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Front Page arrow Titles (by Subject) arrow Property, Law, and Economics - Literature of Liberty, Summer 1980, vol. 3, No. 2

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Subject Area: Political Theory

Property, Law, and Economics - Leonard P. Liggio, Literature of Liberty, Summer 1980, vol. 3, No. 2 [1980]

Edition used:

Literature of Liberty: A Review of Contemporary Liberal Thought was published first by the Cato Institute (1978-1979) and later by the Institute for Humane Studies (1980-1982) under the editorial direction of Leonard P. Liggio.

Part of: Literature of Liberty: A Review of Contemporary Liberal Thought, 20 vols. 19781-982

About Liberty Fund:

Liberty Fund, Inc. is a private, educational foundation established to encourage the study of the ideal of a society of free and responsible individuals.


Property, Law, and Economics

Marc R. Tool and Andre Brun

  • California State University at Sacramento and the Institut National de la Recherch Agronomique, Orleans, France

Two Reviews of A. Allan Schmid's Property, Power and Public Choice: An Inquiry Into Law and Economics. New York: Praeger Publishers, 1978. Journal of Economic Issues 13(September 1979):743–749.

These two reviews of A. Allan Schmid's book are generally complementary. Schmid identifies the way institutions shape interactions through property rights. Property rights create the opportunities, costs, and constraints of transactions and economic distributions. Schmid combines the positive analysis of such institutions with a normative analysis. He criticizes the predominant Pareto efficiency criterion and other criteria for welfare economics as being disguised value judgments. He also believes that economist's contributions ought to be limited to providing information about the source and consequences of conflicts over interests. This role of the economist is not, however, value free, since it assumes informed choices are better than uninformed choices.

The two reviewers' criticism is that Schmid fails to provide a convincing value criterion for economic analysis, given that he has criticized welfare economists for their disguised value judgments. Furthermore, Schmid does not discuss the fact that institutional “constraints” depend in part on people's perceptions concerning whether they are indeed constraints or liberating devices.