The Online Library of Liberty

A project of Liberty Fund, Inc.

• Introduction
• Part One: the Needless State (chapters 2, 3, 4 Are Not Available Online For Copyright Reasons)
• 1: Who Gave Us Order? On Exclusion, Enforcement, and Its Wherewithal *
• 5: Empirical Evidence *
• Part Two: Redistribution (chapter 7 Is Not Available Online For Copyright Reasons)
• 6: A Stocktaking of Perversities *
• 8: Disjunction, Conjunction *
• Part Three: Justice (chapters 10, 11 Are Not Available Online For Copyright Reasons)
• 9: Justice As Something Else *
• 12: Slicing the Cake Nobody Baked *
• Part Four: Socialism
• 13: Ownership, Agency, Socialism *
• 14: Market Socialism: “this Square Circle” *
• Part Five: Freedom
• 15: Right, Wrong, and Economics *
• 16: The Paretian Liberal, His Liberties and His Contracts *
• 17: The Bitter Medicine of Freedom *
• Works Cited

Works Cited

• Alchian, A., and H. Demsetz. (1973) The Property Rights Paradigm. Journal of Economic History 33.
• Anderson, T., and P. J. Hill. (1979) An American Experiment in Anarcho-Capitalism: The Not So Wild Wild West. Journal of Libertarian Studies 3.
• Atiyah, P. S. (1979) The Rise and Fall of the Freedom of Contract. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
• Axelrod, Robert. (1984) The Evolution of Cooperation. New York: Basic Books.
• Barry, B. (1986) Lady Chatterley’s Lover and Doctor Fischer’s Bomb Party. In J. Elster and A. Hylland, eds., Foundations of Social Choice Theory. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Revised version in B. Barry (1989), Liberty and Justice, Oxford, Oxford University Press.
• ———. (1991) Liberty and Justice. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
• ———. (1994) Justice, Freedom, and Basic Income. In H. Siebert, ed., The Ethical Foundations of the Market Economy. Tubingen: J. C. B. Mohr/Paul Siebeck.
• ———. (1995) A Treatise on Social Justice. Vol. 2, Justice as Impartiality. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
• Baumol, W. J. (1952) Welfare Economics and the Theory of the State. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
• Benson, B. L. (1989) The Spontaneous Evolution of Commercial Law. Southern Economic Journal 55.
• ———. (1990) The Enterprise of Law: Justice Without the State. San Francisco: Pacific Research Institute for Public Policy.
• Bergman, M., and J. T. Lane. (1990) Public Policy in the Principal-Agent Framework. Journal of Theoretical Politics 2, no. 3.
• Bergson, A. (1948) Socialist Economics. In H. S. Ellis, ed., A Survey of Contemporary Economics. Homewood, Ill.: American Economics Association.
• ———. (1967) Market Socialism Revisited. Journal of Political Economy 75, no. 5.
• Berlin, I. (1978) Concepts and Categories. London: Hogarth Press.
• Bernholz, P. (1974) Is a Paretian Liberal Really Impossible? Public Choice 19: 99–107.
• Breyer, F. (1977) The Liberal Paradox. Decisiveness over Issues and Domain Restrictions. Zeitschrift für Nationalökonomie 37: 45–60.
• Breyer, F., and R. Gardner. (1980) Liberal Paradox, Game Equilibrium, and Gibbard Optimum. Public Choice 35: 469–81.
• Buchanan, J. M. (1965) An Economic Theory of Clubs. Economica 32.
• ———. (1968) The Demand and Supply of Public Goods. Chicago: Rand-McNally.
• ———. (1975) The Limits of Liberty. Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press.
• ———. (1994) Ethics and Economic Progress. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press.
• Buchanan, J. M., and G. Tullock. (1962) The Calculus of Consent. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
• Coase, R. H. (1960) The Problem of Social Cost. Journal of Law and Economics 3: 1–15.
• ———. (1974) The Lighthouse in Economics. Journal of Law and Economics 17, no. 2: 357–76.
• ———. (1988) The Firm, the Market, and the Law. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
• Cowen, Tyler, ed. (1988) The Theory of Market Failure. Fairfax, Va.: George Mason University Press.
• Dahlman, C. J. (1979) The Problem of Externality. Journal of Law and Economics 22: 141–62. Repr. in Cowen 1988.
• Demsetz, Harold. (1964) The Exchange and Enforcement of Property Rights. Journal of Law and Economics 7. Repr. in Cowen 1988.
• ———. (1970) Private Production of Public Goods. Journal of Law and Economics 13, no. 2: 293–306.
• Ellickson, R. C. (1991) Order Without Law: How Neighbors Settle Disputes. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
• Engels, F. (1891) The Origin of the Family, Private Property and the State. In K. Marx and F. Engels, Selected Writings, 1968.
• Feinberg, J. (1984) Harm to Others. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
• Friedman, D. (1978) The Machinery of Freedom: Guide to a Radical Capitalism. New Rochelle, N.Y.: Arlington House.
• Gaertner, W., P. K. Pattanaik, and K. Suzumura. (1992) Individual Rights Revisited. Economica 59: 161–78.
• Gauthier, D. (1986) Morals by Agreement. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
• Gauthier, D., and R. Sugden, eds. (1993) Rationality, Justice and the Social Contract. Hemel Hempstead: Harvester Wheatsheaf.
• Gibbard, A. (1974) A Pareto-Consistent Libertarian Claim. Journal of Economic Theory 7: 388–410.
• ———. (1982) Rights and the Theory of Social Choice. In L. Cohen et al., eds., Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science vol. 6. Amsterdam, 595–605.
• Gray, J. (1992) The Moral Foundations of Market Institutions. London: IEA Health and Welfare Unit.
• Griffin, J. (1986) Well-Being. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
• Hahn, F., ed. (1989) The Economics of Missing Markets, Information and Games. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
• Hampton, J. S. (1987) The Free Rider Problem in the Production of Collective Goods. Economics and Philosophy 3, no. 2: 245–73.
• ———. (1990) Hobbes and the Social Contract Tradition. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
• Harsanyi, J. C. (1977) Rational Behavior and Bargaining Equilibrium in Games and Social Situations. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
• Hart, H. L. A. (1961) The Concept of Law. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
• ———. (1983) Essays in Jurisprudence and Philosophy. Oxford: Clarendon Press; New York: Oxford University Press.
• Hayek, F. A., ed. (1935) Collectivist Economic Planning. London: George Routledge and Sons.
• ———. (1960) The Constitution of Liberty. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
• ———. (1973–1979) Law, Legislation and Liberty (3 volumes). Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
• ———. (1978) New Studies in Philosophy, Politics, Economics and the History of Ideas. London: Routledge Kegan Paul.
• Heiner, R. A. (1996) Exogenous Versus Endogenous Information: A General Theory of Nash Equilibrium. Public Choice (forthcoming).
• Hobbes, T. (1651) Leviathan. Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1968.
• Jasay, A. de. (1985) The State. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
• ———. (1989) Social Contract, Free Ride: A Study of the Public Goods Problem. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
• Kliemt, H., and B. Lahno. (1992) Social Contract, Free Ride. Constitutional Political Economy 3, no. 2: 267–71.
• Knight, F. H. (1943) The Meaning of Freedom. In C. M. Perry, ed., The Philosophy of American Democracy. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
• Lange, O. (1936) On the Economic Theory of Socialism I-II. Review of Economic Studies 4 (October): 1.
• ———. (1937) On the Economic Theory of Socialism I-II. Review of Economic Studies 4 (February): 2.
• Leoni, B. (1961/1972) Freedom and the Law. Los Angeles: Nash Publishing.
• Lewis, D. (1979) Prisoners’ Dilemma Is a Newcomb Problem. Philosophy and Public Affairs 8, no. 3: 235–40.
• Libecap, G. D. (1992) The Rise of the Chicago Packers and the Origins of Meat Inspection and Antitrust. Economic Inquiry 30 (April): 218–24.
• Little, I. M. D. (1950/1973) Critique of Welfare Economics. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Repr. as Oxford Paperback.
• ———. (1952) Social Choice and Individual Values. Journal of Political Economy 60: 422–32.
• Loan, A. (1991/1992) Institutional Bases of the Spontaneous Order: Surety and Assurance. Humane Studies Review 7, no. 1.
• Love, J. R. (1991) Antiquity and Capitalism: Max Weber and the Sociological Foundations of Roman Civilization. New York: Routledge.
• MacFarlane, A. (1979) The Origins of English Individualism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
• Maddison, A. (1991) Dynamic Forces in Capitalist Development. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
• Maine, H. (1885, 1976) Popular Government. Indianapolis: Liberty Fund.
• Marx, K. [1843] The Jewish Question. Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts. In Early Writings, 1975.
• McPherson, T. (1967) Political Obligation. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.
• Mill, J. S. (1848) Principles of Political Economy.
• Mises, L. von (1966) Human Action (2nd ed.). Chicago: Chicago University Press.
• Musgrave, R. A. (1939) The Voluntary Exchange Theory of Public Economy. Quarterly Journal of Economics 53.
• ———. (1959) The Theory of Public Finance. New York: McGraw-Hill.
• Nozick, R. (1973) Distributive Justice. Philosophy & Public Affairs 3: 45–126.
• ———. (1974) Anarchy, State, and Utopia. New York: Basic Books.
• ———. (1993) The Nature of Rationality. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
• Oakeshott, M. (1962) Rationalism in Politics. London: Methuen.
• Olson, Mancur, Jr. (1965) The Logic of Collective Action. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
• Ostrom, Elinor. (1990) Governing the Commons. Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press.
• Paqué, K.-H. (1986) Philantropie und Steuerpolitik, Tubingen: J. C. B. Mohr/Paul Siebeck.
• Pareto, V. (1909) Manuel d’economie politique. Lausanne.
• Paul, E. F., F. D. Miller Jr., J. Paul, and J. Ahrens, eds. (1986) Marxism and Liberalism. New York: Social Philosophy and Policy Center.
• Popper, K. R. (1963) The Open Society and Its Enemies. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
• Posner, R. A. (1993) Leftist Legal Formalism. Critical Review 6: 4.
• Radnitzky, G. (1933) Wie marktkonform ist die Soziale Marktwirtschaft? Schweizerische Monatshefte 73: 6.
• Rawls, J. (1971) A Theory of Justice. Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press.
• Raz, J. (1986) The Morality of Freedom. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
• Ricardo, D. (1817) Principles of Political Economy and Taxation. London.
• Roepke, W. (1959) The Economic Necessity of Freedom. Modern Age. Reprinted with a foreword by E. J. Feulner Jr., The President’s Essay, Washington, D.C.: Heritage Foundation, 1988.
• Sabourian, H. (1989) Repeated Games: A Survey. In F. Hahn, The Economics of Missing Markets, Information and Games. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
• Samuelson, Paul A. (1954) The Pure Theory of Public Expenditure. Review of Economics and Statistics 36.
• Sandels, M. J. (1982) Liberalism and the Limits of Justice. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
• Scanlon, T. M. (1982) Contractualism and Utilitarianism. In A. Sen and B. Williams, eds., Utilitarianism and Beyond. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
• Sen, A. K. (1970a) Collective Choice and Social Welfare. Edinborough.
• ———. (1970b) The Impossibility of a Paretian Liberal. Journal of Political Economy 78: 152–57.
• ———. (1970c) Interpersonal Aggregation and Partial Comparability. Econometrica 38: 393–409. Repr. in Sen 1982a.
• ———. (1976) Liberty, Unanimity and Rights. Economica 43: 217–45. Repr. in Sen 1982a.
• ———. (1982a) Choice, Welfare and Measurement. Oxford: Blackwell.
• ———. (1982b) Liberty as Control: An Appraisal. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 7: 207–21.
• ———. (1983) Liberty and Social Choice. Journal of Philosophy 80: 5–28.
• ———. (1986) Foundations of Social Choice Theory: An Epilogue. In J. Elster and A. Hylland (eds.), Foundations of Social Choice Theory. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
• Starbatty, J., et al. (1993) Adjektivlose oder Soziale Marktwirtschaft. Bonn: Ludwig Erhard Stiftung.
• Stigler, G. (1961) Private Vice and Public Vertue. Journal of Law and Economics (October): 1–11.
• ———. (1978/1984) Wealth, and Possibly Liberty. Journal of Legal Studies 7, no. 2. Repr. in Stigler 1984.
• ———. (1982) The Economist as Preacher. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
• ———. (1984) The Intellectual and the Marketplace. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
• Strauss, L. (1953) Natural Right and History. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
• Streit, M. (1994) Comment on Robert Sugden “The Theory of Rights.” In H. Siebert, ed., The Ethical Foundations of the Market Economy. Tübingen: Mohr.
• Sugden, R. (1985) Liberty, Preference, and Choice. Economics and Philosophy 1/2: 213–29.
• ———. (1991/2) Suckers, Free Riders and Public Goods. Humane Studies Review 7.
• ———. (1993) Rights: Why Do They Matter and to Whom. Constitutional Political Economy 4: 127–52.
• ———. (1994) The Theory of Rights. In H. Siebert, ed., The Ethical Foundations of the Market Economy. Tübingen: Mohr.
• Taylor, Michael. (1976) Anarchy and Cooperation. London and New York: Wiley.
• ———. (1987) The Possibility of Cooperation. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
• Thompson, E. A., and R. Faith. (1981) A Pure Theory of Strategic Behavior and Social Institutions. American Economic Review 71: 366–79.
• Trakman, L. (1983) The Law Merchant: The Evolution of Commercial Law. Littleton, Colo.: Rothman & Co.
• Ullman-Margalit, E. (1977) The Emergence of Norms. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
• Vaughn, K. I. (1981) Introduction. In T. J. B. Hoff (1949, 1981), Economic Calculation in the Socialist Society. Indianapolis: Liberty Fund.
• Wagner, R. E. (1989) To Promote the General Welfare. San Francisco: Pacific Research Institute for Public Policy.
• Walzer, M. (1983/1985) Spheres of Justice. Oxford: Blackwell.
• Wicksell, K. (1896) Finanztheoretische Untersuchungen. Jena: Gustav Fischer.

The typeface used for this book is ITC New Baskerville, which was created for the International Typeface Corporation and is based on the types of the English type founder and printer John Baskerville (1706–75). Baskerville is the quintessential transitional face: it retains the bracketed and oblique serifs of old-style faces such as Caslon and Garamond, but in its increased lowercase height, lighter color, and enhanced contrast between thick and thin strokes, it presages modern faces.

The display type is set in Didot.

Printed on paper that is acid-free and meets the requirements of the American National Standard for Permanence of Paper for Printed Library Materials, z39.48-1992. (archival)

Book design by Richard Hendel, Chapel Hill, North Carolina

Composition by Tseng Information Systems, Durham, North Carolina

Printed by Edwards Brothers, Inc., Ann Arbor, Michigan, and bound by Dekker Bookbinding, Grand Rapids, Michigan