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Subject Area: Political Theory

American Foreign Policy - Leonard P. Liggio, Literature of Liberty, October/December 1979, vol. 2, No. 4 [1979]

Edition used:

Literature of Liberty: A Review of Contemporary Liberal Thought was published first by the Cato Institute (1978-1979) and later by the Institute for Humane Studies (1980-1982) under the editorial direction of Leonard P. Liggio.

Part of: Literature of Liberty: A Review of Contemporary Liberal Thought, 20 vols. 19781-982

About Liberty Fund:

Liberty Fund, Inc. is a private, educational foundation established to encourage the study of the ideal of a society of free and responsible individuals.


American Foreign Policy

Earl C. Ravenal

  • Georgetown School of Foreign Service

“The Mythical Crisis of Presidential Leadership: Prologue to a Paper on the Carter Administration's Foreign Policy.” Paper presented to the Seventh Annual Libertarian Scholars Conference, New York, October 26, 1979, 42 pages.

The nation has become fixated upon the idea of presidential leadership: the notion that a President can somehow lead the country out of its present problems. Thus each President's popularity falls with his failure to do so. What this ignores is “the unchanging nature of American foreign policy objectives over seven or eight administrations since World War II,” and “how remarkably little personalities have mattered.” What is happening to the U.S. is no more President Carter's fault than any of the other's, while the Presidency itself, for most of a century, has been “systematically overrated.”

What has occurred to the U.S. relates to an intersection of two kinds of restraint, both “structural, and therefore not so easily alterable.” (1) At an international level, events are for the most part simply beyond American control, or at least disproportionately expensive for any return. (2) Domestically, the constraints are economic, social, political, and, ultimately constitutional. It is difficult for a President to start a war, and certainly more difficult to be able to finish it. Despite military spending and verbal bellicosity, it is not clear that the nation would go along with a war. Indeed, the people, as envisaged by the Founding Fathers, have shown more restraint in foreign affairs than other politicians and strong Presidents. There is a crisis of American power in the world, but it is not a crisis of the American spirit. This will mean some painful readjustment after a growing hegemony of almost a 100 years.

The Carter Administration has done little to accept these changes in external circumstances, but rather has carried on much like previous administrations, but with some novel policy thrusts such as human rights and nuclear non-proliferation. The unfortunate result has been not the multipolar balance of power pushed by Nixon and Kissinger, but “across-the-board global competition with the Soviet Union.” Nixon and Kissinger meant by “linkage” an effort to involve the Russians in a web of commercial contacts which might help to avoid a crisis. “Carter and Brzezinski turned linkage from a carrot into a stick.” Given Soviet problems with the economy, China, dissidents, and minorities, this was the time to exert pressure. This was coupled to the idea of a forward defense of creating situations of confrontation, and with the concept of a Unilateral Corps of about a 100,000 men as the core of a rapid strike force.

Why, despite their verbal assurances, have the policy makers done this: the “reluctant” implementation of the foreign policy of the hawks? Because they were committed to the same basic paradigm as their predecessor's, with far less power in the changing external circumstances. The constant elements in this paradigm have been deterrence and alliance. Deterrence has meant seeking to maintain an “essential equivalence” with our global adversaries in strategic nuclear arms, and at the same time providing “nuclear umbrellas” over our allies. Finally, deterrence has been perceived by all concerned as implying “the maintenance of a perpetual balance.” Alliance, the other element in the paradigm, has meant commitments to protect nations which, for a number of reasons—strategic, social, or political—we have felt important. From this has developed the aid, bases, military assistance, and other support. Within this rather constant paradigm there has been an ongoing debate over short-run tactics which has at times given the illusion of change by one administration or another. But this U.S. paradigm is basically flawed and almost impossible to sustain in the present changing global circumstances.

What has frustrated the desires of the policymakers over the years in terms of ultimate power have been the values of individual liberty and economic freedom built into the American system, and which have tended to obstruct the mechanisms of conscription and taxation. Basically, “what is happening is that we are being priced out of our present national strategies and foreign policies.”

The problem with deterrence, as opposed to a broader defense, is that the bluff and pretense involved increase the credibility and destructiveness of war.

What is needed is a new paradigm for American foreign policy based upon conflict avoidance and self-reliance. Interventionism is not basic to our security and we can no longer pay the costs which are entailed in maintaining such a capability across a whole spectrum of technology and geography. We are going to have to adjust to, rather than try to control, our environment.