its first Founder, and supreme Governor. These things being consider’d, in the best manner we are able, our Mind may by some general Conclusions pronounce, “What sort of human Actions chiefly promote the Common Good of all Beings, especially such as are Rational,” wherein each Man’s proper Happiness is contain’d. And we shall hereafter see, that in such Conclusions, provided they be true and necessary, the Law of Nature is contain’d.

Because all moral Philosophy is finally resolved into the Knowledge of Nature.§III. Yet the Nature of our Undertaking does not require, that we should take a particular View of all kinds of Beings. We congratulate, indeed, the happy Genius of this learned Age, that the intellectual Part of the World has been much illustrated by that great Accession of Light, which former Proofs of the Being of God, and the Immortality of the Soul have receiv’d from the daily increasing Knowledge of the inferior Part of Nature. We also congratulate, both the present Age and Posterity, that, now at length, the material Part of the Universe begins to be explain’d by introducing Mathematicks into the Study of Nature. It is truly a vast Undertaking, “To resolve the visible World into its most simple Principles, Matter, variously figur’d, and Motion, differently compounded, and after the Geometrical Investigation of the Properties of Figures, and of compounded Motions, from Phaenomena faithfully observ’d, to shew the History of the whole corporeal System exactly conspiring with the Laws of Matter and Motion”; but that is an Undertaking, not only unequal to the Abilities of any one Man, but of an Age. It is, nevertheless, worthy of the united Endeavours, and unwearied Industry of those great Genius’s of which the Royal Society is compos’d: Worthy of his most excellent Majesty, King Charles its Founder, Patron and Example.3 We may therefore safely commit so important and difficult an Affair to so faithful and skilful Hands. It is sufficient for us, in the beginning of this Undertaking, to have admonish’d the Reader, “That the Whole of moral Philosophy, and of the Laws of Nature, is ultimately resolv’d into natural Observations known by the Experience of all Men, or into Conclusions of true Natural Philosophy.” But Natural Philosophy, in the large Sense I now use it, does not only comprehend all those Appearances of natural Bodies, which we know from Experiment, but also inquires into the Nature of our Souls, from Observations made upon their Actions and distinguishing Perfections, and at length leads Men, by the Chain of natural Causes, to the Knowledge of the first Mover, and acknowledges him to be the Cause of all necessary Effects. For the Nature, as well of the Creatures, as of the Creator, suggests all those Ideas, of which the Laws of Nature are form’d, and discovers the Truth of those Laws, as practical Propositions; but their full Authority is deriv’d from the Knowledge of the Creator. And these things require to be a little farther explain’d in this Place.

The Natures of Things consider’d only as necessary to explain one general Law of Nature, whence all particular Laws of Nature may be deduc’d.§IV. But altho there are innumerable things, which, in the Knowledge of the Universe, may be made use of for the Matter of particular Propositions, which are to form our Manners; I have, nevertheless, thought proper to select only a few, and those the most general, which might, in some measure, explain that general Description of the Laws of Nature, which I at first propos’d, and are a little more manifestly contain’d in one Proposition, the Fountain of all Nature’s Laws. Which general Proposition is this, The greatest Benevolence of every rational Agent towards all, forms the happiest State of every, and of all the Benevolent, as far as is in their Power; and is necessarily requisite to the happiest State which they can attain, and therefore the common Good is the supreme Law.4

The Method observ’d in treating of this general Law.The Sense of this is first rightly to be explain’d. Secondly, We are to shew, how it may be learned from the Nature of Things. Lastly, I hope it will plainly appear, from what follows in this Treatise, that it has the Force of a Law, and that all the Laws of Nature flow from it.

Its Parts explain’d, Benevolence.The Reader is to observe, that I no where understand by the Name of Benevolence, that languid and lifeless Volition of theirs, which effects nothing of what they are said to desire; but that only, by force whereof we execute, as speedily and thorowly as we are able, what we heartily desire. We may likewise also comprehend in this Word, that Affection, by which we desire things grateful to our Superiors, which is particularly distinguish’d by the Name of Piety, towards God, our Country, and our Parents; and therefore I chose to make use of the Word [Benevolence] rather than [Love], because, in virtue of its Composition, it implies an Act of our Will, join’d with its most general Object, and is never taken in a bad Sense, as the Word [Love] sometime is.The greatest Benevolence of all I here use the Words, the [greatest] Benevolence, because I would express the intire or adequate Cause of the greatest Happiness. We shall elsewhere shew, how those Scruples which some object here, may be easily solv’d. By the Word[All] I understand that whole System which consists of the Individuals consider’d together, in order to one End, which It here mention by the Name of [the happiest State.] By the Name of [Rationals] I beg leave to understand, as well God as Man; and I do it upon the Authority of Cicero, whom I think I may safely take for a Guide, as to the Propriety of a Latin Word.Rationals, For he acknowledges Reason, common both to God and Men, and has taught, That “Wisdom” (which all ascribe to God) is nothing else but “Reason in Perfection.”5Forms the happiest State of all, I have us’d the Word [Forms] to intimate, that Benevolence is both the intrinsic Cause of present, and the efficient Cause of future Happiness, and is necessarily requisite in respect of both. I have added [as far as is in their Power] to insinuate, that the Assistance of things external, is often not in our Power, altho they are requisite to the Happiness of the animal Life;As far as is in their Power. and that no other Assistance to a happy Life is to be expected from the Laws of Nature and moral Philosophy, than Precepts about our Actions, and those Objects of Actions, which are in our own Power.6 And altho it happens, that different Men, according to their different Abilities of Mind and Body, nay, that the same Men, in different Circumstances, are not equally able to promote the public Good; nevertheless, the Law of Nature is sufficiently observ’d, and its End obtain’d, if every one performs what he is able, according to his present Circumstances. But of this there will be a fuller Explanation in what follows.

How we come to the Knowledge of the Terms of the foregoing Proposition.§V. I must now shew, “Both how the Ideas contain’d in the foregoing Proposition, necessarily enter into the Minds of Men, and that when they are there, they are necessarily connected, that is, that they make a true Proposition”; which we shall afterwards prove to be practical, and to have the force of a Law. Seeing therefore it is well known by the Experience of all Men, that those Ideas or Thoughts, which the Logicians call simple Apprehensions, are two ways excited in the Mind of Man; (1.) By the immediate Presence and Operation of the Object upon the Mind; after which manner the Mind is conscious of its own Actions, and also of the Motions of the Imagination, or of the Ideas its Objects; and by Analogy to these, we judge of the Minds of other rational Beings, God and Men. (2.) By the Means of our external Senses, Nerves, and Membranes, in which manner we perceive other Men, and the rest of the Parts of this visible World; it presently appears, that the Terms of our Proposition become known, partly by internal, partly by external, Sensation. For what Benevolence is, and what are its Degrees, and, consequently, what is any ones greatest Benevolence, we do not otherwise understand, than by the Mind’s reflecting upon itself; nor needs there other help; for such is the Frame of the Mind, that it cannot but be thorowly sensible of its own Actions and Affections, as being what are intimately united with it self. I acknowledge, however, “That it is to the Assistance of our outward Senses, we owe the Knowledge of external Advantages, which Benevolence distributes amongst all,” of which hereafter. In the same manner we come to the Knowledge of Reason, by our inward Sense thereof; and we apprehend what are rational Agents, mention’d in the Subject of the Proposition. “That there are others besides our selves who have the use of Reason,” we collect by Observations made by our outward Senses. We come at the Knowledge of the Causes constituting any thing, whether intrinsically, or in the way of an Efficient, generally by the Assistance of our outward Senses, and by Reasoning founded on Appearances. The inward Nature of our Mind, and its active Powers by which it determines the voluntary Motions of our Bodies in pursuit of apparent Good, the Mind it self perceives, partly by reflecting upon it self, partly by the Aid of the Senses observing the Effects consequent upon the Command of our Will. Lastly, we come to the Knowledge of the State of Men, and of their Happiness, by the same Means, by which we hinted, that their Nature, and those good Things, in the Enjoyment whereof their Happiness consists, were known; for the State of Things adds nothing to their Nature, besides the Notion of some Duration, or Continuance. And a State is called Happy, from the Possession of good Things, very many, and very great.

And of the Connexion of these Terms, or its Truth.§VI. As to the Connexion of the Terms of this Proposition, in which its necessary Truth consists, it seems to me sufficiently plain; for it signifies the same as if we should say as follows; That the Willing, or Prosecution, of all good Things situated in our Power, which is most effectual to the Enjoyment of them by our selves and other Rationals, is the most that Men can effect, that they themselves, and others, may most happily enjoy them. Or, There is no Power in Men greater, by which they may procure to themselves and others a Collection of all good Things, than a Will to pursue every one his own Happiness, together with the Happiness of others.

In which words, what is first obvious, is, “That there is no Power in Men greater to effect any thing, than a Will determin’d to exert its utmost Force.”

In the next place, it is also most evident, “That the Happiness of single Persons, for example, of Socrates and Plato, and other Individuals,” (mention’d in the Predicate) “cannot singly be separated from the Happiness of all,” (whose Cause is contain’d in the Subject,) because the Whole does not differ from all the Parts taken together. This universal Proposition, pronouncing concerning the Benevolence of all, may be observ’d to agree with Laws from this, that it declares, “Not what any one Person, or a few, ought to do to procure their own Happiness, without any regard to that of others, but what both all unitedly can do, in order to be happy, and what each separately, without any Repugnancy amongst themselves, (for that is not consistent with Reason, of which all are Partakers,) may do, in order to obtain the common Happiness of All, in which the greatest Happiness possible to Individuals is contain’d, and most effectually promoted.” It is first and better known, as flowing from the common and essential Attributes of human Nature, “What all in general can, or cannot, do, conducing to the common Good,” than, “What any particular Person can do in determinate Circumstances,” for these are infinite, and, consequently, impossible to be known by any Man. As, several Armies being brought into the Field, it is better known, that they cannot all get the Victory, than which Army shall overcome.

Thirdly, in the last place, “One or a few particular Persons can neither enjoy a present Happiness, or with probability hope for it hereafter, by acting without any regard, or in opposition, to the Happiness of all other rational Beings”; for to a Mind so affected, an essential Part of its Happiness is wanting, “That inward Peace, which arises from an uniform Wisdom, always agreeing with it self,” for it is inconsistent with it self, when it determines to act after one manner in relation to itself, and after another manner in relation to others, that partake of the same Nature: That “great Joy” is also wanting, “which arises in a benevolent Mind, from a Sense of the Felicity of others.” Not to say any thing at present of Envy, Pride, and those Legions of other Vices, which besiege the Malevolent, and necessarily render him miserable, as labouring under the worst Distempers of the Mind.

Beside, “No Person, in such an Attempt, can have a well-grounded Hope of Happiness,” because in it he neglects, nay provokes to his Destruction, other external rational Causes, God and Men, upon whose Aid that Hope necessarily depends. “There is therefore no other way, which can lead any particular Person to his Happiness, than that which is to lead all to the common Happiness.” Let it suffice, briefly to have hinted these things in this place, which I have done only with this View, that I might shew from such Observations as are most obvious by common Experience, that the Truth of the aforesaid Proposition is very evident; but these things we shall deduce more at large hereafter.

Which kind of Truths are as necessary as Mathematical ones.§VII. However, I acknowledge, that this Proposition cannot be effectual, to the forming any Man’s Manners, before he has propos’d to himself as his End, the Effect here discoursed of, “His own Happiness in Conjunction with that of others,” and has taken “those various Actions into which Benevolence is branched,” for the Means. The Proposition, however, and all just Inferences from it,(such as those less general ones, which declare the Power of Fidelity, Gratitude, natural Affection, and the other particular Virtues, towards obtaining any part of human Happiness,) may, before such Proposal, be prov’d necessarily true. For the whole Truth, as well of that general Proposition, as of those which are thence deduced, depends upon the natural and necessary Efficacy of such Actions, as Causes, to produce such Effects. For they do not suppose, that there are such Actions, which, indeed, depend upon the Agency of free Causes. And it is sufficient to evidence this Truth, “That, when soever there are such Causes, Effects of such a kind shall thence follow.” It is an undisputed Point in the Solution of all kind of Mathematical Problems, in relation to which no one questions, but that we come at true Science. All know, “That to draw Lines, and to compare them, in Geometrical Calculation, depends upon the Will of Men. We freely add, subtract, &c. and yet whoever performs these Operations, according to the Rules prescribed, necessarily finds out the true Sum, which is equal to all the Parts added.” The like may be said of the Remainder in Subtraction, the Product in Multiplication, the Quotient in Division, and the Root in Extractions: And in general, in every Question, whose Solution is possible from what is given, the Answer is necessarily found from the Operations duly perform’d. The Connexion is necessary, between the Effect desired, and its Causes assigned by this Science. According to this Pattern are other practical Arts to be modell’d, and this we have endeavour’d to attain, in delivering the Principles of Morality, by reducing to one general Name [Benevolence], all those voluntary Actions, which fall under the Direction of Moral Philosophy, by inquiring into its Branches; and lastly, by shewing the Connexion between this Act and the End design’d.7

All those Actions which fall under the Consideration of Moral Philosophy, are comprehended in Benevolence.§VIII. But seeing only voluntary Actions can be govern’d by human Reason, and those only which regard intelligent Beings, are consider’d in Morality; and seeing the Object of the Will is Good, (for Evil is rated from the Privation of Good;) it is evident, “That a more general Notion of such Actions cannot be form’d, than what falls under the Name of Benevolence,”8 because it comprehends the Desire of all kinds of goodThings, and consequently the avoiding all kinds of Evils. But beside, the force of Benevolence extends it self to all the free Acts of the Understanding, (whether we consider or compare good Things among themselves, or enquire concerning the Means of obtaining them;) and of our bodily Faculties, which are directed by our Will in the pursuit of Good. But it is universally true, “That the motion of a Point does not more certainly produce a Line, or the Addition of Numbers a Sum, than that Benevolence produces a good Effect (to the Person to whom we wish well) proportion’d to the Power and Affection of the Agent, in the given Circumstances.” It is also certain, “That keeping Faith, Gratitude, natural Affection, &c. are either Parts or Modes of a most effectual Benevolence towards all, accommodated to particular Circumstances; and that they must certainly produce their good Effect, after the same manner, as it is certain, that Addition, Subtraction, Multiplication, and Division, are Parts or Modes of Calculation; and that a right Line, Circle, Parabola, and other Curves, do express the various Effects, which Geometry produces by the motion of a Point.”

General Mathematical Theorems, necessary to the Construction of Problems, are freed from the uncertainties of such Guesses as are made concerning future Contingencies, “By not affirming that such Constructions shall be, only demonstrating their Properties and Effects, if ever such Constructions are produc’d”; I have thought fit to proceed in the same Method, and “To deliver some evident Principles, concerning the natural Effects, the Parts, and the various respects of universal Love, without affirming that there is such Love”; being, however, certain, because such Benevolence is possible, that many Consequences may be thence drawn, which may direct us in the Practice of Morality, “which is what Theorems perform in the possible Construction of Problems.” I confess, notwithstanding, that whilst we, with the greatest Prudence, endeavour some things which require the concurrence of others, we may sometimes not succeed according to our wish; but this does not prove any error in the Rules. The Trial shews, “That the Effect was not in our Power,” or, as the Mathematicians speak, “That the propos’d Problem could not be solved, or thorowly determin’d, from what was given”; and as they acquiesce in such Discovery, so in like Cases may prudent Minds very justly enjoy Tranquillity. But the Experience of past Events, and the Observation of our own Strength, will quickly enable us to form a Judgment, “whether any Effect propos’d, be in the given Circumstance in our power, or no”; and that, for the most part, without the trouble of making an Experiment. And Reason requires, that such Judgment should be made; because he can hardly avoid the Imputation of Folly, “Who greatly labours the gaining a Point, which he did not know, that his Strength, together with the Assistance he had reason to expect, might obtain.” This, at least, is necessary, that he be certain, “That the probable Hope of obtaining his End, is of greater Value, than any Effect his Endeavours could produce in the same time.” For I hereafter shew, “That some Propositions of unchangeable Truth, can be form’d concerning the Value of contingent Advantages.”9

Which is the Summary of the Laws of Nature.§IX. Moreover, the Nature of Things instructs us, “That we must first distinctly know, what is the best Effect in our Power, before we can distinctly know the chief End we ought to regard.” For the Answer to the former Question consists of more simple Terms, and consequently, of more certain Signification. The Answer to the latter, as it ought to contain all that is in the former, so it moreover denotes, “That the rational Agent has determin’d within himself, to use the means proper to produce that Effect.” But because from this Consideration, “That many Effects tending to the common Good are in our Power; and that they, by the Will of the first Cause, are made necessary to the Attainment of our own Happiness,” there arises, both an Obligation to intend the producing those Effects, and the actual Intention it self also, whenever it is found in Men: We must of necessity lay the Foundation of the Laws of Nature, in those manifest Observations on the Powers of Men, by which duly regulated they are enabled to make each other happy, nay will certainly do so. But these Laws are all summ’d up in [Benevolence] or [Universal Love.]

I have observ’d, “That Mathematicians, in laying down the Principles of their Science, make no mention of the End, which the Doctrine by them deliver’d respects”; altho the more eminent of them most diligently pursue a most noble End. For they propose to investigate the Proportions of all kinds of Bodies and Motions, whence arise all the Phaenomena of Nature we are wont to admire, and the most useful Effects in common Life. The Mathesis universalis, (such as Des Cartes and his Commentators have deliver’d in their Geometry)10 is however content in the beginning briefly to suggest, towards the establishment of its Theorems, “That all kind of Proportions may be exhibited, by the help of such right Lines as we can draw,” and “That those which are unknown, may without great difficulty be investigated, by Geometrical Calculation, from those that are more easily known.” But it especially admonishes, “That, in order to the Preparation of those Lines whose knowledge is inquir’d after, nothing else is to be done, than that some Lines should be added together, subtracted, multiplied, or divided,” and “That the Extraction of Roots, which is of principal use, should be look’d upon as a kind of Division.” It uses no long Exhortation to induce you, “To investigate an accurate knowledge of all kinds of Things, from a mutual Comparison of their Proportions,” altho that be its principal End; but it supposes, “That it is desirable for its own sake, and of the greatest use in Life.” It thinks that it has sufficiently discharg’d it self, if it has briefly hinted, “How such Operations may be applied to the solution of all kinds of Problems.” Nor does it think it any diminution, either of its Truth or Dignity, “Tho most Men should, thro’ Unskilfulness or Sloth, neglect, or even oppose, its Rules.” Just so it is with the Doctrine of Morality, which is contain’d in the Laws of Nature. For it is wholly conversant, “In computing the several Proportions of human Powers, which at all contribute to the common Good of rational Beings,” which indeed are different in all Variety of possible Cases; and it may justly be said to have perform’d its Part, if, having in the Beginning, in general, hinted, “That all those Powers are comprehended in universal Benevolence,” it afterwards particularly shews, “That a Division of all Things, Fidelity, Gratitude, a care of our selves and of our Off-spring, is herein contain’d,” and, “In what cases they are to be made use of”; and, “After what manner thence necessarily proceed, Virtue, Religion, Society, and every thing else which contributes to the Happiness of Life.” For in this consists the Solution of that most useful Problem, whose investigation moralPhilosophy teaches. Nor is the Truth and Authority of its Precepts in any measure diminish’d, “Because many will not obey, or will oppose them”; this only thence follows, “That they will make shipwrack of their own Happiness, and perhaps, in some measure, involve others in the same Calamity.” Nevertheless, after it is made manifest, “That so excellent an Effect may certainly be produc’d, by Actions within the compass of their own Power”; it is not to be doubted, but that Men may more easily be persuaded, “To propose this Effect, so far as it is in their Power, as their End; and to take those Actions, from which, as from its Causes, it is produc’d, as the necessary means.” As Men are excited to the making Parabolic Specula, or Hyperbolic Telescopes, for the sake of the Effects which Mathematicians have demonstrated, will thence follow.11

Of which Laws, God is the Author.§X. Here I shall only add, “That this Truth” (as all others equally evident, but especially those which are hence necessarily deriv’d) “does proceed from God, and has annex’d to its Observance Reward; to its Transgression, Punishment; and is, in its own Nature, a proper Rule to direct our Manners.” The case being such, I see not what is wanting, to give it the Force of a Law: However, I shall add, in the Conclusion of this Work, “That in this Proposition is contain’d, both Piety towards God, and Charity towards Men.” In which the Sum of both Tables of the Divine Law, as well Mosaical as Evangelical, is contain’d. I shall at the same time shew, “That from hence all moral Virtues, and the Laws of Nations, in respect both of Peace and War, may be deduc’d.” That a Truth so evident, is impress’d by God as its Author, is very readily shewn from that natural Philosophy, which shews, that all Impressions upon our Senses are made, according to the natural Laws (as they are call’d) of Motion; and that Motion was first impress’d upon this corporeal System by God, and is by him preserv’d unchang’d. By this Method, which to me seems most certain, and is wholly built upon Demonstration, all necessary Effects are immediately resolv’d into the first Mover. But the Impression of the Terms of this Proposition (at least as far as it proceeds from Matter and Motion) is a natural Effect; and the Perception of the Identity, or Coherence of these Terms, as they are in the Imagination, is nothing else than a Perception, that each Term is an Impression made upon us by the same Cause. But the Perception of the Mind, by which it apprehends the Terms, as they lie in the Imagination, and perceives their Connexion, and is sensible of its own Strength and Actions, so naturally and necessarily follows their Presence in the Imagination, and that internal, natural, and unblameable Propension of the Mind, to the Observation of those things which are plac’d before it, that they cannot but be ascribed to the Mind’s efficient Cause, that is, to God, by him who acknowledges God to be the Creator of all Things, or the first Mover. But all other Methods of explaining Nature, how much soever they differ from the foregoing, or amongst themselves, agree in this, that they acknowledge God the first Cause of such necessary Effects: Altho many seem not to have remark’d sufficiently, that the simple Apprehension of Ideas, and their Composition, when they plainly agree, (whence arises a necessary Proposition,) are to be reckon’d amongst necessary Effects, that is, such as (first supposing the natural Impressions of Motion, and an intelligent Nature, to which they are clearly and distinctly propos’d) cannot but exist: which however conduces much to our Purpose, because God being acknowledg’d the Author of these necessary practical Truths, which point out Actions necessary to that End, which Nature has determin’d us to pursue, it gives them the Authority of Laws.

(Hobbes contradicts himself, with respect to the Existence of God.§XI. But what Mr. Hobbes thinks of the resolving such necessary Effects into God as their first Cause, and of the Authority of Laws thence arising, is not easy to affirm; for his Writings seem in some Places to acknowledge thus much, and yet there are many other Passages in him, which contradict, as well the Existence of God, (which is prov’d by this very Argument,) as the Authority of the Laws of Nature, which is establish’d by the same Reasoning. As to the first, it is certain, that the following Syllogism is plainly Atheistical, “Whatsoever is not Body, or an Accident thereof, does not exist. But God is neither Body, nor an Accident thereof. Therefore,” &c.12 But altho Hobbes has in many Places very sollicitously inculcated both the Premises, yet he denies the wicked Conclusion, and affirms it to be only “a Sin of Imprudence,” either to assert it, or any otherwise to blaspheme God.13 The Sense of the foregoing Syllogism, he does but too openly advance, where he contends, that “Incorporeal Substance are Words, which, when join’d together, mutually destroy one another, as if any one should say, A bodiless Body”; and that, “there is no real Part of the Universe, which is not Body.”14 And “what any one shall affirm to be mov’d, or produc’d, by an incorporeal Substance, is affirm’d without Grounds.”15 But the Minor, that “God is not Body,” he seems plainly enough to advance, where he denies, “That God has any Properties of Body; such as Figure, Place, Motion or Rest.”16 It is true, indeed, that, in the Appendix to his Leviathan lately publish’d, he openly declares, “God to be a Body,” in the beginning of the Third Chapter; and he endeavours to prove it; for getting in the mean time, that in the First Chapter of the same Appendix (near the end) he had promised not to deny the First Article of the Church of England, in which it is expresly said, that “God is without Body, and without Parts.”17 But if that Authority,18 which is the only one for which he seems to contend, is of less weight with him, let him hearken to himself, Lib. de Cive c. 15. § 14. where he teaches, “That those Philosophers spoke unworthily of God, who said, that he was either the World itself, or the Soul (that is, a Part) of the World; for they do not attribute any thing to him, but wholly deny his Being.”19 But does not Hobbes affirm him to be “Part of the World,” or “the Whole,” when he says that he is Body? For it is very certain that he has asserted, Leviath. c. 34. “That the Universe is an Aggregate of all Bodies, and that it has no Part, which is not it self Body; and that nothing can be properly called Body, which is not some Part of the whole Universe.”20 But that the World and the Universe, with him signify the same thing, any one will easily perceive, who reads these his Words of the Universe and Stars, Every Object is “either a Part of the Universal World, or an aggregate of the Parts; &c.”21 I am afraid therefore, that he is convicted by his own Authority; “Of denying the Being of God.” But it is not to my purpose, to insist any longer upon these things. I do not however doubt, but that the Properties of Body (such are, to be capable of being measured, and to be divided into Parts, to undergo all the Changes of Generation and Corruption, and to exclude all other Bodies out of its Place) are so well known now-a-days, both to Mr. Hobbes and all others, not to be consistent with the divine Perfections, that it would be easier for him to persuade most Men, “That God did not at all exist,” than, “That he was Corporeal.” This however we are pleased with, that, in contradiction to his own Principles, he professes to believe the Being of God, and acknowledges the Force of the Argument, by which we discover it; for he grants, “That there necessarily exists one first and eternal Cause of all Things.” Leviath. c. 12. § 6.22

And the Authority of the Laws of Nature.But as to the Authority of the Conclusions of Reason flowing from these Principles, (which, tho immediately discover’d by Reason, yet, by the Intervention of that, must appear to proceed from God, who is the Author of that natural Necessity, by which our Reason is determin’d to acknowledge them;) Hobbes is neither consistent with himself, nor with Truth. Leviath. c. 26. § 7. “The Laws (saith he) of Nature, which consist in Equity, &c. in a State of mere Nature, are not properly Laws, but Qualities disposing Men to Peace and Obedience.”23 He gives a Reason for this, “Because a Law, accurately and properly speaking, is the Speech of one, who with Right commands others, to do or for bear any thing.” Hence in the same Place he infers, that, “As they proceed from Nature, they are not Laws.”24As if “God were not properly included in the Name of Nature”; or, as if “a Proposition, the Scope of which consists in declaring to us, what things are to be done, or omitted, under the Reward or Punishment of having our Happiness either increas’d or diminish’d, and which is form’d in the Mind of Man by the Necessity of that Nature which he has receiv’d at the hands of God, were not a sufficient Signification of the divine Will”; or as if “it were not properly enough called, the Speech of him who has a Right to command.” For what else does he who “commands in plain words,” than “make us most assuredly understand, that he has so determin’d concerning our Affairs, that if we act thus, Punishment, if otherwise, Reward is to be the Consequence; and that, in right of the Dominion which he has over us?” In the same place he contends, “That they are not otherwise the Laws of God, than as they are declar’d in Scripture.”25 But if any one inquires, how it appears, “That the Scriptures are the Word of God,” or, “That ever there was at all any Prophet, who either receiv’d them or any other Revelation from God”; in answer to this Question put by himself, he roundly affirms, “That it is plainly impossible, that any Person can be certain of a Revelation made to another, without a Revelation particularly given to himself; no, not even by Miracles.” Leviath. Part 2. c. 26. § 40. of the English Edition.26 Yet he affirms in the same place, “That it is essential to a Law, that the Person to be oblig’d by it be certain of the Authority of the Legislator”:27 And this renders what he says, in the Passage just cited, and in the last Paragraph of the Fifteenth Chapter of his Leviathan, wholly ineffectual. Wherefore, if we will believe him in both places, we shall deny them to be Laws, both as they are from Nature, and as they are revealed in Scripture, because we cannot be certain that those things were revealed; but there ought rather to be no Credit given to what he says, who contradicts himself: For the same Person, (as if he had done it on purpose, that his Readers might conjecture, that one Part of the Contradiction was advanced, out of respect to the Christian Magistrate, the other, from his own real Sentiments,) in the same Treatise de Cive, § next following, and cap. 4. § 1. professes, that “The Law, usually called Natural and Moral, is not unjustly called a divine Law; both because Reason, which is it self the Law of Nature, is immediately given by God, to every one for the Rule of his Actions; and because the Precepts of Life which are thence derived, are the same which were deliver’d from the divine Majesty, for the Laws of the Kingdom of Heaven, by our Lord Jesus Christ, and by the holy Prophets and Apostles.”28 Here truly, (perhaps that his Reader might see how much he can comply with the Manners of those among whom he lives,) he acknowledges “Those Conclusions, not unjustly to be called Laws,” which but a little before he denied, “To be Laws, properly and accurately speaking.” As if, “When he, who is by right a Sovereign, gives immediately to his Subject, a Rule of his Actions with Rewards and Punishments annex’d,” he did not “properly command him, that something should be done or forborn,” or “ordain a Law.”

Nevertheless, his real Sentiments may be discover’d, which, in such Cases, are always on the impious side of the Contradiction.)§XII. But I will insist no longer on shewing these Contradictions; I will only give the Reader this Hint, (which may be every where useful, to his more certain Discovery of this Author’s real Sentiments;) That these latter Passages in favour of moral Rules have this Mark, by which one may guess they were affirm’d for fear of others, he does not offer any Reason to support what he seems to grant. That “Reason was given by God for a Rule of Action,” That “its Conclusions are promulg’d by Revelation,” he elsewhere endeavours, as I have shewn, to disprove by reasoning, tho here he seems to assert it: But to the contrary Positions he has added a Reason, such as it is, from his Definition of a Law; that you might know his real Sentiment to be, “That the Conclusions of Reason, which direct us to Equity, Modesty, and other Virtues, are not” (as they are wont to be esteem’d) “Laws of Nature properly so called.” He here seems to have done, what he says cautious Men do, in another Affair relating to Religion; they speak of God agreeably to the Sentiments of others, “not dogmatically but piously.” Leviath. c. 12. § 7.29

Who (viz. God) has guarded these his Laws, by the double Sanction of Rewards, Internal or Essential, and External or Adventitious.What I propos’d to my self to prove, was only this, “That as the Being of the first Cause, so the Authority, or full Power of Obligation, which the Laws of Nature derive from their Author, may be made appear from the Consideration of the Universe; from whence the first Cause of all is found out.” In the mean time, I take notice also, “That the Laws of Nature have an intrinsecal and essential Proof of their Obligation, taken from the Rewards or Increase of Happiness which attends the benevolent Person from the natural efficacy of his Actions, and follows the Man who studiously observes these Laws; and from the Punishments, or Degrees of Misery, which, whether they will or no, they call upon themselves, who either do not obey, or do oppose, the Conclusions of right Reason.” For the Connexion of these Rewards with Benevolence, which is the Summary of the Laws of Nature, is plainly express’d in the above-mention’d Proposition, by the most happy State of all; and so the want thereof, and Misery, its Opposite, is sufficiently shewn to be the Consequence of the Malevolence of all towards all.

The Terms of the foregoing Proposition, and their Connexion (i.e. Truth,)§XIII. These things being suppos’d, which I have briefly premis’d concerning God, the Author of natural Effects, and, in consequence, of the Laws of Nature; (they being by the Supposition we have just hinted at, in the present State of Things necessarily introduced into the Minds of Men, as soon at least as they come to Years of Discretion;) I shall now proceed to the Distinction and Explanation of the simple Ideas, of which this Proposition and its Corollaries consist; and also of the complex Truth, which arises from the Composition of those Terms. Its Subject is the greatest Benevolence towards all Rationals, which, it is evident, does consist in a constant Volition of the greatest Good towards all, so far as the Condition of our Nature, and of other Things, makes it practicable. In this place it seems proper to consider, how, together with a Knowledge of the visible World, (of which our Body is a part,) is let in upon our Senses and Minds, the Knowledge, (1.) of good Things; (2.) and, more particularly, of those which are common to many; (3.) amongst which one is often greater than another; (and that we call the greatest, than which we can perceive no greater;) (4.) of which we easily perceive that some are daily in our Power, and therefore practicable; some, in certain Circumstances, exceed the narrow Limits of our Faculties.

Become known two ways, to the Vulgar, more confusedly; to Philosophers, more distinctly.But seeing we come at the Knowledge of the Nature of these Things, two ways, (1.) More confusedly, by obvious Experience and daily Observation; (2.) More distinctly, by Contemplation and Philosophical Enquiries, founded upon Experiments cautiously made, and diligently compar’d amongst themselves: By both these Methods we receive some Knowledge of the Laws of Nature. Hence it comes to pass, that they become known, even to the Vulgar, but confusedly and imperfectly, according to the Degree of Knowledge which they have of Nature: But Philosophers must more accurately observe, both the Connexion of the most general Notions, (of which they are composed,) with the universal Causes and Principles of Things, and the Train of Consequences, by which particular Precepts are deduced from the general Fountain of them all; as also their mutual Relation and Rank, according to which one gives place to another; when, in the same case, the Observance of several of them together seems impossible. The former Manner of coming at the Knowledge of the Laws of Nature, I thought not fit to be intirely slighted, because it is that by which almost all Men learn them; and because the Principles, into which Nature is to be philosophically resolved, are so much disputed, that there might be some danger, if I built the Doctrine of Morality upon those physical Principles alone, which I embrace, that many would reject it, for that very Reason, as not agreeing with me in their Natural Philosophy.30 I shall therefore call to mind the common Phaenomena, in which almost all agree; and from them I shall shew briefly in this Chapter, that the Simple Knowledge of the Terms of the aforesaid Proposition, and their Connexion by which they are form’d into a true Proposition, may be deduced.

The former Method.§XIV. All daily behold, “That the Enjoyment of very many Things,” (produc’d upon the Surface of this Earth, and compriz’d under the Name of Victuals, Clothing and Houses,) “and the mutual Assistance of one Man to another, contribute naturally to the Life, Preservation, Strength, Comfort and Tranquillity of Man.” Such kind of Effects we conceive to have this in common, that they agree with that Nature for whose sake they are; that is, we esteem them Good; and so we come to represent that Affection of Man, whence the external Acts, productive of these Effects, proceed, under the Notion of Benevolence. Again, all are sensible, “That this their Benevolence may profit, not themselves only, or a few, but very many, partly by Counsel, partly by Strength and Industry”; and whereas they see others altogether like themselves, they cannot but think “them able to make like Returns,” and consequently, see “much Good and Advantage to each Man, arising from mutual Aid and Assistance, which all must want, and in their stead suffer innumerable Dangers, with extreme Poverty, if each, regarding himself only, were always malevolent to others.” But such Endeavours, profitable to many rational Beings, necessarily produce in the Mind a Notion of common Good, which, from the obvious Likeness of Rationals among themselves, may easily alike regard all, whom we have ever an Opportunity of coming to the knowledge of. To which this also may be added, that it is most obvious, by constant Experience, “That we have it more in our power to assist Men, than other Animals,” to say nothing of the inanimate Kind: for the Nature of Man (and consequently, his Good and Evil) is most known to us, from that Knowledge of ourselves which we cannot avoid; and is also capable of enjoying more good Things, to the Attainment whereof we can lend our Aid; and liable to greater Calamities, in guarding against which, our Power may most usefully be employ’d. Besides, we may procure innumerable Advantages to Men, by our Prudence and Counsel communicated by proper Signs, of which other Animals are wholly incapable.

Moreover, because of the Likeness of the Nature of other rational Agents. “To will such things to them, as we are naturally inclin’d to desire for ourselves, Reason cannot but judge more agreeable to our inward Principles of Action,” (whatever they may be,) “than to desire the like to Beings widely different.” Further, as we perceive our selves more willing to benefit others who are like our selves, we may with reason hope, “That they whom we benefit, will be mov’d with our Benefits, to return us the like, or greater, that they may likewise oblige us.”

Lastly, it is well known by the Experience of all, “That there is no more valuable Possession upon Earth, no greater Ornament or Safeguard, than is the sincere Benevolence of all towards all”; (which is very consistent with a particular Friendship for a few select Persons;) because Men, if they are malevolent, may easily force from others, as all other things, so Life it self. Nor is there a more effectual Method to procure either of these, than “by our Actions to shew the same Affection towards others, that we desire from them,” that is, Benevolence, as occasion offers, towards all, but a more particular Regard and Kindness toward chosen Friends. But if (as is meet, and as is every where the Practice, even of the Vulgar;) we take care “to sollicit the Aid of the first Cause, to the Establishment of human Happiness,” we shall find nothing in ourselves more Divine, by which we may please the Deity, than that sincere and most extensive Love, (of which we have been hitherto discoursing,) which reaches even God himself, as the Head and Father of rational Beings, and all other rational Agents, as his Children, more like to himself than the rest of his Creatures are; and, in consequence, the most dear to him: “For we are his Offspring.” is the Saying of Aratus the Cilician, approv’d by the Athenians, when Heathens.31 I could easily quote innumerable Testimonies to the same purpose, but ’tis folly to light a Candle to the Sun.

Which is as certain and clear, as Mathematical Reasoning.§XV. The things now propos’d concerning human Happiness, appear so plain by common Experience, or obvious Reasoning, that I know nothing belonging to human Nature more evident; and they have the same Respect to the Direction of our Practice in Morality, which the Postulates of Geometricians have to the Construction of Problems; such are for plain Problems, that we can draw a Right Line from any one Point to any other; or that we can describe a Circle with any Center and Radius: And other more difficult ones, for the Construction of solid and linear Problems. In all these Cases are suppos’d Actions, depending upon the free Powers of Men; yet Geometry does not become uncertain, by any Disputes arising from the Explanation of Freewill. The like may be said of Arithmetical Operations; for it is sufficient for the Truth of these Sciences, that the Connexion is inseparable between such Acts (which it supposes may be done, and which we find placed in our power, when we go about the Practice of Geometry,) and the Effects desir’d. And either the Pleasure arising from such Contemplations, or the manifold Uses in Life, are sufficient to invite Men to search after such Effects. By a like Reasoning, the Truth of Moral Philosophy is founded in the necessary Connexion between the greatest Happiness human Powers can reach, and those Acts of universal Benevolence, or of Love towards God and Men, which is branch’d out into all the moral Virtues. But in the mean time these things are suppos’d as Postulates, “That the greatest Happiness they can attain, is sought by Men”; and, “That they can exercise Love, not only towards themselves, but also towards God, and Men, partaking of the same rational Nature with themselves.”

I will here only add,32 “That the same Experience which proves that the Benevolence of each towards all, is the most effectual Cause of the Happiness of the Benevolent, does most necessarily prove, by a Parity of Reason, that the Love of any Number, towards any Number, has an Effect in proportion; and that likewise Malevolence towards all, brings most certain Destruction upon particular Persons, how much soever they may love themselves.” For “what takes away the necessary Causes of Happiness, and places in their stead the Causes of all kinds of Calamities, threatens nothing short of extreme Misery.”

(Hobbes himself allowing the Principles, tho he over-looks their natural Consequence.)§XVI. The justness of this Consequence is every where acknowledg’d by Mr. Hobbes, whilst from his Supposition, “That every one naturally provides for his own Life only, and arrogates to himself a Right over all Things and Persons,” he infers, “A War of all against all,” and then proclaims, “That from thence all kinds of Miseries, even Death it self, hang over the Heads of all.” Nay, he supposes, “That all Men are sensible of this, before they consent to enter into Compacts of Society with others.”33 The Man is very sharp-sighted, in the Causes of Evil, and of Fear; but he is perfectly blind, with respect to the Causes of Good, and the Hopes of Happiness altho these latter are certainly equally obvious, nay first in the Order of distinct Knowledge, because the Causes constituting and preserving the Natures of Things, (which are Good,) come first to be discovered, before the Causes corrupting and dissolving the same, which are call’d Evils. I cannot therefore doubt, but that it is manifest, even to Hobbes himself, that the Study and Pursuit of the common Good, under the prudent Conduct of Reason, avails as much toward the Security and Happiness of all, as the Neglect thereof can toward the Destruction of all, whilst every one is intent upon his own particular Advantage: But, whatever he may think, it is certain, that from ourselves this Truth may be learn’d by every Man of common Sense, that is come to Years of Discretion. For from their Experience, “That the Activity of their Will in procuring Good, is, at proper times, both sufficient to benefit themselves and others,” they cannot but understand, “That a like Will in other Men is neither less effectual, nor less necessary, to the obtaining the same end.” But ’tis tedious to inculcate with many Words a thing so plain; yet I would not pass it over in silence, because all that follows is deduc’d from thence, as presupposed.

But seeing the Deduction of the particular Laws of Nature from this general one, is Matter of philosophical Enquiry, and does therefore belong to the second Method of deducing them, it seem’d proper to premise some Considerations drawn from Natural Philosophy, in order to make it appear, “That a philosophical Contemplation of Nature does very much assist the Minds of Men, in forming a more distinct Notion of that general Law.”

How, in pursuance of the second Method, the Mind comes to form universal ideas,§XVII. In the first place, I think it proper to take notice, “That those more general Notions,34 whose use very frequently occurs in all the Laws of Nature, are observ’d in Things corporeal, and that the Mind may therefore perceive them, even by the assistance of their Senses”: Such are those universal Ideas, of Cause and Effect, and of their connexion; of Number, compos’d of Units, and consequently of Summ, (whence all collective Notions,) of Difference, &c. of Order, of Duration, &c. But, altho I think this Observation conduces much to our present purpose, because such Notions are essential Parts of the Laws of Nature, yet because this is no matter of Debate between us and our Adversaries, and is obvious to all, there is no occasion farther to enlarge upon this Point.

As also, of natural Good and Evil.2dly, Natural Philosophy does very distinctly explain, “What Things, or Powers and Motions of Things, are to others either Good or Evil”; and, “How necessarily and unchangeably this is brought about.” For seeing it is the only Scope of this Science, “To discover the Causes of Generation, Duration, and Corruption,” (all which we behold daily to happen to most Bodies, but especially to Men,) and “To demonstrate the necessary Connexion of such Effects with their Causes”; and seeing it is certain, “That the Causes generating and preserving Man, for example, by Efficacy of which he continues for some time, and flourishes with Faculties, as well of Body as Mind, enlarg’d, and determin’d to their proper Functions, are call’d Good to him,” but “That the Causes of Corruption, Grief, and Troubles, are to him naturally Evil”; it evidently follows, “That Natural Philosophy explains what things are to him naturally Good and Evil, and demonstrates that they are necessarily such.”

I esteem as Parts of natural Science, the Knowledge of all those things, which Nature produces for the Food, Cloathing, Habitation, and Medicine of Man. We may also refer to natural Science, the Knowledge of all human Operations and Effects, of use in human Life: for, altho the voluntary Actions of Men, whose Effects are external, do not take their Rise in the same manner with Motions merely natural, from the impulse of other Bodies, but are determin’d by our Reason and Free-will; nevertheless, since they are true Motions produc’d by, and receive their Measure or Proportion from, the Powers of our Body, which are of the same Nature with the Powers of other natural Bodies, they must, after once they exist, by a like Necessity and altogether in the same manner, as other natural Motions, produce their Effects according to the Laws of Motion. This is most clearly and universally evident, in the Operations of the simple mechanical Powers, (such are the Lever, the Pully, and the Wedge, into which all the rest may be resolv’d,) which (as is well known to all) produce the same Effects, when they are enforc’d by human Strength, as, when, instead thereof, the Weight of inanimate Bodies is apply’d.

Which are such necessarily, and invariably.§XVIII. It is likewise commonly known, “That the Industry of Man, by the Motions of his Body,” (which the Philosopher easily resolves into the mechanic Powers,) “is both able and wont to be subservient to the Preservation of himself and others, in preparing and preserving Victuals, Medicine, Apparel, Houses, and Ships.” Upon these Effects is laid out the whole Power of Man, exerted in Agriculture, Architecture, Ship-building, Merchandizing, and other handycraft Trades, of Smiths, Carpenters, and Weavers. Even the Propagation of the Species, the Suckling and Nourishment of Infants, may be resolv’d into the same Principles, according to Hobbes’s own Confession, to which he has my Concurrence. Nor are those other more liberal Arts, in which, by the help of sensible Signs, articulate Sounds, Letters, and Numbers, the Minds of Men are enrich’d with Sciences, or directed to various Operations, wholly exempt from these Laws of Motion; the natural Powers of our Hands and Mouths, are our Instruments, for Writing, or Speaking, in the making Contracts, in the Distribution, Conveyance, and Preservation of Rights; in which, Justice, the principal Effect of Ethicks and Politicks, almost wholly consists. For, to say nothing of Action, the Power of Words and Letters, which are perform’d wholly by bodily Organs, is not inconsiderable, either in the Instruction of the Mind, or in the Government of the Passions, altho both the first Institution of Words as Signs, and their Choice and Composition, be entirely the Work of the Mind, directing the Imagination and the Tongue; and altho, after Men have heard Sermons, and perused the Laws, they are still left to the free Determination of their own Will. Let us consider, for Example, after what manner Laws written, or spoken, operate. How great soever the Force of these Laws is, it consists entirely in these two Things, the Promulgation, and foreseen Execution of them by the Distribution of the Punishments and Rewards therein express’d: but both these become known to Men, by the help of the Senses, which are affected by corporeal Motions necessarily producing their genuine Effect; which I therefore thought proper here to remark, because, seeing the Promulgation and Execution of Laws are good, that is, conducing, as efficient Causes, to the Happiness of all rational Beings; it may be hence prov’d, “That there are things which are good, necessarily and naturally”; and this could be certainly known, before any Laws at all were made by Men: for these Signs35 conduce to the formation of Mens Manners, after the like manner, as the North-Star, the Observation of the Motion of the other Stars, the Mariners Compass, Sea-Charts, and other Mathematical Instruments, are of use to the Safety of Ships, altho they may thro’ Carelessness be neglected. But the Operation and Concurrence of the Mind with the bodily Powers, to produce these Effects, may be compar’d with the Action of the Steersman, plac’d at the Ship’s Helm, and of the Merchant carried in that Ship, estimating the Prices and Uses of the Lading;36 who can do nothing without the help of an Interpreter, and of Signs; without the Conveniences of Ports and Winds; and unless the Ship be tight in the Seams, and furnish’d with Sails and Rigging; unless also different Countries produce such Merchandizes, as may relieve mutual Wants, which yet, every one must own, depend upon necessary Causes.

37Altho it cannot be imagin’d, “That such Arts had arriv’d to their present Perfection, or even their Improvement and bringing to Perfection could be distinctly foreseen, before Men enter’d into Societies”; yet Mr. Hobbes himself must acknowledge, “That all were appriz’d, mutual Assistance would prove very advantageous”; and “That all were able, sufficiently to make known their Inclinations to others by Signs”: Because he founds Societies upon Compacts, enter’d into for that very Purpose.

By Parity of Reason, all Actions and Motions contrary to these, are naturally and necessarily Evil; such are those, by which human Bodies are brought to decay, either by withdrawing what is necessary to Life and Strength, as Food, Raiment, and Houses; or by introducing hurtful things in their stead: as also those Motions, by which the Minds of Men are debarr’d from Knowledge and Virtue; or, in their stead, Errors and unbridled Affections, which stand in opposition to the common Good, are introduc’d.

And may be common to many.§XIX. When we treat of Good or Evil, with relation to the Laws of Nature, we regard not the Body or Mind of any particular Man, or of a few, (because the Suffering or Punishment of these may sometimes contribute to the public Good;) but the collective Body of all Mankind, as naturally subordinate to God their Governour, which will afterwards be more clearly explain’d. But the Good of the collective Body is no other, than the greatest which accrues to all, or to the major Part of the Whole.

But these things, which I have here enlarg’d upon, concerning the natural Efficacy of many human Actions, to the preserving or assisting others, I have mention’d only for this Purpose, that we might distinctly consider, “How Men, from the Observation of the Faculties of others, may naturally come to the knowledge of Things naturally good, and those both great and necessary; and so be induc’d to do what they have in their power, for the Benefit of the Bodies and Minds of other Men.” It will not now be difficult to shew, “That these Faculties and Actions are not so limited, as to profit one only, but that their Force and Benefit extends to many; so that the Knowledge, Art, and Industry, the Benevolence, Fidelity, or Gratitude of one Man, may gratify very many; and being themselves good and common to many, may naturally imprint upon the Minds of the Observers, an Idea of common Good.” What is more, by means of the Union of the Mind with the human Body, the Power of Man reaches farther, and performs greater Things, than the much greater bodily Force of other Animals. For that Power has invented the Art of Navigation, knows how to enter into and observe Compacts with others at a great Distance, hath shewn us how, by the benefit of Letters and Numbers, to maintain Commerce with the East and West-Indies; and at so great a Distance, can treat of Peace, or wage War: But, of necessity, innumerable Motions must hence be determin’d. Nevertheless, it is not unusual in other Causes, whose Force is only Mechanical, to observe an evident Efficacy, productive of Advantage or Disadvantage to many. This is acknowledg’d, even by the Peripatetic Philosophy, and by common Experience, which shews, “That the Rays of the Sun convey vital Nourishment, to innumerable Vegetables over the whole Earth, and necessary Heat to the Blood of all Animals.” But a more accurate Inquiry into Nature, does upon several Occasions demonstrate, “That every Motion of every corporeal Particle does very widely extend its Force, and consequently, in some measure, however little, necessarily concur with many other Causes, to produce many Effects.” The Proof of this Assertion is easy, nor at all foreign to the matter before us: But because it depends upon Principles which are partly Physical and partly Mathematical, which to most would seem too remote from the Doctrines of Morality, and because it will be readily allow’d, even by our Adversaries, I chose to omit what I had prepar’d upon this Head.38

(It is therefore a Mistake in Hobbes, to assert the variable Nature of Good and Evil, even upon his own Principles.)§XX. This, however, I have here thought fit to take notice of, “That Hobbes, in this matter, seems to grant more than sufficient,” when in the last Paragraph but one, of his Treatise De Corpore, he expressly asserts, “That there can be no Motion in a Medium admitting of no Vacuity, unless the next part of the Medium give way, and so on infinitely, so that the particular Motions of every particular Body contribute somewhat to every Effect.”39 Mean-while he is not aware, that this will thence follow, “That any human Action may, by its own Nature, contribute somewhat to this Effect, viz. The Preservation and Perfection of many, who do not desire it,” that is, may be naturally Good to many. Otherwise, he would not so crudely assert, “That Good respects only him who desires it”;40 and hence infer, “That the Nature of Good and Evil is variable, at the pleasure of single Persons in the State of Nature, and at the pleasure of the Government in every civil State.”41 Which are the fundamental Principles of Hobbes’s Ethicks and Politicks, as I shall shew in the Chapter concerning Good.42

I propos’d in this Place only to shew, “That certain Motions, Powers, and Actions of all Things whatsoever, and consequently also of Men, whence we perceive that something is done tending to the Preservation or more flourishing Condition of others, do naturally imprint upon us the notion of a Good common to many”; and because the Nature of Things will not permit us, to think all kinds of Motions or Actions equally conducive to this End, that therefore Nature does sufficiently instruct us. “That there is a difference between Things good and evil, whether they relate to many, or to Individuals.” Yet further, seeing the Generation, Preservation, and Perfection of natural Bodies, (Men for Instance,) and on the contrary, their Destruction and Corruption, are nothing else than certain Motions, variously complicated, of those Particles whereof they consist, and that all these Motions are produc’d by their Causes, according to the Laws of certain Theorems geometrically demonstrated; it is clearly manifest, “That all things are generated, preserv’d and perfected by their Causes with the same necessity, that these Theorems are geometrically demonstrated to be true.” But the constituting, preserving, and perfecting Causes of Things or Men, are those Things which we call good, and the contrary to these, evil, whether their Efficacy reaches one only, many, or all. Wherefore, supposing “such Motions and Actions, of some Men in relation to others, as we now see tend to their Preservation,” they produce this Effect with the same necessity, that the geometrical Theorems concerning such Motions are true; and therefore they are naturally Good, altho no Laws were yet suppos’d, by which they are commanded.

Therefore Hobbes’s Fiction, “That Good and Evil are changeable,” is perfectly inconsistent with the necessary and immutable Causes, which he every where asserts, of the Being and Preservation of Man. Nor can he come off this by saying, (which yet he often inculcates,) “That before civil Laws there is no measure of Them”; for there is the same measure of Good and Evil, that there is of Truth and Falshood, in those Propositions which relate to the Efficacy of those Motions, that tend to the Preservation or Corruption of other Things, namely, the Nature of Things; and whatsoever Proposition points out the true Cause of Preservation, does at the same time shew, what is true Good.

From the limited Powers of all Finite Beings, appears,§XXI. We have now briefly seen, “How the Nature of Things imprints on us as certain and firm a Knowledge of Good and Evil, even of that which is common to many, as is that by which we know the Causes of Generation and Corruption.” I now proceed to consider, “That the Matter and Motion, in which the Powers of a human Body, as of all other parts of the visible World, do consist, have a finite Quantity, and certain Limits, beyond which they cannot extend themselves.” Whence flow these most evident Axioms concerning all natural Bodies: That the same Bodies cannot at the same time be in more Places than one: That the same Bodies cannot at the same time be mov’d toward several Places, (especially if contrary,) so as to be subservient to the opposite Wills of several Men; but that they are so limited, that they can be determin’d by the Will of one only, unless several conspire to one and the same Effect or Use. Nor is this peculiar to Bodies only, but common to the Minds of Men, and to all created Beings, as being Finite.

1. The Justness and Usefulness of that Distinction of the Stoicks, between Things in our Power, and, out of our PowerFrom hence I would infer two Things, of great Consequence to our Purpose. (1.) That from the Knowledge of Nature, especially that of ourselves, we learn that celebrated Distinction of the Stoicks, between those things which are in our Power, (such are the Actions of our Mind, and some bodily Motions, both which, by the Effects we daily perceive, are obedient to the Will, and thence, by a parity of Reason, we may easily collect, what we shall be able to do hereafter;) and those things which are not in our Power: Such are by far the greatest, and the most, of those Motions which we daily perceive in the Universe, which we (little Animals) cannot obstruct, and by whose Force all things are in a perpetual Change, and which are the continual Sources, even to Men themselves, of the Vicissitudes of Adversity and Prosperity, Birth, Maturity, and Death.43

Which is a great help to Prudence,This Distinction, constantly attended to, is of great use in forming our Manners, and regulating our Affections and Endeavours. For hence we are taught, “Not to seek any other Happiness to alleviate our Labours, than that which arises from a prudent Management of our Faculties, and from those Aids, which we know the Providence of God, in the Administration of the Universe, will afford us.”

And to the Government of our Passions.By this means we are freed from those fruitless Labours, to which vain Hopes sollicit most Men; nor shall we ever disturb our selves upon account of those Evils, which, without our Fault, have hitherto happen’d to us, or may hereafter happen; and so a great part of the Troubles, which usually arise from those restless Affections, Grief, Anger, and Fear, will be prevented. Nor shall we be hence only directed how to avoid Evils, but we shall also be shewn the most compendious Way, by which we may by degrees proceed to the best Things, which are possible to be obtain’d by us, namely, the cultivating our Mind, and the Dominion over our Affections. But I have no purpose to prosecute any farther, this Subject, in this Place.

2. The Necessity of Benevolence, in order to our Happiness.I will only make this Observation, which is to our present Purpose,44 that it is well known by the Experience of all Men, “That the Powers of any single Person, in respect of that Happiness, of which from without he is both capable and stands in need, are so small, that he wants the Assistance, both of many Things and Persons, to lead his Life happily; but that every one can nevertheless afford many Things for the use of others, which himself does not at all need, and which therefore can be of no use to him.” But seeing we are certain, from the known limits of our Powers, “That we cannot compel all those whose Aid we want, (God and Men,) to co-operate with us in the procuring our Happiness”; the only Method we have left to obtain this End, is, “To procure their Good will, by making a tender to them of our Service, and by a faithful Performance.” But, altho that greatest Benevolence, (mention’d in our foregoing general Proposition) consists in a hearty, constant, universal Inclination so to act; and therefore also in Cases, where often no Retaliation is expected, nay, where we know there will be no return of reciprocal Affection: Yet it does not hinder us, from cultivating Friendship chiefly with them, from whom Reason persuades us to hope for the grateful return of a mutual Benevolence.

This is the first Conclusion which I draw from the finite Nature of all Things, of our selves especially. It thence follows,

3. The Necessity of limiting the uses of certain Things, and of human Services, to particular Persons for a limited time.§XXII. Secondly. If Men, or other Things, do, or afford, any thing for the use of Men; such Service or Benefit is naturally and necessarily limited to certain Persons, Times, and Places. Therefore, if right Reason enjoins, “That the Use of Things, or the Services of Men, should be useful to all Men,” it necessarily enjoins, “That, for a certain Time and Place, that use of Things and of human Services should be limited to certain Persons.” The Consequence is manifest, because “That is right Reason in commanding, which commands that to be done, which is possible to be done, according to the Nature of Things.” The Consequence tends to prove, “That a Division of Things, and of human Services, at least for the time they may be of use to others, is necessary for the Advantage of all.”

(Which over-throws Hobbes’s fundamental Principle, of every Man’s Right to every Thing.)And, certainly, that necessary Limitation of the use of one Thing to one Man for the time it benefits any Person, is a natural Division, that is, Separation from the use of any other Person for the same time. It is manifest, that I here call those things one, that are necessarily wholly employ’d, in one use at one time. For other things are likewise call’d one, which at the same time may be of use to many, as one Island, one Wood, &c. concerning whose Division I have yet affirm’d nothing. From the above-mention’d natural Division of Things, and its necessity to the Preservation of all, is deriv’d that primitive Right to Things by first Occupancy, (which is so frequently mention’d by Philosophers and Lawyers, and which they teach is to take place, supposing all things common;) for Right is the Liberty of acting any thing, granted by a Law: But in that suppos’d State there is no other Law, but the Conclusions of right Reason, concerning Actions necessary to the common Good, promulgated by God. Therefore, because right Reason grants, as necessary to the common Good, to every Man the use of Things and human Services, for so long time as such Use is beneficial to him, by that Grant a Right is given him (the first Occupant) to the use of that Thing or Person, for that time. The Will or Benevolence conformable to this Conclusion, is as truly Justice, as that which gives every one his Rights afterwards arising in civil Society. And the same Benevolence, as far as it permits such Rights to every one, and restrains those Affections which have a contrary Tendency, is laudable Innocence. But it is most evident, that no one can in any measure promote the publick Good, except he preserve his Life, Health, and Strength, by the use of Things, and of human Labour; and that therefore such Occupancy of Necessaries is a means plainly necessary to that End. For the Preservation of a Whole, consisting of mutually divided Parts, (such as Mankind is,) consists in the Preservation of the divided Parts, (not to mention any thing now of the Order to be preserv’d among them:) But the Preservation of the divided Parts, that is, of particular Men, requires the divided use of Things and of human Labour; therefore that is necessary to the Preservation of the Whole. Such Division, which is a kind of Property, after things are occupied and applied to uses truly necessary, is very consistent with some Community, like that in Feasts and Theatres; such as several of the antient Philosophers have suppos’d,45 not contrary to Reason indeed, but not very consistent with the sacred History; and directly inconsistent with that Right of all to all, which Hobbes has feign’d, in order to prove, “That, before the Institution of civil Government, preceded a State of universal War, of every Man against every Man; and that then a License of doing any thing against any Man, was both just and necessary.”46

Here may be collected, by the way, “How every Man comes to have a right to preserve his own Life and Limbs,” from this, that these are his most certain Means of serving God and Men, in which consists that common Good, I have been treating of. It is also plain, that the Right of every one is under these Restrictions: (1.) That if Religion, or the publick Welfare of Men, requires it, we be ready to part with the last drop of our Blood: And, (2.) That no innocent Person is to be hurt, to procure to our selves any Advantage.

This is most clearly deduc’d from the Principles which I have here briefly touch’d upon, and overthrows Hobbes’s whole Doctrine of the Laws of Nature and Empire. For the whole of that does first suppose (not prove, nor limit) “A right to preserve this mortal Life, as the Foundation of all natural Laws, and of Society”; and then is intirely employ’d, “In applying to that End some Means, which are often most enormous.” Lib. de Cive, c. i. §. 7. and elsewhere.47

And this is what we must assert, concerning the Original of Meum and Tuum, of Property and Dominion, (in the large Sense of the Words,) without taking into consideration what is reveal’d in the Mosaic History, as those Philosophers necessarily did, who had not receiv’d that Account. But this Example of introducing a Division being given by Nature, it is easy, and agreeable to the Genius of a human Mind, by a parity of Reason, from observing those Inconveniences, which every Man experiences, of holding all things in common, to proceed (for the benefit of all) to a further Division of Things and human Services, and to introduce amore complete Dominion or Property in both, that might be in some respect perpetual.

Whence also is deduc’d the Origin of Property and Dominion.§XXIII. The Reader, I believe, will not expect, “That I should recite all the most grievous Mischiefs, that would arise from a Parity introduc’d amongst all, or from having in common, Wives, Children, and all other Goods,” for of these Mischiefs, others have abundantly treated. See Aristotle, in the second Book of his Politicks, and his Commentators.48 For what he had said of a particular Society, may be easily applied to the general Society, made up of Mankind, the Subjects, and God, the Governour. It is sufficient, that the common Experience of the World teaches us, “That, where any thing is yet left in common, that thing generally comes to a Division, to avoid needless Contentions”: And “That it is a natural Vice, to neglect that which is possess’d in common, and to think he has nothing, that has not the Whole.”49 For the Dangers of Contentions, and Want, the Effect of neglecting to cultivate the Earth, would (especially after Mankind grew numerous, and Vices, arising from Ignorance and a neglect of Discipline, became prevalent) reduce human Affairs to such a State, “That all must see it equally necessary to their common Happiness, to make a Distribution of Things and the Services of Men, which shall be fix’d and valid for the time to come, as to permit the present enjoyment of them to him, who first gets them into his Possession.”

From whence it follows, “That as Nature” (according to what we have above shewn) “confers the right of using Necessaries present, so she does, in the same manner, grant the right of a stated and durable Division of Things, and Offices, which is call’d direct Dominion.” For nothing is more evident, “Than that the future use of Things, or of human Labour, has the same relation to future Life or Health, which the present Enjoyment has to present Life”; there is in both the relation of a necessary Cause. Wherefore the Case is almost the same in this, as in Geometrical Propositions, where from three given Terms a fourth is found; and we may justly think, that Mankind, in a State of Nature, (which Hobbes himself supposes,) may thus reason: As a right to the Life of this Day, proves a right to its necessary preserving Causes, viz. A limited and divided use of Things and of human Labour, whilst they are now at hand; so also a right to Life for the time to come, shews a right to limit the use of Things and Persons for the future. There is no occasion here for artificial Multiplication and Division, which are requisite to find out a fourth Proportional in large Numbers; for such reasoning is obvious to every Man in his Senses, and is daily practis’d by all, even whilst they are not aware of it, nor distinctly dispose the Terms into such an order. I have shewn, that the two first Terms are given by Nature. And it is evident, that the third Term also is given, because it contains nothing that is not known by all. For all Men provide for the future, and suppose it probable, that themselves and other Men, or even their own Posterity, and that of others, shall hereafter continue some time upon the Earth, and have a right of preserving their Life. Nay, to foresee Things future at a great Distance, to be very sollicitous about them, and to inquire into the Causes of such Things as present themselves to his Thoughts, is peculiar to Man above other Animals.50 They will therefore come at the above-mention’d fourth Proportional, which is the certain and limited Causes of preserving their Life for the future, which are no other, than “The divided use of Things, and of human Labour, to be ratify’d and ascertain’d by common Consent for the future,” avoiding all the Hazards of Contention, and banishing that Scarcity, which we suppose Experience taught them to have taken its Rise from a Neglect of the Cultivation of Things.

But such Reasoning from an exact Similitude of Cases is so strong, that in evidence it rivals Euclid ’s Method (Elem. 6.) of finding a fourth Proportional, by drawing a Parallel to a Line given, and in easiness exceeds it; which yet no one will deny to be suggested by natural Reason.51

From this Example of a further Division, appears first, “How from a Change of Circumstances,” (or from a Consideration of some Things, which, not being essential, are not contain’d in the primary and universal Notion of Mankind;) “human Actions of a new kind may become necessary to the publick Good”: And secondly, “After what manner, from such Necessity, arises a Right,” (antecedent to the Institution of Civil Government,) “to perform such Actions.”

And of a Right to self-preservation, and self-defence.Nor upon these Suppositions, will there be any Right to do any thing, except what right Reason declares to be necessary to the common Good, or at least consistent with it; of which the first is therefore commanded by Reason, the last permitted, which I shall explain more at large in the Chapter of the Law of Nature. This, however, I thought proper here carefully to inculcate, “That all Right, even to the Use of those Things, which are absolutely necessary to every one’s Preservation,” (as it is distinguish’d from the mere force of seizing those Things, in which Sense only its Original is here inquir’d into,) “is founded in the Command, or at least in the Permission, of the Law of Nature,” that is, of right Reason, pronouncing concerning those things which are necessary to the common Good, according to the Nature of Things; and that therefore it cannot be known, “That any one has a Right to preserve himself, unless it be known, ‘That this will contribute to the common Good,’ or That it is at least consistent with it.” But, if this be the Rise of our Right to our own Preservation, our Powers will be hereby so limited, that we may not invade the equal Rights of others, nor break forth into a War against all; that is, make an Attempt towards the Destruction of all.

In short, I affirm first, “That a Right,” (distinguish’d from mere Power,) “even to Self-defence, cannot be understood without Respect had to the Concessions of the Law of Nature, which consults the Good of all”; and that all solid Arguments, “by which any one can claim any Right to himself,” do prove, “That there is such a Law, and that it is at the same time of equal Force to the Protection of others.” But secondly, since the Right to the making such a Division can only be deduc’d from a Care of the common Good, it manifestly follows, that the Dominion of God over all Things is preserv’d unviolated; and that, from this Principle, no Right of Dominion can accrue to any Man over others, which will license him to take from the Innocent their Necessaries; but on the contrary, that the Right of Empire is therefore given to them, that the Rights of all may be protected from the Evils of Contention, and may be encreased, as far as the Nature of Things, assisted by human Industry, will permit.

A brief Deduction of the principal particular Laws of Nature.§XXIV. Having already briefly deduced, from the Law which commands an Endeavour to promote the common Good, the Property of particular rational Beings, at least in things necessary, some Right is granted, which every one may justly call his own; and, by the same Law, all others will be obliged to yield that to him, which is usually included in the Definition of Justice.52

Justice;It seems moreover proper, more distinctly to shew, “what kind of Actions have a natural Tendency to promote the publick Happiness”; for thence will appear, both what Actions are commanded, and what permitted to Individuals.

Abstaining from,It is manifest, First, That to abstain from hurting any innocent Person, is necessary: For the Damage of any Part is a detriment to the Whole, unless it be inflicted as a Punishment, for some Crime committed against the publick Welfare. Hence all Invasion of another’s Property, is prohibited; for all Damage done to the Mind, Body, Goods, or good Name of any Person, is a Loss to the Publick.

And repairing, Injuries;Hence also the same natural Law, which requires to give every one his own, must, for the publick Good, command Reparation of Injuries.

Secondly, It is manifest, that this greatest and noblest End cannot be obtain’d by a bare Abstaining from doing Evil; but it is necessary, that every one contribute his Share, by a true, certain, and constant Application, as well of Things external, as of his Powers, towards the gaining this Point. For, otherwise, neither will the publick Happiness, nor our own, be the greatest we can effect.53 It is upon this account a natural Precept, that if at any time, (the Nature of the chief End so requiring it,) we should transfer to another some Right of ours, either by Gift, at present, or by Promise, or Compact, afterwards to be perform’d; we make that Transfer validly and faithfully, and not with an Intention to deceive;Liberality; making, and faithfully performing Promises and Compacts; for it is only such a firm transferring of any Thing, or of our Services, to the Use of another, as I have mention’d, which can at all conduce to the End commanded us. Hence arises the obligation to make and keep promises; but our Pains is most wisely and happily laid out, in the prosecution of the common Good of all rational Beings, if we observe the following Order in our Actions.

Piety, Loyalty, Gratitude to Parents, Benefactors, and Ambassadors;We should, first, perform what is acceptable to the intelligent Agents,54 who are Causes of the common Good, and, consequently, of our own; that is, every one should take care to make himself acceptable to God, to Princes, and the whole Body of the State, (upon supposition that there are such in being,) to Parents, to Benefactors; but especially to Negotiators of Peace, or Ambassadors.

Self-Preservation and Improvement;Secondly, Every one should study his own Preservation, and further Perfection; but always preserving the Rights of others, by that Innocence which I have already shewn to be commanded. Hither I refer our being oblig’d to study the Improvement of our Minds, with all useful Knowledge and Virtue, and to preserve the Life, Health, and Chastity of our Bodies.

Natural Affection;Thirdly, Men should provide for their Families and Offspring, because (to omit, that they are the Substance of their Parents, form’d into the same Species with them, whence they may justly claim to themselves the Rights of human Nature) they are the only Prop of the approaching old Age of the present Set of Men, and by them only we can hope to raise a succeeding Generation. To this Care of our Offspring, I refer Love towards our Kindred, (who are the Offspring of our Parents,) and towards our whole Posterity.

And Humanity, towards All;Fourthly, Every one should study to make himself acceptable to all others, by good Offices, and to benefit others, without the detriment of any, by all Acts of Humanity, as they are called, such as, to shew the way, to raise the Fallen, &c. in proof whereof there is no Occasion to add any thing farther, than that, in order to the preservation of any aggregate Body, whose Parts are transient, (as is the Case of all Mankind,) it is necessary, “That the Causes of its Corruption, especially those which happen to its inward Parts, be taken away; that there be a certain Communication of Motion between its Parts; that its Causes of Preservation, and all its essential Parts, be cherish’d, not only those which are at present, but also those which shall hereafter be produc’d, by the Motion which is intrinsick to that aggregate Body; and that its Parts and Motions, which have a less Proportion to the Whole, give way to those which have a greater Proportion to the same.” For scarce any thing can be prov’d more plainly, than this general Proposition, which immediately flows from the Definitions of Things preservative and destructive,55 of Whole and Part, of Cause and Effect; and yet in all things suits with those Particulars, which, in the foregoing Section, I affirm’d to be necessary to the Preservation of Mankind.

This illustrated by various Examples from Nature, of the Contrivance of its Author, for the Preservation of the whole, with respect, 1. To Individuals;§XXV. But, lest any thing should be wanting, which might suggest such Thoughts to the Minds of Men, and might demonstrate their necessary Connexion among themselves, Nature lays before us a sufficient Number of Examples, in Beings of various Kinds. Let the Nature of any Animal be consider’d, as an Aggregate made up of Parts very different, that defends it self, for the time appointed by universal Nature, by the Methods already mention’d; (1.) By expelling, according to its Power, those Things which are hurtful, which it diligently separates from the vital Nourishment; (2.) by circulating the Blood, and perhaps other useful Fluids, as the Lymph, the Bile, and the nervous Juices; (3.) by repairing what is wasted, by a new Succession of like Parts; (4.) and by the mutual good Offices of every Part, perform’d according to the general Laws of Motion, which nevertheless hinder not, but that each may take to themselves what is sufficient for their proper Nourishment and Strength.

2. To Animals of the same Species;If we turn our Eyes to the mutual Behaviour of different Animals, but of the same Kind; it is evident, that they continue their Species, by a certain kind of Innocence, Retaliation of Benefits, limited Self-Love, and a most powerful Love of their Offspring.

• Parcit cognatis maculis similis fera.

• Juv. Sat. 15.56

3. To the Frame of the visible World.Lastly, If we consider this visible World, with Des-Cartes and others,57 as a most exquisite Machine, we may perceive, that this our Vortex is no otherwise daily preserv’d, than by resisting some contrary Motions of the neighbouring Vortices; by changing or removing Bodies of Figures or Motions less agreeable; by a circular Motion of the Parts; by propagating the different Species of Things, by such kind of Motions, as those by which it has produc’d the Individuals which now are; and by causing its Parts to yield to one another, according to the Proportion which their Dimensions and Motions have to one another, and to the Whole. But I am determin’d, not to insist upon such Hypotheses, altho I know, that we may fairly reason from them, provided the natural Laws of Motion be exactly observ’d in them; and I dare affirm, that has been perform’d by Des-Cartes, with great Care and Exactness, in most Parts of his Hypothesis. Howbeit, whatsoever Hypothesis be assum’d, in order to explain the Phaenomena of Nature, such Laws of Motion must of necessity be allow’d, as, amidst all natural Changes, preserve the State of the System of the World, by such Methods as I have mention’d. Such being the Case, it is manifested by a most illustrious Example, what things are necessary to the Preservation of the greatest and most beautiful aggregate Body; the Consideration whereof cannot but most certainly convince Men, “That human Actions, not unlike these, may be the no less proper Causes of preserving the whole System of Mankind, and making them happy.” Upon which account I am of opinion, that it would not be unprofitable to consider the special Laws of Motion, from the necessary Observance whereof the above-mention’d general Effects arise: But because this is too remote from my present chief Aim, the Philosophical Reader is referr’d, either to his own Experience, or to Galileus, Des-Cartes, Wallis, Wren, and Huygens, all celebrated Writers.58 But all these Theorems, or Laws of Motion, may be deduced from this Supposition, “That Motion is not annihilated, after it has been impress’d upon Matter by the first Cause”: And for this very Reason. “That it exists in a World that admits no Vacuum, it is necessarily still further propagated, till it return into it self”:59 And, on the contrary, the Truth of this Supposition is demonstrated, by all the Theorems of Motion observ’d in Nature, by the help of the Senses. It is sufficient for my present purpose, that, in what State soever Men are suppos’d to exist, the Power of doing those things which I have mention’d is plainly necessary to be permitted them, that the collective Body or Race of Men may be preserv’d; and that the Will to do so is no less necessary to the actual Happiness of Men: And to these Heads may be reduc’d whatever is necessary to this Effect.

How it appears to be the Will of God, that we should promote the publick Good, i.e. be Virtuous.§XXVI. What I have hitherto said, concerning the necessary Connexion between the aforesaid Actions and the common Good, is advanc’d with this View, “To fix unchangeably, by their Relation to this Effect, the Nature of those human Actions, wherein Piety, Probity, and every Virtue consists”; for the Relation between entire adequate Causes (that is, Causes consider’d in all their Circumstances requisite to Action) and their Effects, is wholly immutable. In every State, as well of holding Things in common, as of divided Property, such a Course of Life, as deceives no Man by Lyes or Perfidiousness, as injures no Man in his Life, Reputation, or Chastity, as makes Returns of Gratitude to Benefactors, and provides for himself or his Posterity, without hurting another, always has been, and will be, a Cause of the common Good, and is therefore to be distinguish’d by the Name of Virtue. This is only to be taken care of, that we have in view an Effect great enough, that is, that some Advantage accrue to the Whole, or, at least, that it suffer no Damage, whilst we endeavour to gratify a Part; whatsoever is acted otherwise, is to be look’d upon as Vice. And because the Nature of Things makes known to Men, “That by such Actions the common Good” (in which their own proper Happiness is contain’d) “may be obtain’d, and that in the highest degree, that is to them singly possible; but that contrary Actions do likewise make Men miserable; and that these things are so, because of the Connexion made by the Will of the First Cause, between such Actions and their Effects”; it evidently follows, “That Men are oblig’d, by the same Will of the First Cause, to exercise Virtue, and Shun Vice; under the Penalty of losing Happiness, or for the Hope of acquiring it.”

1. From the Evils necessarily connected with a vicious Action.Innumerable Evils, to the Doer himself, naturally attend every Action injurious to others; for he himself, because he contradicts better practical Principles, (which are known to himself,) sets his own Mind at variance with itself, so as to be Self-condemn’d; and he that but once delivers himself up to the Conduct of Rashness and of blind Affections, rather than to the Counsel of his own Reason, will, for the future, be more easily hurried away by them, whence he will at last with ease procure his own Ruin: He sets others also an Example, which may be highly prejudicial to himself: He increases Suspicion and the Causes of Distrust, the Inconveniencies of which he will some time or other experience. Nay, further, every vicious Action may be said to contain all that Punishment, to inflict which, it will excite any rational Agents, out of their regard to publick or private Good, in order to restrain Malefactors.

2. From the Punishments inflicted, for evil Actions, by other rational Beings,Now this Influence of Actions, to excite Observers to inflict Punishment, tho it extends only to rational Natures, God and Men, yet is of great moment, and ought always to be consider’d, before we undertake any Action, lest we should thereby, even unwillingly, draw Destruction upon our own heads; because our whole Hope depends upon God and Men, who judge of the Merit or Demerit of our Actions, by their Relation to the common Good.

Whether God,“That God is privy to, and punishes, the most concealed Wickedness,” perhaps I should seem impertinent, if I went about to prove, after so many Philosophers, antient and modern, and also so many Christian Fathers; especially since he, whose Opinions I am now examining, does no where, that I know of, deny it. Nevertheless, the manner, by which we naturally come to the Knowledge of this, I shew afterwards, where I more fully set forth my Opinion, concerning the Obligation of the Laws of Nature.60

or Men.Besides, the Author of no Villany can be secure; because Men (whose Interest it is universally, that a most extensive Benevolence, and that Justice should take place) may come to the Knowledge of, and punish, the most secret Crimes, which may be discover’d a thousand ways, that no one can avoid. Wicked Persons have often betray’d themselves in their Dreams, in their Ravings, in their Cups, or in a sudden Fit of Passion.61 And this even Epicurus and his Followers have confess’d; they, who have used great Endeavours to shake off the Fears of a divine Providence, have yet frequently own’d, that the Fear of Man cannot be shook off: The Reader may have recourse to the fundamental Maxims of Epicurus, with Gassendus’s Notes.62 I will add only this, that, beside the divine Vengeance, which the Conscience of almost all wicked Men dread, as the Avenger of the most secret Crimes, among Men, consider’d even out of a State of civil Government, Revenge generally follows any Act of Wickedness, after it has been discover’d. For seeing it is the Interest of all, “That Crimes should be punish’d,” any Person, that is able, has a Right to exact those Punishments, which a regard to the publick Good requires should be taken by some body. For, by the Supposition, all Inequality among Men being taken away, that Saying of the Latin Poet takes place, I am a Man, and therefore no Calamity that befals Mankind seems to me indifferent.63

(Hobbes is inconsistent with himself, in denying the foregoing Obligation of the Laws of Nature, in a State of Nature;)Nor certainly can Hobbes, who says, “That every Man has in that State a Right of warring against all,” justly deny him the Sword of Justice to punish Crimes. Nor do I see any just Reason why he (who teaches, that the obligatory Force of Civil Laws proceeds from the Punishments annex’d, and the Fear thence arising) should not allow some Obligation to accrue to the Laws of Nature, even to external Actions, either from the Punishments which Conscience foresees will be inflicted by God; or even from the Punishments which any Man, in a State of Nature, has a Right to exact from the Transgressor of Nature’s Laws. Truly, the hands of so many Avengers were to be fear’d, and it were strange, if none of them were sufficiently furnish’d with Strength and Courage, so as to be both able and willing to revenge a Contempt of the common Good. But even Hobbes himself does elsewhere (Leviathan, Chap. 31. near the End) acknowledge, that we may observe such natural Punishments; and asserts, that they follow Crimes not by positive Appointment, but by Nature. “There is (saith he) no Action of Man in this Life, that is not the beginning of so long a Chain of Consequences, as no human Providence is high enough to give a Man a Prospect to the End. And in this Chain, there are link’d together, both pleasing and unpleasing Events, in such manner, as he that will do any thing for his Pleasure, must engage himself to suffer all the Pains annex’d to it; and these Pains are the natural Punishments of those Actions, which are the beginning of more harm than good. And hereby it comes topass, that Intemperance is naturally punish’d with Diseases, Rashness with Mischances, Injustice with the Violence of Enemies, Pride with Ruin, Cowardice with Oppression, negligent Government of Princes with Rebellion, and Rebellion with Slaughter; for seeing Punishments are consequent to the Breach of Laws, natural Punishments must be naturally consequent to the Breach of the Law of Nature, and therefore follow them, as their natural, not arbitrary, Effects.”64 But this same Philosopher of Malmsbury, altho he asserts a War of all against all in that State, hath entirely overlook’d this Cause of War, that they might punish Crimes against the publick Good, or defend it against Invaders; yet he sets all a fighting, to take from others what they are either justly possess’d of, or lay claim to.65 And whereas the immediate effect of the Right to punish, for example, an Invader, be an Obligation to abstain from that Crime, Hobbes does indeed acknowledge the Cause, viz. that all have a Right to punish, by acknowledging their Right to War, but does not see the Effect, viz. the Obligation thence arising, or rather discover’d. He acknowledges almost all Virtues to be necessary to Peace and mutual Defence, and that Men do agree, that this State of Peace is good, and that War (in which is included the Right of punishing Offences) has a natural Connexion with the neglect of moral Virtues; and yet he does not see, that Men are obliged, for fear of that War as of a Punishment, to the outward Acts of those same Virtues, whose inward Acts only will not preserve Peace and mutual Defence, which Nature dictates are to be pursued. Compare Chap. 3. § 27. with § 31.66

Upon a mistaken Notion, of all Mens Right to all Things, which is here examin’d;§XXVII. But because, from this general consideration of all things, I have briefly shewn, “That it is necessary to the common Good, that all Rationals should constantly desire, that the use of Things and the mutual Services of Men, at least for the time in which they may be of advantage to particular Persons, should be divided or look’d upon as their Property”; and also, “That this Dictate of Reason declares Rewards to those who observe it, and Punishments to those who violate it; and that the same is necessarily impress’d upon the Minds of Men, and has therefore God, the Author of all natural Effects, for its Author and Enforcer,” in which the whole Power of a Law is contain’d; it will not be improper to examine likewise briefly Hobbes’s Assertion, concerning the Right of all Men to all Things: for as we think, that the Foundation of universal Justice, and consequently of all Virtue, is establish’d by our Doctrine; so we are of opinion, that the same is entirely overthrown (as far as in him lies) by these his contrary Notions. Hobbes affirms, That “in a natural State” (that is, without the civil Authority) “every one has a Right to all Things”; which he thus explains, that “every one has a Right to do whatsoever, and against whomsoever, he pleases,” or “to have and to do all things,” as he says in the Conclusion of that Article.67 That this monstrous License is necessarily contain’d in the Law of Nature, he in the same place endeavours to prove, from what he had advanc’d in the ninth Article, and in the rest, from the seventh to the end of the Annotation subjoin’d to the tenth; which because I think not worth while to transcribe word for word, the Reader is desir’d attentively to consider, whether I have not justly reduc’d their whole force into this Syllogism. In a State of Nature every one has a Right to, or may lawfully have, all things, and do all things against all, which he himself shall judge necessary to his own Preservation. But every one will judge it necessary to his own preservation, to have all things, and to do all things against all. Therefore every one has a Right to, or may lawfully, do thus.68

But lest any one, perhaps, should not have Hobbes’s Treatise at hand, and to avoid Suspicion, that I have not fairly stated his Argument, I will transcribe the Abridgment of this Reasoning of Hobbes’s, which he himself has set down in these words, in his Annotation upon c. 1. §. 10. “Every one has a right to preserve himself, by Art. 7. Therefore he has a right to make use of all the means necessary to that End, by Art. 8. But the Means necessary are those, which he shall judge such,” by Art. 9. Therefore he has a Right to do, and to possess all things, which he himself shall judge to be necessary to his own Preservation. “It is therefore by the Judgment of the Doer, that what is done, is either rightfully or wrongfully done; it is therefore rightfully done. Therefore it is true (which I propos’d) that in a State of Nature every one has a right to do all things against all, &c.”69 From that last Consequence, “Every one has a right to do and to possess all things, which he himself shall judge necessary, &c. therefore every one has a right to possess and to do all things against all”; it is manifest, that this Minor Proposition is to be understood: But to possess all things, and to do all things against all, every one will judge necessary to his own Preservation; for otherwise the Conclusion would not follow from the given Major. But both the Premises of that Syllogism are false; and, in the first place, that Minor which is understood, which he seems to presume to be so evident, that he does not so much as mention, much less prove it; unless perhaps he thinks it sufficiently prov’d, from what he had said in the 7th §, That “every one is carry’d to the Desire of that which is good to himself, and that by a natural Necessity, not less than that by which a Stone is carry’d downwards”;70 for I do not see, even tho this be granted, “Why every one should judge every Good to be necessary to himself.” Certainly Hobbes himself elsewhere (c. 1. § 4.) grants concerning some, that they think otherwise, in these words; “For another, according to natural Equality, permits to the rest all those things which he claims to himself, which is the Part of a modest Man, and one who rightly estimates his own Strength.”71 Certainly, if he judges according to right Reason, who permits to others like things with himself, whosoever will arrogate all things to himself, as necessary to his own Preservation, can acquire no right to himself by such his irrational Judgment; for Hobbes himself has defin’d “Right to be a Liberty of using our natural Faculties according to right Reason.”72 Therefore no one will have a Right to disturb that natural Equality, which he had but just before confess’d that right Reason dictates. But if Individuals judg’d according to right Reason, at the same time that they determin’d, “That a plenary Disposition, Use, and Enjoyment, of all Things and Persons, according to their several Wills, tho perfectly contrary to one another, was necessary to the preservation of each particular Person”; it might be concluded, “That the matter were so”; for the matter is always as right Reason pronounces it. But, on the contrary, the Nature, both of all Bodies and of Motion, and common Experience, testify, “That it is impossible that any body” (much less that all) “should at once be subject to so many contrary Motions, as there would be contrary Wills of Men, concerning its Use; and therefore that that is, in the Nature of Things, impossible, which Hobbes supposes each particular Person to judge, according to right Reason, necessary.”

And which he endeavours to support by a groundless Supposition, That every Man has a Right to what he himself shall judge necessary to the Preservation of his Life,§XXVIII. My Readers now, I suppose, perceive the Reason, why I rank’d that common Observation, that the Powers and Uses of things are limited, amongst the Notions chiefly necessary to the Knowledge of the Laws of Nature: for hence both a fundamental Error of Hobbes is detected, and a most useful Truth is inferr’d, “That both the Uses of Things, and Services of Men, are necessarily to be divided, or to be determin’d to one Person for one time, if we design they should effect any thing at all; and consequently, if we would promote the publick Good”: Hence also, when many have a like Right to Things to be enjoy’d in common, the first Occupant has always the Preference.73

And so much may suffice concerning the Minor of the foregoing Syllogism, that it contradicts the most general Notions upon which Laws are founded; but the Major of that Syllogism is more diligently defended by Hobbes, and is by us therefore more at large to be confuted. But it cannot be done here so pertinently, because the Nature of this Right cannot be so distinctly understood, unless the Knowledge of the Law of Nature be first suppos’d. Wherefore Hobbes seems to have transgress’d the Rules of Method; who, altho he openly acknowledges, that by the Name of “Right,” he understands a “Liberty left by the Laws”;74 yet supposes it in Men, and sets forth to them its vast extent, before he explains even Natural Laws: and yet it is certain, that, without respect had to them as prior, what Right is cannot be understood; which very thing has given occasion to many of his Errors. But that Hobbes has thus transgress’d, may be understood from his Definition, who has defin’d “Right” to be “A liberty of using the natural Faculties according to right Reason”; which is the very Law of Nature, by him not yet explain’d, c. 1.§7.75 Notwithstanding, because this Syllogism is before us, we will briefly consider how he proves the Major, in order to make the Falshood of it more evidently appear. His Proof of it, reduc’d by me into the Form of a Syllogism, stands thus: Every one has a Right to possess all Things, and to do against all what the Judge shall have judg’d necessary to the Preservation of every one’s Life: But what he himself shall judge necessary, that the Judge judges necessary to his Preservation; for he himself is the Judge of those things which are necessary to his own Preservation, Art. 9. Therefore, &c. The Sense of the major Proposition is contain’d in these words, which are found Art. 10. “But we suppose himself Judge, whether these things conduce to his Preservation or no; so that those things are to be look’d upon as necessary, which he himself judges to be such. And by Art. 7. Those things are, and are esteemed to be, according to the Law of Nature, which necessarily conduce to the defense of a Man’s proper Life and Limbs.”76

Which ought to be parted with for a greater Good;But I affirm that Major to be false, (I.) Because Life it self is to be parted with for a greater good, such as the Salvation of a Man’s Soul, the Glory of God, and the common Good of Men. These are not to be given up, altho it were necessary to the Preservation of Life. (2.) Because a Judge may in the State of Nature falsly affirm those things to be necessary, which really are not necessary.Nor does his mistaken Judgment of the Means necessary to that End, alter the unalterable Nature of Things. Nor can any Reason be given, “Why in a State of Nature the Sentence of a Judge should have power to confer a Right upon any one, if that Sentence disagrees with the Rule according to which Judgment ought to be given.” But the Laws of Nature, and the Nature of Things, whence they are drawn, are the Rule of Judgment in that State; so that it will come to the same thing, which of these two we take for the Standard of Judgment. No State can be imagin’d, in which there is either no Rule of Judgment, or wherein things immediately become such, as the Mind shall rashly determine. The usefulness of things to the preservation of human Life, much more their Necessity to that End, depends upon the natural Powers of things, nor can be chang’d at the Pleasure of Men. If any one, in a State of Nature, should have judg’d Wolfsbane to be a wholesom Herb, or even necessary to the Nourishment of his Body, and should therefore have gorg’d himself with its Juice, it will not therefore become wholesom Nourishment, but will kill him, notwithstanding the Opinion of the Judge to the contrary. Nor is the Efficacy of those things less determin’d, which are good or evil to the whole collective Body of Men, whether they be voluntary human Actions, (concerning which the Laws of Nature, or moral Philosophy pronounces,) or whether they be the natural Powers of Meats and Drugs, (in which Medicine instructs us;) nor are they chang’d by the Opinions of Men, however they may be Judges, from whom no Appeal is permitted. According to the same unalterable Laws of Motion act all those universal Causes, which at once profit or hurt many, as doth any particularCause, Wolfsbane for instance, when it takes away the Life of one only.77

The Rise of Hobbes’s Error, “That a mistaken Judgment, in a State of Nature, confers a Right,” proceeds from the obligatory Force of even the unjust Sentence of a civil Judge, for Reasons which will not hold in a State of Nature.§XXIX. But this Error of Hobbes, concerning the Force of that Sentence (which falsly pronounces a Dominion over all Things and Persons to be necessary to Self-preservation) to give any Persons such a prodigious Right, has arisen hence, that in civil Society he observ’d, “That the Sentence of the supreme Judge bound the Subjects, however it may have been given contrary to what the Nature of the Case requir’d.” But this (which is supported only by a probable Foundation) has been introduc’d by the Consent of Parties, to put an End to Contentions in civil States. Nor is the Sentence of a Prince of so great efficacy, as to make things in their own Nature impossible, or not necessary to the Preservation of the Life of any Person, become necessary to that end.78 It does indeed transfer Property, which Subjects are oblig’d not to resist; for all Subjects are oblig’d to acknowledge the supreme Judge (whenever there is occasion) as an equal Arbitrator to all, and in Law-suits are understood to have subjected themselves to his Arbitration. This Judge is supposed to be chosen out of the most skilful Lawyers, so as to be able, and to be under the Obligation of an Oath, so as to be willing, to give Sentence according to the known Laws, the Allegations, and the Evidence.

But all think with themselves, “That this conduces more to the common Happiness, That a few should suffer that Evil, which may follow from an unjust Sentence, (which will sometimes happen, notwithstanding the above-mention’d Precautions,) than that Strifes should never be ended, but by Wars.” So that a greater care of the publick Good, than of the Life of any particular Person, may be suppos’d as the Foundation of this Prerogative granted to the ruling Powers in States.79 But in a Stateof Nature, (which Hobbes supposes and defines to be the Condition of Men out of civil Society,) it is manifest, that these Considerations can have no place: for where every one is a Judge, there no Skill or Probity can be suppos’d, by which the Judge excels others; no Power of citing Witnesses, and of doing those other things which are requisite to come at the exact Knowledge of a Cause; as is the Case of civil Judgments. There is no Agreement of all in the State of Nature to be suppos’d, by which particular Persons should trust both themselves, and such things as are necessary to them, to the publick determination and integrity of supreme Powers. Nor is there at all any Reason, why this great Privilege of the chief Magistrates should be indulg’d to particular Persons in a State of Nature, however ignorant and wicked. On the contrary it is evident, that the State of Nature affords no other final Determination of any doubtful Case, except that Evidence which arises from Things themselves, or from Testimony, by which the Mind of Man is freed from all Scruples, and is fully satisfy’d that it is not deceiv’d; and that there could be no end of a Dispute among several, unless one Part willingly came into the Opinion of the other, being thereunto moved, either by the weight of Reason, or thro’ an Opinion of the other’s Knowledge and Veracity: for this is evident from the Nature of Judgment, (of which we are every one of us conscious within our own Breasts,) that its Doubts cannot be clear’d by any coercive Power, but by Arguments only, and that they are all deduc’d from the Nature of Things, or from the Authority of the Teacher, which the Learner receives as authentick. Nature acknowledges a Distinction between true and false Judgment, right Reason, and that which is corrupted; and Truth and right Reason have this Privilege, that Man has a natural Right to do those things which they command; for the very Definition of Right declares it to be nothing else but a Liberty of using our natural Faculties according to right Reason:80 But Error, or a false Judgment of the Mind, whether it be concerning things necessary to support Life, or other matter of Practice, gives no one a Right of doing that which he falsly thinks necessary to be done, in order to preserve his Life: for the Reason of him who is in an Error, is not right; nor can any one use his Faculties according to right Reason, (which is to act by Right,) whilst he acts according to Error, which contradicts it. It is therefore a gross Error of Hobbes, when he teaches, “That all things are to be look’d on as necessary to any Man’s Preservation in a natural State, which he himself judges necessary; and that therefore every one has a Right to all things, and to do any thing against every Man.” But it was particularly a shame for Hobbes to commit such a Mistake in this Matter, or in this Place:

First,81 Because it was absurd to ascribe to any Man in a State of Nature, that which is the peculiar Privilege of a civil State, even there where he pretends to treat with the greatest accuracy of the difference of these two States:

Secondly, Because he boasts to have demonstrated that to be necessary, which is naturally impossible, That the same Body should be mov’d towards parts diametrically opposite, according to the opposite Wills of Men; for that Conclusion will justly cause the truth of the Premisses to be suspected:

Thirdly, Because every thing that is particular to Hobbes in Politicks falls to the ground, when this Foundation is taken away; for that State of War vanishes, whose necessary Connexion with a State of Nature he hath hence inferr’d, Art. 12. where he hath rashly concluded, “That every one, from his own arbitrary Opinion, has a Right to invade all others; and that likewise every one has a Right of resisting, whence War ariseth.”82 All the rest likewise fall to the ground, which he thinks he has demonstrated from these Principles: but there will be a more convenient Opportunity for refuting these, when I shall have more fully propos’d better, Principles, whence both the Laws of Nature take their Rise, and a Liberty is left within the Bounds prescribed by them.

By means of which Error, Hobbes proposes Means that are impossible, as necessary to obtain an End, which is too narrow.I will only mention this by the way, “That Hobbes has propos’d too narrow an End on this first Head now under examination, viz. the mere Preservation of Life and Limbs”; for Men may be very miserable, tho these were safe. “The Means by him requir’d are likewise too narrow, viz. only Necessaries, c. 1. § 8.”83 For this World, whose Inhabitants we are born, and which first offers it self to our Consideration, supplies us with things innumerable, which solicit the Mind to the acknowledging and honouring its first Cause; and which, with regard to our selves, are subservient to the Perfections of the Mind, and do not only preserve the Life of the Body, but also contribute sufficiently to its Health, Strength, Activity, Beauty, and Ornament. All these, as well as the Necessaries of Life, do afford both Matter to the Laws of Nature, directing us in their Use, and Room for the exercise of Liberty, according to right Reason. But seeing these are manifest, from so superficial an Observation, that Hobbes could not be ignorant of them, any one may easily conjecture, for what cause he assign’d no larger Bounds to Right and the Laws of Nature, than the Preservation of this frail Life; as if Men, like Swine, had Souls given them only, instead of Salt, to preserve the Body from Putrefaction;84 and in the mean time, to obtain so diminutive an End, has given every one all things as means necessary; so that here he has been as faulty in excess, as there in defect: nor can any one more shamefully transgress the Rules of right Reason, than by neglecting the best End, and by looking on things impossible as means necessary.

Nor can such a Right of all Men to all things be prov’d, from an original holding all things in common;§XXX. Vain is Mr. Hobbes’s Attempt to maintain or prove this absurd Right of all Men to all Things, from that primitive holding things in common, which some Philosophers suppose, and some Histories have affirm’d:85 For besides that Mr. Selden hath taught, and prov’d from the divine Donation, Gen. i. 28. “That private Dominion was a most acknowledg’d Right from the days of Adam,” as you may see in his MareClausum, l. 8. c. 4.86 it is certain, that both Philosophers and Historians thought, “That the use of such an universal Right had so much in it of the nature of Property, that what any one had seiz’d for himself, it were an Injury in another to force from him.” This may be explain’d by an Example us’d by Cicero. Altho the Theatre be common, it may justly be said, that the Place which any one has taken possession of, is his.87

Nor from the Power of Individuals.But no Mortal, before Hobbes, ventur’d to assert such a Right of every one to all things; which, if you will believe him, contains in it self a Right of reigning over all, coeval with their very Nature;88 that is, from their Infancy; altho, according to the same Person, it be founded in Power: Which destroys all Property in another, so that it is impossible to invade that which is another’s, and lawful to claim every thing to himself:89Which makes it lawful to lie with every Woman, to break the Faith pledg’d to another: Which makes it lawful to wage War against all, and therefore to kill any Person, even the most innocent: Which leaves every Determination of disputed Cases, to every Man’s proper arbitrary Judgment, and Children at liberty to honour their Parents or not.90 He in the mean time forgot, that he had said elsewhere, “That it cannot be understood, that a Son can exist in the State of Nature”;91 and that, therefore, neither has the Right proper to this State any place in Sons. Of a-piece with this, is what he has added in the end of c. 14. § 9. That “there is no occasion to give Testimony, whether true or false, in a State of Nature, because there are there no publick Courts”;92 as if a private Judge had no occasion for Testimony, in order to give his Award, where he hath been chosen Umpire between Persons at Variance; or, as if a false Testimony in such a Case were not criminal, (as contrary to the common Good,) altho there were yet no Civil Laws; such as he there contends the Precepts of the second Table of the Decalogue to be. Here may be added that of Hobbes, which he sometimes expresly acknowledges, That “all Violation of the Laws of Nature consists in the false Reasoning, or in the Folly of Men who do not see,” (and why not as well, of Men who do not observe?) “their Duties toward other Men, necessary to their own Preservation.”93 And he acknowledges that the Laws of Nature, in the State of Nature, do oblige in the inward Court, or that of Conscience;94 therefore they at least oblige to pass a true Judgment, that all Things, and a Dominion over all Persons, are not necessarily requir’d to the Preservation of every one. But if every one is under an Obligation so to judge, vain will be the Judgment of him whose Sentiments are contrary; nor can that prodigious Right over all things accrue to him from so gross an Error. To be brief, there can be no Right of acting contrary to the Law of Nature, or the Dictates of right Reason, because Right is defin’d to be a Liberty of acting according thereto. But right Reason, as I have shewn, points out the necessity of coming to a division of Things; and, according to Hobbes’s own Confession, forbids the retaining a Right to all Things, c. 2.§3.95

Another Error of Hobbes, by which he endeavours to support a Right of every Man to every thing in a State of Nature, is, “That Right and Wrong depend upon human Laws.”§XXXI. Let us therefore proceed to examine, what other Arguments Hobbes has brought to establish this his wild Doctrine: He suggests, “That what any one does in a State merely natural, cannot be injurious to any Man; because Injustice toward Men supposes human Laws, such as in that State are not.”96 Yet he grants that even then, Men may sin against God and the Laws of Nature; but he in vain and without proof assumes what is most false, “That an Injury against Man supposes human Laws.” For from the Dictates of right Reason, altho they be the natural Laws of God only, accrues to Man a Right to those things, which Reason has dictated to be granted to him by God: As for example, “The innocent Person has a Right to his Life, to preserve his Limbs entire, and to necessary Sustenance, without which it is well known, that he cannot be subservient to the common Good.” Therefore an Injury is done him, if any one, upon Hobbes’s Principles, shall maim or kill him, in pursuit of his Claim of all things: for every Opposition to, or Violation of, another’s Right, is an Injury, by what Law soever that Right accrued to the other; but much more, if that Right was yielded him by the divine Laws, than if by any human Law or Compact. Hobbes indeed supposes, “That no one can injure another, but after he has transferr’d by compact his own Right of doing what he pleases.” But this supposes that it has been prov’d, “That a Right of doing what he pleases belongs to every one”; which I have prov’d to be impossible. Therefore in vain he seeks a Support to his tottering Foundation, from this Consequence, which wholly depends upon the Supposition (which I have overthrown) of every Man’s Right to all Things. Even Hobbes himself, altho he asserts here, and more openly c. 3.§4. “That no Injury can be done to any one, with whom we have not enter’d into compact”;97 yet elsewhere more justly, and as the Truth it self requires, he has most expresly taught, “That it is injuriously done, whatsoever is done contrary to right Reason.”98 Seeing all grant, “That to be rightfully done, which is not done against right Reason”; we ought to think, “That injuriously done, which is contrary to right Reason”; and so he there acknowledges, That to be a Law. You observe he does not here require a transferring our Right to another, before an Injury can be done. Now seeing he acknowledges these Dictates of Reason to be divine Laws,99 I desire that he will shew, “What hinders, but that these may confer upon every one such a Right to Life, as without Injury cannot be taken away, or how any one can have a Right to oppose and violate another’s Right”: For every Man’s Right is a Liberty granted by right Reason, which can never allow, that Men speaking or acting by its Prescription, can contradict or oppose one another. It will be in vain for him to say, that the Injury is done to God only, seeing only his Laws are violated; unless he shew, that these Laws of God cannot confer on Men a Right to their Life and its Necessaries, nor prohibit others to violate the Right so granted.

This however I here thought fit to add by the by, “That if an Injury consists only in the Violation of Compacts transferring Right, then no Injury could possibly be done to God, according to Hobbes’s Principles, altho his natural Laws, both concerning the Cultivation of Peace amongst Men, and concerning the Worship which ought to be paid himself, should be violated by Crimes of the deepest Dye, and even by Blasphemy it self”: for Man is suppos’d, “Not to have enter’d into a Compact with God, to yield Obedience to his Laws”;100 nay, he openly declares, c. 2. § 12, 13. “That a Compact cannot be enter’d into with God, except as he has thought fit, by the sacred Scriptures, to substitute in his Place certain Men, with an Authority to consider and accept of such Compacts.”101 God therefore and Men are in such a State, according to Hobbes, that without Injury Men may be Enemies to God, and have a Right (as the Giants are fabled to have done)102 to make war upon him, and to hate him. God indeed will have a Right (according to Hobbes’s Principles) to kill such, which he might with equal Justice have done, tho they had not sinn’d. But they, who so reject all Reverence towards God, as not to submit to his Precepts, nor fear his Threats, are not look’d upon as his Subjects, but his Enemies, or as living without the Limits of the Kingdom of God, whom he may at pleasure invade, as he hints,c. 15. § 2.103 But, in my Opinion, even Atheists and Epicureans, who deny a Providence, are oblig’d by the Law of Nature, (which is sufficiently promulg’d, altho by them neglected and deny’d,) to obey God; and they are Subjects by Birth, not Compact, and may therefore be punish’d by God for their Crimes as rebellious Subjects, and not invaded only, as Persons born without his Jurisdiction. But this by the by.

Nor does War, as Hobbes supposes, necessarily arise from the Passions.§XXXII. Let us now consider, if you please, what the same Author has advanc’d in his Leviathan, towards the establishing this Right of every one to all Things; for he there endeavours to infer it from different Principles. However, I cannot but observe, that Hobbes is no less inconsistent with himself, than with all others in this Point, which is the Foundation both of his Morality and Politicks. For, in his Treatise de Cive, he deduces the War of every Man against every Man, from this Right of every Man to every Thing, as from a Cause, which made it both lawful and necessary.104 Whereas, in his Leviathan, he first affirms the State of Nature to be a State of War; and thence infers a Licence to do every thing in that State, as will appear from considering the Thirteenth Chapter, and comparing the former part thereof with this in the Close. “To this War” (saith he) “of every Man against every Man, this also is consequent, that nothing can be unjust; the Notions of Right and Wrong, Justice and Injustice, have there no place. Where there is no common Power, there is no Law; where no Law, no Injustice. Force and Fraud are in War the two cardinal Virtues, &c.”105There he affirm’d, that the Invasion of the one Party, and the Resistance of the other, were both just, whence a War must needs arise just on both sides. But here he refers the Original of this War to the Nature of the human Passions, little sollicitous about the Right of commencing it; and, War once suppos’d, he affirms (without proof) that it will follow, That there is nothing unjust, That there is no Property, &c. This Reasoning in the Leviathan is more popular, but less conclusive; for it is acknowledg’d by all judicious Writers, that a War must first be prov’d just, before it can justify any Proceedings against the Enemy; nor are all things lawful, even in the justest War. The Law of Nature must therefore first be acknowledg’d; whence we may determine, whether the War to be undertaken be just, or at least permitted by right Reason, before we can infer the lawfulness of those things, which are necessary in the carrying on such War. And this is so evident, that even Hobbes himself, tho in the latter part of this Chapter he contends, that, in a State of Nature, there is no Distinction between Just and Unjust; yet in the former Part of it he endeavours to prove, “That this Power of waging War ought to be allow’d to every Man in that State, as necessary to Self-defense”;106 which is equivalent to saying, “That such a War is just or lawful.” Wherefore he is inconsistent with himself, even in the same Chapter; for whatever Argument proves, that any thing is Just and Lawful in a State of Nature, proves that there is a Distinction between Lawful and Unlawful in that State, and supposes the Obligation of some Law, by whose Permission, at least, that War may be licens’d: which is the chief Point I would establish, and which Hobbes (as we have seen) expresly denies, when he affirms nothing to be Just, or Unjust.

Let us examine by what Arguments he would prove a War of all against all to be necessary or lawful. In his Leviathan, he has not that close and compact way of Reasoning, which he aims at in his Treatise de Cive. However, he refers the Original of War to three principal Causes, Competition, Defense, and Glory.107 And he affirms, that it must necessarily take its Rise from these Passions. War from Competition arises from the Hope of Gain: A defensive War, in which we prevent others by Force or Fraud, proceeds from Fear, lest others should usurp a Dominion over us; and we wage War to acquire Fame, from a Desire of Glory.

But I care not to transcribe all his unconclusive Reasonings, in order, from these Affections, to persuade the necessity of a State of universal War; he that pleases may turn to them in the Author himself. I think it sufficient to give this general Answer: “That Men are not necessarily led or compell’d by these Passions, but that both these, and all other Passions may be temper’d and guided by Reason and Counsel; so that it is false, that they hurry Men by a natural and irresistible Force to such a War; and the Reasoning is weak, which thence concludes it lawful.” Inhuman Passions, what is produc’d in Man by a Necessity arising from the Impulse of external Objects, cannot be forbid by any Law of Nature, because Laws direct only such Actions as are in our power. But those Passions, whence Hobbes would infer the Necessity, and consequently the Lawfulness, of War, are of such a kind, (because they look into Futurity, and that often at a great distance,) as depend upon the Reason and Counsel of Men, and consequently may by these be govern’d. Even Hobbes himself elsewhere openly owns, That “those who cannot agree concerning the present” (because of their contrary Appetites) “may yet agree concerning the future, which is the Work of Reason; for Things present are perceiv’d by the Senses, Things future by Reason only.”108 And hence he acknowledges the Agreement of Mankind in this, (which is the Summary of the Laws of Nature,) that Peace is to be sought after. He is therefore inconsistent with himself, when in the Leviathan he sets them at War from those Affections, which depend upon Reason taking a prospect of Futurity, thro’ the whole Course of Life.

What is more, in the Close of this very Thirteenth Chapter, he acknowledges Men to have those Passions which have a peaceable Tendency, which are, Fear, especially of a violent Death, the Desire of the Necessaries and Comforts of Life, and the Hope of obtaining them by Industry. These Passions, if narrowly examin’d, are certainly the same with those, of which he had but just before affirm’d that they compell’d Men to War. This is the same Fear with that before-mention’d, lest others should lord it over us at pleasure, and should, in consequence, rob us of Life, whenever they so thought fit; by which Fear he had before affirm’d them to be prompted, to secure themselves by preventing and invading others. The like may be said of the Desire of Glory, which may be reckon’d among the Necessaries of Life, and also of the Hope of Gain. And thus Peace and War, according to Hobbes, are Effects of the same Causes. Certainly, if any thing in these Affections be absolutely necessary, it ought carefully to be examin’d on both sides, in order to find out, whether they more powerfully incline human Nature to Peace or War; which Hobbes has no where in his Writings done. Yet it is no less absurd to affirm any thing concerning the State of Man, and his natural Inclination to future Actions, from the sole Consideration of those things which incline him to War, without examining those things which persuade him rather to Peace, than it would be to affirm, which way a Balance would incline, from the knowledge of the Weight thrown into one Scale only. But when I have compar’d, as diligently as I can, the Causes of these Effects, and the Forces of the Powers on each side, both as they are natural Motions arising from the Impulse of external Objects, and (in some measure) depending upon the Constitution and Frame of a human Body; and also, which is of much greater Consequence, as they are excited and govern’d by Reason, taking a prospect of Man’s whole future Existence: They seem more powerfully to persuade universal Benevolence, and that Peace, which may reasonably be expected from the Exercise thereof, than that War of all against all; in which, according to Hobbes’s own Confession, is “continual Danger of violent Death, and a Life solitary, poor, brutish, and short”;109 in which therefore no Safety can with Reason be expected.

Hobbes’s Objection, That perfect Security of all possible Happiness is not, by the practice of Benevolence, to be obtain’d, Answer’d, by proving it the most effectual means of Happiness in our power, and therefore to be chosen.§XXXIII. The only Appearance of Difficulty in this Question, is, “That a perfect Security of procuring to our selves all kinds of Happiness is not to be obtain’d, tho we should promote the common Good and Peace, by the Exercise of universal Benevolence; and that, because of the unbridled Passions of some others, who, thro’ Folly and Rashness, will not propose to themselves the same End.” But this will appear no Difficulty, if we consider, “That we can do nothing with respect to Men, which will more effectually secure our Happiness”; or, (which comes to the same thing,) “That it is evidently impossible to obtain that perfect Security from all Misfortunes, proceeding from the unbounded Desires of Men; and that it is therefore necessary that we should be content to do that, among all those things which are in our power, which will be most effectual to the procuring this End.” That is, that, by constantly promoting the Happiness of all, we should first bring them over to some degree of Friendship, and then to civil or religious Society, as effectually as we can; and that afterwards, by the same Benevolence, we should continue them in that State. Whatever is short of, or contrary to, this Endeavour, is so far short of, or contrary to, our utmost Endeavours to promote our own and the common Happiness of all, by those means which, by the Light of Nature, we know to be the most effectual. By this Method we sollicit to our Aid and Defence all rational Beings, whose joint Happiness is that common Good we are in pursuit of, who will therefore concur with us in the same Views, except they be blinded by some Passion, and have so far divested themselves of their Reason. If, thro’ any Inconstancy of Mind, we neglect this End, or hurt any one innocent Person, it is evident, that all are, in some measure, neglected and provok’d; for every one will have just reason to fear the same Evil at our hands, which we have done to the Innocent.110 And this Hobbes himself was aware of, in his Explanation of Compassion upon his own Principles, in his Treatise of Human Nature.111 In short, the Force of these Passions, Hope, Fear, &c. which may incline Men either to Peace or War, is to be estimated from the Force of those Causes, which excite those Passions in Men; for, since these Causes are Things good or evil, which our Reason judges possible or certain, in consequence of the Actions of other rational Agents, we can no otherwise know the Force of those Causes, than by considering the Nature of those Agents. Wherefore the present Question, when we are in search after a Rule of Action pointed out by Nature, is brought to this short Issue, whether, (without any regard to Civil Government,) it be manifest to Men, from such Knowledge of the Nature of God and other Men as is easily attainable, that they shall better consult the Happiness and Security of all, and of themselves in particular, by universal Benevolence, (which includes Innocence, Fidelity, Gratitude, and all the other Virtues,) than by Hobbes’s “Anticipation” (explain’d by him in this Chapter) as “The most reasonable way for any Man to secure himself in this Diffidence of one another; that is, by Force or Wiles to master the Persons of all Men he can, so long, till he see no other Power great enough to endanger him?”112 I affirm it to be evident, that whoever best consults both his own Happiness, and that of others, will compose and settle all those Passions, which may stir up needless Quarrels and Disturbances, such as vain Hopes, Fears, &c. Nor is it less evident, that rational Agents are the principal Causes of such Happiness. Wherefore he takes the best Measures to obtain this End, who most effectually reconciles these Causes to himself, which he does, who accommodates himself to their most prevailing and natural Principles of Action, viz. the Power and the Will of acting according to Reason, by pursuing that Happiness only, which is connected with, and subservient to, the Happiness of All. Hence all may conspire and co-operate with us to the same end, securely, and without prejudice to their rational Desire of obtaining their own Happiness.

No one can rationally desire or expect, from external Causes, greater degrees of Happiness, than what may proceed from the nature of other rational Causes, (between whom and him the dependence is mutual,) and which is therefore consistent with that Happiness of them all, which they all naturally desire. But it is manifest, that this common Good of all is greater than the Good of any one, or of a few, as the Whole is greater than a Part; and that the like Sentiments in all other rational Beings, are the necessary result of the nature of Things.

Upon these Principles, those rational Beings, who have so far cultivated their own Understanding, as to know certainly that this common Good is the greatest, and that the adequate Causes thereof will effect the greatest Happiness of each Individual which is possible in Nature, will most assuredly pursue the same End with us, and will therefore be ready to assist us. Nor are these Principles of living happily so difficult to know, but that we may reasonably presume them, both understood and approv’d of, by almost all other rational Beings; or, at least; that they may be all instructed to believe these Principles, except it appear evidently, that they have entirely given themselves up to the Conduct of unreasonable Passions. These Propositions seem to me to have the greatest Evidence, little different from that of mathematical Axioms. “The good of the Whole, is greater than the good of a Part. The Causes, which most effectually preserve and perfect a Whole, or Aggregate, whose Parts mutually require one another’s Assistance, do in like manner preserve and perfect the Parts thereof.” The Aid of those, who do not acknowledge such first Principles of acting rationally, is either not to be sought after; or, if necessary, it is to be procur’d by the Assistance of those who do acknowledge them. On the contrary, Hobbes’s Anticipation endeavours to compel all others to things evidently impossible to be done, which they would therefore be as unwilling to undertake, as unable to execute; for, upon that Principle, every particular Person would endeavour to force all, to obey him only as his sovereign Lord. But since such Dominion of every particular Person is in direct opposition to the like Dominion of all others, it is no less impossible, that several such Dominions should at once take place, than that the Motion of the same Body should at once have a thousand contrary Directions. It is equally absurd to suppose, that Men should attempt such Impossibilities, after they clearly understand them to be such, as it is that they should effect them. These Observations, drawn from the nature of rational Beings, and from the practical Principles of a right Judgment, (which all rational Beings, as such, are endow’d with,) prove, that universal Benevolence is a more effectual means of Happiness, than Hobbes’s Method of Anticipation. I shall offer more that may be reduc’d to this Head, where I designedly treat of Human Nature.

Likewise, universal Experience confirms Men’s general Tendency, rather to Acts of Benevolence, than Malevolence.§XXXIV. I shall confirm what I have said, by the addition of only two Observations, confirm’d by the concurring Experience of all Ages.

First, Bordering States enjoy a greater Security and sweeter Fruits of Peace, by means of Alliances, which subsist only by Fidelity and some degree of mutual Benevolence, than when they are at open War, and practising upon one another by Force or Fraud.

Secondly, Even in civil Society there are numberless Cases, in which the Authority and coercive Power of the State cannot exert themselves, in which, however, we frequently observe, that Men mutually obey the Laws of Innocence, Fidelity, Gratitude, and all the other Virtues, and much less frequently presume upon a liberty of hurting others, than is usual in a State of War. No one has greater Security, that his Life or Possessions shall not be wrested from him by the Perjury and false Testimonies of his Fellow-Subjects, than what arises from the Fidelity of Men, the Violation whereof the civil Magistrate can rarely detect or punish. But it is needless to add more in answer to what Hobbes has advanc’d, of the necessity or lawfulness of warring against all, from the nature of the Passions.

In pursuit of the same Point he advances a new Argument in these words: “The Desires and other Passions of Men are in themselves no Sin: No more are the Actions that proceed from those Passions, till they know a Law that forbids them; which, till Laws be made, they cannot know; nor can any Law be made till they have agreed upon the Person that shall make it.”113 I answer, that Actions forbid by right Reason, (which is the natural Law of God,) are Sins; tho Men do not see this Legislator, nor make him their Governor; provided it sufficiently appear to them, that he has a Right of Dominion over all, and that he has enacted those Laws. Both which Hobbes elsewhere often acknowledges. Altho here he affirms, that Men are not bound by Laws, to which they themselves have not given their consent. Certainly, since Sin is the Transgression of a Law, if it be prov’d that there are Laws of Nature, the Transgression of them will be truly a Sin, tho none had consented to the Authority of God enacting them. But because I have before prov’d this in a summary way, and shall do it more at large hereafter, there is no occasion to insist upon it here.

Which Hobbes offers to disprove; by pointing out what the Dictates of Reason are, from the practice of Animals void of Reason;However, I will not dismiss this Article of his Thirteenth Chapter, before I have advertis’d the Reader, by how strenuous an Argument Hobbes has confirm’d this his Position, of the Right of War of all against allout of the Bounds of civil Society; which, in the last Edition, he has added to the rest, near the Close, in these words. “But why am I at the pains to demonstrate to Men of Learning, what even Dogs themselves are not ignorant of, who bark at those who approach them, by Day at Strangers only, but by Night at all?”114 Notably argu’d! The Rights of Nature (that is, the Power granted by right Reason) are to be learn’d from the Example of Dogs void of Reason; they bark at all that approach them in the dark; therefore it is lawful for Men, in a State of Nature, to murder all, even their familiar Friends, whom they meet with by Day. Let Hobbists rather learn to warn others, by their harmless barking, to be upon their guard; but let them not, as he has instructed them, attack the unguarded by Force or Wiles: Let them learn to watch before their own Doors; but let them not invade the Rights of others. But it is time to dismiss such Levities.

And by falsly asserting, “That Justice cannot be the Quality of a man existing alone in the worldWhat he afterwards adds to the same purpose, has more of Subtilty in it. “Justice and Injustice are none of the Faculties either of the Body or Mind: If they were, they might be in a Man that were alone in the World, as well as his Senses and Passions: They are Qualities that relate to Men in Society, not in Solitude.”115 But what he would insinuate is false, if it be understood of a Society form’d by human Compact. I own indeed, that external Acts of Justice for the most part respect others, (tho it is possible for a Man to be injurious to himself;) but the Propension or Will, to give every one his own, (in which the Nature of Justice consists,) both may and ought to be in a Man in Solitude. Were there but one Man in the World, he might be dispos’d to allow others, whenever they should be created, equal Rights to those he claim’d to himself. Nor is there any reason, why such an Inclination should not be call’d natural, tho it could not produce external Acts, in a Man existing Single. As Hobbes himself (I believe) will not deny Man’s Propension to propagate his Species to be natural, as he is an Animal, tho he were suppos’d alone, as Adam was before the Creation of Eve.

Lastly, Hobbes, in order to support his Hypotheses, gives absurd Definitions of Right, and of Right Reason.§XXXV. Lastly, because Hobbes’s whole Hypothesis is built upon this one Principle; and (as I believe) he perceiv’d, that this Right of every Man’s warring against all, and of arrogating every thing to himself, was not very consistent with the true Definition of Right, which he himself had given in the Passage above quoted, therefore in the beginning of his Fourteenth Chapter of the Leviathan, he has given a different Definition of natural Right, thus: “The Right of Nature is the Liberty each Man hath to use his own Power as he will himself, for the Preservation of his own Nature.”116Now truly, by the Name of Right, is to be understood, not the Liberty of acting according to right Reason, or any Law of Nature; but of acting any thing, as he will himself.

But lest Hobbes should seem too inconsistent, in order to reconcile him to himself, I will discover the truth of this Affair, which is, that by the Name of “right Reason,” he before understood, in his Treatise de Cive, “every Man’s own Opinion,” (as appears from his Note on c. 2. § 1.)117 not excepting what is most absurd, and contradictory to the Judgment of the same Person at another time, as well as to that of all others; and in this Sense, indeed, right Reason is consistent with every Man’s own Will: But neither right Reason, nor Right, are thus pliable to every Man’s pleasure. These are as inflexible as the Beam of the Balance is suppos’d to be; for right Reason consists in a rigid conformity with Things themselves, whose Natures are invariable, as I shall hereafter prove at large; and Right extends it self no farther than right Reason permits, or pronounces to be consistent with that End, which it proposes to all rational Agents. It is in vain, and without example, to affirm that any one has a Right to do those things, which are neither allow’d nor permitted by any Law. There is no doubt, but that Man has a natural Power, or Will, which he himself may determine to act which way he pleases. But when we are enquiring into the Right of Acting, the Question is, “Which, among those Actions which are in our power, are lawful?” Any Answer to this Question, without respect had to some Law, at least that of Nature, is absurd. Any one can either hang, or throw down a Precipice, either himself, or any other innocent Person; yet no one will affirm, that any one has a Right to do these things, because Right and right Reason which directs it, respect a good or true End, namely, that Happiness which is attainable consistently with the Rights of others, and the Means subservient to that End. But the Will of Man may rashly depart from both these. All others, if at any time they call Liberty by the name of Natural Right, understand a Liberty allow’d and guarded by the Laws of Nature. But if Hobbes pretends that he has a Licence to call such a Liberty of acting any thing at pleasure for Self-preservation, by the name of Right, (tho no one beside himself ever used that Word in this Sense,) because Philosophers are at liberty to limit the Significations of Words according to their own Definitions; this will be a sufficient Answer: Allowing his confining that Word to that Sense, in which he alone uses it, (for others are not oblig’d to make use of that Word in the same Sense;) it is incumbent upon him to prove, “That such a liberty of acting whatever he thinks fit for his own Preservation, does, or ever did, exist in that State”; or, “That there is nothing to forbid, and, consequently, to hinder Men so to act, laying aside the Consideration of Civil Laws.” I affirm, “That, even in that State, there are certain Dictates of right Reason, which God suggests, by the Nature of Things, to the Minds of Men, which denounce most grievous Punishments attending them, who attempt any thing, tho for their own Preservation, contrary to the common Good.” Nor is this a bare Assertion, I prove it undeniably.

Hobbes no otherwise proves, that such a Liberty, as what he calls Right, is granted us, than by affirming, that we cannot will to act otherwise;118 which is contrary to every Man’s manifest Experience. For my own part, I profess, that I can will to act otherwise, and believe, that great Numbers have willingly laid down their Lives for the common Good. So weak is this Foundation, which supports all the rest of his Morality and Politicks; so that all those Arguments, which I offer, in order to establish the Law of Nature, as it respects the Good of others, will prove that, even before the erecting Civil Government, it was not lawful for any one to preserve himself by the Violation of that Law: And they render ineffectual and ridiculous that unbounded Right asserted by Hobbes, which it will never be lawful to use, except when a Man’s Will is conformable to the Law, and consequently limited.

But to what purpose take I so much pains to prove this Right of acting arbitrarily against all, vain? since even Hobbes, tho in contradiction to himself, acknowledges almost as much; for he allows (c. 1. § 11.) “That this Right is unprofitable.”119 He himself, who had concluded the immediate foregoing Article with affirming, “That Profit is the Measure of Right,”120 does yet here immediately affirm, “That this Right,” which he had taken so much pains to establish, “is unprofitable.” Nay the very words, Right (as he himself has defin’d it) and unprofitable, (which he has join’d to Right in the Margin of that Article,) are inconsistent; for in both places he defines “Right” by “An Use of Liberty”: but he affirms, upon the same Subject, that no Use of Liberty consists in what is “unprofitable.” But right Reason does not use to tack together such contradictory Notions, nor is so regardless of Futurity, as to affirm that War to be necessary to every one’s Preservation, which it will immediately perceive to be destructive to all: Therefore Hobbes’s Reason, by which he endeavours to establish these Opinions, is not right.

Remark on Chapter I

I think our Author is abundantly too general in this Chapter of the Nature of Things; and that he should either here, or in his Chapter concerning Human Nature, or in that concerning Good, have shewn more particularly, “How the most of our Enjoyments are general or extensive in their Use,” and, “That publick and private Happiness are so interwoven, that the very Actions which promote the private Interest of any particular Person, do in all, at least in all common Cases, necessarily tend to the Advantage of the Publick: That our Possessions of all Kinds, our Lands, our Houses, our Money, are all enjoy’d by many”: And, “That it is not possible to confine them to the Use of one.” The very Clothes we wear are, in some measure, common in their Use: Nay, the very Food we eat is not confin’d to one, but returns to its Parent Earth, and there contributes to the growth of those Vegetables, which may, perhaps, serve for the Nourishment of the Inhabitants of the most distant Countries. Nay, the very individual Particles of Air we breathe, are not our Property, but perform the same kindly Office to Thousands. Our bodily Labour too is always general in its Use: We can’t so much as plant a Tree, or manure a Field, but Thousands reap the Fruit of our Labours; and tho our Labour be most extensive in its Use, yet we are utterly unable, without Assistance, to provide for our selves the most simple Necessaries of Life. The most ingenious Mechanick would not, perhaps, be able of his own proper Labour, to furnish himself out so much as a commodious Garment. Who, that but reflects upon the Number of Hands that one single Garment must pass thro’, before it becomes fit for Use, and upon the Number of curious Arts that contribute to its Perfection, (a competent Knowledge in none of which can be attained without the Industry of some Years:) Who, I say, that yields but the least Attention to these things, can doubt of our Dependence, nay, of the Necessity of our Dependence, on one another?

These things, which I but hint at, are, I think, worthy of the most serious Contemplation; and were they but fully laid open to our View, we should have a clearer insight into the Beauties of the moral World, and be at once fill’d with Love and Admiration of its Author.

The Force of the Reasoning, that is built upon the Observations that are above hinted at, may be thus express’d. It appears, from those Observations, “That the publick Good is, in the greater Number of Cases, most plainly connected with private Advantage. Therefore we have reason to believe, from the Uniformity of Nature, that there is the like Connexion in those other Cases, wherein, from our Short-sightedness into the Consequences of Action, we can’t perceive it with so great Evidence.”

CHAPTER II

Of Human Nature, and Right Reason.

Man defin’d, By the Word [Man], I understand an Animal endow’d with a Mind; and Hobbes himself, in his Treatise of Human Nature, acknowledges the Mind to be one of the principal Parts of Man.1 Natural Philosophers, both antient and modern, Des-Cartes, Digby, More, but especially Seth Ward, in opposition to Hobbes himself, have sufficiently proved the distinctness of the Mind from the Body, under which all the Animal Faculties are compriz’d;2 so that I should but light a Candle to the Sun at Noonday, in offering to add to their Arguments. However, I cannot but take notice, that Hobbes has unluckily stumbled at the Threshold of his Treatise de Cive, in reducing the Faculties of human Nature to four Kinds, bodily Force, Experience, Reason, and the Passions:3 For beside, that the first of these, bodily Force, contains all the rest, in his Opinion, who acknowledges no other Force, but that of Body; it is contrary to all Use of Words, to call Experience a Faculty of our Nature; whereas it is properly to be reckon’d among those things, which are accidental to our Senses, both internal and external, of which Memory is sometimes the Effect, tho it is not it self Memory, as it is by him defin’d, in his Treatise of Human Nature, Page 36.4 Nay further, it is well known, that things we have experienc’d, do sometimes slip out of our Memory: But, if by the word Experience, he understands a Habit acquir’d by Experiments, it is a mistake to reckon it among the Faculties; except he would reckon Geometry, a Knowledge of the Law; and other Sciences, both Theoretical and Practical, amongst our Faculties, because they are Habits. But this is not a Matter of sufficient importance to dwell longer upon: Let us rather a while consider the foregoing Definition of Man.

As Animal.By the word [Animal] I understand, what the Philosophers agree is to be found in Brutes, the Powers of receiving Increase by Nourishment, of beginning Motion, and of propagating their Species; and I also willingly so far allow them a sensitive Power, as we may bestow the Name of Sensation5 (in which I see no Absurdity) on the Motions impress’d on the Organs by the Objects, and thence transmitted, by the Nerves appropriated to the Senses, into the Brain, and sometimes thence communicated to the Muscles, where they excite Motion, or to the Heart or Lungs, and perhaps to other Intestines, by means whereof various Affections are excited. However, I suppose the Power of observing or distinctly perceiving these Motions to be peculiar to the Mind, so as freely to contemplate what in them, for example, determines the Figure of the Object, what, a Situation in the Object, different from that which is in the Retina; what, its Magnitude, what, its Motion; what in the Surface thereof, or what Refraction in the Medium, does so diversify the Motions of Light, as to exhibit all the various Phaenomena of Colours: for I do not see, what in the corporeal substance of the Brain can separate from one another all these (crowding at once into the Eyes, by means of the same percussion of the Rays of Light;) compare them with one another, and distinguish them; or what should hinder them from appearing always confused, as they are perceiv’d in the Camera Obscura,6 or in the bottom of the Eye of an Animal, whence they naturally rush at once into the Thalami of the Optick Nerves, which penetrate the inward substance of the Brain. But these are Matters of physical Consideration.

To the Mind we ascribe Understanding and Will; to the Understanding we reduce Apprehending, Comparing, Judging, Reasoning, a methodical Disposition, and the Memory of all these things, and of the Objects about which they are conversant: To the Will we ascribe, both the simple Acts of chusing and refusing, and that Vehemence of those Actions which discovers it self in the Passions, over and above that emotion or disturbance of the Body, which is visible in them.

Endow’d with Mind.In the Memory of Propositions, Theoretical and Practical, consist Habits, as well Theoretical, which are distinguish’d by the Name of Sciences, as Practical, which are called Arts. Here Ethicks, which is the Art of Living, or of directing the whole of all human Actions to the best End, comes under Consideration.

(Whence variety of Manners proceeds. See ch. 5. § 9.)§II. Here it may be proper to take some notice of the various Manners of particular Nations; nay, and of most Men too: for various Habits are acquir’d, partly from diversity of Disposition or natural Genius, more prone to Habits of some sorts than others; partly from the Temper of the Body, Climate, Soil, Education, Religion, Fortune, and kind of Business about which Men are employ’d. From Manners, thus procur’d, arises to Men as it were a second Nature; they are therefore to be consider’d in the framing Laws, and that so far, that very antient Laws, tho not in all respects, if consider’d in themselves, the best, ought nevertheless to be retained, were it but upon this account, that Men long accustom’d to them would not readily suffer better to be substituted in their stead, without publick Commotions, and, consequently, greatly endangering the Rights of all.

Man (notwithstanding Hobbes’s Assertion to the contrary) is rational, and fitted for Society, by Nature.I thought it also proper to observe here by the way, that I, (as all other Philosophers do,) in the following enquiry into the Laws necessarily connected and agreeing with human Nature, always understand or suppose human Nature as it is in adult Persons, who have a sound Mind in a sound Body; so far, at least, as is necessary to the exercise of Reason and Virtue: for Laws are not framed for Infants, Ideots, or mad Men; nor of such do we form Societies; nor therefore ought we, from their irregular Appetites and Actions, to form a Judgment of the Rights and Inclinations of human Nature. Tho, I think, what ever we perceive in them (after Maturity) agreeable, whether to the animal or rational Nature, that we may look upon as a Proof, that such Actions are very natural to Men; so in them we may perceive, both an expectation of Compassion from Men, and a Sympathy to be accounted for upon Principles which I shall afterwards explain, by which they rejoice with those that rejoice, and weep with those that weep. In vain therefore does Hobbes, (explaining the Reason why, in opposition to the Opinion of most Philosophers, he affirm’d Man not to be Ζωον πολιτικὸν,7 which he translates, “An Animal form’d by Nature for Society,”) bring this Proof for his Opinion, that since “civil Societies are Leagues, whose Obligation Infants and the unlearned are ignorant of; and whose Usefulness is not understood by those” (whom he afterwards affirms to be “very many, perhaps the Majority, thro’ distemper of Mind, or want of Discipline) who have not experienc’d the Damage arising from want of Society: Whence it comes, that those cannot, and these care not to enter into Society; yet these, both Infants and Adult Persons, partake of human Nature, therefore Man is not made apt for Societyby Nature, but by Discipline.”8 This is the Substance of Hobbes’s Annotation, these the words, tho somewhat contracted for brevity’s sake. I at present pass by his false Supposition, “That Societies are Leagues”; and that he sets Discipline, which entirely accommodates it self, and is subservient, to Nature, in opposition to Nature; for whatever we learn from others; they draw from their own Nature and that of the Universe. I here also affirm, “That Experience it self (for want whereof he accuses the Generality as unfit for Society) is resolv’d into Nature, which, without doubt, teaches whatsoever Experience testifies to be true.” Altho many acquire most of their Knowledge by words of arbitrary Appointment, yet the Ideas or Sense affix’d to these words, and Connexion of these Ideas, in which all Truth consists, are from Nature; whence they are the same every where, tho Languages differ. Hobbes, it seems, forgets here, where he sets Experience in opposition to human Nature, that he had before made it one of its Faculties. I would only observe, “That all Philosophers and Writers of Politicks, tho they were neither ignorant nor forgetful, how unqualify’d, Infants, and adult Persons of distemper’d Minds, were for forming Leagues, or doing the Duties of Society, have thought Man form’d by Nature for that, which, when come to years of Maturity, he was prompted to by Nature, except something preternatural, such as all Distempers of the Mind are, interpos’d.” The Observation of Juvenal is well known,

• • Nunquam aliud Natura, aliud Sapientia dicit.
• • Nature does not teach one thing, and Wisdom another.9

And Aristotle (Politic. 1. c. 2.) affirms, that “we ought to judge of Nature from her Intention or perfect State”;10 and it is certainly a childish Inference, favouring more of the Grammarian than the moral Philosopher; “Men are born Infants, therefore they are born unfit for Society.” This is much of a-piece with Hobbes’s accounting (in his Physicks) for the Noise of Thunder from the breaking of Ice, which, in spite of Staticks, he suspends in the Air in the middle of Summer.11 Altho the word Nature be deriv’d from Nascor [to be born,] yet it is well known, that by human Nature we mean that Force of Reason, whose first Rudiments only are to be found in new born Infants. So Man is by Nature fitted for propagating his Species, which yet neither an Infant, nor one whom Distemper hath render’d impotent, is capable of, nor any Person without the help of a Woman. So likewise, we call the Powers of Plants and Fruits to afford us both Nourishment and Medicine, natural, which yet are not to be found in them, upon their first Appearance out of the Earth or Trees, but then only, when the Sun and Rain have brought them to Perfection, and they have escap’d the Malignity of blasting Winds: but that Reason, nay right Reason, is a Faculty of human Nature, and therefore natural to us, Hobbes himself acknowledges in these words, “Right Reason therefore is a kind of Law, which may be call’d natural, since it is no less a part of human Nature, than any other faculty or affection of the Mind.”12 Yet the same Hobbes elsewhere denies this very thing; Leviath. c. 5. p. 21. where he says, “Reason is not, as Sense and Memory, born with us, nor gotten by Experience only, as Prudence is, but attained by Industry.”13 Let him free himself, if he can, from Contradiction. I will not therefore waste my time in proving what is self-evident; especially when I had before affirm’d expressly, that I consider’d the Nature of Man come now to Maturity, at which time Nature usually confers upon him the use of Reason.

Which suggests the Law of Nature in the same manner as it does the Art of Numbering;§III. I shall think that I sufficiently prove my Point, when I have made it appear, “That human Nature suggests certain Rules of Life, in the same manner that it suggests the Skill of Numbering.” All Men, when come to Maturity, except they labour under some Distemper of Mind, of their own accord reckon things by Numbers, adding, subtracting, multiplying, and dividing them, if the Numbers be small, without any Rules of Art. The Sentiments of all Nations are necessarily the same, concerning the Sum of two Numbers found by Addition, and concerning their difference by Subtraction, how much soever they may differ in the Names and Characters by which they express the Numbers, which every Nation fixes for it self arbitrarily. It seems to me, that all, in the same manner, under the same conduct of Nature, necessarily acknowledge, (1.) That the Good of all rational Beings is greater than the like Good of any part of that aggregate Body; that is, That it is truly the greatest Good: and (2.) That in promoting the Good of this whole Aggregate, the Good of Individuals is contain’d and promoted: Also, (3.) That the Good of every particular Part requires the introducing and settling of distinct Property in such Things, and such Services of rational Agents, as contribute to the common Happiness; that is, such as are necessary to testify the Honour we pay to God, or to preserve the Life, Health, and Faculties of every particular Man. In these three Propositions we shall find the Seeds and Force of all the Laws of Nature to be contain’d. Skill in Numbering is much assisted by Industry, by artificial Characters, and by their Places: but these very Helps we owe to Nature, as to their Original; nor can they ever cause that, which without Art we know to be true and of necessary use in Life, to become false or useless. “Whatever Assistance we may procure from Art, the whole Effect is to be ascrib’d rather to Nature than to Art.” Just as, after the Art of Cookery has fitted Meat for Nourishment, no one will deny, that we are nourish’d by the Power of Nature, otherwise Life it self were not natural.

The Mind is necessarily determin’d, in forming simple Apprehensions, in chusing Good, and refusing Evil in general.This I think proper to premise as a Postulatum, which, I believe, no one will think unreasonable, “That the Mind of Man, and every Faculty thereof, especially the Intellectual, is prone to such Actions as are proper thereto, as often as Occasion is offer’d, and Matter suggested, either from without, or from the Body united to it. ” It is confirm’d by continual Experience, “That the Mind (whenever Light, Colour, or Sound, is presented to it thro’ the Senses, the Eyes, for example, or the Ears) is immediately apt to observe what is offer’d.” And the Case is the same, in observing painful or pleasant Sensations, taking their rise from the inward State of the Body. Simple Apprehensions, the more obvious Comparisons of Ideas among themselves, and certain Judgments or Propositions thence form’d, are in some sort necessary; the evident Connexion between Causes and Effects does also lead Men to form Propositions affirming that Connexion; and they involuntarily return upon the Mind, when any occasion is offer’d from the inward force or vigor of the Memory; nor can the Will at all put a stop to such Actions, tho it may indeed promote them. For we can excite our selves to recollect those things which had almost slipt out of the Memory, and attentively to consider what our Senses had observ’d, and diligently to form Comparisons and Propositions from Ideas compar’d among themselves, to form Syllogisms from Propositions compar’d, and from these to infer new Conclusions. Every one come to maturity, in proportion to the natural vigor of his Mind, is by the same Nature spontaneously carry’d on to such Operations, at once with the greatest pleasure, and with absolute necessity. Into this natural Impulse, I would resolve most of those Propositions, which I call the natural Dictates of Reason, (namely, the primary and self-evident ones;) as also those Acts of the Will, which are conversant, either about Happiness in general, that is, about the whole sum of all possible good Things; (for there is in this Case no occasion for the Judgment to deliberate and compare, because Happiness is, as defin’d by Cicero, “A Collection of all good Things”;)14 or about those several parts of our Happiness, which are desirable for their own sakes; such are Wisdom, Health, the seeing a Light not too strong, and such other agreeable Sensations as come in our way. Nor do I suppose that Hobbes, the great Patron of all kind of Necessity, will contradict me here, who hath affirm’d, that all “Conceptions are nothing really but Motion in some internal substance of the Head; which Motion proceeding to the Heart, if it help the vital Motion, is called Delight, Contentment, or Pleasure; and, with reference to the Object, Love. But when such Motion weakeneth or hindereth the vital Motion, then it is called Pain; and in relation to that which causeth it, Hatred, which the Latins express some times by Odium, and some times by Taedium; and that this Motion is also a Sollicitation, or Provocation, either to draw near to the thing that pleaseth, and is then called Appetite, or to retire from the thing that displeaseth, and is then called Aversion.” Human Nature, p. 69, 70.15 I do not indeed perceive any such Power of the material World over our Minds, that necessarily determines them by mechanical Principles; yet I concur with all Philosophers, that I know of, in affirming, “That the first Apprehensions of Things, and the desire of Good and aversion from Evil in general, are necessary”: for the innate Activity of the divine Nature of the Mind, permits it not to be perfectly idle; nor can it do any thing else than (as occasion offers) understand, chuse, refuse, and determine certain Motions of the Body, in order to obtain what it has chosen.

A distinct enumeration of those Powers of the human Mind, (which has greater Powers than what are necessary to preserve the Life of the Body,) which dispose Men, beyond other Animals, to enter into Society with God, and other Men;§IV. But because the Laws of Nature enjoin those things only, which proceed from innate Principles of Action, it is therefore proper to take a thorow view of the State and Power, both of the Mind and Body, separately and jointly, that it may thence appear, for what kind of Action Man is fitted by his inward Frame.

There are most evident Indications, that the Mind has much greater Powers, and is created for much nobler Purposes, than only to preserve the Life of one inconsiderable Animal; which I shall now endeavour to explain.

And here, in the first place, I must not omit its spiritual, incorporeal, and God-like Nature, which is capable of a better Employment than that of the Soul of a Swine, instead of Salt, to preserve a Carcass from Rottenness: For it may and ought to be observ’d in general, “That Powers of the Mind, far inferior to those which we find in Man, are sufficient to preserve Life for a long time”; which is evident in long-liv’d Brutes, nay, and in Trees, as the Oak, whose long continuance in a flourishing State is even without Sense, much more without Reason: Nay, “That the Sagacity of our Mind does not consist in discovering what kinds of Nourishment, Medicines, Exercise, &c. are most conducive to our long continuance in this State,” for even the best Physicians are strangely at a loss in these Particulars; but, “That it rather excels in those Qualities, which relate to the Knowledge and Worship of a Deity, and to Acts moral and civil.” But Dr. Ward, now Bishop of Salisbury, hath excellently manag’d this Argument, beyond any other, whether antient or modern, Philosopher, and vindicated it from the Objections of Mr. Hobbes.16

Nevertheless, it is necessary to lay before the Reader some Powers and Actions of the Mind, whence it may appear, “That it is naturally fitted to become a Member of the greatest Society, (consisting of all rational Beings with God at their head,) and that it neglects its principal use, and loses the best Fruits of its natural Disposition, if it do not enter therein”; and that for a better Reason, than we affirm that the Earth (which here spontaneously produces Ears of Corn, and there Fruit-Trees) is naturally fit to encourage and reward the Industry of the Tiller; for Soils have their different natural Dispositions. The human Faculties are so fitted for Society, that it appears, (1.) “That all Men can both know and observe the Laws of Nature, which must in the first place be evident, because otherwise both the Admonitions of others, and our own Endeavours would be vain: (2.) That the Observance of those Laws is in it self pleasant and grateful; that the Precepts which point out to us such a Method of Action, for this very reason that they lead us to things naturally pleasant, promise a Reward to Obedience; and that a suitable Practice brings along with it no inconsiderable Advantage, namely, that Pleasure or part of our Happiness, which is necessarily contain’d in such natural employment of the human Faculties, as leads to the best End we can propose in Life, and to the fittest Means to attain it”: for all exercise of natural Powers, especially of the highest Order, in which we neither miss our aim, nor turn out of the direct Road, is naturally pleasant; nor can we conceive any other pleasure in Action, except what arises from Actions of this kind.17Freedom from Evil, and from Uneasiness, and grateful Impressions of some kinds, may be effected in us by external Objects;18 but no other Pleasure can take its rise from within our selves, than what either immediately or mediately depends upon such kind of Actions as I have now been describing. This is the only Happiness to which moral Philosophy directs us; nor can we be instructed how to obtain that, which in no sort depends upon our own Actions and Faculties. Hence it follows, “That the more things there are in the human Faculties, fitted for the knowledge and observance of the Laws of Nature, and consequently for the Practice of Virtue, so much greater are the Rewards annex’d to such Actions of the Mind, or, a Happiness so much the greater and more peculiar to Man, may be obtain’d by acting virtuously”: For each Faculty is render’d happy, by those Actions tending to promote the publick Good, to the exercise whereof it is fitted by Nature; for I shall shew hereafter, “That Happiness’s proceeding necessarily from such Actions as take their rise from Nature, is a most evident natural Proof, that it is the Will of the first Cause to oblige Men to such Actions, or that he enjoins them by his Law.”

Which Powers are, 1. Right Reason. 2. The Power of forming universal Ideas, Judgments from them, and consequent Volitions, and of representing these Ideas by arbitrary Signs, i.e. Words.I have selected as fittest for my purpose,

First, Right Reason, and the Standard of its Rectitude;

Secondly, Universal Ideas, (such, for example, as that of human Nature in general,) and the Judgments or Propositions thence arising concerning the Properties agreeing or disagreeing with those Ideas, and general or undetermined Acts of the Will agreeable to, and consequent upon, such Judgments. Hither also is to be referr’d the power of appointing arbitrarySigns, such as words spoken or written, accommodated to such universal Ideas, Propositions and Volitions. For Speech, because it is a help to the Memory and Reason,19 is rather subservient to Virtue, than Vice; to Society, than Sedition. Hence arises the power of forming general Rules of Life or Action, from Ideas of Actions20 agreeing in their general Nature with the Idea of human Nature: But such Propositions are more easily remember’d, if they be express’d in Words accommodated to this purpose, and to the Ideas of the generality of Mankind, and be applied by common Consent to express them. Thence are form’d Rules common to many, or publick Laws, which, as the State of Affairs happens to require, may be enacted, abrogated, or alter’d: As a Physician may justly prescribe to the same Patient, at different times, sometimes a slenderer, sometimes a more plentiful, Diet, now Restoratives, and then evacuating Medicines.

3. The Knowledge of Number, Measure, and Weights.Thirdly, The knowledge of Number, Measure, and Weights, and consequently the power of collecting many Particulars (lesser good Things, for example) into one Sum, and comparing the same with one another, according to their Difference and mutual Proportion. Hence Man can discover the chief Good, that is, the Collection of all good Things, and a comparative Good, perceiving one Good to be greater or less than another; and can subtract some from others; and is able to estimate the Proportion between things equally and unequally Good. To direct such Actions in such manner, as that they may best promote the best End, is the business of all the Laws of Nature.

4. The Power of observing and establishing Order.Fourthly, The Power (nearly related to this) of either observing Order already established, or of establishing it, in the Conduct of our Affairs, and of knowing of how great moment it is in uniting several Powers, in order to produce the same Effect, especially the common Good, as we may observe in modelling an Army or Common-Wealth. Whilst I was more attentively considering this Subject, I imagin’d, “That the best way of distinctly knowing the Nature and Force of Order, was to consider it in the most simple Matter, that shews its most simple Effect.” But I no where meet with Order in a more simple Matter, nor a more simple Effect thence demonstrable, than that Geometrical Order of right Lines and compounded Motions, whence Descartes has demonstrated (Geom. 1. 2.) that his Geometrical Curves might be generated.21 For he has there prov’d from Analytical Principles, “That the Nature and Properties of a Line describ’d by compounded Motions, is not subject to accurate Calculation or Demonstration, unless all the other Motions, in subordination to one another, be regulated by one.” What he has observ’d concerning a Line, the most simple Effect of compounded Motions, holds equally true in all Effects, depending upon the Concurrence of many Causes; namely, that it is necessary, that, among such Causes, some should be regulated by others in a certain Order, and all by one supreme Power; otherwise it will be uncertain, what Effect will follow from their Concurrence; and so either no End will be procured by the common Assistance of them all, or by Means which we know not, whether they be proper or no. By means of this Knowledge, and from the Train of subordinate Causes, which we perceive by our Senses, the Mind comes to a more distinct Knowledge of a first Cause, which is God the Governor of the World, who is able to foresee, what will be the Effects of the power of all rational Agents, placed and acting in a known Subordination; both which Considerations will have a natural Tendency to persuade Men, to consider themselves, both in their Thoughts and Actions, as subordinate Members of the most enlarg’d Society, in which all are contain’d, as it were in the Kingdom of God.

5. The Power of the Mind, to raise, stop, and moderate the Passions.Fifthly, From these arises that exalted Privilege belonging to the Mind of Man, of great force to establish and preserve this Society, namely, the Power of the Mind, to raise, stop, and moderate the Passions, and to direct them to desire greater Good, and to avoid greater Evil, than what any other Animal is capable of knowing; because we comprehend good Things, both more in number, and universal as to extent, their Sums, and their orderly Series; and we are conscious, that we can divert our Minds from such Thoughts and Affections as respect only our own private Good, and fix them upon the Care of the Publick Good, in which Liberty principally consists. I will not meddle with the Disputes about Liberty, which have been handled by others. This seems to be beyond all Controversy, “That the Nature of Man has so much Liberty, that he is determin’d to nothing (in external Actions, such as are Contracts, their Observation and Violation) without using his own Judgment, in forming which he may call in the Aid, not of the Senses only, but of the Memory; and to consider, Is this which I am going to do, consistent with the publick Good, which except it be preserv’d unviolated, the Happiness of particular Persons cannot be secur’d? Is this consistent with the well-grounded Motives of Virtue? &c.” I have observ’d that even Hobbes’s Politicks do, and that justly, suppose this Postulatum, “That Men may agree among themselves, or covenant, to transfer their Rights to another Person, for the common Good, (c. 5. §. 6.)”22 tho elsewhere he contends, “That they can regard nothing but their own private Good.” But since there is naturally in Men so large and noble a Faculty, which can both comprehend and pursue that vast Good, the greatest united Happiness of all rational Agents, the Reader will easily judge, whether the greatest Happiness of every particular Person does not consist in the perpetual vigorous Exercise of that Faculty. I do not contend that this Faculty is any thing distinct from the Powers of the Understanding and the Will: It is sufficient, if from the Concurrence of them the Power I have mention’d, arises. Every one sees, how immediately this Power of the Mind disposes or qualifies Men to restrain themselves from any sudden Sally of Passion, and to conform their Manners to the Laws, first of Nature, then of the Society; and, consequently, to establish at once the greatest and strictest Society of all rational Beings. Concerning right Reason and universal Ideas, I think proper to treat more at large; it will be sufficient to handle the rest briefly.

Of right Reason, (which consists, as well of selfevident Truths, as of Conclusions thence deduced, and stored up in the Memory;)§V. We must treat of right Reason the more particularly, both because what is right discovers both it self and what is crooked; it holding the same Rank in Morality, that Health does in Physick, the knowledge whereof is prior and more distinct in the Order of Nature, than the Theory of Diseases: and because Hobbes agrees with other Philosophers, that it is the Rule of human Actions, even before Civil Laws are fram’d; (See de Cive, c. 2. §. 1. and the Annotation.) 23 And, if he will be consistent with himself, we shall not differ much with him about its Definition. For c. 2. §. 1. in a Parenthesis (which he seems to place there for a Definition) he hints, that it is “Truth inferr’d from true Principles by right Reasoning.”24 But I think that, in this Argument, the notion of right Reason is somewhat more extensive; for it comprehends, as well first Principles, or self-evident Truths, as Conclusions thence form’d. The Etymology of the Word [Ratio] favours this Sense, which implies only a Proposition, that is rata, i.e. certain, unchangeable, and agreeable to the Nature of Things, whether it be self-evident, or prov’d by the help of an inference. Custom also, which is the Rule of Language, favours the same Sense of the Word; for all acknowledge the most evident Propositions, (such as “It is impossible for the same thing to be, and not to beat the same time”) for the Dictates of Reason, no less than those which require proof. Nor do I believe that Hobbes himself will oppose this larger Sense of the Words. I agree, however, with him, that by right Reason is not to be understood an infallible Faculty, (as he affirms many, but I know not who, to understand it;) but yet by it is to be understood a Faculty, not false in these Acts of judging. Nor is it properly understood to be an Act of Reasoning, (as he too rashly asserts,) but an Effect of the Judgment; that is, true Propositions treasur’d up in the Memory, whether they be Premisses or Conclusions, of which some that are practical are called Laws; for Actions are compar’d with these, in order to examine their Goodness, not with those Acts of Reasoning which discover them; yet I willingly allow, that these Acts of Reasoning are also included in the Notion of right Reason.

Of which, not every Man’s proper Reason, but the Nature of Things, is the Standard.But that which he immediately adds in the Annotation, (in order to give a Reason, why, in his Definition of right Reason, he lays down “every Man’s proper Reasoning as the Standard ”) is most false. “Out of civil Society, where no one can distinguish right Reason from wrong, except by making a Comparison with his own, every Man’s proper Reason is to be esteem’d, not only the Standard of his own Actions, which he does at his own peril, but also the measure of other Mens Reason with respect to his Affairs.”25 For, out of civil Society, any one may distinguish right Reason, without making a Comparison with his own. Because there is a common Standard, by which every Man’s own Reason (or Opinion) and that of others, is to be try’d, namely, the Nature of Things, as it lies before us, carefully to be observ’d and examin’d by all our Faculties. That is the Rule with which all, both Premisses and Conclusions, are to be compared, whether form’d by me or by any other Man, or by the Commonwealth it self, after it is form’d. For it is most certain, “That the Truth or Rectitude of Propositions concerning Things and Actions, present or future, consists in their Conformity with the Things themselves, concerning which they are form’d.” For since all our Ideas, or simple Apprehensions of Things, are the Images of those Things, (and the Truth and whole Perfection of Images consist in their exact Correspondence to the Objects they are design’d to represent;) and since true Propositions are the joining, by Affirmation, of Apprehensions impress’d upon the Mind by the same Objects, or the separating, by Negation, of Notions representing different Objects; it is necessary, that their Truth and Rectitude should entirely depend upon their Conformity with the Things themselves; as all agree, that the Truth of simple Apprehensions is to be deduced from that Standard.

This therefore is beyond Controversy, “That the Man who judges of Things otherwise than they are, does not judge according to right Reason, or does not make a right use of his Judgment; but that he pronounces according to right Reason, who affirms or denies, as Things really are.”

Wherefore such Propositions only are true, as agree with the Nature of Things.§VI. Nor is it material in this case, “Who it is that judges otherwise than the Thing really is, whether a sovereign, or a subordinate, Judge”; because the Truth, or Rectitude, of a Proposition in no respect depends upon the Order established amongst Men, but only upon the Agreement there of with the Things, concerning which a Judgment is made. Nor is it any Proof of the contrary, that there are some Mathematical Propositions,26 and others of like kind might be invented, which may be called true, tho there be nothing in Nature, to which they are conformable. For such conditional Propositions, because they pronounce nothing concerning Things without the Mind, are not to be compar’d with them; for their Truth consists only in an Agreement among the Terms, of which they are compos’d; and that is all which is to be look’d for in this Case. But these are of no use in human Life, except we find something external done, or possible to be done, which differs in nothing considerable from our Ideas.27 If their Subject, or something extremely like it, cannot exist, the Propositions are trifling, and are only equivocally called true. For the Truth of Propositions, which consists only in the Agreement of the Terms, if the Terms themselves cannot exist,28 is not of the same nature with that, which affirms the Agreement of Terms, possible, at least, if not present or future. The former kind of Truth is perfectly useless. However, let this Point be determin’d as it will, this is clear, “That a Proposition, whose Subject does or will exist, that is, whose Subject is conformable to Things without the Mind, which either now are, or hereafter shall be, does require, that what is affirm’d of that Subject should be conformable to the same things; and that therefore the whole ought to agree with the Nature of Things without us”; which is the principal Point I at present contend for.

It is also certain, “That every particular Man, and his Right over Things and Persons, whatever it may be, is not something merely chimerical and fictitious, but to be consider’d as something real, and existing without the Imagination”: because the Rights of particular Persons relate to the use of Things, and to Effects grateful to Men; and therefore the Truth of Propositions, or of the Dictates of Reason, concerning them, does necessarily consist in their Conformity to the State of Things; which is what I would lay as a Ground-work, in order to overthrow Hobbes’s Fundamentals: for it hence immediately follows, “That contradictory Propositions, concerning the Right of any two to the same Things or Persons, cannot be the Dictates of right Reason”; which is the Foundation of Hobbes’s Scheme.

An Explanation of practical right Reason, which points out the end, and the means thereto;§VII. I think it proper to observe here, by the way, “That by the Dictates of practical Reason, I understand Propositions, which point out either the end, or the means thereto, in every man’s power”; for all Practice is resolv’d into these: and, “That practical Reason is then called Right, when it determines truly, or as the thing is in it self, in Propositions declaring what is every man’s best and most necessary End, and what are the most proper Means of obtaining it”; or (which comes to the same thing) which pronounces, according to Truth, what Effects of our own Counsel and Will will render our selves and others happy, and how we shall, with the greatest certainty, produce them; just as in Geometry, that speculative Reason is right, which affirms a Quantity, which is really in its own Nature greater, to be greater, than another. And that practical Proposition is right, which teaches that method of constructing Problems, which if we pursue, we shall really produce the effect propos’d. Nor is an Opinion, or Proposition of this kind, truer, when affirm’d by a King, than when by a Subject. Since then all right Reason is conformable to those things, about which we have form’d a Judgment, since each thing is, in its nature, but one, and uniform with it self; it follows, “That right Reason in one cannot dictate that, which contradicts right Reason, concerning the same things, in any other Person.”

And is uniform and consistent,From this Principle follows that Precept of universal use, concerning the Actions of all Men, That human Actions ought to be uniform and consistent with themselves, thro’ the whole course of every Man’s Life; and that he cannot act always agreeably to right Reason, who, as Horace expresses it,

• • Aestuat, & vitae disconvenit ordine toto.
• • Fluctuates, and disagrees with himself thro’ the whole course of Life.29

It is included in the Notion of a true Proposition, (a practical one, for instance,) and is consequently a necessary Perfection of a Man forming a right Judgment in that Affair; that it should agree with other true Propositions framed about a like Subject, tho that like Case should happen at another time, or belong to another Man: And therefore, if any one judge, “That his Act of taking to himself the Necessaries of Life, not yet possess’d by any other, would promote the common Happiness”; it is necessary that the Judgment, “That the like Action of another in like Circumstances, would equally conduce to the same End,” must be undoubtedly right.Forming like Judgments in like Cases, whether our own, or those of other Men. Whoever therefore judges truly, must judge the same things, which he thinks truly are lawful to himself, to be lawful to others in a like Case. In the same manner, whatever Assistance any Man rightly and truly believes, he may or ought to demand according to right Reason, it is equitable, and consequently a Dictate of right Reason, that he should think, that any other in like Circumstances justly may or ought to demand the like help from him.

The reason of Hobbes’s making so gross a Blunder in this Argument, was, because he did not observe, “That there was the same Standard to all, by which the Reason of every one is to be tried, whether it be right or no”; namely, the Nature of Things, especially, of the End necessary to all rational Beings, and of the Means naturally leading thereto.

(To which sight Reason, and consequently to God, its Author, Hobbes imputes Contradictions;§VIII. We may observe here, by the way, how honourable Hobbes’s Sentiments are concerning God, ruling naturally by the Dictates of Reason; that is, that God, instructing Men in the Laws of Nature by the Dictates of right Reason, does enjoin Contradictions; that he first tells us, “We must fight against all, and so engages Men in a War, in which all that fall, are unjustly murder’d on both sides, because they claim only their own Rights”; that afterwards, “By the same right Reason he forbids War, and commands us to relinquish those very things, which yet he affirms are justly to be retain’d, and defended by the Sword, because they are Rights”: For he must necessarily ascribe to God all those Contradictions, which he imputes to the right Reason (as he calls it) of Men, contradicting one another with relation to the Necessaries of Life; for he affirms, that “God rules by this Reason, as by a Law,”30 and consequently, that he permits all those things which Reason permits; and teaches that all those things may be done consistently with his Laws, which right Reason has taught may be done, by natural Right. For Hobbes himself does not extend “Right” (where he purposely defines it) beyond “the Liberty of using our Faculties according to right Reason.”31

It is hence evident, “That God, according to Hobbes, first gives a Right to invade the Properties of all others, that his right Reason includes a Licence to commit any Crimes, and then involves all Men in the Miseries of a destructive War.” But after he has render’d Men miserable by the Evils of Wickedness and War, he points out a somewhat better road to Justice, such at least as may be sufficient to avoid the Punishment of the civil Power; and then at last endeavours to bring over wretched Mortals to such a Peace, as that Justice would establish.

Whereas right Reason judges alike in all.)That Reason, which I acknowledge as Right, first examines all the Parts, both of our own and others Happiness, and foresees, at a great distance, the Causes thereof that are lodg’d in our own Power; then, perceiving them in their own Nature so interwoven, that a prudent care of our own Happiness cannot be separated from the pursuit of the Happiness of others, that is, of the common Society of all rational Beings, it determines, that the strictest Justice is to be cultivated, with respect both to God and Men, and presages, that the Fruit there of shall be a most happy Tranquillity. By the same Reasoning it foresees, that the Actions of Men, who arrogate each all things to himself, or are guilty of such Practices, will involve all in War and extreme Calamities; and that so evidently, that there need not for Information be made so rash and fatal an Experiment. Therefore it will never allow a Right to act in such a manner; but, on the contrary, it will command Men to contract Friendships, to establish civil Government where it is wanting, and to preserve it when establish’d; that not only those Miseries of War, which it forsees may arise from the Folly of some Men, may be avoided, but the greatest Assistances to the most perfect Virtue and Happiness be procur’d. Hobbes therefore thought that this would be done, (and that necessarily too,) because he did not observe, “That there was the same Rule (the Nature of Things) for all, by which the Reason of all ought to be tried, whether it be right or no.”32

Here, I think, the fundamental Corner-Stone of the Temple of Concord is laid by Nature; for hence is deriv’d that Law of Nature uniting all rational, or wise, Beings (for Reason in perfection is Wisdom)33 among themselves, and with God as the wisest; which is thus express’d, Whoever determines his Judgment and his Will by right Reason, must agree with all others, who judge according to right Reason in the same Matter. Whence it also follows conditionally, (which I shall afterwards prove from proper Principles,) “If any right Reasoner, any wise Person, shall assign to each his proper Office, in order to the publick Good, all others who judge rightly, shall approve of the Distribution.” But of this more hereafter.

How to prevent false Reasoning.§IX. I shall hereafter observe, “That, in order to preserve our Reason right, we ought not only to avoid false Deductions, but especially the rash Admission of any thing as self-evident, without proof.” And we ought to take care, in the first place, “That our simple Ideas be both clear, from strong and frequent Impressions of the same thing known in various Circumstances; and distinct, by a separate Observation of the Parts singly; and adequate also (as far as we can) by the Assistance of the Memory and Understanding, added to the Discoveries of Sense.” It is to be observ’d, “That in these external Impressions there can be no Falshood, properly so called.” The Unwary, indeed, take occasion of judging falsly, from the Distance, the Refraction, or the tinging of the Rays of Light in the Eyes of Persons infected with the Jaundice: but if all things in the Medium between the Organ of Sense and its Object be consider’d, as they ought, before we pass a Judgment, (to this Head is to be referr’d the Temper of the Blood, that of the Animal Spirits, and the Brain;) we may avoid falling into Error. In the Medium are the partial Causes34 of the Impressions made, and they are therefore necessarily to be consider’d. What is more, before we determine any thing concerning the Sameness, and Connexion, or the Diversity, and Opposition of the Terms, they are most carefully to be compar’d with one another; and we ought to take care, especial care, when we contemplate the first and most universal Truths, not to give our Assent to any Proposition, without the strongest and most inevitable Necessity; for Truth depends not on our Will, but upon the Connexion of Things, and of those distinct Ideas, which are impress’d upon us by Things; but what we perceive, we necessarily perceive, whenever the Faculty is attentive, altho that Attention generally depends upon our own Will: and upon this Rule depends the main Point now in dispute. For since the whole Truth of affirmative Propositions consists in the Connexion of two Terms; and since these are naturally connected, because both Terms are imprinted upon the Mind by the same thing, and are evidently Representatives of one and the same Thing under different Respects; it is evident, “That Truths depend, not upon the Will of Men imposing and connecting Names arbitrarily, but upon the Natures of Things delineating their own Representations upon the Mind. But whatever Motions are impress’d upon us by the Nature of Things, are necessary, and proceed from the first Mover, the Author of Nature; so, consequently, do all those Ideas, which, impress’d upon the Senses and Imagination by a Motion evidently natural, represent practical Truth to the Mind, concerning Actions most conducive to the common Good. Truths of this kind are natural Laws, as I shall hereafter prove; and their Impression upon the Mind is the Inscription and Promulgation of Laws; and they may for the same reason be affirm’d to be by the first Mover imprinted upon us, (by means of the Nature of Things;) that speculative Axioms (such as, “Lines drawn from the Centre to the Circumference of the same Circle are equal”) may be truly affirm’d to be necessarily planted in our Minds by the First, thro’ the intervention of Second, Causes. Justly therefore may we ascribe to the Law of Nature the words of Demosthenes, which Marcian, in the Pandects, has inserted into his general Description of Laws, that it is “The Invention and Gift of God.”35 They, who do not acknowledge the Proof of a Deity from the Necessity of a first Mover, (which Hobbes however acknowledges,)36 take away the most antient, and, in my Opinion, the strongest, Prop of Religion. Nevertheless, if they own the Proof of a God from that Order which is visible in the World, the mutual Relations of Things, and the Beauty thence arising, or from this, that they perceive so many of them design’d by Nature for our Use, as their final Cause, they will be oblig’d, by this our Argument, to acknowledge God as the Author of all necessary Impressions.

To which we are never necessarily determin’d, Judging, Willing, or Acting, wrong, being owing only to an Abuse of Liberty;§X. This Observation, concerning the Truth of simple Apprehensions, or of all natural Impressions, seems to me of so great importance, that I will venture thence to conclude, that “Neither does our own Nature, nor that of Things without us, ever necessarily or unavoidably determine us to form a false Judgment, nor, consequently, to chuse or act amiss”; which always proceeds from the Uncertainty or Error of the Understanding Whatever, at any time, we judge, chuse, or act, contrary to those Notices, which a thorow Examination into the Nature of Things affords; that I think wholly owing to a hasty, rash, and unseasonable Use of Liberty, which is generally deluded thro’ the Sollicitation of a present Advantage, and incites the Judgment to determine Points not yet sufficiently clear’d up. “All Truths, (even in Morality,) which are unchangeable and never deceive, are owing to Nature, and to a Necessity of assenting to things evident. And to Nature they only (exclusive of Errors) are to be ascrib’d, if we would not be injurious, to our own Faculties, no one of which ever necessarily determines us to embrace a Falshood; to natural external Agents, that cannot deceive; and, to God himself, to whose Nature it is a Contradiction to suppose him willing to deceive us.” We thus determine upon these Points, on better Authority, than Physicians, who call only those Motions of the Humors, for instance, Natural, which tend to the Preservation and Health of the Individual, calling the rest, which tend to Disease and Death, Preternatural; and with Reason, because by Nature here they understand the Nature of the Individual, whose Preservation is the End of their Art: Yet they will not deny the most fatal Alterations of the Humours, to be according to the universal Laws of Nature. But, in Man, the Error of the Judgment, and Perverseness of the Will, are neither agreeable to the Nature of the Individual endeavouring its own Perfection, nor proceed from any necessary influence of things external upon him; but first from mere Inadvertency and Rashness, afterwards from Habits or Example, the Imitation of himself or others. Hobbes is therefore very unfair, who proposes whatever Transaction he has observ’d among Cabals of Villains, as a momentous Discovery in human Nature, and a Foundation of a new Set of Politicks.

And human Judgment acting most agreeably to Nature, whom it approaches nearest to Necessity.I am of Opinion, that not only speculative Axioms, but the first Principles of moral Habits are thus necessary. It is sufficient, indeed, that those Dictates which determine many particular Actions, as they are circumstanc’d, are supported by probable Reasons, such as the Weakness of our Mind, which cannot examine all things present, much less foresee all the Consequences of the present Action, can attain, whilst urg’d by an immediate Necessity of Acting. Those things which proceed from Examination and cautious Deliberation, from Experience, and the faithful Testimony of competent Witnesses, such are Civil Laws and Precedents, or Cases adjudg’d in Courts of Judicature, make the nearest Approaches to Necessity. We ought therefore to form a Judgment of the Inclination of human Nature from these, rather than from the rash Actions of Men. For Deliberation, Experience, and all the other helps to discover Truth, do continually bring us nearer to that State of Mind, by which, because of the Influence of Things upon it, it cannot think otherwise than it does think, which is the Case, when it judges from the Evidence of Sense, or clear Demonstration: And thus the more necessary and unavoidable any Judgment is, so much the more natural, or approaching to what is natural, it is to beesteem’d. Hobbes, on the contrary, forms a mistaken Judgment of human Nature, from rash Actions, as absurdly, as if we were to judge of the Nature of a Tree, from the fungous or mossy Excrescencies sometimes growing to its Bark.

2. Of universal Ideas,§XI. 2. Next comes under Consideration, that peculiar Power of the human Mind, by which it forms universal Ideas, omitting those Accidents, by which particular things are distinguish’d. Hence arises a great help to the Memory, and consequently to Prudence thence arising; nay, to every Virtue, as connected therewith, and to every Action and Habit, which ministers Steadiness, Beauty, and Happiness, to human Life. For the Mind can easily apply to innumerable Individuals and their various Circumstances, Properties agreeing to one or a few Natures consider’d in themselves, whether those Properties respect their inward Frame, or their Causes and Effects: Hence all Sciences take their rise, as compos’d of Universals. By the help of these, Abstracts, and the chief Heads, of Natural History are easily collected; whence (to omit other Advantages) we readily learn what things are necessary, to preserve and perfect, both our own Nature and that of others. In like manner the Precepts of Arts, since they too are universal, compendiously instruct, by what means any Persons, whose Faculties are capable of them, shall or may attain the Ends by them propos’d. So Logick, Physick, Ethicks, (or the Art of Morality,) the Arts of Navigation and Architecture, do not instruct one particular Person only, how Aristotle, for example, shall direct his Reason, in one Affair, to the Discovery of Truth; or Hippocrates preserve, or recover, his own Health; or Palinurus reach one Port only; but they instruct all Artists without distinction: They consider the End, and, consequently, the propos’d Good of every Man in general, chusing, and prescribing the use of, Means as general; and, therefore, both they who teach, and they who learn, these Arts, first contemplate these general Precepts. Which proves, by the way, that Men not only can, but that in all Arts it is their universal Practice, to respect a general Good, earlier than their own: Altho nothing hinders, but that Hippocrates, applying his general Precepts to a particular Case, may preserve his own Health, for instance, as well as that of others; and Vitruvius may build himself a House, as he had done before for others. It is of this further Advantage to observe these universal Ideas and Propositions, both Speculative and Practical, which are naturally form’d by the Mind of Man, because from such universal Notions are form’d Unchangeable, and consequently in some Sense Eternal, Rules of human Action. In the following Sheets, I shall lay before the Reader many such Propositions or Rules, whence he may distinctly perceive, what those universal Notions are, of which they are form’d; and how peculiar they are to the Mind of Man; and how much they promote Religion, civil Government, and the Peace and Commerce of different Nations.

And Speech, which is compos’d of Words, which are the arbitrary Signs of universal Ideas.But first I must make a few Observations on the Power and Inclination of the Mind of Man to form Words, spoken or written, and other arbitrary Signs, by help of which it may either recollect, or communicate to others, its Notions, both universal and particular. This remarkable Difference, between Men and other Animals, contributes much both to the forming and preserving Societies: The great Agreement observable among Men, in the use of such Signs, will easily be accounted for, if we consider (as becomes Christians) what the sacred History informs us, “That all Mankind have sprung from one Original,”37 so that Eve might, without Difficulty, have used words in the same Sense that Adam first appointed them, and their Posterity might suck in their Signification with their Mother’s Milk. But if Hobbes would rather consider them in his State of Nature, as suddenly sprung out of the Earth (like Mushrooms) of full Growth, and without any Relation to one another;38 even in that Case Reason would persuade them, that many, (namely, all those who wanted to maintain a mutual Intercourse,) might agree in the same words, or other Signs, to express the same things. Nor was it at all of any Consequence, who first express’d this Idea or Thing by that Sign; but it would greatly concern them all, to agree among themselves in some common Marks of their Ideas, by help whereof each particular thing might be made known to all. Hereby each Person, by communicating his Observations to others, is enabled to “Improve their Minds with a further Degree of Knowledge”; so that the Experience and Endeavours of the present Age may point out to the succeeding ones a shorter way to Prudence and Happiness, and by a more easy Method produce in them all kinds of Virtue; hereby Men are inabled to “Debate concerning Covenants, and Laws, to be made,” to “Promulgate such as have been agreed upon,” to “Examine, whether they have been observ’d”; to“Produce and receive Testimonies”; and to “Give Judgment according to the Proofs.” Hobbes himself will not deny, both that these things are peculiar to human Nature, and that they fit Man for Society.

Of the Reflex Acts of the Mind, and of Conscience.§XII. Shall I not reckon among the Perfections of the human Understanding, that it can reflect upon it self? Consider its Habits, as Dispositions arising from past Actions? Remember and recollect its own Dictates, and compare them with its Actions? Judge which way the Mind inclines? And direct it self to the Pursuit of what seems fittest to be done? Our Mind is conscious to it self of all its own Actions, and both can, and often does, observe what Counsels produced them; it naturally fits a Judge upon its own Actions, and thence procures to it self either Tranquillity and Joy, or Anxiety and Sorrow. In this Power of the Mind, and the Actions thence arising, consists the whole force of Conscience, by which it proposes Laws to it self, examines its past, and regulates its future Conduct. Nor appear any Traces, in other Animals, of sonoblea Faculty. Great are the Powers of this Principle, both to the Formation and Increase of Virtue, to the erecting and preserving Civil Societies, both among those who are not subject to the same Civil Power, and among Fellow-Subjects. And, indeed, the principal Design of this Treatise is to shew, “How this Power of our Mind, either of it self, or excited by external Objects, forms certain universal practical Propositions, which give us a more distinct Idea of the utmost possible Happiness of Mankind, and pronounce by what Actions of ours, in all Variety of Circumstances, that Happiness may most effectually be obtain’d.” For these are the Rules of Action, these are the Laws of Nature.

I will here add nothing to what I have already mention’d of the Knowledge of Number, Measure, Order, Free-Will, &c. altho these be both peculiar to Man, and are very material in the present Argument.

Indications enforcing universal Benevolence, from a Survey of the human Body, considr’d.§XIII. I will now apply my self to the Consideration of the Human Body, in which I meet with several things worthy of Observation for my present Purpose, which are usually neglected, or at least omitted, by others who have handled this Argument.

For, since the Life, Health, and most perfect State, of the human Body, which can be acquir’d, (every thing else being regarded according to its Value or Dignity,) is part of that End which right Reason proposes to its self, and its Powers and various Uses are Means highly useful to the whole Man, both to procure the Improvement of the Minds of Individuals, and to promote the common Good; it is impossible, but that the Consideration thereof must suggest somewhat useful to direct us in the Choice of the supreme End, and in the Application of the Means; but in Dictates concerning that End, and the Means conducing thereto, does the whole of the Law of Nature, whose original and principal Parts I here propose to enquire into, consist.

In the first place, I think that this may be affirm’d universally, That whatever (1.) demonstrates, from the divinely-contriv’d Make of our Body, “That the whole possible Happiness of Man depends upon many Causes, the chief whereof are Rational; and that, therefore, it cannot reasonably be expected but in conjunction with the common Happiness”; whatever (2.) proves further, “That every one can, by the proper Power of his own Body, effect somewhat, by which this common End may be promoted, and the Assistance of others procur’d, and that, by his Endeavours of this kind, every Man will procure to himself the greatest Happiness in his Power”: That demonstrates certainly, “That the Nature of the human Body affords a sufficient Indication of our Obligation to such Endeavours.” And this will appear plainly, from the Consideration of natural Obligation, and of Law, which I shall afterwards explain.

Further, the more evidently and constantly the Manner and Method is pointed out, according to which it is necessary, in order to our own Happiness, that we should co-operate with others to procure the common Happiness; and the greater any one’s Powers are, or the stronger his Inclination to such Actions; so much the easier it is to pay this Debt due to the Publick, and the Crime the greater, which is committed by the Breach of the Commandment; and from hence our clearer and stronger Obligation to such Actions may with the utmost Certainty be inferr’d: For these Reasons I thought it proper to propose some Indications of this kind, taken from the human Body. The Observation and Sagacity of others will add more, or will pursue these Hints further.

In the human Body are to be consider’d, (1.) What belongs to it as Body; (2.) What it has, as a Body endow’d with Life and Sense, like other Animals; (3.) What are peculiar to it self.

I. As a Body in General, I. It has these things in common with all other Bodies.

1. Having its Motions, necessary for its Preservation, dependent upon, and limited by, the Motions of other Bodies, especially those of other Men.1. That all its Motions, and consequently those which preserve its Life, Health and Strength, (whose Preservation each Person proposes to himself as a principal part of his End,) proceed from the first Mover, and are necessarily complicated with, and in some measure depend upon, innumerable Motions of other corporeal Parts of the same System. Among these are chiefly to be consider’d the Bodies of other Men, and their Motions which can limit ours, and are govern’d by Reason, which we have just ground to hope may be brought to concur with our Reason.39

2. That its Motion (as that of all other Bodies) is propagated far and wide, and does not perish, but concurs with other Motions to perpetuate the Successions of Things, or to preserve the Whole.2. Being equally able to promote those Motions in other human Bodies, which are equally necessary for their Preservation. And as the first Observation instructs us, “That our private Good depends upon common Powers”; so this second Observation proves, “That the Powers of particular Persons may be of publick and most extensive Advantage.” The former forbids, “To hope for the Happiness of particular Persons separately from the Good of the Whole,” and consequently points out “The common Good” as “The fruitful Cause of private Happiness”: the latter shews, “That the Pursuit of the common Good will not be in vain, because it conspires with the Endeavours of the whole Universe.” In both these complicated Motions, namely, that, by which almost all Things concur in some measure to the Preservation of any particular Body for some time, and that, by which any particular Body concurs with others to the Preservation of the whole System, a certain Order is preserv’d, by which some Motions are determin’d by others in a continued Series, and all are govern’d by the continued circular Motion of the whole System. I need not any particular Hypothesis concerning the System of the World, to prove what I have advanc’d concerning the necessary Order, and the Powers of complicated Motions; for these are demonstrated from geometrical Principles, which no Hypothesis can hurt. Tho a Contemplation of this kind may at first seem merely speculative, yet it is not without its Use in human Affairs; for hence we know distinctly, and from general Principles, “How necessary a certain Order among Causes which act by a corporeal Force, is, that many of them should conspire to produce any Effect foreknown and design’d in the Mind.” It further shews, “How we may judge with Certainty, which Cause has contributed more, which less, to the Effect design’d.” Whence the value and worth of Causes, with respect to any Effect, is fix’d and determin’d by their proper and natural Force; and, consequently, we are instructed by the very Nature of Things, both, “Which Causes are more highly to be valued, upon account of what they have already effected,” and, “The Aid of what Causes we ought chiefly to sollicit, in order to procure what we farther desire.” We thus come to know, “That those Causes, which Philosophers call Universal,40 (such as the Motion of the Aetherial Fluid, & c.) but chiefly the first of them, God, are the principal Sources of the common Good, which we either all enjoy, or which we expect from the Nature of Things.” We thus also know, “That Motions of Bodies ever so little subject to the Determination and Direction of the human Will,(too mit the Consideration of those which are exempted from it,) when govern’d by the universal Benevolence of all rational Beings towards all, are the principal Causes of the publick Happiness of all, whence is deriv’d the private Happiness of each.” For universal Benevolence is the Spring and Source of every Act of Innocence and Fidelity, of Humanity and Gratitude, and, indeed, of all the Virtues by which Property and Commerce are maintain’d. They are govern’d by it, as particular Motions are determin’d by the universal Motion in the System of the World; or as all the Functions of the Spirits, Bowels, Vessels, and Limbs, in the Body of an Animal, proceed from the general Motion of the Blood. If we embrace this Opinion, from a thorow Examination of the Nature of Things, it will doubtless oblige us to pay Obedience to all the Laws of Nature, and to take diligent care, that the same be paid by others: This is the utmost we can do, to make our selves, as well as others, happy; nor can Reason propose to any one a greater End.

Knowledge, and the Use of Signs, in Mankind, consider’d as a corporeal System, supplying the want of Contiguity in communicating Motion.§XIV. However, in this Comparison of the Aggregate of Mankind, as they act by a corporeal Force, with the natural System of Bodies, I am not ignorant of this wide Difference between them, “That the Effects of Systems merely corporeal, are perform’d, not without Contiguity between the Bodies moving and moved, for the most part without Sense, but always without the interposition of Counsel and Liberty; whereas Men act often at a considerable distance, and make much use of their Reason and Liberty.” It is, nevertheless, likewise evident, (1.) “That the corporeal Force of all Men, when it is exerted, is subject to the same Laws of Motion with other Bodies”; and, (2.) “That the force and necessity of Subordination between the Motions arising from Man, is the same with that which is among those of any other Bodies”; whenever many Men co-operate to any Effect which relates to others, (which they daily practise more than any one can “be well aware of”:) with respect to these two Points only, I propos’d the foregoing Comparison; which, therefore, was made and apply’d justly. I will, upon this occasion, venture to go farther and affirm, “That, because Men have frequent Opportunities of meeting, by which they mutually profit or hurt one another, and many ways of doing, by Words or Actions, good or harm to Persons at a great distance, especially, if Men form Schemes for the Conduct of their Lives, (which it is certain every one naturally and constantly does, because every one desires that all his future Existence should be happy”;) I will venture to affirm, I say, “That the whole Race of Mankind ought to be consider’d as one System of Bodies, so that nothing of any Moment can be done by any Man, relating to the Life, Fortune, or Posterity of any one, which may not some way affect those things which are alike dear to others; as the Motion of every Body, in the System of the World, communicates its Motion to many others, especially neighbouring ones.” For that vast Privilege of extensive Knowledge, with which Men are endow’d, supplies the want of Contiguity, which is requisite in other Bodies, to the Communication of Motion; for Men are excited to Motion by the least Signals, whether Natural or Arbitrary, by which they quickly perceive what has been, or ought to be, done by other Men at the greatest distance. What is more, they retain a Memory of those things, done either to themselves or those who are dear to them, and by it are excited to take the first Opportunity of Retaliation; they are also naturally provident, and presage, from what has been done to others, what is to be expected by themselves, and those they love; and this induces them to many things, with a view to prevent Evils, and to create a probable Prospect of very remote future Advantages. This Remembrance of Things past, and Foresight of Things to come, are the Reason why Men, at a distance, are more mov’d by what is done to others, than inanimate Bodies are by the Motion of neighbouring ones, which act nothing, except they be present: for from these they immediately and justly conclude, “That being like in Nature and Condition, with respect to Necessaries, they also are to expect like things.” Thus they cannot but be affected with those Actions of any towards others, which, if often repeated, or copied after by others, naturally work a considerable Change (either for the better or the worse) in the Condition of Men in general.

I own, however, that all are not equally affected with such Actions, but some more, some less, according to their different degrees of Sagacity, in apprehending the Causes or Hindrances of the common Good. Nor is the Influence communicated from some Men to others, by such Actions as respect the common End of all, for that Reason less natural, than that between Bodies of the same System with respect to natural Motions, which are communicated to more subtle and fluid Matter in a greater, to grosser Matter in a less, degree. It is sufficient, that “To perceive in Men a Likeness of Nature and Condition with respect to Necessaries,” and “To infer from what is done to others, what we are to hope or fear will be done to our selves,” are Acts, Natural and Universal, and not of less Efficacy to influence Men, than mutual Contact between Bodies moving and moved, is to communicate Motion among the Parts of a corporeal System. I will infer no more from hence, than what is otherwise evident, and seems to be naturally accounted for upon these Principles, that all Men may hence learn, “That their Security from Evils, and their whole Prospect of Assistance from others, in their pursuit of Happiness, necessarily depend upon the voluntary Assistance of many, who do not less stand in need of many others, that it may be well with them.” Whence we are immediately oblig’d to acknowledge, “That the mutual good Offices of all are useful to all.” Just as natural Bodies in the same System cannot perform their Motions, unless other Bodies concur with, and give place to, them.

From the Necessity of mutual Offices it follows necessarily, “That he that would, to the utmost of his Power, provide for his own Happiness, must, according to the measure of his Ability, procure to himself the Benevolence and Assistance of all others.” Every one may easily know, that he has Power to confer upon others Assistance and innumerable good Offices, and to conspire with the whole System of rational Beings to the same End, and in pursuit of the common Good: but, on the contrary, that he can no more compel so many Causes, which are singly of force nearly equal with himself, to lend him their Assistance, and at the same time to relinquish and neglect all natural Endeavours to promote such things as are necessary for themselves, than one Pound Weight can, in a just Balance, raise a Weight of some thousand Pounds in the opposite Scale. For all Struggles between Men, by force merely corporeal, are perpetually determin’d according to the natural Laws of Motion; all which Laws Wren and Huygens have shewn how to exhibit by the Beam of a Balance, suspended either upon a single Center, or upon two Centers at equal distance from the Center of Gravity.41 Nor is the Cunning or Craft of any one above all the rest, of so great Powers as to force the Beam, which is depress’d by the real Necessities, Powers, and Counsels of a great Number, toward the common Good, to incline to the contrary Part, that is, to the private Advantage of any particular Person. Wherefore it cannot but appear evident, from the general Nature of human Power, “That we can more surely procure its Assistance, by promoting the common Good, than by Force and Fraud, or a savage Rapaciousness”; to which, according to Hobbes’s Doctrine, (in the Epistle dedicatory to his Treatise de Cive,) even good Men must have recourse in a State of Nature;42 and their natural Right resto perve themselves, makes it no Vice.

Which is illustrated from the known Laws of Matter and Motion.§XV. Our Opinion seems to be much illustrated by the general Principles of Mechanical Philosophy, (the only Principles Hobbes himself seems to me to agree to,) which inculcate this principally, as necessary in every Hypothesis, “That the Motion of the corporeal World, dispersed thro’ the several Parts thereof, is preserv’d by that mutual Communication, Cession, Acceleration, or Retardation, of all Motions, which the Powers and Impulses of every particular Body, reduced to an exact Calculation, require: yet so, That the Motion of the whole System about the common Center, (which is compos’d as a whole, of the Motions of every particular Body added together,) is preserv’d always without In terruption or Alteration, and determines and adjusts the Motion of all its Parts.” All Bodies have the same Power and Necessity to continue in Motion, which is in each proportionable to their Quantity of Matter, or their Bulk and Solidity compar’d together: but even this Force is subordinate, in every particular Body, to the Motion of the whole System; and is therefore it self, as well as the whole, preserv’d by that which determines it. Thus the Motions of particular Bodies agree with the general Motion of the Whole, and are subservient thereto; and that general Motion of the System governs and preserves the Powers of all particular Bodies, in the most effectual manner, by the Nature of things consider’d, either together, or each by it self; which Nature consists in perpetual Motion and Change. All things are so order’d, “That not the smallest Quantity of Matter nor Motion may be lost,” which is demonstrated from Mechanical Principles; and universal Experience, and the most authentick Histories of past Times, witness, “That the same Kinds of Animals are perpetuated, and their Numbers rather increas’d than diminish’d, notwithstanding the fierce Passions of some few Animals.” In this Perpetuity of Matter and Motion, and of the Kinds of all things continued by a Succession of Individuals, consists the Preservation, or natural Good, of the material Universe, which is promoted, according to the unchangeable Laws of Motion. Nor can any sufficient Reason be assign’d, “Why the Preservation of Mankind should not be look’d upon as establish’d and continued by the force of Causes equally certain and natural, as the Successions of any other Animals, which entirely depend upon the unchangeable Nature of the material World, and the necessary Laws of Motion, since they perfectly agree in all that is essential to an Animal.” Certainly the Conjunction of the Mind with the Body, very often makes its Condition better than that of Brutes, but never worse; which will be evident to any one who considers, what Advantages the Body receives from the Conduct of Reason, which abundantly compensate some Mischiefs, which happen to the Body thro’ the Error of the Mind: nay, it is certain, that the Errors of the Mind about Food, Pleasure, and other things which relate to the care of the Body, proceed from hence, that the Mind, regardless of the Admonitions of its own Reason, gives way to the Appetite, and the corporeal or animal Affections.

Whence it appears, that the common Good is the noblest Effect possible, and inseparable from that of particular Persons.These Observations, concerning the necessary Causes of the Preservation of the corporeal Universe, and (to omit other things) of the several Kinds of Animals, and consequently of Mankind, make such Impressions upon the Minds of Men, as these which follow, and conduce much to our present purpose, viz.

1. That the Preservation (or common Good) of Mankind is a matter not only possible, but that it depends upon so many Causes, so certainly determin’d, that we have the greatest reason to believe, that it will undoubtedly be perpetuated, notwithstanding the malevolent Endeavours of any to the contrary.

2. That this Effect is both in its own nature the most noble, and most closely united with the Preservation, and possible Happiness, of every Individual.

3. That the Matter and Motion of all particular Bodies, and, consequently, of Men themselves, is, in some measure, naturally and necessarily subservient, whether they will or no, to the Preservation of the corporeal Universe, (which includes human Bodies,) namely, as every particular Body is determin’d in its own Motion, by the general Motion of the whole System, by which it is perpetuated.

Does not the Nature of Things, and consequently God its Author, powerfully persuade and command an Endeavour to promote the common Good of Mankind, by every Indication they give, that it is both a possible Effect, and the greatest; and also more closely united with the private Happiness of every one, than any other Effect which we can foresee as possible, and by making us in some degree to promote it necessarily, even then when we give way to our natural Affections, and oppose it to the utmost of our Power? Is it not evident, that he acts most agreeably to practical Reason, and to the imprinted Ideas of the Causes of both publick and private Good, who promotes the first Attempts of corporeal Nature, and exalts them to a greater height, by the additional Force of the human Mind?

Which is effected by the Subordination and balancing of Powers.But this seems to be sufficiently evident to all, especially because the whole Operation of the Mind, necessary to compleat human Happiness, may be deduced from what I have said concerning the manner in which the corporeal World is preserv’d; for it consists in these two Things, (1.) That the Endeavours of all particular Persons toward their own Preservation be made subordinate to such Endeavours or Actions as are evidently necessary to the Preservation of the Whole. (2.) That by this Method those Powers of all Individuals, necessary for Self-defence, be so pois’d, that no one can be destroy’d by any other, to the hazard and damage of the Whole. Something like these is observable in the Motions of the Mundane System, which arises from the Plenitude of the World,43 and the Contact of Bodies, and therefore extends it self to them all. It is the work of the Mind and Reason to observe, “That every one’s proper Happiness depends in a nobler manner upon the voluntary Actions of other rational Agents, even at a great distance”; and therefore to take care, “That all human Actions do in like manner contribute to the common Good of all rational Beings; as the Motions of all Bodies contribute to the Preservation of the corporeal System.” This we shall effect, if these two Things which I have now mention’d, be observ’d in all voluntary Actions which respect others. Thus therefore we are instructed by the Nature of things, “How to promote the common Happiness, and our own, which is necessarily included therein”: which is the same as to say, “We are taught what Actions are commanded by the Law of Nature.” And certainly all prudent Persons, in all kind of Deliberations, where Civil Laws take no place, or leave the matter to every Man’s own Determination, naturally fix their Eyes on these things, and can agree among themselves upon these things only, which serve to promote the common Good of the Parties consulting, and so to balance the Powers of all, that it may be every one’s Interest, that no one have Power to oppress another. Thus, among all neighbouring States, who are not subject to the same Government, this is the chief View in all Embassies, Covenants, and Leagues, so to balance the Powers of every particular State by mutual Assistance, that it should be difficult for them to destroy one another, but sufficiently easy to preserve, and, in some measure, enrich, themselves, which was the End of first erecting Civil States.

Which is illustrated from the Consideration of the Nature of Government,§XVI. In like manner, at the first Establishment of any Commonwealth, the Powers of all Orders and Parts are mutually balanc’d with the greatest Exactness, and are all subjected to the supreme Power, so as to be able mutually to assist, but hardly to hurt, one another. Nay, further, the Preservation of the Commonwealth, both from seditious and internal Evils, and from foreign Invasion, is only a continued Establishment of the same Balance of Power, and proceeds from Causes plainly alike. Moreover, whenever new Laws are to be enacted, or old ones to be amended, or receive an equitable Construction, all wise Men will ever have recourse to the Principles I have mention’d; and, universally, in all Cases where civil Laws are silent, or cannot bring a seasonable Relief, or where they allow a Liberty of acting, to Persons, whether in a publick or private Station, (which Cases, as Hobbes himself owns, are almost innumerable,)44natural Rules of human Actions can be taken from nothing else, than from the Consideration of the common Good, as the End, and from the Advantage of preserving that Balance of Power, which either Nature hath made, or the Constitution of the Commonwealth hath establish’d.

And of the System of the World, without assuming any particular Hypothesis.Tho’ I own, that the Power of Order and of conspiring to one common End, and also the Necessity of a Balance of Power in all Parts of any System, in order to the Preservation of the Whole, both may be, and usually are, observ’d in the Frame, whether Natural or Artificial, of such things especially as are most obvious, without any Skill in Mathematicks, and the mechanical Philosophy of the System of the World; in like manner, as much is discover’d concerning the Numbers and Magnitudes of Things, without any other Arithmetick and Geometry, than what is learn’d by common Experience only, without the Help of Books: Yet I thought it proper, in this stricter Research into the Nature of Causes, where we are endeavouring to obtain an exact Knowledge of the whole Matter, sometimes to have recourse to those Sciences, in which these Notions are most distinctly explain’d, and in so general a manner, that they may, with great Advantage of Illustration, be thence easily apply’d. So it is usual to have recourse to the artificial Rules of Arithmetick and Geometry, when any Difficulty arises relating to those Things, whose Number or Measure we have guess’d at by the Help of natural Sagacity only, or when we have occasion for an exact Computation. I chose to illustrate the present Argument by the Example of the System of the World; both because some general, tho confus’d, Notion thereof is always present to the Minds of all, and imprints upon them some Idea of the greatest End, the common Good, and of mutual Assistance, as the only Means to obtain it; and because, from those general Motions of the System of the World, (of which only the Learned frame a distinct Idea,) the Powers, Orders, and Limits, of all lesser Motions, as from the most general Causes, are deduced; so that, in this Enquiry into Causes, we can never stop, till we arrive at the First Causes among those which are created, which lead us immediately to God. But let it suffice, to have hinted these things in general; from them it easily appears, “That those Powers, which, consider’d either singly or jointly with others, are very unequal, may yet be conveniently enough balanc’d among themselves in the same System, to the Preservation of the Whole.” I thought it proper, not to make use of any particular Hypothesis, with respect to the System of the World; both because the Resemblance between the Manner and Causes, by which this material World and Mankind are preserv’d, does not extend it self to all Circumstances, (which is not necessary, in order to the Mind’s learning something, which may be of publick Advantage;) and because what I have advanc’d is so manifestly true, that it must be admitted in every Hypothesis: Lastly, because to have added more, was not necessary to those who are conversant in Natural Philosophy, and to others it would be unacceptable, and seem impertinent.

II. As a Body, endow’d with Life and Sense, like other Animals.§XVII. II. That Power and that Necessity of being subservient to the Motions of innumerable other Bodies, which I have shewn, from the general Nature of Matter and Motion, to be in all Bodies, as long as they continue in Motion, are found likewise in human Bodies, and seem to persuade, and readily incline, each particular Person to lend his Assistance to Mankind. But if to these we add those things which distinguish the Nature of Animals from other Bodies, they will more strongly incline us, and will lay before us a sufficient Reason, why we should be chiefly sollicitous to assist those of our own Species, with little comparative regard to other Bodies.

Bodies Animate are distinguish’d from Inanimate, by that Temper of Parts, and Configuration of Organs, which are sufficient for Nutrition, Generation, Sensation, Imagination, Affections, and voluntary Motions; and all unanimously agree, that, by these Actions, all kind of Animals endeavour their own Preservation, and Perfection, or Happiness, for the time appointed by the universal Causes of the World. Nor is it difficult, in some measure, to explain the Power and Causes of this Endeavour, from the Observations of Anatomists and Physicians, on the Circulation of the Blood and other useful Juices, and on the spreading of the Nerves thro’ the whole Body of Animals, together with what Natural Philosophers have thence deduced, concerning the Causes of Hunger and muscular Motion; but it is not worth while to insist upon the Proof of Truths universally acknowledg’d; from these, as allow’d us by our Adversaries, it will be proper to draw some Inferences, which may make for our present Purpose. Such are,

First, “That, from the same inward Frame of Animals, which determines them to Self-Preservation, there are beside afforded manifest Indications, that their behaving themselves innocently and beneficently towards Animals of the same Species, is necessary to their own Preservation and happiest State”: and then,

Secondly, “That, from the Concurrence of the same internal Causes, Animals cannot but be sensible of, and retain in Memory, these Indications.” The former of these summarily includes the Precept and the Sanction of the Laws of Nature; the latter respects their Promulgation, or the manner by which they become known: There fore both these must be explain’d in their proper order.

Whence the first Indication to Benevolence is this, That Men, being Animals of the same kind with other Men, have therefore their Appetite of Self-preservation limited in like manner; which is therefore very consistent with a Permission to others of the same Species, to preserve themselves likewise.In the first place it offers it self to our Observation, “That the Bodies of each Animal are contain’d within very narrow Limits, and that the time of their possible Duration is but small”; which is a sufficient Indication, that each has occasion for a few things only, in order to its Welfare; or that, if some sort of concurrence of many things be necessary, it is no other, than what may at the same time be communicated to many. Hence they are by Nature induced to desire but few things for them selves separately, and to desire those things in common with others, whose Use may conveniently be common to many, such as Air and Light. The same Surface of Skin, which in every Animal limits the spreading and circulation of its Blood, by the same Power, sets Limits to those Necessities, which urge it to Self-preservation. All the Necessities of the Body are enclos’d within the Circumference of the Circle describ’d by the Blood of that Animal: Those few things which are sufficient to fan and repair this vital Fluid, are sufficient to the Preservation of Life, Health, and natural Strength. The Quantity of that Juice is very small, which, by twitching the Stomach and Throat of an Animal, excites Hunger and Thirst; and it therefore needs no great Quantity of Meat and Drink to rebate its force. Lastly, the Capacity, of those Vessels in which the Nourishment is prepar’d and fermented, of the Chyle-Vessels, and of the Veins and Arteries receiving it, is fill’d by a Quantity so determin’d and small, that I believe it evident, that no Animal, even of the Brutekind, ever fell into Hobbes’s Error, so as to think all things necessary to its own Preservation.

It is hence evident, from the inward Frame of Animals, “That it is necessary to their Preservation, that they take to themselves only a few things, to satisfy their Hunger and Thirst, and to repel the inclemency of the Weather, and leave the rest of fruitful Mother Earth’s abundant Productions to those others, to whom they may be useful.” Thus the Quantity of the Bodies of Animals, which is naturally limited, limits their Appetites, to seek only a few things necessary for themselves, leaving the rest to the use of others; whence naturally arises some kind of division of Things, among several Animals, in which is laid the Foundation of that Concord and mutual Benevolence, which we are inquiring after. For on this very account, that Self-Love, which is natural to Animals, is limited and satisfy’d in the manner I have now shewn, there is no inducement to their opposing the Preservation of others, either by debarring them from a free use of what is not necessary to themselves, or even by refusing to lend them their Labour, when it is of no further use to themselves; but they are rather, on the contrary, thence dispos’d to assist others; whether from the Pleasure, tho it were not suppos’d very great,45 which they receive from the Society of others, and the present Happiness thence arising; or from the Hope of their afterwards rewarding them with the like Assistance. Animals (I believe) are sensible, I am sure Men cannot be ignorant, that when once they have provided themselves with Necessaries, there remains nothing that can be of greater Advantage to them, than Tranquillity, and the Society of Animals of their own Kind, which can be procur’d or preserv’d, only by Benevolence towards them.

Secondly, That Likeness of Images, by which Animals of the same Species are represented, disposes them to Affections, like to those, by which they are inclin’d to their own Preservation.§XVIII. We may take the second Indication, from the Effects of the Senses, Imagination, and Memory, when they are employ’d about Animals of the same kind; for those Impressions, which, made upon the Senses of Animals, discover others to have a Nature very like their own, passing immediately into the Brain (where they goby the Name of Imagination) dispose them to Affections towards those of their own kind, like those they bear towards themselves, and that from the Constitution of their own Nature. Here I will industriously avoid all Controversies, concerning the Knowledge of brute Animals, of what Kind it is, and of the manner how the Affections are mov’d by the Imagination; I take this only for granted, “That the Imagination excites the Affections,” and “That a like Imagination (as such) excites like Affections.” The latter is a Consequence of the former; whence I would infer only thus much, “That a known Likeness of Natures, when discover’d, does somewhat promote Benevolence among those who are alike, except it be join’d with some unlikeness more strongly enforcing Enmity.” To this it is owing, that Animals cannot wholly forget others of the same Kind, whilst they remember themselves. For like Animals (as far as they are such) are represented under the same Image; they also cannot but know, that they are subject to like Hunger and Thirst with themselves; and that they are therefore equally urg’d by Nature, to seek Nourishment for themselves; and that therefore it is pleasing to them, when they are permitted a free use of it, or when they are assisted in procuring it. Because Animals have perpetually such Images of others of the same Kind, and some benevolent Efforts thence necessarily arising from the Condition of their Nature, it follows, “That their natural Disposition is so far thwarted, as any thing contrary to such natural Efforts proceeds either from Madness or Pleasure, or any violent Desires or Passions”: As all look upon it as a Dies temper, and praeter natural Disposition of a Dog, who, thro’ Rage or Madness, is unusually excited to bite every other Dog he meets. Nor can I see any Reason, why all kinds of Affections, which so disturb the Oeconomy of any particular Animal, as to hurry it on to Actions destructive to Animals of the same Species, (such as Malevolence, Envy, violent Fits of Anger, &c.) should not be look’d upon as certain Distempers of the Blood, and Brain perhaps, and somewhat a kin to the Rage of a mad Dog. Such Affections are attended with manifest Symptoms of Distempers, an overflowing of the bilious Juices, a dangerous Effervescence of Blood, a Jaundice Colour, Paralytick Tremblings, and other such Effects, well enough known to Physicians. Nor is raging Anger against Animals of the same Species, the only Passion which turns to a formal Disease; an excessive Fear of them is no less Praeter natural; that is, it is no less different from that Manner of all Animals, which arises from their natural and found Disposition; and, like other Distempers, it prejudices their Health by reducing them to Sadness, Solitariness, and unseasonable Watchings, with the other Symptoms of a predominant Melancholy, which hastens untimely Death; nor can any Measure or Bounds be set to this Fear, which is rooted in a false Imagination and Opinion, that all other Animals of the same Species, are naturally and necessarily inclin’d, to hurt, and fight against, them.

The Condition of such Animals, (and such Hobbes feigns all Men in a State of Nature,) is perfectly like the wretched State of those, who are seiz’d with a Hydrophobia;46 they are afraid of Water and all Liquids, without which, (tho they sometimes hurt accidentally,) Life cannot be supported. And as this Opinion proceeds not from the Nature of the Water, but from an Imagination disturb’d by the Bite of a mad Dog, so it proceeds from a distemper’d Brain and Imagination, that any Animal is afraid of its whole Species, when in reality there is nothing pleasanter to those whose Brain is not disturb’d. It is too well known to need Proof, “That Animals, if by any Accident they have for some time been separated from others of the same Kind, as soon as they have come within sight of one another, even at a distance, immediately rejoice, shew their Joy by Gestures, run to one another, and with Pleasure eat, drink, and play together, but very seldom fight with one another; and, if at anytime they happen to fight, that immediately after a Victory, for the most part obtain’d without any Damage, the same Animals herd again very lovingly and peaceably together.” But because it is evident, “That the Causes of their thus peaceably associating and agreeing with one another, which are essential to Brutes, are plainly necessary; nor other than those, by which their Blood, Spirits, Brain and Nerves, are preserv’d in a sound State”; it thence follows evidently, “That the Health of every one of them cannot be separated from an Inclination to associate friendly with those of the same Species, but is easily and naturally preserv’d therewith”; which was what was to be prov’d from this second Indication, which is common to all kinds of Animals, and consequently to Men.

Thirdly, The Love Animals bear to those of their own Species, is a pleasant Affection, and its Exercise therefore closely connected with that Self-love, which is common to all Animals.§XIX. Near of kin to this is the Third Indication, taken from the Pleasantness of those Affections, which are conversant about Good common to many: This is of near Affinity with the precedent, because the Rise, and all the Powers, of the Affections, depend upon the Imagination. Natural Philosophers very well know, “That the Motion of the Blood and Heart, which is necessary to Life, is befriended by Love, Desire, Hope and Joy, especially when conversant about a great Good; whence the Arteries and Veins are fill’d with better and more flowing Juices, brisker Spirits are produced, and the whole Circulation, and consequently all the animal Functions, perform’d with greater Ease.” Nor is it less evident, “That the Good, which is known to extend it self to very many, (among which the Animal it self, concerning which we speak, is comprehended,) will upon this very account appear the greatest.” Wherefore it self will necessarily be much befriended by those very Affections, by which it befriends other Animals of the same kind with it self:47 And for this very Reason, that it has naturally a perfect Sense of this Effect in it self, it will have a strong Propension to those benevolent Affections, as very useful to, and intimately united with, its own Preservation, and a natural Reward will follow such Affections. I affirm’d indeed, that every Animal perceives this agreeable Effect, or the Pleasure of such Passions; yet the manner how these Passions have this friendly Influence, is unknown to most Men, who are ignorant of natural Philosophy, much more is it above the Knowledge of Brutes: It is, however, sufficient, to excite the Inclinations I have mention’d, that they are sensible of the Effect. On the contrary, “In Envy, Hatred, Fear and Grief, the Motion of the Blood is retarded, and the Heart is clogg’d, so that it contracts, and expels the Blood, with difficulty; whence the Countenance of Man becomes pale, and numberless Mischiefs, in the whole Animal Oeconomy, but especially in the Functions of the Brain and Nerves, follow; such are the Distempers usually ascrib’d to the Spleen and Melancholy.” This Matter belongs properly to the Consideration of Physicians; I therefore willingly resign it to the Skilful in that Art, who are daily industrious to adorn it with noble Discoveries for the Good of Mankind. I will, however, transcribe one extraordinary Case, from Harvey’s Anatomical Exercitation concerning the Circulation of the Blood, which will be a noble Illustration of what I have advanc’d. “I knew” (says he) “a high-spirited Man, who, thro’Anger and Indignation conceiv’d for an Injury, join’d with an Affront, receiv’d at the Hands of a powerful Person, so kindled with Rage, that, Envy and Hatred continually increasing for want of Revenge, and the strong Passion which rankled in his Mind being disclos’d to no one, he fell at length into a strange kind of Distemper, and was miserably afflicted with a great Oppression and Pain, both of his Heart and Breast, so that receiving no Relief from the Advice of the most Skilful, he fell, after some Years, into a sscorbutick Habit of Body, which threw him into a Consumption, of which he died. He had some Ease, only as of ten and as long as the whole Region of his Breast was compress’d. His jugular Veins were swell’d, as thick as a Man’s Thumb, with a Pulse high and strong, as if each of them were it self the Aorta, or great descending Artery, and appear’d like two oblong Aneurisms;48when I had dissected the Body, I found the Heart and Aorta so distended, and stuffed with Blood, that the Size of the Heart and Cavities of the Ventricles were as great as those of an Ox.”49 Whence we may observe, that such Passions obstruct the Motion of the Blood in the small Branches of the Arteries, which are dispers’d thro’ the Brain; and that vast Mischiefs arise thence to the Heart, and consequently to the whole Animal, with dire Symptoms of Distempers, whence Life it self (common to Man with other Animals) is greatly endanger’d. It is hence evident, “That the very Nature of an Animal, and of the Passions, admonishes Men, that it will be of Advantage to them, to be of a benevolent Disposition towards others, all, if possible”; since fierce Hatred against one Man brought so great Mischiefs to the Cherisher of the Passion.

Fourthly, The same is prov’d, from their natural Propension, to propagate their Species, and rear their Offspring.§XX. Next follows the fourth Indication of the same thing, which is taken from hence, “That Animals are incited to endeavour the Propagation of their own Species, by the force of the same Causes, which preserve the Life of every Individual, so that these Two are connected by Tie evidently natural.” Hence it is, that, Animals of the same Species but, different Sexes are united, by a strong Friendship, whence they perform to one another many mutual good Offices, and that Offspring is propagated, which they love and cherish as their own Blood, except something very unusual happens to change their natural Inclinations. But those things, which so rarely happen, ought not to be brought into the account, when we are taking a Survey of the ordinary and regular State of Nature. The Connexion is very close between the Propagation of the Species, and that natural Affection, which excites to an Endeavour of nourishing the young when brought forth. Preservation is only a kind of continued Generation of a thing; therefore the same natural Causes will incline an Animal to both: But it is evident, that their Offspring cannot be preserv’d, except Animals of the same Kind mutually cultivate Peace or Benevolence. Therefore they naturally desire, that this Benevolence may be of as long Continuance, as they wish to their Offspring: in such a Benevolence, which is extensive and durable, consists the Pursuit of the common Good of the whole Species, in proportion to the Capacity of the Animal, which, indeed, if Man be excepted, is but of a small reach, and not at all provident. Yet that low degree of Sagacity, which all Animals are possess’d of, is sufficient to enable them, to provide for themselves and their Young, by the exercise of some kind of Benevolence towards Animals of the same Kind. Because I hinted, “That the natural Love of their Offspring, proceeds from the same Causes, which incline Animals to propagate their Species,” I must shew, “That this Inclination is essential to Animals, whose Powers are come to their greatest Perfection, and that it flows from the same Causes, which are necessary to the Preservation and Perfection of every Individual”: Whence it follows, “That it is necessary, that Animals should, along with their own Welfare, endeavour the Continuation of their own Species, and, consequently, promote the common Good.” And this is evident, from the manner in which Animals are form’d, and nourish’d: for it is certain, (as Harvey has observ’d,)50 that the same Causes which, in the Womb or Egg, form the Parts requisite to the Nourishment of the Individual, (as the Stomach, Heart, &c.) do likewise form the spermatick Vessels, and difference of Sexes, in the first rough-draught of Animals. From the same Mass of nutritious Juice mingled with the Blood, part goes into Nourishment, part into Seed for propagating the Species. The whole Circulation of the Blood, and every thing instrumental thereto, as the muscular Force of the Heart, and the Contrivance of the Valves in the Veins, is at the same time subservient to the private Nourishment of the Individual, and to the publick Good by propagating the Species, whilst it sends off the Materials of the Seed to the spermatick Vessels. Lastly, whatever any of the Bowels, or other Parts of the Body, perform towards preserving the natural State of the Blood, at the same time tends to preserve the Life of the Individual, and, remotely at least, disposes to the Procreation of Offspring, which is hinder’d by every great Disorder of the Blood.

I might here expatiate very largely; but, lest I should be too prolix, I thought it proper to leave the Remainder of what be longs to this Subject, to be farther pursued by such Readers as are skilful in Natural Philosophy and Medicine, and to be apply’d, by a Parity of Reason with what I have already suggested, to the forming a Rule of Manners from the Indications of Nature, I will add only this, that it is very evident, “That Animals are in the manner above-mention’d inclin’d to the Love of the other Sex, and of their Offspring, and thus divest themselves of a contracted Selfishness, which when they have once laid aside, they are easily induc’d to proceed still further in the Love of others, till at last, upon account of their Likeness of Nature, it takes in all of the same Species”; and, consequently, that the Observation of common Experience hasits Foundation in the common Nature of Animals, “That Men are more inclin’d to Peace after begetting Children, and that their natural Propension to beget Children disposes all to the Love of Peace.”

(All our Actions cannot be resolv’d into a principle of Self-Love; and, tho they could, that would not take away the Obligations to promote the common Good.)I must here, however, take notice of that common Evasion, by which many are wont to elude this and other Indications taken from natural Inclinations, whence human Reason may learn the Law of Nature, “That, altho it often happens that, by means of these Inclinations, many are profited, yet they all proceed from the Love of our own Pleasure only, and, consequently, that all the Actions flowing from hence have no other End, and that they therefore discover no thing but mere Self-Love.”

I answer, 1. It is evident from what I have already said, that I do not take any Indication of a Law of Nature, obliging to promote the common Good, from the End which Animals propose to themselves; I affirm nothing concerning their Intentions.

2.51 It cannot be prov’d, that Animals, in those voluntary Actions, by which they actually promote the Good of others, as well as themselves, do not alike intend and will both. It is certainly much more probable, that both Effects are equally intended; since it is so in all those Cases, where Men act deliberately; for they intend to produce all the foreseen Effects of their Actions, tho some of them move them to Action much more strongly than others, and delight them much more, after the Action is over; yet every thing which they intend to effect, is justly call’d an End of Action.

3. Supposing, but not granting, that Animals sought their own Preservation and Happiness only, as their End, and that they exercis’d Benevolence towards other Animals of the same Kind, as the Means, naturally and perpetually necessary to that End; yet even this Supposition would prove, that there was an Indication from Nature, “That the common Good of the whole Species was to be promoted,” and thence would arise an Obligation to the use of Means so necessary, which would be no less valid than our Obligation to the End suppos’d, viz. Self-preservation. For the Obligation is the same to the necessary Means, and to the End it self. And this Obligation is equally valid, with any which can arise from the Punishments of Civil Laws, which can inflict nothing greater than Death, and which these Objectors contend, is by far the greatest, or rather the only real Obligation we lie under. For this Reason therefore, among many others, Hobbes’s Argument is vain, who (that he might take away all natural Obligation to promote the common Good) endeavours to resolve all natural Propensions tending thereto, into a Desire of preserving or of pleasing one’s self only. So, partly in his Treatise of human Nature, (Chap. 9. § 10, 15, 16, 17.)52 partly in that de Cive (Chap. 1. § 2.) he affirms, not only that the Love by which Animals are inclin’d to the Propagation of their Species, but also, that the natural Affection, with which they embrace and rear their Offspring, and all Charity towards others, and Compassion towards the Afflicted, arise from hence, “That Animals, by these Actions, either seek some Advantage to themselves, or, at least, that they may think magnificently of their own Powers, or have a good Opinion of themselves,”53 which is Hobbes’s Definition of Glory; but, beside that the inward Force of these Affections, and their Effects, by which they are much more serviceable to others, than to the Agents themselves, are an evident Proof of the contrary; and that those Animals, in which these Affections are vigorous, are sensible enough of this, and therefore cannot but intend greater Advantages to others than to themselves: If it be granted, “That these Affections are necessarily in Animals, that they may make themselves happy by certain Advantages and this imaginary Glory,” nevertheless the Obligation to Actions advantageous to others would remain, lest they should in any respect be wanting to themselves, in those things which he supposes to be naturally and necessarily, and, consequently, perpetually desir’d. For it is impossible, but that they must be influenc’d by the Hope of enjoying these Advantages, and by the Fear of losing them, if those Actions, which respect the Good of others, be neglected; and Hobbes acknowledges, that natural Obligation takes place, where human Liberty is restrain’d by Hope or Fear, de Cive, c. 15. §7.54 This Reasoning seems to me conclusive against Objections upon Hobbes’s Principles. In what consists the Nature of moral Obligation, I have elsewhere explain’d; I will here only add, “That in the true Rules of Morality, whence natural Obligation arises, so diminutive an End as the Preservation of one Man only, is not regarded, but the common Happiness of all rational Beings.” On the contrary, Hobbes proposes this little End as the Rule of all human Actions, with this View, that they may neglect any Actions whatsoever, and any natural benevolent Propensions, when soever they shall not seem to make for their own private Advantage, altho in reality “The Desire of the publick Good testify’d by outward Actions, is always a Means necessary to the chief Happiness of every particular Man”; which yet most, who are blinded with Self-Love, are generally ignorant of.

Lastly, Not to dwell too long upon the Solution of this Objection, it is to be consider’d, that I have drawn my Conclusion, not from voluntary Actions, whose Ends are various in different Animals, and in the same Animal at different times, but from such Actions and Inclinations as are evidently necessary, which are in Animals even not conscious of them, and sometimes opposing them; and which, as I briefly hinted, proceed from the very Frame and Temper of their Bodies; for it is not owing to their chusing and desiring to preserve themselves, but to the natural Contraction of the Heart, that the Blood is sent off to the spermatick Vessels, and the Seed thence separated and brought to Perfection, whence arise in all Animals, venereal Inclinations, and a Desire of begetting and preserving Offspring. For both Appetites are Effects of the same Cause: Just as from the same matter an Animal is at first form’d, and for some time nourish’d and grows in the Egg or Womb; yet of these things the Parents are so little conscious, that, tho they concur, as Instruments to the Production of the Effect, yet they know not before their Offspring comes into the World, whether what they have begotten be Male or Female, whether it receives its Nourishment by the Mouth or Navel, or both: Nay, whether it is at all nourish’d, or whether it lives or no. It is hence evident, “That, in the forming and nourishing the Foetus, Animals are not directed by their Knowledge foreseeing the Effect or End, much less by the Prospect of preserving their own Life by this Method, for that is rather weakened by the Propagation of the Species; but that these Actions are done by them without Deliberation, and that the Propensions to these Actions are in a high Degree necessary”: In these Actions Animals are plainly like Plants, which, tho they are void of Sense and all Prospect of an End, yet do not draw in Nourishment for themselves alone, but produce Seed for the Propagation of their Species. And as in Eggs are contain’d both the Body of the Chicken, and proper Nourishment for it, till it becomes strong enough to procure its Food elsewhere, and to digest it; so also in Seeds, beside the small Bud, (which is the rough-draught of a future Plant,) is contain’d also a fit Substance, which, after moistening, and a certain kind of Fermentation arising from a proper Heat, insinuates it self into the tender Roots of the Bud, which it nourishes till it has got Strength enough to imbibe Nourishment out of the neighbouring Earth. But afterwards, when the Foetus is born, Animals perceiving, that an Animal like themselves is form’d from their own Blood, by the Concurrence of their own natural Powers, they are inwardly dispos’d not to destroy it, by any Act or voluntary Neglect of theirs. What I have now advanc’d, is well enough known to natural Philosophers; which if any one desires to see more distinctly explain’d, he may consult Harvey and Highmore of Generation, and Needham in his learned Treatise of the Formation of the Foetus.55 These few Observations are sufficient to prove “That a strong Tendency, not only to propagate their Species, but to nourish it when propagated, arises from the very Frame and natural Disposition of Animals (nay, and of Plants too) which proceeds from universal and determin’d Causes.” What is more, it is well known from Experience, “That these Propensions grow stronger in Animals by Age and Practice, so that any Accident thwarting these, produces in them strong Resentments.” Hence Mankind shed those Tears, which fall in case of disappointed Love, of Barrenness, or Loss of Children. Therefore one may easily infer, from these, and innumerable other like Instances which daily happen, “That the ordinary State of Animals would, for the most part, be very disagreeable to ’em, unless (to the best of their Power) they enter, by Benevolence towards others of the same Species, into a friendly Society with them, by whose Assistance they may beget Offspring, and rear them as safely as possible.”

Fifthly, Benevolence among Animals of the same Species, prov’d from the intire Frame of Animals.Lastly, The whole Frame of Animals, (because it is the necessary Cause of their usual Functions and Actions,) plainly indicates, “That from the same internal Causes proceed both Actions in order to Self-preservation, and Affections of so great Benevolence, as are sufficient for a friendly Association with other Animals of the same Species”: for these two are generally exerted by all Kinds of Animals, altho it happens sometimes, but rarely, thro’ Ignorance or irregular Passions, that they hurt either themselves or others of the same Species. Therefore, because Concord among them is much more frequent than Discord, it follows, “That the natural and internal Causes of Concord are stronger, or that their Nature, without the Assistance of civil Society, does more strongly incline them to this Affection than to Discord”; which is the principal Point I contend for. For (unless it appear, that the Animal Nature in Men is fiercer or less inclinable to Peace than the same in Brutes) this is sufficient to prove, that in all Deliberations upon future Events (in which we can only reckon upon what happens for the most part) we may conclude in general, “That a peaceable Association with others will be more agreeable to our natural Inclinations, and that the same is more probably to be expected in others, than the contrary, tho in some Cases it may happen otherwise.” As any one may with truth affirm, that it is more agreeable to the Nature of a Die, that a Six should not be thrown at the first Cast, than that it should; because there are five possible Cases inconsistent with this Cast, and but one that favours it. That Brute Animals act, for the most part, benevolently with others of their own Kind, is easy to prove, by taking a View of all those things, which I have in the first Chapter shewn to be requisite, that any thing may be said to be subservient to the publick Good of any Species.56 They generally abstain from mutually hurting one another.57Juvenal has long since observ’d what makes much for our present Purpose.

• ———Mollissima corda
• Humano generi dare se natura fatetur,
• Quae lacrymas dedit. Haec nostri pars optima sensus.
• Plorare ergo jubet casum lugentis amici,
• Squaloremque rei, pupillum ad jura vocantem
• Circumscriptorem, cujus manantia fletu
• Ora puellares faciunt incerta capilli.
• Naturae imperio gemimus, cum funus adultae
• Virginis occurrit, vel terra clauditur infans,
• Et minor igne rogi. Quis enim bonus & face dignus
• Arcana, qualem Cereris vult esse sacerdos,
• Ulla aliena sibi credat mala? separat hoc nos
• A grege mutorum, atque ideo venerabile soli.
• Sortiti ingenium, divinorumque capaces,
• Atque exercendis, capiendisque artibus apti
• Sensum à coelesti demissum traximus arce,
• Cujus egent prona, & terram spectantia. Mundi
• Principio indulsit communis conditor illis
• Tantum animas, nobis animum quoque, mutuus ut nos
• Adfectus petere auxilium, & praestare juberet,
• Dispersos trahere in populum, migrare vetusto
• De nemore, & proavis habitatas linquere silvas;
• Aedificare domos, Laribus conjungere nostris
• Tectum aliud, tutos vicino limite somnos
• Ut collata daret fiducia: protegere armis
• Lapsum, aut ingenti nutantem vulnere civem;
• Communi dare signa tuba, defendier iisdem
• Turribus, atque una portarum clave teneri.
• Sed jam serpentum major concordia: parcit
• Cognatis maculis similis fera. Quando leoni
• Fortior eripuit vitam leo? quo nemore unquam
• Expiravit aper majoris dentibus apri?
• Indica tigris agit rabida cum tigride pacem
• Perpetuam: saevis inter se convenit ursis.

• Juven. Satyr. 15.58

• Compassion proper to Mankind appears,
• Which Nature witness’d, when she lent us Tears.
• Of tender Sentiments we only give
• Those Proofs: To Weep is our Prerogative;
• To shew by pitying Looks, and melting Eyes,
• How with a Suff’ring Friend we Sympathize!
• Nay, Tears will ev’n from a wrong’d Orphan slide,
• When his false Guardian at the Bar is try’d:
• So tender, so unwilling to accuse,
• So oft the Roses on his Cheek bedews,
• So soft his Tresses, fill’d with trickling Pearl,
• You’d doubt his Sex, and take him for a Girl.
• B’Impulse of Nature (tho to us unknown
• The Party be) we make the Loss our own;
• And Tears steal from our Eyes, when in the Street
• With some betrothed Virgin’s Hearse we meet:
• Or Infant’s Fun’ral, from the cheated Womb
• Convey’d to Earth, and Cradled in a Tomb.
• Who can all Sense of Others Ills escape,
• Is but a Brute at best in Human Shape.
• This natural Piety did first refine
• Our Wit, and rais’d our Thoughts to Things Divine:
• This proves our Spirit of the Gods descent,
• While that of Beasts is prone and down-ward bent.
• To them but Earth-born Life they did dispense,
• To us, for mutual Aid, Coelestial Sense;
• From straggling Mountainers, for publick Good,
• To rank in Tribes and quit the Salvage Wood;
• Houses to build, and them contiguous make,
• For chearful Neighbourhood and Safety’s sake;
• In War, a common Standard to erect,
• A wounded Friend in Battle to protect;
• The Summons take of the same Trumpet’s Call
• To sally from one Port, or man one publick Wall.
• But Serpents now more Amity maintain!
• From spotted Skins the Leopard does refrain;
• No weaker Lion’s by a stronger slain.
• Nor, from his larger Tusks, the Forest Boar
• Commission takes his Brother Swine to gore.
• Tyger with Tyger, Bear with Bear you’ll find
• In Leagues Offensive and Defensive join’d.

• English’d by Mr. Tate.59

What is more, they behave more mildly toward those, with whom they have herded for some time; and the Practice of the Storks, who feed their disabled Parents, in which are to be found some Footsteps of Gratitude, is notorious.60 In all these is observable a limited Love, both of themselves and their Offspring, and they are inclin’d to do several mutual good Offices, not trifling ones only, as when they play together, but very considerable, as when they assist one another against a common Enemy; and they signify their Expectation thereof, by a particular kind of Voice, by which most Animals, when sensible of approaching Danger, call others to their Assistance. These things are (if you consider the Substance of the Actions) the same with those which I have affirm’d to be necessarily included in the care of the publick Good, which, indeed, are perform’d very imperfectly by Brutes, yet in proportion to that slender Knowledge, which they use about things necessary to their own Preservation.

Sixthly, Benevolence is inforc’d among Animals of the same Species, by their numerous wants, and the most probable Method of relieving them, from natural Assistance.§XXI. If we inquire into those Causes, which are so interwoven into the Frame of Animals as to become part of their Nature, and which determine them generally to such a Conduct, besides those whence I have taken the foregoing Indications, the following are peculiar to them, as they are distinguish’d from inanimate Bodies. First, their Frame, as being made up of Parts very different, needs more things for its Preservation, than Minerals or Plants do. For the Blood, and other Liquors necessary to Life, as the Lymph, Bile, Pancreatick Juice, and perhaps a Nervous Fluid, and Animal Spirits, are so perpetually subject to Change and Perspiration, that there is continual Occasion for new Recruits, and also for Exercise, Rest, Sleep, Watching, and moderate Affections, to restore to a just Temper what has been chang’d, or repair what has been spent. Hence arise very uneasy Sensations of Hunger, Thirst, and various Diseases, and these excite them to search for, and try, the most convenient Methods of acquiring Nourishment, Medicine, and other Helps, such as an Estimate of their own Powers, and a Knowledge of things about them shall suggest. But they are conver sant with nothing better known to them, than Animals of their own Species, of whole Powers and Necessities they make an easy Estimate from their Likeness to their own, and, from the same Likeness of Nature, they conceive some Hope of their Love and Assistance. The Cause of that Hope is, partly, because like Things usually beget like Images of themselves, and, consequently, like Affections (except there arise some great Impediment, such as Passion, Error, a very disagreeable unlikeness, &c.) causing them to embrace other Animals of the same Kind with themselves, with the same Love as themselves: Partly, because they foresee great and innumerable Evils arising from Discord and Contention, but that scarce any Good can be thence expected. For Equality of Strength, or many Accidents which may set a smaller Power upon a level with a greater, (such as Sleep, Weariness, Diseases, the Confederacy of several weaker Powers, various accidental Advantages arising from the Place, by means whereof the weaker may overcome the stronger,) will give them frequent Opportunities of mutually hurting or killing one another. For if contending Powers by any means become equal, they are to one another mutually, as Weights counterpoising one another, of which each can with-hold the other from the lower place, to which it tends, and neither of them can reach the Place, to which it-self tends. Such are the Mischiefs arising from the Contention of one Animal with another of equal Power, tho each were at Peace with all the rest. But if each One should wage War with all the rest, there would be so frequent Contests with Forces vastly superior, that there would remain no Hope of Life to any. To be brief, it is probable, “That, even in the Judgment of Brutes, it is better, where there is plenty of all things necessary to the Preservation of every Individual, amicably, as occasion offers, to share in the Use of Things, and assume only what is at present necessary, than to expose themselves to the Hazards of perpetual War, in order to acquire Plenty of Things not necessary.” But in the Will to allow such a Division of Things and mutual Services, and to preserve it after it is made, is contain’d the Sum of all Actions, by which the common Good of every one’s Species is procur’d; wherefore “Even Brutes themselves, in some measure, perceive the Connexion between their own Preservation, and Actions contributing to the common Good of their Species, and for this Reason act benevolently to one another”; which was to be prov’d. I will add only this, that all those things which I have observ’d in Animals, are to be consider’d jointly, as concurring to enable and incline Animals to promote the common Good of their own Species, and that so strongly and constantly, that, except Animals comply therewith, they will want a great part of their Happiness, (which consists in the gratifying of their natural Inclinations,) and will find a Grief arising from this Struggle of vain Passions, which oppose those most natural Principles of Action, whose Force depends upon no Delusion of the Imagination; and are therefore justly distinguish’d from those Passions which I call’d vain, because they proceed from a deluded Fancy. It is with this View, that I inquir’d into the Causes of this Benevolence towards Animals of the same Species, which by the help of Reason may be rais’d to a greater Degree of Pefection.

Hobbes’s Objections against the Argument, drawn from the Association of other Animals, answer’d,§XXII. Hobbes was not ignorant, that this was no way consistent with his Principles, and therefore he abounds with such Insinuations as these to the contrary: That “Men are fiercer than Bears, Wolves, and Serpents”; that “Their natural State is a State of War of All against All,” that “Among them there is no such thing as publick Good or Evil, before the Establishment of civil Government,” and that “Therefore there is no Knowledge or Desire of such Good.” I have elsewhere cited the Passages in which he has advanc’d this Doctrine;61 but here falls properly under Consideration a Passage in his Leviathan, Chap. 17. (which is agreeable to what he advances, de Cive, c. 5. § 5.) where he thus objects to himself, “That certain living Creatures, as Bees and Ants, live sociably one with another”;62 and he asks, What hinders but that Men may do the same? He reduces his Answer to six Heads; of which the Substance is this.

1. “Men are continually in competition for Honour and Dignity, which these Creatures are not.”63 I reply; “That civil Honours (about which Contentions sometimes arise) have no place in a State of Nature, or before the establishing civil Government among Men, and that, therefore, they cannot contend about them in a State of Nature, (concerning which is the present Question,) more than Brute Animals.” In the next place, “true Glory,” of such Honour as can be attain’d out of civil Society, according to Cicero’s Definition, is “The concurrent Praise of good Men, and the incorrupt Voice of those who form a true Judgment of eminent Virtue.”64 But the Pursuit of the common Good comprehends all Virtues, and thence only is procur’d the Praise of good Men. War, and that against all, is so far from being an Effect of the Desire of such Honour, that, on the contrary, Men are by this Motive excited, beyond other Animals, to the Exercise of all the Virtues, which Hobbes himself owns to be necessary Means of the common Peace. Leviath. 15.65

2. He answers, 2dly. That “Among all those Creatures, the Common Good differs not from the Private, and being by Nature inclin’d to their Private, they procure thereby the Common Benefit. But Man, whose Joy consisteth in comparing himself with other Men, can relish nothing but what is eminent.”66 To this I answer; “That we are oblig’d to Hobbes, that he has unawares acknowledg’d, that there is such a thing as the publick or common Good, out of civil Society, and that this is really procur’d by Brutes themselves.” Elsewhere he affirms the contrary; see his Treatise de Homine, c. 10. in the latter end.67 I am of opinion, “That the Knowledge of the publick Good, disposes Men to Peace and Virtue, as in its own Nature amiable, and the strongest Security of private Good.” Its differing (in some Cases) from the private Good of some Particulars, is not a sufficient Reason, why Men should war amongst themselves, rather than Bees or Ants, whose common Good is distinguish’d from the Private in the same manner. What he adds concerning Men, if it be taken universally, as the Words seem to import, is most false and groundless; unless, perhaps, he sends us to that general Demonstration, as he calls it, of such Matters, which he hints in the Preface to his Leviathan;68Hobbes, truly, knew himself, and that with respect to his own Possessions, he relish’d nothing but what was Eminent, upon comparing himself with other Men, and thence he concludes, that all others are in the same Sentiments. But he ought to have shewn something in the Nature of Things, or of Men, that imposes a Necessity upon all Men to form such a Judgment. All who reason justly, know certainly, from their natural Wants and the Use of Things, what Judgment to pass upon their own Affairs, whether they relish them or not, and in what degree, without comparing them with those of other Men. They are foolish or envious Persons, who take pleasure only in the Excess of their own Enjoyments above those of others. But if he would have his Assertion understood, with Limitation to such Men only, he does not assign a sufficient Cause of a universal War of All against All, but only of some accidental Contention rais’d by the Foolish and Envious, which the Reason or Force of wiser Men may easily restrain from hurting All.

3. He answers, 3dly. That “These Creatures, having not (as Man) the Use of Reason, do not see, or think they see, any Fault in the Administration of their common Business: Whereas amongst Men it is otherwise: Hence War.”69 To which I thus answer; “That this Reason suggests nothing to hinder Men from living peaceably with one another, tho they were subject to no civil Government; in which case their natural Propensions to universal Benevolence, and all the Laws of Nature, would take place, notwithstanding any thing here alledg’d to the contrary.”70 Nor does he offer any thing which proves, but that such Men may agree among them selves to erect Civil Government, (for the Causes of such hindrance are what we at present inquire into;) he only objects what may hinder the Preservation of Government already establish’d by Consent alone. Let Hobbes look to it, whether or no what he here asserts concerning the Temper of the Generality of Mankind, will not as effectually unsettle the Foundation of Peace, in a Commonwealth establish’d by his fictitious UNION. “Among Men” (saith he) “There are very many that think themselves wiser, and able to govern the Publick better, than the rest; and these strive to reform and innovate, one this way, another that way, and thereby bring it into Distraction and Civil War.”71 Do not Men, so dispos’d, usually violate the Compacts they have mutually enter’d into, and break into Civil War? It is farther to be consider’d, “That human Reason does much more effectually promote Peace and Concord, by discovering numberless Delusions of the Imagination and Passions, than Discord, by its own Fallibility, in such Things as are always necessary to the common Peace, which are but few, and very evident.” Farther, “Men don’t immediately make War, as soon as they think they see any Fault in the Administration of the Publick”; the same Reason, which discovers the Fault, also admonishes them, that many things are to be borne with for Peacesake, and suggests several Methods, by which the redressing such Grievance may be peaceably attempted. I appeal to your Judgment, candid Reader, whether Reason makes the Condition of Man worse than that of Brutes? Does not Hobbes rather form an unjust Judgment of Men, who accuses their Reason of all the Miseries arising from War and Discord, and for this Reason contends, that Men live less peaceably with one another, than irrational Brutes? But this whole Answer of Hobbes’s is nothing to the Purpose. The Question is, “Concerning the Obligation of the Precepts of right Reason, before the erecting of Government”: The Answer is, “That the Reason of many Men is so erroneous, as to dissolve Governments already erected.”

4. He asserts, 4thly. That “Men cannot live sociably with one another as Bees, &c. because those Animals want that Art of Words, by which some Men can represent to others, that which is Good in the Likeness of Evil, and Evil in the Likeness of Good, &c. discontenting Men, and troubling their Peace at their Pleasure.”72 Truly, because it sometimes happens, that Seditions are rais’d by the help of the false colouring of Speech; therefore Men, because they can make such use of Speech, certainly will not preserve Peace among themselves. Here is evidently no Consequence. For he ought to prove, “That Men necessarily, or at least certainly, have the Will to use, and that constantly, such seditious Speeches as tend to raise War”; especially, since there are so many Causes, both within and without them, that rather persuade them to cultivate Peace. He ought likewise to prove, “That such Speeches necessarily, or at least always, have so great an Effect upon all or most of their Hearers, as to ingage them immediately in War.” For “They may, perhaps, be too sharp-sighted, to suffer themselves to be imposed upon by rhetorical varnish.” It is possible, “That they may rather listen to the peaceable Speeches of the Prudent, supported by more solid Arguments.” It is possible, “That they may rather weigh the importance of Things, than the empty Sound of Words”; to which they certainly have a natural Tendency; for they well know, that Words will not feed or defend them from Injuries, but that Actions, proceeding from mutual Benevolence, will. What hinders, but that the Persuasion of good Men may prevail, which the Reason, both of the Speaker and Hearer, and the very nature of Things themselves, favour? Why may not the Tongue of the Ambassador of Peace prevail above that which sounds the Trumpet of War? All cautious Person regard diligently, rather what others do, than what they say; and, beside, take care, that the Power of those whom they trust be so balanc’d, that they may not be able to hurt them, without their own great Peril. But, if the Reader further considers, how great Force Words, both spoken and written, are of, to the making of all Contracts, and to the preserving the Memory of Laws, (by which two subsists all peaceable Society;) I doubt not, but that he will agree with me, “That they have a much greater Tendency to establish, than banish, Peace, and that they are, therefore, to be reckon’d among the Advantages of Mankind, and not among those things, which make Men more inhuman than Brutes themselves.”

5. Hobbes urges, “Irrational Creatures cannot distinguish between Injury and Damage, and, therefore, as long as they be at ease, they are not offended with their Fellows. Whereas Man is then most troublesome, when he is most at ease: for then it is that he loves to shew his Wisdom, and censure the Actions of them who govern the Common wealth.”73 The Antithesis, or Opposition, here insinuates thus much; “That Men are of a less peaceable Disposition than Brutes, because they distinguish between Injury and Damage.” I am of a very different Opinion, “That Men more patiently bear Damage done them by other Men, provided it be not injuriously done, and that all Distinction between these two, is founded in the Knowledge of Right and Laws, which I readily acknowledge, to be proper to Man alone.” But I utterly deny, “That this Knowledge inclines Men to violate Peace, or to trample upon the Laws, and the Rights of others like their own.” I acknowledge, indeed, “That Men may violate the Rules of Justice thro’ unbridled Passions, notwithstanding this Knowledge”; but the Knowledge of the Difference between those things, which are done rightfully and injuriously, can never make Men more prone to injure others. But they will envy others, (as the Antithesis insinuates,) and will “Love to shew their Wisdom, by censuring the Actions of them who govern the Commonwealth.” It is certainly very injurious, “To impute to all Mankind the Faults of a few, and that without Proof, ” except that, perhaps, he has found such Affections in himself, and has thence concluded, that they are natural to all Men; for, in the Preface to his Leviathan, he recommends this Method of knowing Mankind, to Rulers and all others, affirming, that “There is no other Proof of such Matters”; but he admonishes us to examine, “Whether these things agree with our own Thoughts.”74 With mine they certainly do not agree. Provided I am happy, tho others be happier, I envy them not; I shall lose nothing by it. I believe human Nature more modest, than to delight in censuring Princes. He must be long harden’d in Wickedness, who will venture upon Rebellion, which is a Complication of innumerable Acts of Murder, Plundering, Sacrilege, and, in short, of all kinds of Villany. But Hobbes very improperly imputes that Crime to Man, in his suppos’d State of Nature, which State, according to his Hypothesis, is previous to the Establishment of Civil Government.

6. Let us now see, whether, in his last Answer, he brings any better Proof, that Mankind is less aptthan Brutes, to a mutual Agreement. “The Agreement” (says he) “of these Creatures is Natural, that of Man is by Covenant only, which is Artificial; and, therefore, it is no wonder, if there be somewhat else requir’d (besides Covenant) to make their Agreement constant and lasting, which is a common Power to keep them in awe, and to direct their Actions to the common Benefit.”75 I answer; “That the natural Causes, which are woven, as it were, in the Constitution of human Nature, as they are Animals, and which induce them to agree in the Exercise of mutual Benevolence, are plainly equal to those, which are found in any other Animals”; for instance, in Oxen, Lions, Bees; and this I have already endeavour’d briefly to prove:76 I will afterwards prove them to be greater.77Hobbes cannot shew any thing wanting in Man, that is the Cause of such peaceful Agreement as is found in Brutes. What he adds, that it is from Covenant among Men, and therfore artificial, may perhaps deceive the Vulgar, but will easily be refuted by Philosophers. For these Covenants are form’d by the Power, both of the animal and rational Nature. Certainly, “If Men had neither enter’d into Covenants, nor made any use of their Reason, the common Nature of Animals of the same Kind, would, nevertheless, be of as great Efficacy among them, to procure their Agreement in cultivating mutual Benevolence, as far as among all Brutes of the same Species”; now such an Agreement among Brutes there is, which is acknowledg’d to be natural. What therefore hinders, but that, after Reason and the Use of Speech are added to Men, that Agreement may still continue to be natural? Reason does not destroy natural Endeavours and Propensions to Concord, nor is an Agreement which is natural, less firm or durable, because it is express’d in Words: As the desire and use of Nourishment cease not to be natural Actions in Man, tho he signify this Appetite by Words, and by his Reason appoint the Place, Time, and Kind of Food to be taken. Besides, Hobbes himself, sometimes, acknowledges Reason to be a Part of human Nature, and a natural Faculty,78 and all others (that I know of) constantly acknowledge the same; whence it follows, “That any further Agreement or Society, which Reason persuades to establish by Covenants, proceeds from the rational Nature of Man; and that it may therefore be justly called Natural, tho it be much firmer, and bound by more Ties, than can be met with among Brutes.” It will appear also, “That Agreement, proceeding from Reason, is therefore more properly called Natural, if we consider that practical Reason is wholly determin’d by the Nature of the best End we can propose, and of the best Means we can use”: And further, “That nothing else is effected by the whole Process of Reason, than that those Propensions to Concord with others of the same Kind, which are natural to all Animals, (but exert themselves in Brutes in a very confused and improvident manner,) are directed to their adequate Object, namely, all rational Beings; and that every Action is, under its Conduct, exerted in the best Time, Place, and other Circumstances, which can be imagin’d.” Thus that taking of Meat or Drink may justly be called most natural, which both, in general, takes its Rise from the Constitution of the Animal, and, in all particular Cases, is most perfectly directed by Reason, taking care of the Animal’s Health, without any Error in Diet. These Precepts of regulating Diet, whose Efficacy and Truth Reason observes from the Nature of Things, may also properly be called Art: For Art is a Habit directing Actions, as the Nature of the End and Means points out: Yet such a Habit may justly be called Natural to a rational Agent, as consisting of Parts or Precepts so few, and so obvious, that they may be easily learn’d from the Nature of Things, without teaching, or so much as intending it; as Brutes collect the manner of regulating themselves, with respect to their Food, from Experience only; and even Plants, without Sense, much less Art, without Error extract from the Earth agreeable Juices only, for their Nourishment. Habits, properly so call’d, are the first Principles of Arts, and indeed essential Parts of the Arts, to which they belong; so that upon this account, perhaps, they may be called Artificial; but, because they are always learn’d without Art, they are by all acknowledg’d to become known naturally; and they, who write concerning Arts, do not teach, but suppose, them. Thus the Skill of adding small Numbers, and Right Lines, together, so as to make a Sum; and a like Subtraction in little or well known Quantities, may be called a Habit, and an essential part of Arithmetick and practical Geometry; yet Teachers of Mathematicks suppose their Scholars to have acquir’d this Skill by their own natural Parts, without Instruction, and, consequently, that it is plainly natural. Euclid therefore, in those common Notions, which he calls Axioms, supposes “Equal Quantities added to, or taken from, Equals,” and that it is known, that “Their Sums, or Differences, will be equal.” The Reason of my observing which, is only to make it evident, “That some Skill of acting (adding, for instance, or subtracting) is at once an essential Part of an Art, and yet may be perfectly natural to Man, as a reasonable Creature.” Wherefore I think Hobbes has not done right, in affirming, that the Agreement among Men, which is express’d in Covenants, is Artificial, in such Sense as to be oppos’d to Natural. I do not deny, that those Words, in which Covenants are express’d, proceed from arbitrary Appointment: But that Consent of Minds, relating to mutual Offices of Benevolence, of which Words are only the Signs, is wholly Natural. But in that Consent of Minds to exchange good Of fices consists the whole Nature of a Covenant, and from thence flows all its obligatory Force. The Knowledge also, and the Will, of appointing some Signs, by which such Consent may be mutually declar’d, is so easy and obvious to Man, without Instruction, that it may justly be called Natural, tho the use of some Signs rather than others, be arbitrary, (for so I would chuse to call it, rather than artificial.) To be brief, the Agreement express’d by Covenants, (especially about the most general Acts of Benevolence, of which, only, we treat in an Inquiry in to the Laws of Nature,) ought either not to be called Artificial, or if it be so called that Term is to be taken in such Sense, as to be consistent with, not oppos’d to, what is natural, as if such Agreement were less constant or lasting, as Hobbes would have it. For the signifying a natural Agreement by Words, contriv’d by some kind of Art, does not make it less firm or durable.

It therefore remains firm, what at first I advanced, “That there are in Men, for this very reason, because they are Animals, at least such benevolent Propensions, as are to be found in other Animals, towards those of the same Species,” which, I have taken notice, do in several Cases observe the chief Heads of the Law of Nature, in proportion to their Knowledge.

And retorted.I thought it worth while, to examine separately these Answers of Hobbes’s, partly, that the Reader might see, how gross an Error he is forc’d to defend, in his Attempt to deface the Indications of the Sanction of the Laws of Nature, taken from natural Inclinations: Partly, because I have observ’d, that all these Particulars, whence Hobbes would infer, that Man is more malevolent toward his own Species, and more unsociable, than Brutes, may, with great Advantage, be retorted upon himself, as the clearest Indications, that Man is by Nature fitted for greater Benevolence toward those of his own Species, than any other kind of Animal is. For, 1. He loves Honour, which flows naturally from such Benevolence. 2. He knows more perfectly the Influence of the publick Good, towards securing his own private Happiness. 3. He has the Use of Reason, which disposes him equally, either to obey or to command, as occasion offers.4. He knows how, by proper words, to give, both an Edge and Beauty to the Force of his Reason. 5. He understands a Law, by means whereof he distinguishes an Injury, from a Damage done without Injury. 6. Lastly, to this Agreement, once made amongst Men, not Nature only imparts Constancy, but Art, the Assistant of Nature, communicates, by means of writing, many Preservatives against even less probable Accidents, and gives it a Continuance beyond the Age of Man. However, I will not insist longer upon explaining these things more particularly in this place, but leave it to the Reader’s unbyass’d Judgment, whether Hobbes’s Answers, or these Retorsions, be juster? or, whether these things, peculiar to Man, do not rather promote benevolent Inclinations, which, it is evident, are perpetually united to the Animal Nature, than extirpate or weaken them?

Lastly, Benevolence is enforced, 1. From those Particulars, which are peculiar to a human Body; such are those which assist the Fancy and Memory, and, consequently, Prudence. (This falls under the Head of the foregoing second Indication, § 18.)§XXIII. My Method requires, that I now take into Consideration some things, which are peculiar to human Bodies, in order to discover, whether these do not dispose Men, more than other Animals, to the Exercise of mutual Benevolence, and, consequently, to the forming more friendly Societies than they do? This will come more pertinently to be consider’d in this place, because even these things belong to them as Animals; and therefore they are to be consider’d, not as of any Efficacy by themselves, but as co-operating with what I have before observ’d common to them with other Animals, whence, from their united Force, we may expect an Effect of the same Kind, but greater and more certain. I, therefore, thought it proper to range these Particulars in such Order, that they may easily be referr’d to the same Heads, which we have but now perceiv’d to indicate, “That the same Formation and Structure of Parts, which inclines all Animals to preserve themselves, inclines them also to Benevolence towards others of the same Species.”

I find nothing peculiar, remarkable in a human Body, to refer to the first Indication, which is taken from the limited Quantity of its Parts; but there are many Particulars, which may be referr’d to the second, which is taken from the Powers or Effects of the Imagination and Memory, in which a human Body excells the Bodies of other Animals. To these is to be premis’d this general Observation, “That, whatever increases the Powers of the Fancy and Memory, or makes them of longer Continuance in Man, than in other Animals, that all contributes much to their learning many things, from natural and common Experience, relating to the Causes (subject to their Power) of both their own and the common Good, and therefore contributes to their greater Stock of Prudence, which will both inable and incline them to direct their Actions in pursuit, both of their own and the publick Good, which two are, from the Nature of Men, inseparably united and intervoven.” But whatsoever tends to increase this kind of Prudence, equally disposes to the Practice of all moral Virtues, that is, to the Observance of all the Laws of Nature.

This being premis’d, I will, out of Anatomical Writers, and also from my own Observations, and those of others, take notice of some things peculiar and remarkable in a human Body, which contribute to the enlarging and strengthening the Fancy and Memory in Men, which singly consider’d are of little Advantage, but if survey’d as united among them selves, and with those things which are common to Animals of all kinds, and also in Subordination to the divine Powers of the Mind, of which these parts of our Body are the proper Instruments, they seem to afford great Light to the present Argument.

The human Fancy and Memory are assisted by, 1. The Brain, which, in proportion to the Bulk of his Body, is much greater in Man, than in any other kind of Animal: 2. Greater Quantity of Blood and animal Spirits thence form’d, and their greater Purity, from the erect Posture of the Body; a greater Vigor and brisker Motion, by means of a freer Passage into the Brain, thro’ the unbranch’d Tubes of the Carotid Arteries: The longer Continuance, both of Childhood, in which great Plenty, both of Things and Words is treasur’d up, and of Manhood, in which our former, and our later, Observations are with greater Judgment rang’d under their several Heads, is of particular use to the Memory. I will enlarge a little upon each of these, to set the whole in a clearer Light.

Under this Head are consider’d, 1. The Brain, much greater in Man, than in other Animals, in proportion to the Bulk of his Body.By the Brain, I here understand all that white Substance, which is contain’d in the Membranes within the Skull, which is sometimes divided into the Brain, properly so called, and the Cerebellum, of which Bartholin writes thus. “The Bulk of the human Brain is remarkable, in proportion to the Body, as Aristotle has observ’d. And a Man has generally twice as much Brains as an Ox, to the Quantity of four or five Pounds.”79 Hence, I think, we may thus reason. The weight of a middle-siz’d human Body amounts not to more than a fourth Part of the weight of an Ox, and yet has a Brain twice as large, to govern so little a Body; it hence follows, that he has eight times the Quantity of Brain, to govern an equal Quantity of Body. I have found the Bodies of large Sheep, and of Hogs, to equal, in weight, a human Body; and that their Brain weighs, but about the eighth Part of the Brain of a Man. But what other Inference can we draw from so great a Disparity, in this matter, between these Animals, than that Man is so form’d by Nature, that the Influence of his Brain, on the Government of his Actions, may be much greater and more conspicuous? It is certain, (to omit other Uses of the Brain, common to Man with other Animals, upon account whereof no Reason can be assign’d for the excess of Weight,) that Man, by the help of this part, 1st. Observes sensible Objects more accurately, and examines, (besides other Effects of less Consequence,) how much all those things, which are in our Power, can bring of Good or Evil to Men singly or jointly consider’d. 2dly. Because all the Nerves take their Rise from the Brain, or from the spinal Marrow, which is only the Substance of the Brain continued, it is evident, that all voluntary Motions of the Body are directed and govern’d by means of the Brain. This may more clearly appear, from what Willis has observ’d of the Origin of all the Nerves, which are us’d in voluntary Motion, from the Brain properly so called. From these Observations it naturally follows, “That both the greater Quantity and Force of the Brain, which are visible in Man, are naturally of use to him, to direct the various Actions or Motions thence depending, with more circumspect Deliberation, Counsel and Care, which are the peculiar Offices of the Brain.”80 But this can no otherwise be effected, than by proposing to himself the greatest End, (which is the common Good of the Universe, but of rational Beings especially,) and, in the best manner, procuring the assistance of the best means, that is, by procuring to himself the Favour of all rational Agents, by an active Benevolence. Certainly, a more simple Apparatus of Organs, such as is found in Trees, is sufficient for the Preservation of one Individual; (for most of them flourish longer than the Age of Man;) nay, is sufficient for the Propagation of the Species, in which is contain’d somewhat of the common Good. Therefore so great a Quantity of Brain, with so many admirable Instruments thereto pertaining, (such as the Organs of all the Senses, and of voluntary Motion,) must be design’d for nobler Uses. In some Birds and Fish, the bulk and weight of the Brain is not greater, but sometimes less, than that of the Eyes, (which, with many other Anatomical Observations, was first communicated to me by my worthy Friend, that learned and successful Physician, Dr. Hollings;)81 yet even these want not Understanding enough, to live peaceably with those of their own Species. How much less can it be wanting to Men in general, (consistently with their Happiness,) who have the largest Organs for acquiring Knowledge; especially, since the greatest part of human Happiness consists in the Use of the Brain, in order to the attainment of Truth and the greatest Good? To this Head belongs what Willis has deliver’d, that, in the Dissection of the Body of one who was a Fool from his Birth, he discover’d nothing amiss in the Brain, but that it was extremely small: And in the Anatomy of a Monkey he observ’d, that the Brain differ’d but little from that in a Dog or Fox, except that, in proportion to the Bulk of its Body, it was much greater, and its winding Passages larger, whence this Animal makes nearer Approaches than the rest, to the Understanding of Man.82

2. The greater Quantity, Purity, and Vigour, of the Blood and Animal Spirits.§XXIV. Secondly; In the human Body are observable the Quantity, Purity, and Vigour, of the Blood and Animal Spirits thence form’d, greater than are to be found in Brutes, which may justly be reckon’d among the Helps of the Fancy and Memory, and, consequently, of Prudence it self. The Quantity of Blood varies, for several Reasons, in all Animals, and, consequently, in Man. Charlton, Lower,83 and other Anatomists, have observ’d, that it is rarely more than 25, or less than 15, Pounds, therefore its Weight may be estimated, at a Medium, at 20 Pounds. If, therefore, we suppose the Body of such a Man, freed from Blood, to weigh 200 lb. (which exceeds the Weight of a middle-siz’d Man,) the Blood will be to the rest of the Body, as 1 to 10, or it will be the eleventh part of the Body of a living Man. Glisson’s Computation is not much wide of this, who affirms the Blood to be the twelfth part of the whole human Body.84 But in a Sheep, Calf, and Hog, I have often found, that the Blood is, in proportion to their bloodless Body, as 1 to 20, or, at most, to 18. Hence we may infer, “That the Blood of a Man is to his Body, almost in a double Proportion to that of Beasts.” But, in Fish and Birds, the Proportion of the Mass of Blood to the Bulk of their Bodies, is still far less. Anatomists likewise agree, that Man’s Blood is warmer than that of other Animals. From the Plenty and Heat of the Blood, it is obvious to collect the Plenty and Briskness of the Spirits. I thought proper to add here this one Remark, “That I affirm nothing of the Form of the Spirits, whether it be Aerial or no,” which I perceive is oppos’d by Harvey85 and his Followers; but that by that Name I understand the most active Part of the Blood, thence convey’d into the Brain, to assist the Imagination and Memory, and also into the Nerves and Muscular Fibres, there to be subservient to the Motions of the Animal, such as Harvey himself does not deny. The manner how the Spirits, or more active Parts of the Blood, are separated from the rest, has not yet, perhaps, come to the Knowledge of those curious Inquirers into Nature, the learned in Physick. It is sufficient for my present purpose, that they are almost unanimously agreed, “That the Blood, whose more spirituous, or active, Parts have been in some measure freed from the rest by Fermentation, is convey’d to the Brain, that there the Spirits may be thorowly separated or distill’d.” This further, only, I would observe, in order to my present Argument, that it is easily intelligible. “That the greater Quantity of Brain and Blood in Man may produce greater Plenty of Spirits in him, than in other Animals,” however it is effected in either.

Further, it may not, perhaps, be wholly impertinent, to take notice of what Dr. Glisson, our learned Physic-Professor, has observ’d in rickety Children, that the Head grows greater, thro’ the wasting of the other Parts; and that, at the same time, the Understanding is inlarg’d, in proportion to the Brain, by means of the affluence of a greater Quantity of Blood.86 Nor ought it to be omitted, that the Posture of our Body, which, when we are awake, is generally erect, contributes some what to this effect. For, hence, we are not only symbolically instructed, to contemplate higher Causes, which have an equal Influence upon all Men every where, and so upon this whole sublunary World, which has been observ’d by many of the Antients;87 but, hence also, the Brain of Manis dispos’d to produce greater Plenty of brisker Spirits, whence we are naturally qualify’d the better, to execute all the extensive Duties of Reason; which are all discharg’d by a friendly Association with other rational Beings. The reason why I am of Opinion, that this Situation of the human Brain contributes somewhat to the Production of more, and more active, Spirits, is drawn from statical Principles, accommodated to the Functions and Situation of the Arteries and Veins, belonging to the human Head; the Influence of which Principles, tho they may to many seem impertinent, and foreign to our present purpose, appears to me to be extended thro’ the whole material World; and, consequently, to have no inconsiderable Effect upon human Bodies. It seems to me, that, while the whole Mass of Blood rushes into the Aorta, by the impulse receiv’d from the Contraction of the Heart, all its Parts do not receive an equal degree of Velocity from that Impulse, because of their difference of Magnitude, Vigure, Solidity, and Motions, which are in the different Parts of the Blood; (which is a Liquor consisting of very heterogeneous Parts, which have different Motions, as they are fluid, as they are warm, as they are fermented, and as they are more or less heavy, in proportion to their Bulk; but that some of them are, for these Reasons, mov’d more swiftly, which I therefore take leave to call, the brisker and lighter Parts of the Blood. Hence I think it probable, that a great Number of these Particles free themselves from the gross ones in the windings of the Arteries, and may with greater ease mount upwards by force of the Pulses perpetually renew’d, by which an unequal degree of Velocity is communicated to the different Particles of the Blood; to the Active, a greater; to the Gross, a less degree. Hence I imagine, that the Blood is somewhat brisker, which rises in the narrow ascending Trunk, than that which passes into the wider descending Trunk, thro’ which the grosser and heavier Blood is forc’d with greater ease. From the ascending Trunk, the yet purer Blood passes into the Carotidal and Vertebral Arteries, whence the Brain is supply’d with Materials for forming the Spirits. I do not think, that the Difference is great, between the arterial Blood which passes thro’ the Head, and that which passes thro’ the lower Parts of the Body; but I thought, that even the minutest Things, which seem’d deducible from clear and universal Principles, were not to be wholly pass’d over in silence, when they came pertinently in my way. I will there fore add another Observation, of a like kind, concerning the perpendicular Situation of the Veins belonging to the Brain, which favours the quicker Circulation of the Blood, descending by its own Gravity; the Branches of the Jugular and Vertebral Veins are hereby quickly emptied, and way the sooner made for a Tide of fresh Blood, from the Carotid and Vertebral Arteries, which would otherwise be retarded by the Resistance of the venal Blood. From the happy Concurrence of these two Causes, that is, from the ascent of the more spirituous Blood, in the Arteries allotted to the Brain, and from the precipitate Descent of the same Blood, (after the Spirits are separated) in the Veins, thro’ the erect Situation of a human Body, the Consequence will be a swifter Circulation of the Blood in the Head, than in other Parts of the Body, or than is in the Heads of other Animals; and, from the swifter Circulation, fresh Blood is more quickly supply’d, whence greater Plenty of Spirits is separated.

To confirm the Ascent of the more spirituous Blood, by the Arteries of the Head, I might easily bring many Arguments, and those taken from the more frequent Obstructions in the Region of the lower Belly, arising from impurer Blood; from the swelling, and sometimes bleeding, of the haemmorhoidal Veins, which Distemper (in my Opinion) peculiar to Man, seems to proceed, in part at least, from the erect Posture of his Body; but I study Brevity. The Reader, who desires more to this Purpose, may consult what Lower has writ in his learned Treatise de Corde, cap. 2. from Pag. 133 to the end of the Chapter, most of which (tho intended by him for another purpose) may, by the judicious Reader, be easily adapted to the present Argument.88 Nor is it any Objection to what I have advanced, that some long-neck’d Birds walk with their Heads upright. It may be granted, that, in them too, the lighter and more spirituous Blood, by that means ascends; yet, from hence, no great Advantage to their Understanding is to be expected, because they have very little, of either Blood or Brain, in proportion to the Bulk of their Body. Moreover, so small a Quantity of Blood, tho it were not spirituous, might ascend thro’ their Carotid Arteries, by a gentle impulse of the Heart’s Contraction, because they are so very slender, that they partake much of the Nature of Capillary Glass Tubes, in which common Water, especially if heated, ascends, as it were spontaneously, to the height of several Inches.

I should now take notice of the swifter Motion of the Blood into the human Brain, proceeding from this, that the Carotid Artery is not divided in Man, as in most Brutes, into a great many Branchings and Windings like Net-work, which check the Motion of the Blood in them; whereas, in Man, it flows in one large and open Channel, till it enters the Brain; whence all its Parts, and, consequently, the Spirits themselves, must necessarily be mov’d with greater Force, its whole Circulation be sooner perform’d, and room sooner made for the Admission of fresh Blood. All which contribute much, to the greater briskness and plenty of the Spirits. But Willis, and Lower, have treated this Matter so fully, and accurately, that they have left no room for our Industry, and ought themselves to be consulted, as Originals.89 It is sufficient for me, to have apply’d these Observations, borrow’d from them, to my present Argument. This, however, I think proper to add, “That, tho in the human Head there are so many Helps to the Imagination and Memory, which are of great Service to the Mind, these are no way sufficient, to resolve the above mention’d Operations into the mechanical Powers of Matter and Motion.” On the contrary, I think Malpighius’s Observation very just, “That, the better we understand the nature and functions of the Brain, the more we shall despair of the Possibility of explaining the Operations of the Mind by its Motions.” See Malpigh. de Cerebri cortice, cap. 4.90

3. Longer Life.§XXV. I now proceed to the last help, to the Memory, and, consequently, to Prudence; this Advantage Mankind usually enjoy beyond other Animals, which proceeds from our ordinary length of Life. The Power of our Memory is certainly wonderful, which comprehends some Thousands of Words, above a Million of Sentences or Propositions thence form’d, and an almost infinite Variety of Things and Actions, observ’d with in the Compass of our Life. Which, however short it is, if compar’d with that Eternity we hope for, or with the long Lives of the Antediluvian Patriarchs, which we learn from sacred History, is yet much longer, than that of most other Animals we know. They sooner come to Maturity, and generally decay sooner, so as not to reach sixty or seventy Years, the usual Limits of the Life of Man. It is also providently contriv’d by Nature, “That the Memory of Children should be retentive, by means whereof, before we become fit for transacting Business, we retain much concerning God and Men, the Causes of the common Good, and of that Happiness we hope for”; and thence learn, “How necessary it is, both to pursue this greatest End, and to exercise a most extensive Benevolence towards them as the only Means to obtain that End.” Yet Hobbes, in this Article as well as in others, prefers Brutes to Men; and in his Leviathan, chap. 3. where he treats of Prudence, he asserts thus. “There be Beasts, that at a Year old, observe more, and pursue that which is for their Good more prudently, than a Child can do at ten.”91 I, who have often, with wonder, observ’d, the Contrivance of Children in their Plays, the Pertinence of their Answers to Questions, and their remarkable Happiness of Memory in learning Languages, have never met with any thing in Brutes comparable thereto: I therefore leave it to the Reader’s Judgment, whether this be not affirm’d by Hobbes, with more Ill-nature than Truth and Ingenuity. He frequently acknowledges, “That many Years Experience, especially after we come to Years of Discretion, naturally produces Prudence”;92 yet he sees not “The advantage, which Men, in this particular, have over Brutes, whose Life is shorter, whose Understanding improves but very little by time, and who cannot so easily communicate to others, what they have learn’d by Experience, especially at a considerable distance of Time or Place, as Men can, and usually do, to their great increase of Prudence and mutual Happiness.”

Secondly, There are some things which,(1.) enable him better to rule his Affections, (This and the following § may be referred to the third Indication, § 19.)§XXVI. Having dispatch’d what relates to the human Imagination and Memory, let us now consider those Properties of a human Body, which seem more nearly to respect the Government, and Determination of the Affections to pursue, rather the Good, than Hurt of others. At present I suppose, and lay down as a foundation, what I have observed in the third Indication, taken from the common nature of Animals, “That those Affections, which are employ’d in pursuit of Good, do naturally more befriend and delight all Animals, in which they reside, and that they therefore incline to these Affections, as more conducing to the Preservation of their own Life, with the same necessity, that all Principles of Action, essential to them, are determined to preserve, rather than destroy, Life and Health.” This being suppos’d, there are two peculiar properties of a human body, which ought to incline them, with a diligence greater than that of other Animals, to govern their Affections; of which the first enables them, better than other Animals, to effect it; the second renders it more necessary to the Health, and, consequently, to the Life, of Man, that he should govern his Affections, than it is to other Animals. If, in either Article, any thing seems not sufficiently proved to the Reader, let him remember, that what I add here is more than is necessary to my Argument, which is otherwise sufficiently prov’d; and that it may be of some use, here to recount these things peculiar to Man, that others, at least, may more happily explain their uses. I make no question, but that they serve other purposes also: yet I think it probable, that they are not ineffectual to those noble ends, which I have hinted. And they are these,(1.) A Plexus Nervosus peculiar to Man;93 (2.) The connexion of the Pericardium with the Diaphragm, and a like communication between the Nervus Diaphragmaticus and the Plexus Nervosus peculiar to Man, which is chiefly subservient to the Praecordia. With respect to these, I think proper, only briefly to sum up the observations of Anatomists, and to accommodate to my present purpose, what they have advanced in general, concerning the Affections hence depending. It is evident, “That the strongest Passions of Men are employ’d about those things, which are the Objects of Laws, whether natural or civil”; for the business of these, is to settle and preserve Property, both in Things and in human Services, than which nothing moves Men more strongly; therefore it is not to be doubted, but “That all those things in a human body, which naturally serve to excite or allay the Passions, have a considerable share in settling and defending a distinction of Property, in which the whole matter of the Laws of Nature consists.”

as a Plexus Nervosus peculiar to Man.I will begin with transcribing, from Willis, a few things concerning the Plexus Nervosus peculiar to Man. The Reader, if he has the Author by him, may consult himself, and receive it with greater pleasure at first hand, where he may find what is here describ’d, represented to his view in the ninth Plate.94 “The Plexus Nervosus peculiar to Man, is about the middle of the Neck, in the Trunk of the intercostal Nerve, which, beside the Fibres sent off into the Blood-vessels and Gullet, and those small Branches, which it sends into the Trunks of the Nervus Diaphragmaticus, and of thePar Vagum, and into the recurrent Nerve, detaches, beside, on each hand, two Branches toward the Heart, which are joined by another rising somewhat lower, and these, at length, meeting more from the other side, form the Plexus Cardiacus; thence proceed both those remarkable Branches of Nerves spreading over the Region of the Heart, and those nervous Loops, which gird the pneumonick Artery and Vein,” (the principal conveyance of the blood, whence the spirits, which contain the first seeds of the Passions, break forth) “and the same intercostal Nerve afterwards winds about the subclavian Arteries, before the rise of the vertebral Arteries, which convey the Blood to the Head. The intercostal Nerve, by these Branches, supplies the Place of an extraordinary Courier, communicating, to and fro, the mutual Sensations of the Heart and Brain. By means of this Communication, the Conceptions of the Brain affect the Heart, and move the Vessels thereof along with the Diaphragm, whence the motion of the Blood, and the Respiration, receive various Alterations, and the State of the Spirits, which are thence to be form’d, is somewhat chang’d.” He farther adds, “That the Thoughts, relating to Acts of the Will or Understanding,” (in which the Powers of Prudence, and the Virtues, are conspicuous,) “may be duly form’d, it is necessary, that the torrent of Blood in the Breast be kept within bounds, and the inordinate motions of the Heart be restrained, by the Nerves, as by Reins, and be reduc’d to regularity.” He observ’d also, “in the Dissection of one who was a Fool from his Birth, that the foresaid Plexus Nervosus was very slender, and attended with an unusually small Train.” And, moreover, he observed “in a Monkey” (which Animal makes the nearest Approaches to human Sagacity and Passions) “some Branches sent off to the Heart and its Appendix, from the intercostal Nerve, before its insertion into the Plexus Thoracicus,” (as he calls it,) “which is different from what it is in other Animals.”95 I will transcribe no more from him upon this head. It is sufficient to have shewn, “That Man is naturally furnish’d with these Instruments, (beside the Powers of his Mind, and, perhaps, yet other undiscover’d Properties of the Brain,) for the Government of his Affections,” which would not be foreign toour present Purpose, tho something of the same kind were to be found in Brutes, conducing to their living peaceably among themselves. But, since these things are peculiar to Man, it cannot but suggest to his Mind, “That it is its Province, diligently to attend the Helm committed to its care, and to steer skilfully.”

(2.) Make Man’s Government of his Passions of greater Importance to him, as the connexion of the Pericardium with the Diaphragm, and other Causes, which render his risques greater than those of other Animals, in violent Passions.§XXVII. We are, in the second place, to consider the connexion between the Pericardium and Diaphragm, (which is not at all to be found in other Animals,) to which I thought proper to add the Communication between the foresaid Plexus Nervosus peculiar to Man, and the Nervus Diaphragmaticus; because, as Willis has observed in the same Place, two, and sometimes three, Nerves are inserted, from this Plexus, into the Nervus Diaphragmaticus: Nor is it to be omitted, that, from the same intercostal Nerve, in which the aforesaid Plexus is found, innumerable Branches are spread thro’ all Parts of the lower Belly, so that the Heart, in some measure, communicates with them all.

I should be too prolix, if I endeavoured to enlarge upon all these particulars, and it would be rashness, to offer to determine the use of each of these Nerves, which to me seems not yet sufficiently discover’d. It is sufficient for my present Argument, to make a few Observations concerning their general use, in which Anatomists are agreed, which is, (1.) That they serve to begin, or stop, motion; (2.) That they convey to the Brain Sensations of Pain or Pleasure, from the Parts in which they are inserted; (3.) That those Nerves, with which they are complicated, sympathize with them. These Particulars being suppos’d, I assume what is evident from innumerable Experiments, “That our Heart and Diaphragm, and all the Bowels of the lower Belly, the Stomach, for instance, the Liver, Spleen, Spermatick Vessels, &c. are variously affected in all violent Passions about Good or Evil, whether our own or another’s; especially, when our own Concerns are found involv’d, from the nature of Things, with those of others, which, because of the known likeness of the Condition of all Men, is always easy to observe.” It is evident, “That the Nerves inserted in these Bowels, are the Instruments of these Motions, perhaps, not without the Concurrence of the arterial Blood.” Hence I infer, “That the Heart of Man is, in such Passions, more affected than that of other Animals”; because it communicates or sympathizes with the other Bowels, by that connexion, peculiar to Man, of the Nerves and Pericardium, which I have mentioned; and because both his Heart and other Bowels, in every kind of Passion, are mov’d by the Influenceof a more powerful Brain, and the Impulse of more active Spirits. And, because the Heart, and the Blood circulated by means thereof, is the Fountain of Life and Health, and, in consequence, of all the Pleasure we enjoy; those Passions, which assist, or retard, its Motion more powerfully in Men than Brutes, must necessarily affect us more than they do them, whose Hearts do not so many ways communicate with their Bowels: Beside, their Brains are more sluggish; and their Spirits, whether in the Blood or Nerves, are fewer and less active. How much it conduces to our present Argument, that, from the very Structure of our Body, we are continually admonish’d of the necessity of governing our Affections with a strict hand, they will easily understand, who consider, “That all the Virtues, and the whole Observance we owe to the Law of Nature, are contain’d in the Government of those Passions, which are employ’d in settling or securing every Man’s Property.”

But, because I have observ’d, from Anatomists, beside those general Phaenomena, concerning which I have treated, two particular ones, peculiar to Man, accurately explain’d from this Connexion between the Heart and other Bowels, which are Laughing and Sighing, I presently imagin’d, that these are Symptoms of our two principal Passions, that of a profuse Joy, this of Grief; and that all the rest of our Affections are like these; so that we may hope, from a Parity of Reason, that, in time, their Symptoms too may in like manner be explain’d. I therefore resolv’d briefly to explain, and to apply to my present purpose, these, as Specimens of what I have before asserted, only in general Terms.

First, therefore, I observe from Willis, in the Chapter before quoted, that, from the above-mention’d Communication, between the Plexus Nervosus peculiar to Man, and the Nervus Diaphragmaticus, the true Cause appears, why Risibility is a Property of human Nature; which is, because the Diaphragm, as well as the Heart, is affected with the pleasing Motion of the Imagination, and is drawn upward by the Intercourse of the Nerves proceeding from this Plexus, and is excited to repeated Heavings as it were; whence, because the Pericardium is joined to it, the Heart itself and the Lungs are likewise mov’d; then, because the same Intercostal Nerve is continued upward with the Nerves of the Jaws, when once the Laugh is begun in the Breast, the Posture of the Mouth and Countenance pathetically corresponds thereto. Willis has more upon this Head. What Lower delivers upon this Subject, differs somewhat from this, but yet may be reconcil’d with it: The Place is worth the Reader’s Inspection.96 I observe, to my present purpose, “That Laughter gives a most agreeable Relish to human Life, and, especially, to friendly Society, but is of little or no use in Solitude, or in such Affections, as are conversant about any great Evil, as in Anger, Envy, Hatred, Fear; and is, therefore, to be reckon’d amongst those things, which frequently make human Conversation more agreeable, but seldom the contrary.” Because this Motion, repeated at proper Intervals, is wonderfully agreeable, and strongly throws off all Uneasiness of Grief, we may conclude, “That human Nature, (on this very account, that it is fitly fram’d to procure its own Preservation,) is inclinable to this sweetner of Society, which is peculiar to Man; and that therefore, in this respect also, there is a natural Connexion between our Care of our-selves, and a Desire to please others.”

The Sigh, tho’ it be not peculiar to Man, is yet more frequently observ’d in him; nor is it, that I know of, in other Animals reckon’damong the Signs of Grief or Melancholy; however, it is more prejudicial to the Heart in Man, than in other Animals, because of the Connexion between his Pericardium and Diaphragm, by whose Motion it is produc’d; for the Motion of the Heart, so necessary to the Life of Man, is disturb’d by that extraordinary Motion of the annex’d Diaphragm. The Inconvenience of Sighing, when seldom, is but small; but, if frequent and of long Continuance, it wonderfully tires the Heart, and disqualifies it for its Functions. This Evil is near a-kin to that Distemper, which is call’d the Hiccough, which, (as Lower has rightly observ’d,)97 tho’ it generally takes its Rise from the Stomach, to which it is prejudicial, is properly an Affection of the Diaphragm; and which, tho’ it hurt but little, when its Stay is short, yet, when it is of long Continuance, and is attended with other Symptoms, (which Physicians are acquainted with from the Aphorisms of Hippocrates,)98 is often a Harbinger, and partly a Cause, of Death.

Whilst I was considering a Sigh, as an Effect of Grief, a probable Conjecture (as it seems to me) came into my Mind, concerning the Cause of Tears, which is one of the Effects of Grief, and almost proper to Man alone. I am of Opinion, “That in Grief the Motion of the Blood, in the Extremities of the Veins and Arteries in the Head, is somewhat obstructed, so that it cannot so freely circulate as before,” (nor are we without other Proofs of this Obstruction in this Passion,) “in which case the Lachrymal Glands” (for whose Explication we are indebted to Steno)99 “can make a more plentiful Secretion of the Serum from the Blood, and empty it, by their Passages, into the Eyes.” I took the first Hint of this Conjecture, from that noble Experiment of Lower, in which, after he had tied the Jugular Veins in a live Dog, all the Parts above the Ligature swell’d prodigiously, Tears flow’d plentifully, and Spittle as copiously, as if in a Salivation. Read the Experiment, useful upon many Accounts, in its Author, in the Chapter above quoted, and I believe, my Conjecture will not seem improbable: But, perhaps, Man alone weeps, either because his Blood is more obstructed in Grief, in proportion to the Size of his Brain, and the Quickness of his Apprehension; or because his Blood, being more copious and warm, and of swifter Circulation in the Head, cannot suffer such Obstructions, without the Secretion of a salt Humour from the Glands, which breaks forth in Tears. However, if in Grief there were no such Obstructions in the Brain as we suppose, yet, if in that Passion the Blood either became too thick to find aneasy Passage thro’ its usual Windings; or if, on the contrary, it were more rarify’d, or its Velocity ever so little increas’d from the Heart toward the Head, because it does not find a proportionably freer Passage, thro’ its winding Canals, into the Veins, the Arteries must of Necessity swell, and there will be the same reason of the watery Parts breaking forth in Tears, as if such Obstructions, as I suppos’d, had oppos’d its Course, which might easily be prov’d from hydrostatical Principles. However this happens, the breaking forth of Tears, in these Obstructions, is an Indication, “That the Health of Man is more endanger’d from giving way to Grief, than that of other Animals”; for the Lachrymal Glands will scarce suffice for evacuating the whole Serum, after it has made an Eruption in some other Part of the Head, tho some Ease may arise from this Partial Evacuation. The clouding the Fancy, and the Symptoms of various Diseases, which usually follow, according to the various Circumstances, and Temper of Body, of the Persons grieving, especially in those of a melancholy Disposition, make it evident, that all the ill Consequences of Grief are not carry’d off by Tears, which are seldom shed by Men come to Years. Yet it is remarkable, that a Stag, whose Blood, especially when heated and accelerated by the Chace, approaches near to the State of human Blood, when he cannot make head against the Fury of the Dogs bearing in upon him, and sees Death approaching, bursts forth into Tears.

But, to cut these Speculations short, I will conclude with this Remark, that it is evident, by the manifold Experience of all, “That human Passions, if not restrain’d by Reason, give Birth and Increase to several Distempers, especially Hypochondriacal, to which Man is subject, more than other Animals; but that the same Passions, under the Conduct of Reason, make Men hale, brisk, lively, and fit for all Duties.” And, therefore, as we would lead our Lives pleasantly, we must endeavour to govern our Passions, whether their Causes be now at length discover’d to us, or whether they remain yet unknown, in whole or in part.

From this Effect, which we certainly know sufficiently, arises a Necessity of finding out some Rules of Reason, by which they may be confin’d within certain Bounds; but those Rules are the same with those, which command us to employ our Affections, only about the Means conducing to the best and greatest End, or the common Good. But the Means to this End, in the Power of Man, are only those free Actions, by which is either made or preserv’d such a Division of Things and human Services, as most conduces to the Happiness of all. And these Rules are the very Laws of Nature, as I shall afterwards shew; and such Actions are Acts of universal Justice, or of Virtue conformable to such Laws. Wherefore, from the Premises, I may conclude, “That all those Properties of a human Body, which effect, either that he is better able to govern his Passions, or that to do so is more necessary to him than to Brutes, do very much conduce, both to his Knowledge of the Laws of Nature, and to his inclining, in some measure, to the doing those things, which they enjoin.”

Thirdly, Mankind are more particularly influenc’d to Benevolence, by their more uninterrupted Inclinations to beget, and, consequently, to rear, their Offspring, than are to be found in other Animals. (This is to be referr’d to the Head of the fourth Indication, § 20.)§XXVIII. What remains will be soon finish’d. With respect to the fourth Indication, common to all Animals, taken from their Propension to propagate their Species, a human Body has this only (that I have observ’d) peculiar to it, which is, “That its venereal Inclinations are not limited to certain Seasons of the Year, as in most other Animals, but are, in some sort, perpetual.” Hence it is, that most Men find it necessary to marry, and hence proceeds a strong Desire of propagating their Species; whence are inseparable, Appetites, and also Covenants, relating to the Maintenance and Government of their Families. And because the Uninterruptedness of this Propension, and its Consequences, proceed from the greater Activity of the human Blood, and the greater Force of the spermatick Vessels, they must necessarily be proportionably greater in Men than Brutes; his Care therefore must be greater, to support and govern his Family; and this necessarily supposes the Knowledge of the Laws of Nature, and some Inclination to observe them. For no Provision can be made for a Family, without settling and preserving some Division of Things and of mutual Services, for that purpose. But when this is once understood and approv’d of in the Care of one Family, the Parity of Reason is so evident, in those things which are equally necessary to the Happiness of other Families, that it cannot be, but that the Necessity of such a Division, must in like manner be understood, nor can any sufficient Reason be assign’d, “Why it should not in like manner be approv’d of by, and so extend it self to, all Mankind.” But in the Knowledge and Approbation of such a Division, necessary for the Good of all, is contain’d the Knowledge and Approbation of the Law of Nature. Meanwhile, the manner, how the seminal and active Particles of the Blood excite the Idea and Appetite of Procreation, is to be explain’d by natural Philosophers upon some physical Hypothesis; for since these Particles, thro’ their minuteness, fall not under the Observation of our Senses, their particular Effects and Motions cannot be methodically explain’d from Observation and Natural History. From the beginning I determin’d to abstain from such Hypotheses; let every one take that, which is most consistent with his own Observations and Reason. It is sufficient for my Purpose to have shewn, “That natural Affection, or the Appetite of preserving and educating Offspring brought into the World, is only a continued Appetite of begetting it, or causing it to exist, which includes an Opposition to those Causes, which hinder its Existence.” But of this enough already. However, this I think proper hereto add, “That, because the Offspring of Man continues longer weak, and in need of the help of its Parents, it is certain, that, thro’ length of Time, and frequent repeated Acts of their Love, that Affection grows stronger in Parents; so that the longer they have bestow’d Pains upon their Education, they with less Patience bear any Evil, but especially Death, happening to them; and so the very Difficulty of forming Men, in order to the common Good, because it is overcome by Hope founded in their Nature, causes Parents to set about it with a greater Earnestness and Industry, and daily to give much greater Proofs of their natural Affection, than what are any where to be met with in other Animals.”

All the Indications, deduc’d from this Head, are the more carefully to be observ’d, because into it finally is to be resolv’d, both the reciprocal Love of Children toward their Parents, and the Benevolence of Relations toward one another, which will, at length, extend it self to a Love of all Mankind; when once we come to know, from the most authentick Histories, (the only means antient Facts can be known by,) “That all Men are descended from the same common Parents.”

Fourthly, From the Consideration of the whole Frame of a human Body, by which is is fitted for Society; (This is to be referr’d to the fifth Indication, § 20.)§XXIX.100 To the last Indication, taken from the entire Frame of Animals and their united Actions, is to be referr’d the Consideration, “That the Bodies of Men are generally more fitted, for discharging the Offices of friendly Society; and, that the manifest Effects of a stricter Union among Men than Brutes, is visible in civil Government, which has always taken place, over the whole habitable World, at least under Heads of Families.” Yet I confess, “That this is not to be ascrib’d wholly to the Frame of their Bodies, as in Brutes, but in much greater measure to the governing Mind, which in Man sits as it were at the Helm.” In this place we are not so much to consider the Privileges of some particular Parts, as the apt Dis-position of them all, with respect to one another, by which they are better enabled to mutual Assistance, of which Disposition it is more easy to perceive the Effects, than to explain wherein it consists. It is, however, to be observ’d, “That almost all these Parts are somewhat more powerful, by their being influenc’d by a larger Brain, by a greater quantity of Blood and Spirits, and a Heart more under command, by means of Nerves peculiar to it-self.” Yet I thought it proper, to take notice of something remarkable in two Parts of a Man’s Body, (by which he is better fitted for friendly Society,) the Countenance and the Hand.

Especially of the Countenance,Of the Countenance, Cicero has long since observ’d, “That it is to be found in no other Animal; their Faces not making near so many Discoveries of their Thoughts and Affections.”101 These Discoveries are of singular use, in beginning and keeping up an Intercourse among Men, but in Solitude are of no use at all. These Signs, what they are, we all perceive, but can hardly distinctly express; yet these are very conspicuous, the Blush in Shame, Paleness in Fear and Anger. These two owe their being visible in Man, to the Transparency of the Scarf-skin of his Face, so that the greater or less Quantity of Blood, which lies under it, and its various Motions, are easily perceiv’d. From the same cuticular Transparency, peculiar to Man, proceeds great part of that extraordinary Beauty, which is conspicuous in the human Countenance, which is of great Efficacy in procuring Good-will among Men, and was, therefore, not to be pass’d over in silence. For hence we see, not only that agreeable Mixture of the bright Colour of the Blood with that of the Skin, but its various Motions, according to the Variety of the Passions: a very agreeable Spectacle! To these may be added Laughter and Weeping, (whose Causes peculiar to Man I have already hinted,) Symptoms of Passions, of great use to give a Relish to Society, and to banish Savageness of Temper. All other Diversities of Countenance, (which can hardly be enumerated,) according to the Diversity of Passions, arise, either from the various Motions of our Blood, which may, in some measure, be perceiv’d by the change of Colour in the outer Skin of the Face, or from the Motions of the Muscles belonging to the Eyes and the rest of the Face, which are excited by the Nerves of the fifth or sixth Pair, which owe their Original to the Intercostal Nerve, and so communicate more immediately than others, with the Plexus Nervosus peculiar to Man. Hence it is, that in the Nature of Man alone is founded that common Observation, “The Countenance is the Image, the Eyes the Index, of the Mind.”102 Moreover, that remarkable Diversity of Face, by means whereof, among so many Millions, scarce two can be found alike, is of vast use in forming and preserving Societies; for hence all may be easily distinguish’d from one another, so that every one may discern, with whom it is that he hath made any Covenant, or transacted any Affair, and Men may give certain Testimony, concerning those things, which any one has done, said, or attempted; which would be impossible, were there not something in the Faces of Men, by which they might be distinguish’d from one another.

and the Hand.The Make of the human Hand, consider’d with its Arm, is very particular;103 and its various Powers, with respect to Agriculture, Planting, Architecture, whether in building Houses, Fortifications, or Ships, and all other kinds of mechanical Contrivances, would be almost useless, unless Men mutually assisted one another, and enter’d into friendly Society. I had not any Opportunity of dissecting an Ape, or Monkey, to compare, in every particular, their Fore-feet, which resemble our Hands, with the dissected Hand, Arm, and Shoulder of a Man. But, without dissecting them, it is evident, both that no Effects of so great Dexterity are produc’d by those Animals, as appear in the Works of Man above-mention’d; and that the Muscles, both in the Extremity of the human Hand, Arm, and Shoulder, are stronger, in proportion to the Bulk of their Body, and the Joints much more pliable every way. It is also evident, that, in Man, the Bone of the Arm, properly so called, which reaches from the Shoulder to the Elbow, is very long, so as to exceed in length the Bones of the Cubit, which terminate in the Wrist, and that the said Bone of the Arm is so conveniently inserted into the Scapula, (which is plac’d upon the Back, and not so forward, as in Brutes,) and govern’d by its Muscles, that the Hands may by that means be extended more widely from one another, and even so turn’d backward, as to be able to grasp a great Bulk, or lift a great Weight.104 By this very particular, and truly mechanical, contrivance of Nature, it is, that a Man’s Hand is not only fitted for many more Motions and Operations, but that it has much more Strength, both in sustaining and carrying Weights, and in communicating Motion to other Bodies. For, when the Hand is to sustain and carry a great Weight, the Hand, with the Weight it holds, is so let down along the side, by the Motion of the Joints of the Arm, as to be at the least distance possible from the Line of Direction;105 whence it is, that the Weight is poiz’d, with the smallest Force, upon the Center of Gravity of the whole Aggregate, compounded of our Body and the Weight to be sustain’d. And this they perform spontaneously, who are perfectly ignorant of the Doctrine of the Center of Gravity, being taught by Experience only; which were not possible, except the Hand were so conveniently fitted to the Shoulder, and to the upright situation of the Body. On the contrary, when our Hand is to communicate Motion to a lighter Body, (to a Stone, for instance, to be thrown, a Hammer, or any other Instrument;) it is from this convenient Frame of our Hand, that we learn to raise it; whence, because it is farther distant from the Center of its Motion, it moves more swiftly, and exerts a greater Force. As in a longer Sling, because of the greater distance from the Center of its Motion, a greater Force (caeteris paribus) is communicated to the Stone to be slung. The Center of Motion, whence the distance of the Hand, and, consequently, the increase of Force, is to be computed, is not always in the Articulation of the Bone of the Arm in to the Scapula, (whence, however, the Stroke of a Man would receive an additional Force, greater than what is to be met with in other Animals,) but in many Cases, as when the whole Body, and, consequently, the Shoulder it self, is, in striking, mov’d along with the Arm, the Center of Motion is in the Foot on which we stand, and the distance is to be computed from the Foot to the elevated Hand, if we would understand the degree of Acceleration, and the Force thence arising. Thus a new and further Strength is added to that of our Hands, as peculiar to Man, as his erectness of Stature. And it is further to be observ’d, that the elastick Force of the many Muscles, spread almost thro’ our whole Body, do both conspire to begin such Motions, and concur with the foresaid distance from the Center of Motion, to accelerate them, when once begun. These Instruments of greater Power may, indeed, be made use of for Slaughter, and other mischievous Purposes, against other Men: Yet I think it evident, “That all those things, which inlarge the Power of all Men in general, provided a due Equality or Balance be preserv’d, are Arguments to persuade each to use his Power, rather to assist, than to hurt others, and, consequently, to recommend that mutual Benevolence, which I endeavour to establish”; this is prov’d, Step by Step, in the following Propositions.

Notwithstanding these Advantages peculiar to Men, their Powers, how great soever, being nearly equal, afford much stronger Arguments to Benevolence than Malevolence.§XXX.106 1. A Power of hurting others, balanc’d by an equal Power in them to hurt, (in Defence or Revenge,) does not afford a proper Motive to any one, who with Caution provides for his own Security, to endeavour to hurt others. For it is manifest, because the Forces of the Powers are suppos’d equal on each side, that, so far, no Reason is assign’d, why the Scale should incline one way, rather than the other. On the contrary, because, if they fight, it is certain, that both the contending Parties may be kill’d or maim’d, and it is also certain, that neither of them can gain as much by the Victory, as he who is kill’d in fight loses, nor as much as he hazards, who commits his Life to the Chance of War; it is both their Interest, “Not to engage.” The hazarding my Life deprives me of more Good, than can accrue to me from this, that my Enemies Life is in equal Danger; nor is his Security therefore the greater, because my Life is insecure; but hence both lose something which neither gains. Nay, if we, for a while, lay aside the Consideration of Life and Health, and regard only our outward Possessions, it is certain, “That the Conquerors do not get all the Conquer’d lose, and that they acquire greater Advantages, who cultivate Peace, by which they may enjoy their own.”

2. A Power of helping others, balanc’d by an equal Power in them of helping, suggests to every one a proper Motive, to desire to help others, especially, when it is certain, such Assistance may be given without Damage to our selves. For a possible Compensation partakes of the Nature of Good, and is, therefore, a sufficient Motive to influence the Will of Man, especially, when, for the most part, we lose nothing by our Beneficence, (the Compensation whereof is at least possible,) which can deserve to be brought into the Account. From comparing this with the former Proposition, it is evident, “That the Consequences (tho they should be suppos’d equally contingent) of Power, determin’d to act benevolently, have a greater Force to influence the Mind, foreseeing these Consequences, to Benevolence, than the Consequences of Power, determin’d to act malevolently, have to influence the Mind that way”; which is sufficient for my present purpose. For the Mind is chiefly influenc’d by the foreseen Consequences of its own Actions. In the former case, we foresee it possible, “That we may bring Evil upon others”; and we see it equally possible, “That we may suffer Evil from them”: on each side there is an equal Evil, but nothing which may allure the Will, which always inclines to the greater Good: In the latter case, we foresee Good, which we are capable, both of doing and receiving, but no damage to draw back the Scale leaning this way; it is not, in this case, so much as possible, that both should lose any thing by Actions of this kind, and here more accrues to the one, than is taken from the other. I can benefit others by Innocence, by Humanity, by performing Covenants in support of the common Good; yet, if I duly consider every thing, I lose nothing thereby; nay, by thus acting, I gain inward Strength and Pleasure, and the Hope of a plentiful Return; which yet, how small soever, can scarce be so small, as what by such Actions I deprive my self of, to bestow upon the Publick. For, if I am consider’d, not only as every one is, alone, but also without the Benevolence, Peace, and Assistance, of others, I have so very little, that I am not sufficient to supply my own Wants, but am, on all sides, so surrounded with extreme Necessity, that I can hardly make my Condition worse by serving others, which will be plainly understood by him, who considers the State of Man in a War of all against all, on all sides unjust. There is no occasion to assert with Hobbes, “That such a War is just and necessary, by means of the right Reason of every particular Person, judging all things to be necessary to himself, before the Establishment of civil Society”; since we may grant to him, that it may be very useful to consider, “How great Evils may proceed from universal Injustice, and the mistaken Judgments of any Number of Men, arrogating each everything to himself.” But this is widely distant from Hobbes’s Error, who has taught, “That the right Reason of all, living out of civil Society, necessarily leads all into these Evils, so as to leave to Reason no Power of doing Good, beside what proceeds from the Authority of civil Government.” I, on the contrary, affirm, “That it is impossible, that right Reason should teach us to arrogate all things to our selves only; nay, that it commands us, to agree benevolently to make and preserve a Division, by which every one acquires some Property; and that, as for many other reasons, so also, because it easily foresees Floods of Evils, that threaten all, and, consequently, every Individual, upon this one Supposition, that each regarded himself only, and with a Desire insatiable arrogated all things to himself.” The two precedent Propositions prove my Point, if the Power of each be consider’d, as balanc’d by the Power of one other Person only. But the Matter will become yet more evident, if we consider,

3. That the Power, in any single Person, of hurting others, is far exceeded by the Power of many, or of all, by which they defend themselves, or revenge an Injury: And, 4. That the Power of any one, by which he may benefit others, is far exceeded by the Power of Requital, which is in many, or in all. For these Considerations will most strongly persuade us, to determine our Powers, how great soever, rather to benefit, than to hurt others. Nor can it be imagin’d, “That the Powers of all will be always so divided, that one will in this War fight only with one”; and by what Accident soever it happens, that an unequal Number of a side engage in the Combat, two against one, for Instance, this will carry on the War to the more certain destruction of that Person; and, if at first an equal Number engage of a Side, they may be reduc’d to an Inequality by the Death of one. But thus much seems abundantly sufficient to prove, “That the very Powers of Men, whilst they are suppos’d nearly equal, rather suggest Arguments for mutual Benevolence, than for attempting mutual Destruction.” It has been already prov’d, “That the other Particulars, which I have shewn to be peculiar to human Nature, enforce the same more strongly.”

(Hobbes falsly asserts, that Men generally refuse equal Conditions of Society, and he argues from accidental and partial Causes, instead of necessary and universal ones.)§XXXI.107 Here, Reader, I desire it may be observ’d, “That Hobbes has no where offer’d any thing, in this manner natural and essential to the Mind or Body of Man, which can suggest to any one a necessary Argument, or can otherwise necessarily determine Men, that each should claim all things to himself alone”; but that he sometimes imputes it to the Passions, which I have already disprov’d; sometimes, that he says only in general, That “They will not bear equal Conditions of Society, tho they desire Society it self. ”108 I answer, “That, altho there are some Men, who sometimes will not accept of necessary and equal Conditions of Society, yet, neither the Nature of all Things, nor of themselves, teaches or determines them to refuse those Conditions. The Manners, which a few sometimes fall rashly into, and from which the Conduct of most others, and often of themselves too, differs, are not to be imputed to the Nature of Man, nor of the Universe; but as those Manners themselves are Contingent, so they have a contingent Cause, which is the rash Determination of their Free-will. He, who would affirm any thing to be Natural, ought to consider the constant, necessary, and essential Powers and Tendencies of all things, especially, of Man, by which his Life, and ordinary Happiness are preserv’d; rather than those accidental Irregularities, by which they are weaken’d: For it is certain, “That, while we live and are in health, the Causes of Life and Health are stronger, than those which, by their Irregularity, disturb us; and that, therefore, an Estimate is to be made of our Nature from those, not these.” The reason is the same, in pronouncing concerning all Mankind, or all Ages of all Men, which succeed one another, like the Parts of a River. As to the Manners of Men, it is generally, tho contingently, true, “That they will accept equal Conditions of Society,” which is evident from Experience, because we see, “That such Societies have been long ago voluntarily form’d every where by them, and that they are preserv’d oftener and longer, than they are dissolv’d”; but to be willing to maintain civil Society, or to preserve Peace with another State, is only a constant and continued Will to establish it. Nay it is sometimes more difficult to continue, than at first to form, a Society; yet that Difficulty is overcome by almost all, thro’ the Powers of their Reason and Nature.

The Advantages of Society, and convenient Subordination, and consequently of Government, may be shown from the natural Union of the Mind with, and Dominion over, the Body.Lastly, the Nature of Man does not comprehend only his Mind and Body, which are his essential Parts, but also the Union of these two to one another. And, therefore, I thought it proper to observe, “That Men may hence also be led to the Knowledge and Desire of a Good common to many, nay, and of Society and Government, and that these are agreeable and grateful to the Will of the first Cause.” For we perceive in our selves, that our Body is naturally, and, consequently, at the divine Appointment, not only united to our Minds, but also, that, in most acts of the Memory, Affections, and Motions, especially Muscular, it is subject to their Government. And hence, as by an Idea or Plan of Polity, inseparably united to the Mind, we are continually admonish’d, “How many different things, because of the mutual Assistance which they afford, are necessarily to be consider’d as one Aggregate, whilst we are in pursuit of the Causes of a happy Life; how necessary it is, that, among our Parts, some should be determin’d by others: Of how great Advantage the mutual Order of Parts is, and how necessary the orderly Concurrence of many Causes is to almost all Effects grateful to our Nature: Of how great use the mutual Offices of Parts are, and how pernicious the Separation of some from others, is, which threatens Death.” Having thorowly treated of these, I proceed next to the Consideration of Good, the greatest Good, which is any way in our Power to attain.

General Remarks on Chapter II

It is highly probable, “That Men are more nearly equal in natural Disposition to Benevolence, than is generally imagin’d, and that the Difference chiefly arises from Habit.”

If this Disposition depends so much upon Habit, surely every Person has the greatest reason, to use all the Industry in his power, to improve it, which, I believe, might, in great measure, be effected, by a strict regard to the little common Occurrences of Life, which are, for the most part, wholly disregarded, as trifling, and of no import. Of the many Incidents in Life, which may be used, either to the Blasting, or Nourishment, of this amiable Disposition, I shall only mention one, which seems to me of the greatest consequence, and the least regarded; and that is, our Behaviour to one another in Company. No Man who considers, “That the Strength of any Habit depends upon the Strength and Number of the Acts which constitute that Habit, and that we have the most frequent occasions in conversation, of acting in a good or ill-natur’d manner”; I say, none who considers these things can doubt, “That our Behaviour in Company is of the last consequence, towards the settling a Habit of Benevolence, or avoiding the contrary Disposition.” I believe no Man, who would but seriously reflect, that, by every little piece of ill-natur’d Raillery, or malevolent Contradiction, that Disposition of Mind, upon the Strength of which the whole Happiness of his Life does in a great measure depend, could take pleasure in giving another Uneasiness. The Politeness of the higher Ranks, which chiefly consists in being agreeable, and avoiding every thing which may give Pain to any of their Company, is, in my opinion, no inconsiderable reason, why Good-nature is to be found more frequently among them, than those of the lower Degrees, among whom there is little else to be found, but Rudeness and Rusticity.

There is also another very considerable use to be made of this Observation, “That Benevolence principally consists in Habit,” which regards the Education of Childhood and Youth. It is most certain, “That this flexible Age is the most proper for laying the Foundations of Habits”; and yet it is, with regard to Benevolence, almost wholly neglected. I believe there can be no other Reason assigned, “Why all our Dispositions, which are approv’d of by Reason, except Benevolence, gather Strength and flourish, as the Person grows in Years and Understanding; and that this, the most amiable, the most noble, of all, does wither and decay.” I say, there can hardly be any other tolerable Reason assign’d for this, than what may be drawn from the above-mentioned Observation. For, tho the Reason of an enlarg’d, well-inform’d Mind does perfectly approve of the highest Benevolence, yet, there are many, of so little, narrow, souls, as to take in nothing but the present: And as a small degree of Understanding may make a cunning, but not a wise, Man; so it generally makes a Man selfish, but never prudent.

General Remarks on Chapters I and II

In the first and second Chapters, most of what the Author says, tends to shew, “That Benevolence contributes to the common Good; and that, from the Nature of Things, and from Human Nature, in particular, it appears, That it is the Will of the Author of Nature, that Men should, in general, assist one another; because he hath framed Man in such a manner, and hath adapted the Nature of Things to the Constitution of Man in such a manner, as that Man, partly from the Instinct of Benevolence, but, chiefly, from Self-Love, in consulting his own Advantage, acts in many cases for the Good of others.” What can be collected chiefly for his purpose, from these things, is, in my opinion, this, “That, from what we know of Nature, it plainly appears, That God is a most benevolent Being; and that, in most grand cases, he hath plainly connected private with publick Good; and that, therefore, we have good reason to believe, from the uniformity of Nature, that private Happiness is in all cases perfectly connected with the publick Good, even in this Life; altho we are often so short-sighted, as not fully to perceive that connexion: Or, that, if private Happiness is not perfectly connected with publick Good in this Life, it is by superadded Rewards and Punishments in another.”

CHAPTER III

Of Natural Good.

Natural Good is defin’d, and divided into Good, proper to one, and common to many.Good, is that which preserves, or enlarges and perfects, the Faculties of any one Thing, or of several. For, in these Effects, is discover’d that particular Agreement of one thing with another, which is requisite to denominate any thing good, to the Nature of this thing, rather than of others.1

In the Definition of Good, I chose to avoid the Word [Agreement], because of its very uncertain Signification. Nevertheless, those things, whose Actions or Motions conduce to the Preservation, or Increase, of the Powers of other things, consistently with the nature of the Individual, may justly be said to agree with them. For we do not otherwise use to judge, whether the Nature or Essence of any thing agrees with another, or no, than by the Effects of the Actions thence proceeding. The Effects are what disclose the hidden Powers and inward Constitution of all things; these strike our Senses, and afford us a Knowledge of those things, whence they flow. In Actions are laid the Foundations of all Respects or Relations, to explain which, is almost the whole Business of Philosophy. So that is Good to Man, which preserves or enlarges the Powers of the Mind and Body, or of either, without Prejudice to the other. “That is Good to any thing, which preserves it,” says Aristotle, (Pol. 1. 2.c. 1.) speaking of Cities.2

What I affirm concerning any one particular thing, I would have understood concerning a Series of many things, in which some things profitable are inseparably connected with others that are hurtful; in which case, those things which hurt, are to be compar’d with those that profit, and the whole is to be denominated from the prevailing Power, whether of hurting or profiting.

Good of this kind, of which we form an Idea, without the Consideration of any Laws whatsoever, I call natural Good; both because it respects the Nature of a thing, a Brute, for instance, or a Tree, whose Powers are capable of Preservation and Increase; and, beside, such is the Effect of such kind of Beings,3 nay, of the Earth it self, that they may be subservient to the Preservation of their own Natures, or even of ours, or to our Improvement by farther Knowledge.

It is distinguish’d, by its greater Extensiveness, from that Good, which is called Moral, which is ascrib’d only to such Actions and Habits of rational Agents, as are agreeable to Laws, whether Natural or Civil, and is ultimately resolv’d into the natural common Good, to the Preservation and Increase of which alone all the Laws of Nature, and all just civil Laws, do direct us. Of Moral Good, more hereafter; let us now turn our Thoughts, for a while, to that which is Natural.

Such Actions and Habits of moral Agents, as may be subservient to the common natural Good of all, are enforc’d by Laws; and, when such Acts or Habits are embrac’d, upon account of their agreement with moral Rules, they are call’d morally Good.Having shewn, “That neither the Notion, nor the Name, of Good, does confine it to him only, who thinks or speaks of it, but that it may likewise relate to every other Man, nay, and to all other Animals,” (to say nothing of inanimate Beings, which are capable of Preservation, or further Perfection, consisting in the Order or Motion of their Parts;) we must proceed to the Consideration of those Aggregates, which may be form’d of many, nay of all, Animals of the same Species; I add, and of all Beings making use of Reason, how much soever they may otherwise differ, such as Man and God. For, as the Mind considers them under an indefinite Notion, equally applicable to all, it can also unite them into one general Body, in order to discover what is Good or Evil for it, which we shall therefore call the common or publick Good or Evil of Mankind, or even of all rational Agents; and can likewise judge, of the diverse good or evil things propos’d, which is possible or impossible, greater or less. Nor, in most Cases, is this very difficult to determine, at least in general; for, since they all have the same Nature, when we know wherein the Happiness of any one consists, we thence know, what kind of Happiness is to be sought for by every Individual. For it is evident, “That those natural Perfections of the Mind, and that Health and Vigour of Body, in which the whole Happiness of one consists, do also comprehend, when universally extended, all the Happiness of all,4 consequently, both the different Degrees of Happiness, and the nature of Means generally necessary to each, in order to attain it, may be equally apprehended in relation to all: That all require Nourishment, for instance, Exercise, Sleep, &c.” because such things are necessary to each, and the whole is the same with all its Parts: hence also, “Whatever adds any thing, tho but to one part of this whole, without changing, and, consequently, without hurting the rest, that increases the whole, which is compos’d of that, and the other Parts.” He who does Good to one Man, without hurting any other, may justly be said to do Good to the whole Aggregate of Mankind, which may with reason encourage every one of us, from the Consideration of the publick Good, “So to take care of our selves, as not to hurt any other Person.”

(Hobbes’s Opinion concerning Good, stated,§II. I own, therefore, “That to be call’d Good, which agrees with another, and, consequently, that the Term is Relative”; but it is not always referr’d to the Desire, nor always to that one Person only, who desires it. In these two Points Hobbes has often err’d grosly, (tho he sometimes comes out with the Truth, in Contradiction to himself;) and on these fundamental Mistakes is supported most of what he has writ amiss, concerning the Right of War of all against all, in a State of Nature, and a Right of exercising arbitrary Power, in a State of civil Society. Concerning Hobbes’s Opinion, that any thing is therefore call’d Good, because it is desir’d. See De Homine, cap. 11. § 4. “All things (saith he) which are desir’d, are, as such, call’d by the common Name of Good, and all things which are shun’d, Evil, &c. whereas different Persons desire and shun different things, it must needs be, that many things which are good to some, should be evil to others, &c. Therefore Good and Evil are Correlatives to Desire and Aversion.”5 Of a Piece with which, is what he has written in his Treatise of Human Nature, where he teaches, that “That Motion, wherein” he thinks “our Conceptions of Things consist, passes from the Brain to the Heart, without any Intervention of Judgment, and there,” (says he,) “As it either helpeth or hindreth its vital Motion, is said to please or displease. And every Man, for his own part, calleth that which pleaseth and is delightful to himself, Good; and that Evil, which displeaseth him. Insomuch, that while every Man differeth from other in Constitution, they differ also from one another,” (naturally, and therefore necessarily, and, according to his Opinion, in a State of Nature, unblameably; why not so in civil Society, where, the soundest Philosophers think, natural Necessity takes away Fault?) “Concerning the common Distinction of Good and Evil.”6 And says he, “Such is the Nature of Man, that every one calls that Good, which he desires for himself, Evil, which he avoids. It therefore happens, thro’ the Diversity of Affections, that what one calls Good, another calls Evil; and that what the same Man now calls Good, he presently calls Evil; and that he looks upon the same thing to be Good for himself, and Evil for another; for we all estimate Good and Evil, from the Pleasure and Uneasiness it creates to us.”7 This, he contends, arises, not from a Fault of the Will, which may be avoided, but from the Nature of Man, and that it is therefore necessary and perpetual, and, before civil Laws are fram’d, blameless. In his Leviathan, chap. 6. he expresses himself in like manner, and adds, “These words of Good, Evil, and Contemptible, are ever used with respect to the Person that useth them, there being nothing simply or absolutely so; nor anycommon Rule of Good and Evil, to be taken from the Nature of the Objects themselves, but from the Person of the Man, (where there is no Commonwealth;) or, (in a Commonwealth,) from the Person that representeth it; or from an Arbitrator, or Judge, whom Men, disagreeing, shall by consent set up, and make his Sentence the Rule thereof. ”8

and confuted by the Author,I, on the contrary, am of Opinion, “That things are first judg’d to be Good, and that they are afterwards desir’d, only so far as they seem Good: That any thing is therefore truly judg’d Good, because its Effect or Force truly helps Nature: That a Private Good, is that which profits One; Publick, which is of advantage to Many; not because it is desir’d from Opinion, whether true or false; or delights, for this or that Moment of time.” The Nature of Man requires, “That Reason, examining the Nature of Things, should, from the Evidence thence unalterably arising, first determine and judge what is Good, (whether in relation to our selves, or others) before we desire it, or are delighted therewith”: And it is the Part of Brutes only, “To measure the Goodness of Things, or of Actions, by Affection only, without the Guidance of Reason.” Men of brutish Dispositions, experience in themselves such a way of acting, and are pleas’d with being told by Hobbes, That this is agreeable to Nature: Out of this Set of Men, the number of his Followers is increas’d. It is, however, more certain, “That a Mad-man suffers a real Evil, tho he be wonderfully pleas’d with his own Madness”; and, on the contrary, “That a Remedy is good for the Patient, tho he should ever so obstinately refuse it.”

and contradicted by Hobbes himself,)And even Hobbes himself sometimes relapses into a just way of thinking, and, tho he elsewhere most frequently inculcates, “That any thing is Good or Evil at the Pleasure of the supreme Powers, or of any private Person, without any respect had to the Good of Civil Society”; yet, Leviath. chap. 30. where he reckons it among the Duties of a supreme Governour, that he should frame good Laws, he plainly affirms, “That all Laws are not Good, tho they are for the Benefit of the Sovereign”; and he defines “Good Laws” to be such, “as are needful for the Good of the People, and withal perspicuous.”9 Behold the Good of the People, which is certainly common to Many, acknowledg’d by himself, as the End, which ought to be propos’d by the Legislator! But the End is supposed to be first known, and, consequently, its Nature determin’d, before the Law have prescrib’d to the People, what is Good or Evil. So also, Leviath. chap. 6. he defines “Benevolence and Charity” to be a “Desire of Good to another”: Nor do I believe he would have defined this Affection, if he had not thought it possible. In the English Edition of his Leviathan, he acknowledges this Affection, when it extends itself to all Men, to be “Good-Nature”: But in the Latin Edition he has omitted this; I suppose, as not consisting with his other Opinions.10 For the nature of Good, and the efficacy of Things, to the Preservation and Perfection of the Nature of one or more Persons, is perfectly determin’d, and is to be estimated from the agreement of Things with all the Faculties of human Nature, or the Principles11 of those Faculties; taking likewise in to Consideration, either the whole Course of Life, or its better part: not from any unreasonable Affection, and transient Motion of the Blood, either somewhat promoted or retarded, from a superficial Apprehension of Things.

The Necessity of establishing the true Notion of Good.§III. It is of the last consequence, to establish a well-grounded and irrefragable Notion of Good; because, if this totters and wavers, we must, necessarily, be fluctuating and uncertain in our Opinions of Happiness, (which is the greatest Good of every particular Person;) and of the Laws of Nature; and of particular Virtues, Justice, &c. which are nothing else, but the means of obtaining that Good, and, in some respect, the Causes, in part, thereof.

Men agree in the general nature of Good, and in the principal Branches of the Law of Nature concerning it.Altho, because of something peculiar in the different Constitutions of Men, it sometimes happens, “That the same Nourishment or Medicine is prejudicial to one, which to most is harmless, or, perhaps, wholesome”; the like to which we may observe, “In the Genius and Manners of Nations,12 some widely differing from others in some particular Establishments” yet, this no more destroys the Consent of Men in the general Nature of Good, and its principal Parts or Kinds, than a light diversityof Countenances takes away the Agreement among Men, in the common Definition of Man, or the Resemblance that is among them, in the Conformity and Use of their principal Parts. There is no Nation, which is not sensible, “That our Love of God, and Observance of the Laws of Nature, in Instances which shall be just now mention’d, afford both present Pleasure, and a well-grounded Hope of future Happiness.” And this Hobbes himself somewhere confesses, as de Cive, cap. 15. § 9. and the following;13 tho elsewhere he affirms, That the Honour due to God consists in Fear only, and an Opinion of his Power; as in Leviath. Part I. chap. 10, 11.14 There is no Nation, which is not sensible, “That Gratitude towards Parents and Benefactors, is beneficial to all Mankind.” No difference of Constitution causes any one to imagine, “That it is not for the Good of the Whole, that the Lives, Limbs, and Liberties of particular innocent Persons should be preserv’d”; and, therefore, the Murder of the Innocent is every where prohibited. What Man is of so particular a Taste, as “Not to think it good for single Families, and, consequently, for all Nations, that the Faith of the Marriage-bed be preserv’d unviolated?” And the same may be said of the Right of using and enjoying those out-ward Things, which are necessary to Life, Health, Fame or Honour, the Education of Children, and the cultivating Friendship. In judging of the Goodness of these Things, to take care of which is the whole Business of the Laws of Nature, and of most Civil Laws, all Men every where agree, as much as Animals do in the Motion of the Heart, and Pulse of the Arteries, or all Men, in their Opinion of the Whiteness of Snow, and the Brightness of the Sun. Even Hobbes himself acknowledges, that Civil Laws teach the same thing; “That in all Cases omitted by Civil Laws,” (which he acknowledges to be “Almost Infinite,” (c. 14. § 14) and may produce infinite Disputes,) “The Law of natural Equity is to be follow’d.”15 He therefore grants, that the Laws of natural Equity may be discover’d, without the help of the Laws of the State, and that more Cases may be sufficiently determin’d thereby, than are determin’d by civil Laws, which are not “Almost Infinite.” This is all I contend for at present, “That since Rules of Equity are, naturally, so well known, that no Men, of common Understanding, differ about them. ” On the other hand, I freely grant, “That there are many things indifferent, or concerning which human Reason cannot universally pronounce, that it is necessary to the common Good, that the Matter should be transacted this way rather than that.” In such cases, the different Constitutions of different States take place, which, altho they might, without a Crime, have been oppos’d, before they were enacted into Laws; yet, after once they have been establish’d by publick Authority, are to be most religiously observ’d, both out of Conscience toward God, whose Vicegerents Magistrates are, and for the publick Happiness of the Subjects, which is chiefly secur’d by the supreme Authority’s being preserv’d unviolated. For it evidently conduces more to the publick Good, “That the Opinion of the Magistrates should prevail; in things indifferent and doubtful, and that the Subjects should take that for Good, which seems such to the supreme Power, rather than eternal Broils should continue among them, whence may reasonably be expected Wars and Murders, which are, without all question, Evil.”16

It is a Mistake in Hobbes to assert, That Man pursues only his own private Good.§IV. There is another Error of Hobbes, concerning Good, which is, that “The Object of the” human “Will is that, which every Man thinks good forhimself. ”17 Which he thus expresses elsewhere, “Every one is presum’d to pursue his own Good, naturally; that which is just, for Peace only, and by Accident.”18 What is just, respects the Good of others, which he does not think any Man seeks, unless from a Fear of those Evils, which arise from a State of War. Of a Piece with these Passages, are the places above quoted out of him; and numberless others, scatter’d thro’ his Writings, insinuate the same thing. Upon this is grounded that Passage, “Whatever is done voluntarily, is done for some Good to him who wills it.”19

All these Passages have this one Tendency, to prove, that “Men are so fram’d, that it is contrary to their Nature, and, consequently, plainly impossible, that they should desire any thing but their own Advantage, and their own Glory.”20That, therefore, since it is evident, that every one can more effectually obtain these things, by Dominion over, than by Society with, others, “All naturally desire such Dominion, and are, consequently, led into a State of War against all, for the sake of obtaining it”; that “They are with-held from War, and forc’d to accept the Conditions of Society, by Fear only.” But if we examine what led him into an Opinion, so contrary to that of all Philosophers, I can see nothing, but that one Hint, which he affords, by the Bye, in the same Section, where he explains “Nature” by “The Affections planted in every Animal, till by inconvenient Consequences, or by Precepts, it is effected, that the desire of things present is check’d by the remembrance of things past.” He judges of human Nature, and the adequate Object of the Will, from those Affections, which are previous to the use of Reason, to Experience, and to Discipline, such as are found in Children and Mad-Men; see his Preface to his Treatise de Cive.21 But I, as well as all other Philosophers, that I know of, think, “That we are to take an Estimate of the Nature of Man, rather from Reason, (and that therefore the Will may extend it self to those things, which Reason dictates to be agreeable to the Nature of any Person;) since such irrational Affections are to be look’d on, rather as Perturbations of the Mind, and, consequently, as Preternatural”; which even Hobbes himself, since the publishing his Book de Cive, confesses in his Treatise de Homine.”22 I also own it possible, thro’ an Abuse of his Free-will, “That a Man (thro’ his own Fault) of a narrow Soul, may consider nothing beside himself, and may therefore desire almost nothing, but what he judges profitable to himself ”; but I could never observe any Symptoms of such a Will, in any Man, except in Hobbes only. Others are certainly of a more generous Disposition, “Who do not think that alone to be Good, which is such to themselves; but whatever conduces to the Preservation and Perfection, to the Order and Beauty of Mankind, or even of the whole Universe, as far as we have any Conception of it; that they think Good, that they will and desire, that they hope for, for the future, and rejoice in, when present.” Nor see I any thing to hinder, but that what I judge agreeable to any Nature, I may desire should happen to it; nay, that I should endeavour, as far as in me lies, that it should be effected. But whatever any Faculty (and, consequently, the Will) can be employ’d about, is included in the adequate Object of that Faculty. To this appertains that Precept of Aristotle, concerning Legislators, “It is the Duty of a good Law-giver, to consider how his Country, and all Mankind, and every particular Community, may live honestly, and enjoy all possible Happiness.”23 And elsewhere, “That is uniformly right, which conduces to the Advantage of the whole Commonwealth, and to the common Good of all its Members.”24 For what Aristotle asserts, in this last place, concerning the Laws of the State, “That in them, not the Good of a part, but of the whole, is to be taken care of; which is to be look’d upon as the measure of Right by the Legislator”; this sufficiently instructs us, if the whole World be consider’d, as one State, what is universally Right, and, consequently, ought to be intended in the Laws of the Universe, or of Nature. For, since every Legislator is only a Man, and he both can, and ought, to provide for the publick Good, that being the end for which he is appointed, what hinders, but that we may allow it, to be in other Men’s Powers, to do the same?

Nay, this may be demonstrated à priori, to those, who acknowledge the Nature of the Will to consist, in the Consent of the Mind with the Judgment of the Understanding, concerning things agreeing among themselves. For it is certain, “That the Understanding is capable of judging, what promotes the Good of others, as well as what promotes our own”; nor is there any Reason, “Why we cannot will those same things, which we have judg’d to be good.” (Nay, it is hardly possible, that we should not will those things, which we have judg’d to be good.) But it is to be observ’d, “That, whatever a Man can will, he can also resolve to effect the same, as far as it is in his Power.” Good thus will’d by us, is said to be intended, and, by virtue of this Intention, it assumes the complete Nature of an End: Therefore the common Good of the Universe may be an End propos’d by Men. And, because that is the greatest Good, which we can will, the Understanding, forming a right Judgment, will affirm such a Volition, to be more necessarily and essentially connected with the Perfection of Men, possess’d with a just Notion of the publick Good; than the Volition of any smaller Good. But, for the present, it is sufficient to have prov’d, “That the common Good may be the End of Man, and the principal one too; provided it be prov’d, to be greater than any other Good.” But, whether any Man be oblig’d to pursue this End, we shall afterwards discover, when we inquire, concerning the Obligation of the Laws of Nature. Here I will only add, that Hobbes himself, in the Latin Edition of his Leviathan, Cap. 31. in the last Section, contradicts all that he had advanc’d, concerning Man’s seeking, only, his own proper Good; and does not only acknowledge, that the publick Good may be regarded, but openly declares, that he hopes his Leviathan will, sometime or other, be serviceable to that End. His words are these, I do not despair, but that hereafter, when Princes shall have more attentively consider’d their Rights, and Professors their Duty, and that of Subjects, this very Doctrine, softned by Custom, shall, sometime or other, be commonly receiv’d, to the Benefit of the Publick.”25 Here, truly, he presages, that his Doctrine, tho not yet establish’d by Princes, shall, hereafter, promote the publick Good; and insinuates, that it is adapted to the Good (not of one State only, but) of all the Nations in the World. Of the Falshood of which, tho I am abundantly convinc’d, yet it is a sufficient Proof, that his Thoughts were sometimes employ’d about this End, and that he knew it might be sincerely intended, otherwise he would, not only, not intend it, but he would not so much as pretend, that he had intended it.

What is more; That to please others, is naturally pleasant, and consequently seems good, to Man, may be prov’d from Hobbes himself, because in his Treatise of Human Nature, Chap. 9. § 15. he plainly asserts, “That even venereal Pleasure is, partly, a pleasure of the Mind, taking its Rise from this, That we are sensible we please another.”26 But it is highly absurd, “That he should acknowledge a Pleasure of the Mind to arise hence, that something grateful is done to one Person only, and that in a Matter of the smallest Consequence,” when in the mean time he will not acknowledge, “That the Mind of Man receives a greater Pleasure from this, that we at once more highly gratify many in more important Matters, when we benefit both their Minds and Bodies, in procuring the common Good, by Fidelity, Gratitude, and Humanity, even when we are not subject to the same civil Power.”

Lastly, in his Treatise de Homine, cap. 11. § 14. where he purposely inquires, among good Things, which is greater, and which less, he plainly declares, that the Good, which is a Benefit to many, is greater (other Considerations being equal) than that which is so to few.27

General Remarks on Chapter III

It would have been very proper for the Author in this Chapter, to have briefly enumerated or compar’d the chief of the human Pleasures.

What follows, (taken from Wollaston’s Religion of Nature, Sect. 2.)28 seems here pertinent.

Prop. I. Pleasure is a Consciousness of something agreeable, Pain of the contrary; and they are proportionable to the Perceptions and Sense of the Subjects, or Persons affected with them. Note on Chap. 5. § 6.)

Prop. II. Pain consider’d in it self is a real Evil, Pleasure a real Good.

Prop. III. By the general Idea of Good and Evil, the one [Pleasure] is in it self desirable, the other [Pain] to be avoided. What is here said, respects mere Pleasure and Pain, abstracted from all Circumstances, Consequences, &c. But because there are some of these generally adhering to them, and such as enter so deep into their Nature, that unless these be taken in, the full and true Character of the other cannot be had, nor can it therefore be known what Happiness is, I must proceed to some other Propositions relating to this subject.

IV. Pleasure compar’d with Pain may either be equal, or more, or less: also Pleasures may be compar’d with other Pleasures, and Pains with Pains. Because all the Moments of the Pleasure must bear some respect, or be in some Ratio to all the Moments of Pain: as also all the degrees of one to all the degrees of the other: and so must those of one Pleasure, or one Pain, be to those of another. And if the degrees of intenseness be multiply’d by the Moments of duration, there must still be some Ratio of the one Product to the other.

That this Proposition is true, appears from the general Conduct of Mankind; tho in some Particulars they may err, and wrong themselves, some more, some less. For what doth all this Hurry of Business, what do all the Labours and Travels of Men tend to, but to gain such Advantages, as they think do exceed all their Trouble? What are all their Abstinencies and Self-denials for, if they do not think some Pleasures less than the Pain, that would succeed them? Do not the various Methods of Life shew, that Men prefer one sort of Pleasure to another, and submit to one sort of Pain rather than to have another? And within our selves we cannot but find an indifference as to many things, not caring, whether we have the Pain with the Pleasure obtain’d by it, or miss the Pleasure, being excus’d from the Pain.

V. When Pleasures and Pains are equal, they mutually destroy each other: when the one exceeds, the Excess gives the true Quantity of Pleasure or Pain. For nine degrees of Pleasure, less by nine degrees of Pain, are equal to nothing: but nine degrees of one, less by three degrees of the other, give six of the former net and true.

VI. As therefore there may be true Pleasure and Pain: so there may be some Pleasures, which compar’d with what attends or follows them, not only may vanish into nothing, but may even degenerate into Pain, and ought to be reckon’d as Pains; and v. v. some Pains, that may be annumerated to Pleasures. For the true Quantity of Pleasure differs not from that Quantity of true Pleasure; or it is so much of that kind of Pleasure, which is true (clear of all Discounts and future Payments): nor can the true Quantity of Pain not be the same with that Quantity of true or mere Pain. Then, the Man who enjoys three degrees of such Pleasure as will bring upon him nine degrees of Pain, when three degrees of Pain are set off to balance and sink the three of Pleasure, can have remaining to him only six degrees of Pain: and into these therefore is his Pleasure finally resolv’d. And so the three degrees of Pain, which any one endures to obtain nine of Pleasure, end in six of the latter. By the same manner of computing, some Pleasures will be found to be the loss of Pleasure, compar’d with greater: and some Pains the Alleviation of Pain; because by undergoing them greater are evaded. Thus the Natures of Pleasures and Pains are varied, and sometimes transmuted: which ought never to be forgot.

Nor this neither. As in the Sense of most Men, I believe, a little Pain will weigh against a great deal of Pleasure: so perhaps there may be some Pains, which exceed all Pleasures; that is, such Pains as no Man would choose to suffer for any Pleasure whatever, or at least any that we know of in this World. So that it is possible the difference, or excess of Pain, may rise so high as to become immense: and then the Pleasure to be set against that Pain will be but a Point, or Cypher; a Quantity of no Value.

VII. Happiness differs not from the true Quantity of Pleasure, Unhappiness of Pain. Or, any Being may be said to be so far happy, as his Pleasures are true, &c. That cannot be the Happiness of any Being, which is bad for him: nor can Happiness be disagreeable. It must be something, therefore, that is both agreeable and good for the Possessor. Now present Pleasure is for the present indeed agreeable; but if it be not true, and he who enjoys it must pay more for it than it is worth, it cannot be for his Good, or good for him. This therefore cannot be his Happiness. Nor, again, can that Pleasure be reckon’d Happiness, for which one pays the full Price in Pain: because these are quantities which mutually destroy each other. But yet since Happiness is something, which, by the general Idea of it, must be desirable, and therefore agreeable, it must be some kind of Pleasure: and this, from what has been said, can only be such Pleasure as is true. That only can be both agreeable and good for him. And thus every one’s Happiness will be as his true Quantity of Pleasure.

One, that loves to make Objections, may demand here, whether there may not be Happiness without Pleasure; whether a Man may not be said to be happy in respect to those Evils, which he escapes, and yet knows nothing of: and whether there may not be such a thing as negative Happiness. I answer, an Exemption from Misfortunes and Pains is a high Privilege, tho we should not be sensible what those Misfortunes or Dangers are, from which we are deliver’d, and in the larger use of the Word may be styled a Happiness. Also, the Absence of Pain or Unhappiness may perhaps be called negative Happiness, since the meaning of that Phrase is known. But in proper speaking Happiness always includes something positive. For mere Indolence resulting from Insensibility, or joined with it, if it be Happiness, is a Happiness infinitely diminish’d: that is, it is no more a Happiness, than it is an Unhappiness; upon the confine of both, but neither. At best, it is but the Happiness of Stocks and Stones: and to these I think Happiness can hardly be in strictness allow’d. ’Tis the Privilege of a Stock to be what it is, rather than to be a miserable Being: this we are sensible of, and therefore, joining this Privilege with our own Sense of it, we call it Happiness; but this is what it is in our manner of apprehending it, not what it is in the Stock itself. A Sense indeed of being free from Pains and Troubles is attended with Happiness: but then the Happiness flows from the Sense of the Case, and is a positive Happiness. Whilst a Man reflects upon his negative Happiness, as it is called, and enjoys it, he makes it positive: and perhaps a Sense of Immunity from the Afflictions and Miseries every where so obvious to our Observation is one of the greatest Pleasures in this World.

VIII. That Being may be said to be ultimately happy, in some degree or other, the sum Total of whose Pleasures exceeds the Sum of all his Pains: or, ultimate Happiness is the Sum of Happiness, or true Pleasure, at the Foot of the Account. And so on the other side, that Being may be said to be ultimately unhappy, the Sum of all whose Pains exceeds that of all his Pleasures.

IX. To make itself happy is a Duty, which every Being, in proportion to its Capacity, owes to itself; and that, which every intelligent Being may be supposed to aim at, in general. For Happiness is some Quantity of true Pleasure: and that Pleasure, which I call true, may be consider’d by itself, and so will be justly desirable (according to Prop. II, and III.) On the contrary, Unhappiness is certainly to be avoided: because being a Quantity of mere Pain, it may be consider’d by itself, as a real, mere Evil, &c. and because, if I am oblig’d to pursue Happiness, I am at the same time oblig’d to recede, as far as I can, from its contrary. All this is self-evident. And hence it follows, that,

X. We cannot act with respect to either our selves, or other Men, as being what we and they are, unless both are consider’d as Beings susceptive of Happiness and Unhappiness, and naturally desirous of the one and averse to the other. Other Animals may be consider’d after the same manner in proportion to their several degrees of Apprehension.

But that the Nature of Happiness, and the Road to it, which is so very apt to be mistaken, may be better understood; and true Pleasures more certainly distinguish’d from false; the following Propositions must still be added.

XI. As the true and ultimate Happiness of no Being can be produced by any thing, that interferes with Truth, and denies the Natures of Things: So neither can the Practice of Truth make any Being ultimately unhappy. For that, which contradicts Nature and Truth, opposes the Will of the Author of Nature; and to suppose, that an inferior Being may, in opposition to his Will, break through the Constitution of Things, and, by so doing, make himself happy, is to suppose that Being more potent than the Author of Nature, and, consequently, than that very Being himself, which is absurd. And it is also absurd to think, that by the Constitution of Nature and Will of its Author, any being should be finally miserable, only for conforming himself to Truth. As if God had made it natural to contradict Nature; or unnatural, and therefore punishable, to act according to Nature and Reality. Which must come to pass, either thro a defect of Power in him to cause a better and more equitable Scheme, or from some delight, which he finds in the Misery of his Dependents. The former cannot be ascribed to the first Cause, who is the Fountain of Power; nor the latter to him, who gives so many Proofs of his Goodness and Beneficence.

XII. The genuine Happiness of every Being must be something, that is not incompatible with or destructive of its Nature, or the superior or better part of it, if it be mixt. For instance, nothing can be the true Happiness of a rational Being, that is inconsistent with Reason. For all Pleasure, and therefore be sure all clear Pleasure and true Happiness must be something agreeable (Prop. I.): and nothing can be agreeable to a reasoning Nature, or (which is the same) to the Reason of that Nature, which is repugnant and disagreeable to reason. If any thing becomes agreeable to a rational Being, which is not agreeable to Reason, it is plain his Reason is lost, his Nature deprest, and that he now lists himself among Irrationals, at least as to that Particular. If a Being finds Pleasure in any thing unreasonable, he has an unreasonable Pleasure; but a rational Nature can like nothing of that Kind without a Contradiction to itself. For to do this, would be to act, as if it was the contrary to what it is. Lastly, if we find hereafter, that whatever interferes with Reason, interferes with Truth, and to contradict either of them is the same thing; then what has been said under the former Proposition, does also confirm this: as what has been said in proof of this, does also confirm the former.

XIII. Those Pleasures are true, and to be reckon’d into our Happiness, against which there lies no Reason. For when there is no Reason against any Pleasure, there is always one for it, included in the Term. So when there is no reason for undergoing Pain (or venturing it), there is one against it.

Obs. There is therefore no Necessity for Men to torture their Inventions in finding out Arguments to justify themselves in the Pursuits after worldly Advantages and Enjoyments, provided that neither these Enjoyments, nor the means by which they are attained, contain the Violation of any Truth, by being unjust, immoderate, or the like. For in this Case there is no reason why we should not desire them, and a direct one, why we should; viz. because they are Enjoyments.

XIV. To conclude this Section, The way to Happiness and the Practice of Truth incur the one into the other. For no Being can be styled happy, that is not ultimately so: because if all his Pains exceed all his Pleasures, he is so far from being happy, that he is a Being unhappy, or miserable, in proportion to that Excess. Now by Prop. XI. nothing can produce the ultimate Happiness of any Being, which interferes with Truth: and therefore whatever doth produce that, must be something which is consistent and coincident with this.

Two things then (but such as are met together, and embrace each other), which are to be religiously regarded in all our Conduct, are Truth (of which in the preceding Sect.) and Happiness, that is, such Pleasures, as accompany, or follow the Practice of Truth, or are not inconsistent with it: (of which I have been treating in this). And as that Religion, which arises from the Distinction between moral Good and Evil, was called Natural, because grounded upon Truth and the Natures of Things: so perhaps may that too, which proposes Happiness for its End, in as much as it proceeds upon that difference, which there is between true Pleasure and Pain, which are Physical (or Natural) Good and Evil. And since both these unite so amicably, and are at last the same, here is one Religion which may be called natural upon two accounts.

CHAPTER IV

Of the practical Dictates of Reason.

All human Actions are not voluntary and, consequently, do not suppose practical Dictates of Reason. I must begin this Chapter with observing, that not all the Actions of Men are grounded upon the Dictates, or upon Notions equivalent to the Dictates, of Reason. For our first Apprehensions, and certain Motions of the Spirits, or Imagination, sometimes also muscular Motions, as the winking of the Eyes, or a sudden starting back from our Friends, seem to be effected without any Dictate of Reason;1 also, most Actions of Infants, as Comparing, Judging, &c. concerning things pleasant and hurtful, by which, nevertheless, their Treasure of Knowledge is increas’d: And, perhaps, the Desire of Good in general may be reckon’d among these.

How the practical Dictates of Reason are form’d.For the Author of Nature has so fram’d us, “That, in our Childhood, we, even unwillingly, perceive many things by our Senses, and firmly retain them in Memory, and judge by a spontaneous Comparison, whether some are greater than others, like or unlike, profitable or hurtful”; but, above all, (because we are always present to our selves, and from the particular Frame of our Mind, reflecting upon it self,) “We are necessarily conscious of the Acts of our Understanding and Will, and how much we have it in our Power, to excite, and govern, certain Motions of our Body,” which are, therefore, usually call’d voluntary; and, therefore, we necessarily know by experience, “What Actions of these Faculties bring us Harm, or Benefit and Perfection,” with which Knowledge, Desire and Pursuit, or Aversion and Avoidance, are naturally connected. Further, we easily perceive, by a Parity of Reason, (without any other Guide than Nature,) “That the like, both Advantages and Disadvantages, accrue to, and are perceiv’d by, other Beings also, as far as they resemble us, either in Mind, or Body, or both.” Hence we draw some Conclusions, concerning Actions acceptable to God, but many more, concerning such as are advantageous, and disadvantageous to Men.

When we have attain’d to a Maturity of Reason, we take into Consideration the whole of our Life, or the whole future exercise of all our Powers; and, because a greater Number of Actions, probably future, and also of good Effects, which we hope for from thence, presents itself now at once to our Mind, than formerly; and a longer Train of Events, which are to succeed in order, and mutually depend upon one another, is contemplated by the Mind, now come to a ripeness of Judgment: Therefore the Mind calls in, to the Assistance of the Memory, not single Words only, but Propositions, distinctly exhibiting the Connexion of our Actions of all Kinds, with their natural Effects. These Propositions are called Practical, nor is it necessary, that they should be pronounc’d in the Form of a Gerund, “This, or that, ought to be done,” as some Schoolmen teach; because that Fitness, which is express’d by a Gerund, wants Explanation, which is to be fetch’d, either from the necessary Connexion of the Means with the End, or from the Obligation of a Law. The Obligation of Laws is not yet to be suppos’d known by those, who are in quest of their Original. And the necessary Connexion, between the Means and the End, is sufficiently express’d, in the Connexion of them, as of Causes, with their design’d Effects.

Moreover, as we approach Manhood, it is natural for us, to compare, with one another, the Powers of several Causes, to produce the like Effects, as also the several Degrees of Perfection of those Effects, from which Comparison we form a Judgment, that this is greater, or less than, or equal to, that. Hence, for example, we conclude, “That some of those Actions, which are in our Power, can contribute more than others, or most of all, to our own Happiness, and that of others.” Such kind of practical Propositions, I call comparative Dictates of Reason.

It is not necessary for us, who only inquire into the Formation of the Laws of Nature, to assert, that such Dictates, even after we know that they have the Force of Laws, do always determine Men to Action; it is sufficient, that they tell us, how we ought to determine. For, concerning the Power, which determines us to Action, there are different Opinions, and I care not to engage in the Dispute. All, however, I think, acknowledge, “That a practical Dictate of Reason is previously necessary to our deliberate Acts, and does, in some manner, direct the Determination of our future Actions.” Nevertheless, the essential Parts of a practical Dictate, and its Form, require, in the next place, to be more attentively consider’d; for thence its Formation, in our Mind, will more easily be apprehended.

Three Forms of practical Dictates of Reason,A practical Proposition is, sometimes, thus express’d. “This possible human Action” (universal Benevolence; for instance) “Will chiefly, beyond any other Action at the same time possible, conduce to my Happiness, and that of all others, either as an essential part thereof, or as a Cause, which will, some time or other, effect a principal essential part thereof.” It is sometimes express’d, in the Form of a Command. “Let that Action, which is in thy Power, and which will most effectually, of all those which thou can’st exert, promote the common Good in the present Circumstances, be exerted”; often also, in the Form of a Gerund; “Such an Action ought to be done.” In my Opinion, these several Forms of Speech, relating to the Law of Nature, mean the same thing, whether the Understanding judges this best to be done, or commands it, or tells me, in the Form of a Gerund, that I am bound to do it.Compar’d. For the Understanding (which in this Affair is call’d Conscience) sufficiently hints the natural Obligation, when it says, “This is best to be done, both for your self and others.” For, in omitting what is declar’d best for me, it is thence evident, that I bring mischief (which may be called Punishment) upon my self. If the Dictate be consider’d, under the Form of a Command, the same thing is inculcated, by representing every Man’s own Understanding, as a Magistrate deputed, and authorized, to make Laws: Which, because it sounds somewhat metaphorically, is, therefore, less philosophical; it is useful however, because the Comparison has a very just Foundation in Nature. The Form of a Gerund teaches the same thing; but as an inferior Judge, or Counsellor, admonishing concerning a Law already made, and requiring a Conformity of the future Action therewith. The first manner is most becoming a Philosopher, which, if we consider the Form, appears a speculative Proposition; if the Force, a Practical, as teaching the natural Foundation of Obligation. The second best becomes a Sovereign Prince; the third, a Divine. But they may all be us’d promiscously, provided we retain in Mind the Distinction, such as it is, between these Forms. The Nature of Things represents to the Mind, what is best to be done. The Mind, considering the Government of Things, does, from the Idea of God, conclude, that he wills, or commands, them to be done, and, in his Name, imposes the Command on it self, in the second Form. In the third, it reflects upon the two former, and pronounces, that an Action agreeable to that Command, will be just; the contrary, unjust.

A fourth Form,§II. There is also another manner of expressing the Laws of Nature, as thus, “This, or that, possible Action is most agreeable to human Nature.” But the Sense is doubtful; for, (1.) Human Nature, either signifies the particular nature of the Agent, and then it is not expressive enough of what ought to be consider’d before Action: For, not the Happiness of one particular Person only, but the greatest common Good, ought to be regarded. Or, (2.) Human Nature respects all Men, and so God is not taken into Consideration. But, if, in either of these Notions, the publick Good is, by consequence, implied, this Form of speaking is coincident with the first, which is therefore to be preferr’d, because it is free from this Ambiguity.Coincident with the first, which is less ambiguous, Again, it is doubtful, to what the Expression [is agreeable] relates: For, (1.) An Action may be said to be agreeable to any Nature, when it is agreeable to the Principles of acting, such are Faculties, Habits, and Objects, either treasur’d up in the Memory, or solliciting to Action from without; and to these Heads may be reduced the practical Dictates of Reason, (that is, Propositions, which are the Rules of Action,) whose Terms, having taken their Rise from Objects, are retain’d in the Memory, and are, by the Mind, form’d into Propositions, where by they determine our Actions, and constitute Habits. (2.) An Action may be said to be agreeable to human Nature, when its Effects preserve, or improve, the Nature of one or more Men. This latter Sense coincides with the Form 1 first propos’d, which is free from Ambiguity: And the first Sense of the Agreeableness of Actions, may, for the most part, be reduced thereto. For practical Propositions, which are among the internal Principles of Action, relate all to the Desire of an End, the chief principally, and to the Use of the Means. Those Propositions, which relate to the Desire of the ultimate End, pronounce only to this Purpose, “This is, in its own Nature, Good, or a part of human Happiness, and that the greatest possible in the present Circumstances.” Those, which determine concerning the Means, inculcate only thus, “This conduces to the obtaining such Good, and that the most effectually in the Case propos’d.” And these Forms of speaking coincide with the first. The first Form is to be preferr’d, because this manner of resolving a Proposition, concerning the Agreeableness of an Action, is not, for the most part, obvious to the Understanding; and, beside, what I aim at, is, “To explain the manner of forming these first Dictates of Reason, with which Actions ought to agree”; wherefore it is not sufficient to our purpose, to say, “That an Action is agreeable to Dictates already form’d, such as, alone, are the immediate Principles of human Actions.” It may not, however, be useless, to remark, that we may truly affirm, “That all good Actions, or Virtues, do perfectly and essentially agree with the Notion or Idea of a rational Agent, whose Reason has ripen’d into Prudence, whither it naturally tends.” For Prudence necessarily includes, both the Desire of the best and greatest End, which is within the reach of any one’s Faculties, and the Prosecution of the same, by the most effectual means. The greatest End is the common Good of all rational Agents, and the Consent of all, to give mutual Assistance toward obtaining that End, is the most effectual means of promoting it. In Actions pursuant to such Consent, consists all Religion and Virtue. And it may be presum’d, even before Compacts are enter’d into, that all will agree, that this is the greatest End, and this the only Means plainly necessary, because no Cause can be assign’d to human Actions, of mutual Assistance, beside the Consent of the Will.2 Therefore, if we reckon such Dictates of Reason, (which, whilst they are stored up in the Memory, determine us to Action,) among the inward Principles of human Actions, (which we may very justly do, since they contain in them selves the whole Essence and Force of Habits,) then it may, truly and agreeably to what we have said, be affirm’d, “That every thing is Just, which agrees with these Principles, and the Laws of a rational Nature.”

Whether the Law of Nature be sufficiently promulg’d.§III. We are next to consider, especially with respect to the first, which is Nature’s principal Form of proposing its Laws, “Whether that Law, or practical Proposition, be taught, or promulg’d, with sufficient clearness, when its Terms, (and consequently their Connexion, or the Truth of the Proposition,) are obvious, and as it were expos’d to the View of those Men, who are willing to attend to the Consequences of their own Actions?” Or, “Whether we are to think, that Nature has not with sufficient Plainness declar’d such a Truth, so as to oblige those, who, thro Wickedness,3 or other Cares with which they distract their Mind, do not compare these Terms with one another, nor form such practical Propositions, for the future Direction of their Actions”? The former Opinion seems to me the more probable, because whoever shews me a Triangle, shews me with sufficient evidence, that the two sides of a Triangle are longer than the third, altho he does not form the Proposition for me. It is, however, incumbent upon me, in this Treatise,4 to prove, (1.) “That the Terms of the Laws of Nature are, as things are fram’d, in the same manner clearly enough laid before the Minds of Men.” (2.) “That the Minds of Men are in like manner excited, by their own Nature, or by their Union with the Body and the rest of the System of the World, to consider, abstract, and compare, those Terms among themselves, and thence to form Propositions for the Conduct of their Actions; and that, therefore, all Persons, in their Senses, retain such Propositions in their Mind, tho sometimes blended with what is impertinent or false, and thereby obscur’d.”

The Terms of those practical Propositions, which are called the Laws of Nature, are such human Actions, as are capable of being guided by Counsel or Reason; and which, after they are exerted, do jointly contribute to the greatest Happiness of all rational Agents, and to our own in particular. Such Actions are commonly divided, justly enough, into,(1.) The Elicit (that is, the proper and immediate) Acts of the Understanding and Will, and, consequently, of the Affections, (at least so far as the stronger Affections have place in the Mind itself;) and, (2.) The Imperate, which are exerted, in the Body, by the Power of the Mind.

The Nature of the practical Dictates of Reason illustrated by a Comparison of them with mathematical Practice.§IV. But, before we consider these Laws more particularly, it will be worth while, to insist somewhat longer, on treating of the nature of practical Propositions, and first to shew their great Affinity, or Agreement in meaning, whether they be Absolute or Conditional, with speculative Propositions. 2dly, That, in them all, the Effect is look’d upon as the End; Actions in our Power, as the Means.

In order to which we are first to observe, that those are properly called practical Propositions, which declare the Origin of an Effect from human Actions, which Definition I think proper to illustrate by Examples.Practical Propositions, Such is this in Arithmetick, “The Addition of Numbers forms the Sum,” or, “The Subtraction of one Number from another, leaves their Difference.” So in Geometry, “The Practice, prescrib’d in the first Proposition of Euclid ’s Elements, will effect an Equilateral Triangle, ” is, a practical Proposition, pronouncing concerning the Effect of a certain Series of human Actions.

which are near of kin to Theorems,Moreover, the Mind certainly understands the Truth of such a practical Proposition, in the same manner it does that of any Theorem, which is, by considering its Terms, of which one includes the other. So the Truth of this Proposition, “The Construction of a whole Equilateral Triangle is made, by constructing and uniting all its Parts,” is known after the same manner with this Theorem, “A whole Equilateral Triangle is the same, with all its Parts united among themselves.”

consider the Effect as the End, Actions as Means.It comes to the same thing, if the Construction of this Whole be consider’d as the End, and the several Motions, by which the three sides of that Triangle are form’d and fitted to one another, are consider’d as the Means necessary to that End. The same Proposition, as to Sense, may be otherwise thus express’d. “It is necessary to the Construction of a whole Equilateral Triangle, that all its sides be form’d, and mutually join’d, after the manner prescrib’d by Euclid, or some equivalent Method.” For, truly, the End is the Effect intended, and all the Causes, effecting a proper Union of all the Parts, include at once all the Means. What we have already said about the Construction, may be very easily accommodated to these other Operations,5 the Preservation or Perfection, of any Whole, which needs such Operations. Seeing the Preservation of any thing, is only the continuing those Actions, by which it was first form’d. Hence this practical Proposition, “It is necessary, in order to procure the Preservation of the whole System of rational Agents, as far as in us lies, that we should preserve, as much as possible, all its Parts, and their Union among them-selves, (such as the Perfection of such a System requires.)” This, I say, has a like Evidence with that Theorem, which affirms, “That the Whole is the same with all its Parts united.” And in that Proposition, rightly understood, I will prove are contain’d the Foundations of all natural Laws. What I have offer’d, concerning the Conversion of Euclid’s first Problem into a Theorem, I would have, by a Parity of Reason, understood universally. For nothing hinders, but that “The Solution of all those things may be perfectly propos’d in Theorems, which are usually sought after in the Form of Problems.” Therefore Archimedes, in his second Book of the Sphere, plainly professes, “That, of Problems, whose Solution consists of Propositions directing Practice, he form’d Theorems.” And Ramus, in Imitation of him, in his Geometry, converts all Euclid’s Problems into Theorems.6 And in specious Arithmetick, (the happiest art of solving Problems,) at the end of the Operation is always produc’d a Theorem, pointing out the Solution of the Problem.

Nor is it to be doubted, but, as Des-Cartes, Vieta, Wallis, and others, have successfully taught an expeditious Method of solving Problems in pure Mathematicks, (Arithmetick and Geometry,) by Theorems algebraically invented and exhibited: so also Problems might be solv’d, in the same manner, in mixt Mathematicks; not in Astronomy only, (which Ward has excellently perform’d,) but also in Mechanicks, Staticks, &c. and in great part of natural Philosophy.7

Yet farther; the science of Morality and Politicks, both can, and ought to, imitate the Analytick Art, (in which I comprehend, not only the Extraction of Roots, but also the whole doctrine of specious Arithmetick or Algebra,) as the noblest Pattern of Science.

(1.) By delivering the Rules of its Practice, and the whole Substance of its Art, in a few universal Theorems. Where I think proper to observe, “That its certainty is no more weaken’d, or usefulness lessen’d, because we cannot exactly determine what is fit to be done, in our external Actions, with relation to a Subject involv’d in a vast Variety of Circumstances; than the Truth or Usefulness of Geometrical Principles, about measuring Lines, Surfaces or Solids, is overthrown, because neither our Senses, nor Instruments, will enable us, to form without us a Line exactly strait, or a Surface perfectly plane or spherical, or a Body, in all respects, regular.” It is sufficient, that we approach so near to Exactness, that what we want of it, is of no consequence in Practice. We may attain a like Degree of Exactness, in Morality, by the help of its Principles. I confess, however, “That those things which, in Morality, are granted, or assumed as known, such as GOD and Man, their Actions and mutual Relations, are not soexactly known, as those things, which in Mathematicks are assum’d, in a fix’d determinate Proportion or Quantity; and that, therefore, the Conclusions thence drawn must labour under the same want of Exactness.” Yet the Method, the Rules of Operation, and the Manner of drawing Consequences, is the same. Nor is Exactness necessary for the Uses of Life; as neither is it requir’d, in the Practice of measuring Planes and Solids.

(2.) As Algebra, by beginning with, and supposing, the most compounded and involv’d Aequations, where the known Quantities are mingled with the unknown, then diligently comparing among themselves the several Terms, does at length discover some simple uncompounded thing, of which the compounded parts may be compos’d, and which, consequently, leads us to the Knowledge and Explanation of the unknown Quantities, by the known. So, likewise, moral Philosophy begins with contemplating an End very intricate, and Means variously involv’d. For the End is a Collection of all those good things within our Power, which are capable of adorning the Kingdom of God, the whole System of intelligent Agents, and its several Parts. The Means, by which this End is to be obtain’d, are all our possible free Actions, about what Object soever. And, from an Equality suppos’d between these two Ideas, as between the Powers of the Cause, and their adequate Effect, are to be drawn all moral Rules, and all virtuous Actions enjoin’d by them. It is evident, that these Things are equal, because the End is the intire Effect to be produc’d, and all our possible Actions make up the intire efficient Cause. But in this consists the Art of Life, “To consider every publick Good in our Power, and all our particular Actions, and their Order, (by which some may prepare Matter for, or add Force to, others,) with such Attention and Care, that having, at length, trac’d out the most easy Actions, which may serve to promote to that End, by their Help we may proceed to the more difficult, and, at last, reach those utmost and most intricate bounds of our Faculties.” And this Practice perfectly corresponds to that of Algebra.

(3.) As Algebra supposes the Quantity unknown, and yet sought after, in some sort already known, by a certain Anticipation of the Mind, and expresses it by a proper Character, and is thus enabled to exhibit its given Relation to the known Quantities, by means whereof it-self at last becomes known: So Ethicks, also, forms some kind of Idea of the End or Effect propos’d; by the help of those Relations, which it bears to our Operations in some measure known, (at least in general,) it distinguishes it by the name of the chief Good, or of Happiness, from other Objects, altho’ it knows, “That it does not yet exist,” and altho’ it does not distinctly know, “What shall at last be the Effect of our Operations, and of the Concurrence of Things without us”; whence it may justly be called Unknown: But, by the help of those Actions and Faculties, to which it is related, as the Effect to its Causes, and on which, consequently, it most certainly intirely depends, it at last gradually becomes known. Hither also is to be referr’d, that, whereas the End propos’d by every one, is that intire and greatest Good, which he can procure to the Universe, and to himself in his station, it follows, “That the End is to be conceiv’d as the greatest Aggregate, or Sum, of good Effects, most acceptable to God and Men, which can be effected, by the greatest Industry of all our future Actions.” It often happens, (and we ought to endeavour that it should happen as often as may be,) “That the good Effects of our Power increase in a Geometrical Progression”; (as in increase arising from Interest upon Interest, or in Husbandry, or Merchandizing, when every year the increase of the former is added to the main Stock;) whence arises a vast increase, both of publick and private Happiness, beyond what can be distinctly foreseen.