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CHAPTER II - George Turnbull, The Principles of Moral and Christian Philosophy. Vol. 1: The Principles of Moral Philosophy 
The Principles of Moral and Christian Philosophy. Vol. 1: The Principles of Moral Philosophy, ed. and with an Introduction by Alexander Broadie (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 2005).
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The laws relative to our embodied state, and our connexion with a material world.Let us now consider our relation to the material world, and the reciprocal dependence of our body and mind with the chief effects that result from this source.
I. First, it is evident, that relation to or connexion with a sensible world, must consist in a certain dependence on its laws, so as to be variously affected by them with pleasure and pain; or, a certain bodily organization, by means of which, certain perceptions and affections are excited in the mind. Existence would be thrown away upon a material system, if it were not perceived by minds or enjoyed by them. But the bodily fabric which is necessary to our communication with matter, must necessarily be subject to the laws of that matter.Communication with the material world necessarily supposes dependence on its laws. Whatever the frame and structure of it may be, or of whatever materials this body is composed, it must be liable to the common laws, to which the whole material part of the creation, to which it is related, is subject. Now by the late discoveries in natural philosophy, it has been proved, that the centripedal and centrifugal forces which hold our mundan system in that perfect order, which it is so beautiful to behold and contemplate, are the best in every respect that can be imagined: insomuch that no alteration can be supposed with regard to them that would not be attended with much greater irregularities and inconveniencies, than all those put together which result from the present laws.These laws are good.
In like manner, with respect to our earth, gravitation, cohesion, fermentation, to which general principles almost all its phenomena are reducible, have been shewn to be excellent laws, and that no others<63> could be substituted in their room, which would not be exceedingly for the worse.This proved by natural philosophers. In a word, it has been proved, that our mundan system in all its parts is governed by excellent general laws, in so much that all objections that have been made against its constitution and oeconomy, have either taken their rise from ignorance of its real state and frame, and of the laws by which it is actually governed; and consequently only serve to shew the absurdity ofa imaginary theories in natural philosophy; or they really terminate in demanding some change greatly to the worse. But such conclusions quite destroy all objections that can be made against our being related to and connected with the sensible world; for to be related to it, and connected with it, without being subject to its laws, is utterly impossible. It is to depend without dependence: it is to be united without any connexion. But a dependence or a connexion that produces greater good in the whole, must be a good dependence. Let us therefore see what goods, advantages or pleasures arise from our having bodies, and being capable of commerce with a material world.
A material world without being perceived could be of no use.II. But let it be observed before we proceed, that as a material world cannot be said to have order and beauty; or to be wisely contrived, but with respect to beings, who perceive it, and are affected by it; or cannot indeed be created for any end, but so far as perceptive beings have communication with it: so were there not in nature such a kind of beings as we are, nature could not be full or coherent: there would be a chasm or void in nature which could not but render it deformed and imperfect to the view of any being capable of perceiving it; who hath, like us, any idea of richness, fulness, and perfection in nature.Without beings capable of enjoying a material world, nature would not be full and coherent. For so are we made, that we cannot represent<64> nature to ourselves as perfect and beautiful, without conceiving it to be full and coherent: we cannot suppose any degree of perfection wanting in the scale of life, that can exist, without being shocked at the thought of such a deficiency, such incompleteness, such a void and breach.
By our commerce with a material world we receive a great many pleasures of the sensitive kind.III. But not only is such a being as man necessary to make the gradation in nature full and complete; but the sensible pleasures we are susceptible of by means of our bodily organization, or our senses, do well deserve their place in the scale of life and being. The more pleasures a creature is by nature made capable of, the larger provision is certainly made for its happiness: now the enjoyments we are made capable of receiving from a corporeal world, by means of our sensitive organs, are not a few: the variety of them belonging to any of our senses, as for instance, to the sight or ear, is almost innumerable. And all these senses, with all their appurtenances, are admirably adjusted to one another, to our external condition, and to our whole bodily texture, made up of them, and preserved entire by their equal nourishment and sustentation. Thus, for example, our sight, at the same time that it is capable of receiving considerable assistances from artificial instruments, is wonderfully well adapted to judge of magnitudes, distances, and other tangible qualities; it being by contact and motion only, that the mechanism of the body can suffer any injury.Our senses are admirably adjusted to one another, and to our whole frame. In like manner, all our other senses are very well adjusted to one another, and to our situation, as has been often observed by several philosophers. This is delightfully told by our excellent poet already quoted.
But though the pleasures our senses afford us be very many, and far from being despicable in their kind; yet the chief advantages our senses bring us, are, as they are means and instruments of sciences and arts; and the means, occasions and subjects of many excellent virtues.
Our senses are instruments of noble sciences and useful arts.I. Our communication with the sensible world is not only the source of very considerable enjoyments to us, as sensitive beings; but it is yet a source of more noble pleasures to us, as we are capable of knowledge and imitation.
By our bodily senses, our minds are rendered capable of contemplating, and of imitating by ingenious arts, many parts of a very wonderful system; many parts of a most beautiful disposition and arrangement of infinitely various objects. For how immense is the variety of the sensible world? Can there be a more delightful, or a more capacious field of study and speculation, than what the riches, the simplicity, the grandeur and perfect order of the natural world afford us?Of natural philosophy. What is greater, or more elevating, than the contemplation of nature, when we are able to take in large views of it, and comprehend its laws? How agreeably do ancient<66> philosophers expatiate upon this topic!a The study of nature, according to them, is the natural food of the soul. And they indeed justly placed a great part of man’s best happiness in contemplating and imitating the regularity, wisdom, goodness and harmony of the sensible world. They with good reason concluded from the structure of our senses, considered together with our intellectual powers, that we are made, “Ad mundum contemplandum & imitandum.”29 To contemplate, admire and imitate nature. What distinguishes our sensesa from those of the brutes, is, (as these philosophers have observed) that sense of beauty, order and harmony, with which they are united in our frame, by means of which they are not merely sensitive, but rather rational faculties. For by these outward and inward senses, as they are conjoined in our frame, we are capable of understanding the regularity and wisdom of nature; of investigating its general laws, and admiring the wonderful consent<67> of all its various parts to make one beautiful whole.And many imitative arts. Nor is this all, for we are likewise qualified by them for divers imitative arts, as poetry, painting, statuary, music, architecture, gardening, &c. from which arts do indeed arise pleasures very nearly allied to virtue, very assistant to it; and which, next to its exercises, are our noblest and most pleasing enjoyments.
They are means and subjects of many virtuous exercises.II. But our senses are yet of further and higher use in our frame, as they afford us means, occasions and materials for exercising many virtues; many kindly, benevolent and generous affections.
Of the social kind.It is in consequence of our having a corporeal frame, or of being cloathed with bodies, that we are visible, audible, and embraceable one to another; all which are sources of pleasures of a very agreeable kind, as well as of a social nature and tendency. How unembodied spirits have intercourse, is a question we cannot possibly solve; but this is certain, that our mutual correspondence is by means of our bodies. And scarcely will any one object against our frame, merely for our being thus made fit for commerce with one another, by the eyes and touch, and by the faculties of hearing and speech.
And of rational dominion over the sensitive appetites.But which is yet more, in consequence of our having bodies, various occasions arise of our mutually aiding, relieving, comforting, pleasing and gratifying one another, and of interchanging many good and friendly offices, for which there could not otherwise in the nature of things be room. And not to add more on this head, is not the regulation of our senses, and their appetites after the gratifications suited to them, a most noble exercise for our reason and moral discernment? By this means, our guiding part hath something to guide and govern: subjects committed to its trust, keeping and management; subjects to provide for, and to rule and maintain in decent and good order and<68> discipline. We have therefore, in consequence of our having bodies, amoral dominion committed to us, in which to acquit ourselves honourably, that is, wisely and prudently, or according to truth, reason, and the fitness of things, is certainly the noblest employment we can form any notion of. The spheres or employments of other beings cannot be higher in kind; the difference can only be in species, or rather in degree. For what can be conceived more great or excellent, than to have business of importance to our own happiness, and that of our kind, to manage by reason; subjects to rule and conduct for the good of the whole? And such are we ourselves to ourselves by our make; that is, such are the inferior parts of our constitution, or our bodily appetites, to that which is principal in us, our reason and moral conscience.a
Thus therefore, in consequence of our having bodies, we are not only capable of contemplating and imitating the sensible world, and of various other pleasures; but our reason hath very proper practical employment. For thus is it that we are capable of all the virtues which are justly divided by ancient moralists into Sustenenceb and Abstinence; or the power of being able to with-hold from the most inviting pleasures, if they be either pernicious in their consequences, or unbecoming our dignity: and the power of suffering any pain with magnanimity, rather than forego our reason, and contradict<69> our moral conscience, by yielding to what these pronounce base and unworthy.
All this, it is plain, supposes a moral sense in our constitution, of which something hath been already said, and that shall afterwards be considered more fully. Mean time, if it be true, that our relation to the sensible world is conducive, or rather necessary to the excellent purposes above-mentioned, it plainly follows, that a reciprocal union between our body and mind, must be morally fit and good.
But this will be yet more evident, if we consider a little some other effects, resulting from this reciprocal connexion, or from our dependence upon the laws of the sensible world, from which we receive so many pleasures, not merely of the sensitive kind.
The general law with respect to sensible pains.I. It is plain from experience, that with respect to every sensitive being, within the reach of our observation, with respect to ourselves in particular, this is the general law of nature, “That the simple productions of nature, which are useful to us, are also agreeable to us,a and the pernicious, or useless, are made disagreeable, or give pain. Our external sensations are, no doubt, often painful, when our bodies are in a dangerous state, when they want supplies of nourishment, or when any thing external would be injurious to them. But if it appears that the general laws are wisely instituted, and it be necessary to the good of a system of agents to be under the influence of general laws, upon which there is occasion for prudence and activity; the particular pains occasioned by a necessary law of sensation, can be no objection against the goodness of the author.Sensible pains whence they arise. Now that there is no room for complaint that our external sense of pain is made too acute, must appear from the multitudes we daily see<70> so careless of preserving the blessing of health, of which many are so prodigal as to lavish it away, and expose themselves to external pains for very trifling reasons. Can we repine at the friendly admonitions of nature, joined with some austerity, when we see they are scarce sufficient to restrain us from ruin?” To this let it be added, that the external and superficial parts of our bodies are the most sensible, and cause the greatest pain when they are in any wise hurtfully affected; because they are exposed to many various external objects, and do thus give us immediate notice so soon as they are affected by them; whereas the internal parts being more remote, cannot be so easily come at, and consequently are not liable to so many interruptions from without, and therefore need not such subtle sensation. Thus we experience (say anatomists) that the veins, arteries, bones, and the like, have little or no sensation at all.a
Several pains the necessary effects of a bodily organization.II. But further, let it be considered, that of whatever materials a body be composed, or whatever its particular organization may be, it must in the nature of things, be liable to as many disorders as there are means of preventing or disturbing its natural course. In general, upon the supposition of our being capable of agreeable sensation, a proportionable degree of pain must ensue, upon any defect or excess whatsoever: because, if health consist in a certain balance or order, every deviation from that order, must be sickness or disease. Pleasant sensation must be produced in some order and method; that is, in order to it, a body must have a certain texture, and there must be a certain adjustment of external objects to that texture: but the result of this must be, that in a habitation like our earth, not made for any one species of animals, but fitted<71> for a variety of beings, somethings being adjusted to bodies of a different texture from ours, cannot but be contrary in their natures to ours, and so tend to a solutio continui30 in respect of them. This is as plain and as necessary, as it is, that two parts of matter cannot tally, unless they are fitted by their make to one another. In other words, it is necessary in the nature of things, that bodies should have each a particular mechanism fitted for a certain end, or for certain enjoyments: and to every material mechanism, as there must be something congruous, in order to the having agreeable sensations; so in a material world, replenished with various animals, in order to make nature as rich and full with good as possible, some things will of necessity be incongruous, and consequently in some manner and degree pernicious to our particular mechanism, by being fitted to different bodies. For it is impossible but those objects, which are suitable to certain organizations, in order to affect them agreeably, must be incongruous to organizations of different forms; and being incongruous to them, they must have some tendency to hurt them. This is inevitably the result of the necessity of a thing’s having a certain texture, and certain qualities in a determinate degree, in order to its being suitably proportioned or congruous to another certain texture, with its qualities. All things cannot possibly be equally congruous to all different sorts of organization.
Pains are useful and proper monitors.III. But if our organization be liable to be destroyed or hurted by certain objects, in consequence of the impossibility, “That the same texture should be equally well fitted to all sorts of external impressions, that may happen through the influence of those very laws of matter and motion, which are acknowledged to be necessary to the general good and beauty of the material world, and to our receiving many pleasures of various kinds from it:” if this be<72> the case, it is certainly fit that whatever external object is pernicious, or tends to disturb and hurt the mechanism of our bodies in any considerable degree, should be signified to us by some means or other: Now the method that nature takes is this; “It is generally some pleasant sensation which teaches us what tends to our preservation and well-being; and some painful one which shews us what is pernicious;” “we are directed by uneasy appetites when our bodies stand in need of nourishment;” “and in like manner, it is by a sense of pain excited in us, that we are warned of the dangerous tendency of bruises, wounds, violent labour, and other such hurtful causes.”31
Now the fitness of our being thus warned and admonished appears, because some warning is necessary; and there can be no other but what has been mentioned, except by knowledge of the natures of things, and their aptitudes to affect us agreeably or hurtfully. But knowledge is in the nature of things progressive, and can only be acquired gradually, as has been shewn, from experience, in proportion to our situation for making observations, and taking in ideas, and to our application to gather knowledge. The knowledge of nature is wisely left to be our own acquisition; and therefore some other warning, even that mentioned by painful sensations, is absolutely necessary to us. It is only some intuitive kind of knowledge of bodies, by immediate inspection (which is hardly conceivable) that could supply the place of admonitions by pain, in order to self-preservation. And if we had such an intuitive knowledge of things as is necessary to this purpose; then no part of knowledge could be left to be our own acquisition by observation and reasoning. For what does not the intuitive knowledge, necessary to be our warner of dangerous applications or approaches to our bodies, include in it? It plainly comprehends in it an intuitive knowledge of our own body, and of all surrounding<73> objects to the influences of which it is exposed: that is, it comprehends an intuitive knowledge of the whole of nature. And consequently, having such knowledge (could we, or any creatures possibly have it, as ’tis plain from the nature of knowledge we cannot) is absolutely inconsistent with the dependence of any part of the knowledge of nature upon ourselves; or with such knowledge being in any degree our own acquisition; that is, with any thing’s being left to be matter of observation and enquiry to us, or subject of exercise to our reason. All parts of natural or real knowledge are so connected together and involved in one another, that if any part of it were attainable by us otherwise than it now is, no part of it could be attainable, as it now is, i.e. by induction, and by reasoning from properties so discovered. And would we not thus be deprived of one of our pleasantest and noblest employments and acquisitions?
From the necessity there is, that bodily appetites should be attended with uneasy sensations arises the necessity of all the other uneasy sensations accompanying our desires which are called Passions.IV. Thus then we see the fitness of our being admonished by uneasy sensations of dangers to our bodies of bodily necessities and wants: because thus we are directed and impelled to relieve and preserve ourselves in such a manner, that reason, neither hath, on the one hand, little or no employment; nor, on the other, a very disagreeable and almost insurmountable task. But it is well observed by an excellent philosopher on this head, that when a necessity of adding strong uneasy sensations to one class of appetites appears, there must appear also a like necessity of strengthning the rest in the same mind by like sensations, to keep a just ballance.32 And thus accordingly, our bodily appetites being for good reasons accompanied with uneasy sensations, our moral desires and affections are strengthened in like manner by uneasy strong sensations to maintain a just balance; so is plainly the Στοργη or natural affection to children, so is compassion or pity to the distressed, and many other moral<74> passions, that thus the public and social ones might not be too weak and feeble in proportion to those which terminate more directly and immediately in the preservation or gratification of our senses. In a constitution, where one degree of force is requisite, a proportionate degree of force in other parts becomes also necessary; otherwise the constituent parts would not bear that proportion to one another, which an equal and sound balance in the whole requires. It is the same here as with regard to antagonist muscles to counterpoise one another in the body.a
The laws of matter make an infant state of body necessary.V. Let me just add upon this head, that as for our coming into the world by the way of propagation we now do, and with weak, necessitous, infant bodies: It is a necessary result of the constitution of this material world to which we are related by our bodies; and besides the many good effects of it of the social kind which are very evident, “There is an absolute fitness, that beings made for progress in knowledge, and in every perfection by their own application and industry conjointly with assistances from society, and who consequently must enter upon the world with infant minds, should likewise enter upon it with infant bodies.”And the law of progressive perfection makes infant minds necessary. How very unequally otherwise would our bodies and minds be yoked? How improper companions and mates would they be? As for death, what may be inferred concerning it, shall be considered, when having enquired into all the other principal laws relative to our present state, we are able to take a complete view of it. In the mean time, it is obvious, that death, or the dissolution of our bodily texture, in whatever way it happens, is always the result of our subjection to some of the laws of matter and motion, to which our union with the sensible world necessarily subjects<75> us, and to which are owing all the pleasures we receive from it in our present embodied state.
The dependence of mental powers and dispositions on the body.VI. The other remarkable phenomenon with respect to our union with a material world is, “The dependence of genius, temper, and mental abilities upon the temperature of the body, air, diet, and other such physical causes.” That a variety of mental temperatures, turns, dispositions and abilities prevail among mankind, will not be called into doubt. And as it is certain, that different textures of eyes must see differently; or every object must necessarily partake of the colour with which the eye itself is tainted:A great variety in respect of these among mankind. so variety in temperature, texture and mould, (so to speak) among minds, must necessarily produce great variety of conceptions, sentiments and judgments, and consequently of inclinations, appetites and dispositions. For, such as the soil is, such will the flavour of the fruit be in the natural world; and by like necessity in the moral, all the impressions, sentiments, judgments, and passions of a mind will be correspondent to its prevailing humour and character: they will necessarily partake in some degree of it. And, hence it is, that every man’s turn of thinking is as distinguishable as his face or gate from that of every other: there are as few minds as faces that have not very peculiar and distinguishing features.a
How far that variety arise from and depends on physical causes.Now, that differences among minds, in texture and character, abilities and dispositions, are no less necessary to the well-being of society, and variety of beauty and good in it, than differences in complexions and countenances, is very evident at first sight, has been already hinted, and will appear more fully when we come to consider the laws of our nature relative to society. All therefore that belongs to the present question is, how far differences among minds<76> depend upon different textures, and temperaments of bodies, and physical causes, and how and why it is so?
I. I do not indeed pretend, that there may not be a great variety of genius’s, characters and abilities among pure, unembodied spirits of the same species: on the contrary, wherever there is community, such diversity is absolutely requisite: a moral, as well as a natural whole, must consist of various parts, fitted by their very differences to one another, and to one common end.The great extent of this dependence is generally owned. But it is manifest that the diversity among mankind in genius, temper and abilities, depends, if not totally, yet to a very great degree and extent, upon bodily constitution and mechanical causes. This is so true, that many philosophers have from hence contended, that all is matter and motion; or that we are wholly body. Such an inference is indeed absurd, but the facts from which it is drawn are beyond all dispute; so palpable are they to every one’s feeling and experience. “Each different nation has its national characteristic,a not merely in the features of the face and texture of the body, but likewise in temper and turn of mind.” “Every man is hot or cold, slow or active, phlegmatic or choleric, lively or dull, amorous and delicate, or dull and insensible, correspondently to the temper of his body, his native climate, &c.” “Air and diet change men’s dispositions as much as their bodily habit; a disease, or a blow, do not make a greater alteration in the outward than in the inward man.” Government, civil policy, and religion more especially, have no doubt a very great influence in<77> forming men’s tempers; but, on the other hand, it was never questioned, that the temper of the body, the soil, climate, and many other physical causes have had a very considerable share in originally determining different people into different forms of government, and distinct establishments with regard to civil and religious policy, by their influences upon genius and temper.
In fine, it is undeniable, that imagination, memory, and the strength of appetites, very much depend upon bodily habit; and, on the other hand, bodily temperature and habit, depend exceedingly on the exercises of the imagination and appetites; upon the employments, habits, and character of the mind. “Let physicians and anatomists, (says an excellent author)a explain the several motions of the fluids and solids of the body which accompany any passion; or the temperaments of body, which either make men prone to any passion, or are brought upon us by the long continuance or frequent returns of it. ’Tis only to our purpose, in general, to observe, That probably certain motions of the body do accompany every passion by a fixed law of nature, and alternately, that temperament which is apt to receive or prolong these motions in the body, does influence our passions to heighten or prolong them. Thus a certain temperament may be brought upon the body by its being frequently put into motion by the passions of anger, joy, love or sorrow; and the continuance of this temperament make men prone to these several passions for the future.”It is well worth while to enquire more fully into it. Were this dependence of the body and mind more studied, and its effects collected and ranged into proper order; no doubt, we would be able to form a better judgment of it, and see further into the good purposes to which it serves; for the greater advances have hitherto been made in any branches of physical<78> philosophy, the more instances do we perceive of excellent contrivance and kind oeconomy.
Mean time, it is evident, that such a dependence is involved in the very idea of union of mind with body.II. Mean time, as the fact, in general, is certain from many experiments, so it is evident, there can be no mutual union of body and mind without reciprocal dependence; and their reciprocal dependence cannot take place without laws, fixing and determining connexions between all the possible changes in the body, and certain correspondent changes in the mind; and alternately between all possible conditions of the mind, and certain correspondent alterations in the bodily part. All this is involved in the very notion of regular and mutual dependence. Consequently the only question with regard to our present union with a material world by means of our bodies is, 1. Whether, in consequence of these laws, we are not capable of very considerable pleasures, which otherwise could not possibly have place in nature? for did we not exist, in the present embodied state we are now in, the sensible world we are capable of enjoying in so many different ways, as rational as well as sensitive beings, could not exist. And, 2. Whether the pains we suffer, in consequence of this union, be not the necessary effects of the union itself, and the best, that is, the fitest admonitions we can have of what is necessary to our sustenance and well-being? for such pains cannot be called evils with respect to the whole system; but, on the contrary, being the effects of good general laws, are goods. To both which questions a sufficient answer hath been given.
The good consequence of this dependence of our minds on body and physical connexions.III. To all which let it be added, that from the dependence of our mind upon body and physical causes, there arises this good consequence, “That, whereas the tempers, characters, abilities, and dispositions of our minds, would be utterly unalterable by us, if they were not dependent in that manner upon us; being<79> so dependent, they may in a great measure be changed by our own proper care; or to do so only requires, that we should give due attention to the natural connexions on which they depend; and conformably to them take proper measures to make fit changes.” That is to say, changing and reforming our minds, as far as mind depends upon body, depends on ourselves, because it depends upon knowledge of nature we may acquire, and right use of such knowledge. It is often regreted by ancient philosophers,a that the dependence of body and mind, as evidently as its extent discovers itself in many cases, is so little studied and enquired into by philosophers. Were it, say they, more carefully attended to and considered, the medicinal art would extend further than to the body: it would be able to do great services to the mind, by proper applications to the body, or by proper external regimens and discipline. Upon this occasion, they have expressed a very high opinion, not only of certain gymnastic exercises, but of the power of music in particular; and seem to think, that very advantageous uses might be made of that art, in several cases, for delivering the mind from disorders; or for purging and refining the passions; calming, quieting, cheering, and strengthning the mind.
True morality must therefore consider man as a compound creature; or his body and mind as reciprocally dependent.But let that be as it will, tho’ the science we have now been speaking of (the medicine of the mind, and that part of natural knowledge, from which alone it can be deduced) be very much neglected, yet from what hath been said of the dependence of<80> body and mind, it plainly appears, why the best ancient moralists, as well as the christian religion, recommend severe bodily discipline, in order to form, establish, preserve, and corroborate virtuous habits. Such must the morality be that belongs to beings of our compound make. Precepts not inferred from the human constitution, must be idle and vain, they cannot appertain to us. To forget in directions about our conduct, that we are rational beings, is indeed to forget our most essential and noble part: but, on the other hand, to forget in moral precepts, that we are likewise sensitive, embodied beings, is to leave out in morality, which ought to be founded upon the nature of beings, a very essential and important part of our make. It is therefore no wonder, if such morality prescribes rules to us, that are either above our practice, or insufficient to gain that purpose which ought to be the end of all rules relative to our conduct; namely, acting agreeably to our frame, or in a manner becoming our rank and conducive to our happiness. That must necessarily be the case, when our make is not strictly kept in view, in laying down precepts for our observance. Now this is plainly our rank; we are neither wholly moral, nor wholly sensitive beings; but a compound of moral and sensitive powers and affections reciprocally dependent upon one another: man is, as some philosophers have very properly expressed it; Nexus utriusque mundi.33 And the excellence of the christian morality consists in this, that in all its precepts man is considered and advised as such a being.
General conclusion concerning their laws.All the observations that have been made by natural philosophers upon the animal oeconomy of the human body, the different bodily oeconomies of other animals suited to their various states, and, in general, upon the wise contrivance and good order of the sensible world might very properly have been collected and inserted here. But the preceeding remarks will prepare every intelligent reader for making a proper use, and seeing the full extent of such observations; and from what has been said, we may justly conclude, “That the laws relating to our embodied state, and our connexion with the material or sensible world, are either necessary or fit: many excellent effects result from them, and none of the effects of good general laws can be evil, absolutely considered, that is, with respect to the whole.”
[a. ]See Discourses on the origin of evil, natural and moral, by Dr. John Clark. [John Clarke, An Enquiry into the Cause and Origin of Evil (London, 1720). The whole book deals with this topic, but see especially p. 48.]
[28. ]Pope, Essay on Man, I.193–206.
[a. ]So Cicero de natura Deorum, Lib. 2. Ipse autem homo natus est ad mundum contemplandum & imitandum. Idem de senectute. Sed credo, Deos immortalis sparsisse animos in corpora humana, ut essent, qui terras tuerentur, quique caelestium ordinem contemplantes imitarentur eum vitae modo ac constantia.
[29. ]Cicero, De natura deorum, II.xiv.37: “[for the purpose] of contemplating and imitating the world.”
[a. ]So Cicero de nat. Deorum, Lib. 2. Ad hanc providentiam naturae tam diligentem tamque solertem adjungi multa possunt, equibus intelligatur, quantae res hominibus a Deo, quamque eximiae tributae sint, qui primum eos humo excitatos, celsos, & erectos constituit, ut Deorum cognitionem, coelum intuentes, capere possent. Sunt enim e terra homines non ut incolae, atque habitatores, sed quasi spectatores superarum rerum, atque caelestium, quarum spectaculum ad nullum aliud genus animantium pertinet. Sensus autem, interpretes, ac nuntii rerum, in capite; tanquam in arce, mirifice ad usus necessarios & facti & collocati sunt—Omnisque sensus hominum multo antecellit sensibus bestiarum. Primum enim oculi in iis artibus, quarum judicium est oculorum, in pictis, fictis, caelatisque formis, &c. [Cicero, De natura deorum: “Many further illustrations could be given of this wise and careful providence of nature, to illustrate the lavishness and splendour of the gifts bestowed by the gods on men. First, she has raised them from the ground to stand tall and upright, so that they might be able to behold the sky and so gain a knowledge of the gods. For men are sprung from the earth not as its inhabitants and denizens, but to be as it were the spectators of things supernal and heavenly, in the contemplation whereof no other species of animal participates. Next, the senses, posted in the citadel of the head as the reporters and messengers of the outer world, both in structure and position, are marvellously adapted to their necessary services” (II.lvi.140). “And all the senses of man far excel those of the lower animals. In the first place our eyes have a finer perception of many things in the arts which appeal to the sense of sight, painting, modelling and sculpture, etc.” (II.lviii.145).]
[a. ]So Cicero and all the ancient moralists. See Plutarch, in particular, de virtute morali. Plato sensit hominis animam non simplicem esse, aut eodem per omnia modo affectam: sed aliam ejus partem intelligentem esse ac ratiocinatricem qua hominem regi naturae sit conveniens: aliam quae variis motibus obnoxia, bruta, vaga, & incomposita, & suapte natura gubernante opus habeat—quando autem bruta pars contra rationem contendat—Statim animus quasi in duas partes dividitur & manifesta sit discordia. [Plutarch, De virtute morali: “Plato thought that the soul of man”(441E) “. . . is not simple, nor is affected in the same way by all things. Instead it has one part which is intelligent and rational by which it is natural that human beings be ruled, and it has another part, one in need of a ruler, a part subject to many impulses, and animal-like, inconstant and lacking orderliness” (442A). “But when the animal part is in contention with reason, the mind is as it were immediately divided into two parts and the discord is plain” (448D). Plutarch, Omnia quae extant opera, 2 vols. (Paris, 1624).]
[b. ]See Epictetus, Arrian and Simplicius. [See above, page 62, note a.]
[a. ]See Hutcheson on the conduct of the passions, and Dr. J. Clark on the origine of evil. [The quote is from Francis Hutcheson, An Essay on the Nature and Conduct of the Passions. . . . (1728); ed. Aaron Garrett (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 2002), I.VI.iii.]
[a. ]See Dr. J. Clark on the origine of evil. [Clarke, Origin of Evil, 258–59.]
[30. ]Solutio continui—the separation from each other of normally contiguous parts. See Bacon’s essay “Of unity in religion” in his Essays, which may be Turnbull’s source for the phrase. Sir Francis Bacon: The Essayes or Counsels, Civill and Morall, ed. M. Kiernan (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986).
[31. ]Hutcheson, Passions. This is a close paraphrase of passages in I.II.vi.
[32. ]“An excellent philosopher” is Hutcheson. The passage is a paraphrase from Passions, I.II.vi.
[a. ]See Hutcheson, on the conduct of the passions, in whose words I have given this observation. [The passage footnoted is a paraphrase of Hutcheson, Passions, I.VI.iii.]
[a. ]See what is further said on this Subject, in the Chapter on the association of ideas. [John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, ed. Peter H. Nidditch (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1975), bk. 2, ch. 33.]
[a. ]So Cicero de lege agraria, contra Rullum. Non ingenerantur hominibus mores tam a stirpe generis, ac seminis, quam ex iis rebus, quae ab ipsa natura loci, & a vitae consuetudine suppeditantur: quibus alimur, & vivimus. Carthaginienses, fraudulenti, & mendaces, non genere, sed natura loci, &c. See Barclaii satyricon, pars quarta, icones animorum, Charron sur la sagesse. And reflexions sur la poesie & la peinture, Part II. [Cicero, De lege agraria, II.xxxv.95: “It is not so much by blood and race that men’s characters are implanted in them as by those things which are supplied to us by nature itself to form our habits of life, by which we are nourished and live. The Carthaginians were given to fraud and lying, not so much by race as by the nature of their position, etc.” Cicero, The Speeches, . . . De lege agraria, trans. John Henry Freese, Loeb Classical Library (London: Heinemann; New York: Putnam, 1930).
[a. ]See Hutcheson on the passions. [Hutcheson, Passions, I.II.vii.]
[a. ]See Plutarch de musica, & de educandis liberis. Plato de legibus & de republica, passim. See a fine passage to the same purpose, in Timaeus Locrus de anima mundi. Ad hos animi impetus, multum adjumenti adferunt corporis temperamenta, &c. See a fine passage to this purpose, in Cicero de Fato. Ed. schr. No. 5. Sed haec ex naturalibus causis vitia nasci possunt: extirpari autem & funditus tolli, ut is ipse, qui ad ea propensus fuerit a tantis vitiis avocetur, non est id positum in naturalibus causis, sed in voluntate, studio, disciplina, &c. [Timaeus Locrus, De anima mundi: “The temperaments of the body are a great help to the impulses of the mind.” In Gale, ed., Opuscula mythologica, physica et ethica. Graece et Latine. . . . (Amsterdam, 1688), 563.
[33. ]“A binding of both worlds.”
[34. ]Pope, Essay on Man, 1.189–92.