The Online Library of Liberty

A project of Liberty Fund, Inc.

• Illustrations
• Foreword
• Preface
• Acknowledgments
• Part I: Family Life and Early Background
• Chapter 1: An American Family
• Chapter 2: Origins
• Chapter 3: Youth and Experience
• Chapter 4: Initiation Into Politics
• Chapter 5: The Early Years, 1894–1900
• Chapter 6: Entering the Business World
• Chapter 7: The Early Years, 1901–1916
• Part II: James P. Goodrich the Consummate Politician
• Chapter 8: The Political Years
• Chapter 9: The 1916 Campaign
• Chapter 10: Years As Governor, 1917–1921
• Chapter 11: The Middle Years, 1916–1923
• Chapter 12: The Great Russian Famine, 1921–1923
• Chapter 13: Emissary to Russia
• Chapter 14: Return to Russia, 1925
• Part III: Businessmen With the Midas Touch
• Chapter 15: The 1920s
• Chapter 16: The 1930s
• Chapter 17: Companies! Companies! Companies!
• Chapter 18: Ayrshire Collieries Corporation
• Chapter 19: The Ecologist
• Chapter 20: The Later Years, 1940–1960
• Chapter 21: The Later Years, 1960–1973
• Part IV: Pierre F. Goodrich Crusader and Philosopher
• Chapter 22: Associations and Causes
• Chapter 23: Wabash College
• Chapter 24: The Mont Pelerin Society
• Chapter 25: A Scholar’s Life
• Chapter 26: Education In a Free Society
• Chapter 27: Moral, Political, and Metaphysical Beliefs
• Chapter 28: Why Liberty?
• Chapter 29: Liberty Fund, Inc.
• Part V: The Goodriches Assayed
• Chapter 30: Who Was Pierre F. Goodrich?
• Chapter 31: Defining Influences
• Chapter 32: Why Did They Work So Hard? Work, Ideas, Citizenship, and Virtue
• Chapter 33: Epilogue
• Appendixes

Chapter 28

Why Liberty?

At the invitation of Friedrich Hayek, Pierre Goodrich delivered his paper “Why Liberty?” at the September 1958 annual meeting of the Mont Pelerin Society at Princeton University.1 Why, of all the ideals, problems, and issues that confront mankind, was liberty Goodrich’s lifelong preoccupation? There were times during his life when he seemed to think about little else.2 An examination of the importance liberty had for Goodrich will serve to render a greater understanding of his overall philosophical beliefs.

In the September 1958 paper, Goodrich quoted two very different views about both the nature and efficacy of power:

Goodrich thought that the view of power one accepts must be determined by one’s belief about the nature of man. He explained why he believed Lord Acton’s observation is clearly the more accurate one. As a basic premise, Goodrich submits—and it would seem foolhardy to suggest otherwise—man is imperfect and therefore fallible. Man has some capacity to reason, however, and some persons have a greater facility for rational thought than others. It is partially under this pretext that some claim the authority to determine what is best for others.3 Goodrich believed, however, that human impulses other than reason often guide and influence decision making: love, compassion, fortitude, envy, hate, fear, lust, greed, and so forth. Goodrich was convinced that imperfect man is often led astray in his exercise of power by these other impulses and by his proclivity, once he gains power, to believe in his own infallibility.

Goodrich believed that even if the occasional wise and benevolent dictator appears (such as Plato’s philosopher-king), it is highly improvident for any person to be given power over others. Why? Because the state is no better than the imperfect human beings who hold the power of the state. When a man is elevated to a higher position of power, his imperfections become magnified, and he is more likely to make errors in judgment about what is in others’ best interests.4 One man simply cannot make better decisions for others than they can make for themselves, for every man has a greater knowledge of his own individual needs and desires than anyone else can possibly have. Any argument to the contrary, Goodrich believed, was merely based on expediency; for example, to enable officeholders to do the popular thing at the moment to gain votes rather than to allow individuals to work out their own destinies.

Moreover, Goodrich believed that those who occupy a seat of governmental power often become corrupted, seeking more and more power. The examples in history that support Goodrich’s position are so numerous that only some of the most egregious need be mentioned: from the Egyptian pharaohs to Roman emperors such as Caligula (“Would that the Roman people had a single neck [to cut off their head]”);5 from Cesare Borgia and Robespierre to modern dictators such as Stalin, Hitler, and Mao.

Goodrich was convinced that even democratically elected officeholders are prone to succumb to the lure of power. Thus, Goodrich did not think that to be dangerous a person with power had to have a sinister side; rather, he believed that the possession of authority was a corrupting influence to the powerholder and would result in the negation of freedom to individuals over whom authority is employed. Power exercised for the general good was the most dangerous because it was disarming and, therefore, least resisted.6

Furthermore, while Goodrich believed that the most dangerous power was that of government, his suspicions about powerholders extended well beyond those who exercise it by the authority of the state; he believed that power was dangerous wherever there was a consolidation of authority with the sanction of force.7 Lord Acton’s admonition to Bishop Creighton was, after all, directly in response to what Acton perceived as the corruption of the papacy of the late nineteenth century.8

Goodrich’s perceptive observations about the potential abuses associated with power are not merely abstract insights. They are supported by studies that have noted the change in behavior experienced by persons who obtain power.

Moreover, Goodrich identified a specific characteristic of the person in a position of power—the reluctance to accept negative feedback, because such criticism interferes with the pleasure associated with “calling the shots.” Subordinates soon realize that flattery serves them better than constructive criticism.10 Since the powerholder receives no negative information, he or she believes that there are no problems and comes to feel infallible.

Goodrich did his best to avoid falling into that trap. He often circumvented his field managers at both the Ayrshire Collieries Corporation and the Indiana Telephone Corporation. Goodrich would visit miners in the coalfields and telephone operators at their work stations. He questioned workers about improvements, cost reductions, production, and customer satisfaction. He knew from experience and common sense that managers are tempted to tell the boss what they believe he wants to hear.11

Goodrich’s remedy for the consolidation of power was to decentralize decision making, holding each individual responsible for his or her success or failure:

Goodrich believed that education alone could enlighten individuals and persuade them to take correct action and accept moral responsibility. Therefore, coercion by the state is not only unnecessary but counterproductive. “Pierre believed that the scholar or great teacher would have influence over the person but would not have power over him,” said the Reverend Edmund Opitz, a staff member at the Foundation for Economic Education who knew Goodrich for the better part of twenty years.13

Therefore, Goodrich believed that there are many ways to influence properly individuals, but all these methods entail moral persuasion through some form of educational process (for example, pamphlets, books, debates, individual study, and discussion). Power by the state, to the degree it need exist at all, should be limited to ensuring that no person’s freedom is infringed upon by others.

Liberty as a Prerequisite of Moral Value

Goodrich believed that there could be little, if any, moral value in a person’s actions if that individual was acting under compulsion. If a person gives to the poor or aids another in any way solely because he is forced to by, for example, a tax or a mandate enforced by the police powers of the state, then the moral value of the act is destroyed. If a person cannot do otherwise, then his actions possess no moral worth; that is, there is no exercise of the human will. The influence of Kant’s thinking on Goodrich is apparent here.

Therefore, Goodrich believed that moral conduct (consisting of respectful behavior toward others and the world at large according to some universal law, such as natural law) is less prevalent where freedom is lacking. For instance, in any society where the state, church, corporation, or another person has power over others, one is likely to find intolerance, brutal treatment of people, and a general disregard for individual rights. Historical examples abound: the Crusades of the eleventh to thirteenth centuries, Robespierre’s “Reign of Terror,” institutional slavery, the early Industrial Age’s exploitation of workers, the purges of Stalin, and Hitler’s Holocaust.

Thus, to Goodrich’s way of thinking, individual freedom is a prerequisite not only for moral value but also for moral behavior. A critical caveat to Goodrich’s moral view of freedom is his belief that the existence of individual freedom has to be exercised in tandem with individual responsibility. To Goodrich, the concepts of freedom and responsibility were inseparable. Goodrich exemplified this belief in his business practices. For example, he strove to make a profit from his coal-mining operations, but he did not believe that his property right gave him the freedom to plunder the land. He believed that his coal company held the land, and other resources, in trust for future generations.14

Goodrich also believed that another prerequisite to a free society is the acceptance of mistakes in the exercise of freedom.15 A free society is subject to the whims of individual decision makers and the values that free individuals pursue. Therefore, any particular individual or group that believes itself to be enlightened about cultural, economic, political, or spiritual matters may well disagree with the values that others, exercising their own freedom, choose to embrace. Leaders of a free society must refrain, however, regardless of how foolish or wrong they believe others’ values to be, from exercising the power to compel “right” action in others.16 Similarly, if a society becomes morally reckless in the exercise of its freedoms and refuses to exercise its corresponding responsibilities, that society may end up sowing the seeds of its own destruction. That is why a free society must be based on strong moral convictions and moral values of a particular kind.

Goodrich believed that maximum liberty is important not only because it eliminates the control that some would otherwise have over others, but also because it liberates the potential in individuals and therefore the energy and potential of a community and nation.17 He further held that when the state or other power assumes responsibility over others, it hinders individual initiative. Thus, statist societies deny individuals the opportunity to achieve their potential and therefore deny society the contributions of enterprising people.

Clearly, one of the main reasons that the United States became such a strong economic and moral power is that its citizens have had the freedom to exercise and benefit from their own talents. Goodrich believed that the main reason that statist societies are generally anemic in comparison is that the state either smothers individual initiative or intervenes to choose winners and losers in advance of individual achievement. Goodrich also believed that it was impossible for the state to justly or wisely make such assessments. He wrote, “Anything we know of man’s history would indicate that such men can not be identified prior to their achievement. Verdi was refused admission for a scholarship at the Conservatory in Milan as lacking aptitude in music. He stayed in Milan and studied privately. Verdi developed his aptitude without benefit of the Conservatory.”18

By comparison, the strength of free enterprise is the mobility that individuals possess in the economic system. In schemes of central planning (for example, socialism) and precapitalist societies (for example, aristocracy), economic and social positions are rigid. The opportunity to do what one desires or to move upward economically or socially is often limited. In these systems, the state (central planners) or the station of one’s birth significantly determines the course of a person’s life. The free enterprise system, however, allows the individual greater opportunity to choose the way in which he or she wants to operate in society. This freedom includes the freedom to make unwise decisions. Less dogmatic supporters of the capitalist system will find fault with this premise, but Goodrich believed that history supported his contentions.

One of the most famous and brilliant passages in all literature is Fyodor Dostoyevsky’s narrative of “The Grand Inquisitor” in The Brothers Karamazov. It presents a disturbing view of man’s inability to accept the freedom that he has been given by Christ’s former presence on earth. The novella within the novel is about the return of Christ in fifteenth-century Spain. There, Christ encounters “The Grand Inquisitor,” the oldest and most powerful Cardinal in the Catholic Church.

The Grand Inquisitor denies Christ because Christ has asked too much in asking man to believe in Him without the evidence of miracles. The Grand Inquisitor accepts man as he is—weak, slavish, ignoble—incapable of living up to the ideals that Christ had taught in his earthly message. Thus, the Grand Inquisitor concludes that Christianity has become merely a utopian dream. The Grand Inquisitor chastises Christ and claims that if the Son of God really loved mankind, he would not have asked so much of human beings. The Grand Inquisitor concludes that most men are incapable of freedom and have instead chosen happiness (“the bread of earth”). As one critic wrote, “Never has the problem of freedom been raised with such vehemence as in ‘The Legend of the Grand Inquisitor.’”19

Goodrich often referred to the dilemma of “The Grand Inquisitor” in letters and other writings. For instance, in a letter to F. A. Hayek he wrote, “I certainly do not wish to join the Grand Inquisitor in my concept of human beings, but, on the other hand, my experience and observations would be that we can put up with a great deal of hardship and a great deal on things we would like to see better than they are in the interest of freedom and inequality.”21 He debated in his own mind whether man is capable of accepting freedom. Goodrich’s fundamental question was: Is man so weak that he is incapable of accepting a free and responsible world, complete with all the obligations, hardships, and inequalities that freedom entails?

Goodrich was very much aware of atheistic socialism’s contempt for Christianity and the minimalist state. The atheist-socialist condemns modern Christianity and capitalism because neither guarantees man happiness, peace, or food. Rather, they leave it to free individuals to embrace or reject the ideals of charity, sacrifice, and the market to satisfy human need. This difference between the two ideologies begs the question why the modern welfare state, not the minimalist state that Goodrich advocated, has evolved in nearly every industrialized nation. Is this because of the recognition of the “man on the street” that he cannot meet the ideals (freedom and its requisite responsibilities) of Christianity and the minimalist state? Or is it merely because man has been hoodwinked by statists into giving up his liberties? Perhaps the answer is both.

In any event, Goodrich constantly asked himself and others a very straightforward question: What does a society do about those who do not want to be free and who want the state to take care of them? Goodrich’s good friend Benjamin Rogge believed that left to their own devices many people who are dependent on the welfare state would in fact take care of themselves, leading to smaller government. Goodrich was less certain of this outcome. He believed, along with Hayek, that a free society contains in itself the seeds of its own destruction.22 This conviction prompted Goodrich to believe also that proper education and perpetual vigilance are needed to guard against the erosion of individual freedoms.

One criticism of Goodrich’s vision of liberty is that he focused too much attention on what Isaiah Berlin, in his celebrated essay “Two Concepts of Liberty,” calls “negative freedom.” Negative freedom, according to Berlin, is the absence of coercion by others. Simply put, the belief is that the individual is free if he is not compelled by some outside force to do other than what he wills to do.23 This conception of liberty overlooks the forces within man that may make him unfree.

What Berlin describes as “positive freedom” focuses attention on what the individual could become if he were free from inherent limitations: passions, penury, psychological hang-ups, and so forth.24 If the individual can overcome these personal obstacles, he or she is much more apt to achieve self-realization. Goodrich’s writings support the view that most people if freed from outside influences do possess the capability and will to become self-directed. A philosopher with a less-hopeful view of human nature might argue that most individuals if left to their own devices will remain slaves to their passions or environment. The difference in emphasis between the two views demonstrates, as Berlin observes, “that conceptions of freedom directly derive from views of what constitutes a self, a person, a man.”25

A second and perhaps more substantive criticism of Goodrich is the preeminence he ascribes to liberty in all situations, seemingly neglecting other values and qualities, such as justice, happiness, security, and abject poverty. As Berlin notes: “Without adequate conditions for the use of freedom, what is the value of freedom? First things come first: there are situations, as a nineteenth-century Russian radical writer declared, in which boots are superior to the works of Shakespeare; individual freedom is not everyone’s primary need. . . . The Egyptian peasant needs clothes or medicine before, and more than, personal liberty.”26

In defense of Goodrich, no doubt he would argue that even the Egyptian peasant needs a minimal amount of liberty to enjoy his meager life; moreover, in theory, at least, the possibility of enjoying greater material comforts and self-esteem will depend upon the individual’s receiving and being responsible for greater amounts of personal freedom.

In sum, Goodrich believed that liberty is the prerequisite for man’s achieving his greatest expression of personhood and the enjoyment of a prosperous society. The exercise of talents and abilities, the moral value of human behavior, the working out of personal destiny—all of these are possible only in a state of freedom from statist or other forms of external control.

Goodrich knew that liberty is not something that, once obtained, need no longer be sought. Life is a continual process of securing and maintaining freedoms. Therefore, liberty must be continually taught, like English, mathematics, and history. If it is not, there are many forces in human nature that will induce humanity to abandon liberty in pursuit of easier and seemingly more expedient solutions to social, political, and economic problems.27

I am now writing mainly to ask whether you think that in the special circumstances which I shall explain there might be a chance of prevailing upon him to speak. . . .

Sincerely yours,

F. A. Hayek

(Hayek to Van Sickle, March 8, 1958, F. A. Hayek Collection, box 74, folder 8 [correspondence with Pierre F. Goodrich], Hoover Institution)Goodrich delivered his paper “Why Liberty?” on the evening of September 8, 1958. Two other papers were delivered that evening, one by Ludwig von Mises (“Liberty and Property”) and the other by Felix Morley (“The Meaning of Freedom”). See “Program of the Meeting of the Society at Princeton Graduate College, Princeton, New Jersey, U.S.A., September 8–13, 1958,” Pierre F. Goodrich Collection, folder 4 (Mont Pelerin Society), Archives, Hoover Institution.

“Why Liberty?” was subsequently published in pamphlet form and distributed by Eugene C. Pulliam, Sr., the Indianapolis publisher who was also Goodrich’s business partner. Pulliam sent one thousand copies of the pamphlet to Goodrich and five hundred to the Foundation for Economic Education. See copy of Leonard Read’s letter to Pulliam, March 13, 1959, Pierre F. Goodrich Collection, box 1, “Why Liberty?” folder, Archives, Hoover Institution. Goodrich also discussed the paper in a seminar at Wabash College on October 15, 1958. The pamphlet also contained the statement of aims of the Mont Pelerin Society, established at the society’s first meeting in April 1947.

[2. ]Walter “Guido” Seaton, a retired employee of the Indiana Telephone Corporation, was called to a meeting in Indianapolis in the late 1950s in which Goodrich participated. At dinner later that evening, he sat next to Goodrich. Seaton said that he and Goodrich had talked little throughout the meal, exchanging nothing more than pleasantries. Suddenly, Goodrich asked Seaton, “Do you think power corrupts?” Seaton responded, “Well, I guess it could.” Seaton said that he and Goodrich did not say another word to each other during the rest of the evening (interview, January 16, 1993).

[3. ]Goodrich writes, “It follows that power, however obtained, be it by force of arms or by a proclamation with a gold seal affixed to it, transforms the holder of that power into a more imperfect man, in fact a dangerous man—he has force over the destinies of other men” (“Why Liberty?” p. 14).

[4. ]Goodrich states: Is not a perfect state inconceivable unless one assumes perfection within mankind? If power tends to corrupt then the power of the state inevitably increases and implements man’s imperfections.If you accept the Acton principle, as I do, that “Power tends to corrupt and absolute power corrupts absolutely,” then it seems to me that you must conclude that the essential nature of that corruption is imperfect man’s deification of his ends and his tendency to justify the use of any means he may possess, including force, to accomplish his ends. He becomes the superman beyond good and evil. (“Why Liberty?” p. 13)

[5. ]From Suetonius, “Gaius Caligula,” De viris illustribus, sec. 30.

[6. ]Goodrich wrote in the Basic Memorandum: “It is observable that the most dangerous of those powers is the power of government, especially when it is combined with unlimited authority accepted by the people generally and when it purports to be for a general good. Where the alleged general good is concerned with securing man’s eternity by governmental force applied to him, such a general good is probably the most dangerous of all exercise of governmental powers” (p. 23, exhibit I-b).

[7. ]Goodrich was especially interested in the common-law offense of assault, in how the mere threat to inflict injury, combined with the apparent ability to carry the threat out, constituted an actionable crime and an abuse of power. Russell Kirk recounted a conversation he had with Goodrich about the offense. “In the last conversation we had together at his office, Pierre told me about English common-law decisions concerning assault. That offense did not necessarily go so far as physical attack: he cited a case in which a man stood silent, a drawn sword in his hand, obstructing a public pathway; and he subsequently was found guilty of assault, even though he struck no one and did not threaten aloud persons who approached him” (letter from Russell Kirk to author, February 8, 1992).

[8. ]Thus, Goodrich applied Acton’s caveat in other contexts, “It is desirable to have a free society and that means neither business nor labor organizations must be given the force of government to achieve their ends and they must not abuse their power by exercising force.”

Goodrich acknowledged that there is always the attempt to justify the exercise of power as a means to achieve an end objective.

I believe that Lord Acton’s statement . . . can be observed in all sorts of human affairs and every person should be able to judge that for himself if he will be honest. I would clearly say that that power which is for the greatest good of the greatest number [utilitarianism], especially for the good of your eternity, has to be the most dangerous of all powers. Even in the business world you have, in the first place, a suspect mission because you cannot properly state your purpose to be for any proper good except that of the business being operated at a profit. (Letter to F. A. Hayek, December 24, 1970, F. A. Hayek Collection, Hoover Institution) In operating his businesses, Goodrich did not openly oppose unionization, but neither would he do anything that would assist collective representation. For instance, in the late 1950s, when a handful of employees (including Walter Seaton) attempted to form a union at the Indiana Telephone Corporation, Goodrich did not fight their attempts. He neither sanctioned their efforts nor, presumably, favored laws that forced unionization. According to Seaton, there were at least two reasons the union did not succeed. First, Goodrich refused to withhold union dues from individual employees’ paychecks, thus compelling the union to try to extract dues individually from employees. That effort proved to be a failure. Second, employees, especially linemen, were spread out over a large area in south-central Indiana, thus making it very difficult to get employees together for union meetings. Seaton stated that eventually the reason to unionize—to obtain certain benefits, and especially a retirement plan—no longer existed, because Goodrich agreed to set up a retirement plan for the employees (interview, January 16, 1993).

[9. ]Richard W. Brislin, The Art of Getting Things Done: A Practical Guide to the Use of Power (New York: Praeger, 1991), p. 45. Brislin bases his writing on research by David Kipnis, who wrote The Powerholders (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1976). Kipnis’s research findings can be summarized by the following eight potential cumulative metamorphic effects on a holder of power:

• 1. The use of power is pleasurable and intoxicating.
• 2. The powerholder puts efforts into achieving more power.
• 3. The judgment of the powerful person becomes cloudy due to a preoccupation with gaining influence and control.
• 4. The powerholder uses the resources for self-benefit.
• 5. Negative feedback is no longer available from subordinates and instead the powerholder is the beneficiary of flattery.
• 6. The powerholder develops a lofty view of his or her own self-worth.
• 7. The worth of subordinates is devalued by the powerholder.
• 8. The powerholder takes too much credit for the accomplishments of subordinates. (The Powerholders, p. 47)

[10. ]In a letter to F. A. Hayek, Goodrich wrote: “Several years ago we hired a county agent for important land work who had 15 years allegedly successful experience. It did not work out and I suspect one of the reasons was that he had been adjusted to sensing what the people wanted to be told as a part of his success as county agent. In working for us his mental ability was partly blocked by his constant sensitiveness to what we wished to be told. This was not good” (February 18, 1959, p. 3, F. A. Hayek Collection, box 34, folder 17, Archives, Hoover Institution).

[11. ]William Nordhorn, interview, January 16, 1993.

[12. ]“Why Liberty?” p. 6.

[13. ]Edmund Opitz, telephone interview, October 10, 1992. Goodrich was, however, leery of the educated person’s being given power solely on the theory that because the individual was well trained, he would exercise power prudently and wisely. He thought that the temptations of power were too great. It might be possible to argue that the extensive knowledge of consequences of human actions which would come from being truly educated would lead a man to choose virtuous behavior, if on no other grounds than that of efficiency; i.e., the knowledge that right action succeeds while wrong action fails. But the Faust myth still rises to challenge us, and we cannot be comfortable with the assumption that the knowledgeable man will also be the noble or virtuous man. In fact, in the Faust myth, it is precisely the most learned who is most susceptible to the temptations of the Devil, to the lure of temporal power over others. (It is tempting to explain the behavior of many modern intellectuals in somewhat this way.) (Education in a Free Society, p. 59)

[14. ]Goodrich’s philosophy and its practice are well summarized in the Ayrshire Collieries annual report that Goodrich issued in 1946, the year after he established Meadowlark Farms. “Your company has recognized that coal operators have certain community obligations, and should demonstrate their willingness to conduct their affairs so far as possible without giving cause for public criticism, which leads to governmental interference, with its tendency to unrealistic approach[es]. The problems involve the field of land use, conservation, and rehabilitation, and can be solved, and operations administered, only by specialists” (William H. Andrews, “Ayrshire Collieries Corporation—Profit with Ecology” [Research paper, Indiana University, n.d.], p. 19).

[15. ]Goodrich wrote, “It also seems evident that it is necessary, as a part of this discipline that he must be free to make choices which appear to be good or bad, fortunate or unfortunate. The freedom to do this, coupled with the responsibility of abiding by the results of that choice, is a necessary part of maintaining liberty” (Basic Memorandum, p. 17).

[16. ]There are other ways to influence “bad” behavior. Ludwig von Mises offers insights that Goodrich would endorse. Freedom really means the freedom to make mistakes. This we have to realize. We may be highly critical with regard to the way in which our fellow citizens are spending their money and living their lives. We may believe that what they are doing is absolutely foolish and bad, but in a free society, there are many ways for people to air their opinions on how their fellow citizens should change their ways of life. They can write books, they can write articles; they can make speeches; they can even preach at street corners if they want—and they do this in many countries. But they must not try to police other people in order to prevent them from doing certain things simply because they themselves do not want these other people to have the freedom to do it. (“Socialism,” chap. 6 in The Morality of Capitalism [Irvington-on-Hudson, N.Y.: Freeman Classics, 1992], p. 49)

[17. ]John Quincy Adams summarizes this idea quite well in a letter to James Lloyd (October 1, 1822). “Individual liberty is individual power, and as the power of a community is a mass compounded of individual powers, the nation which enjoys the most freedom must necessarily be in proportion to its numbers the most powerful nation” (John Bartlett, Familiar Quotations, 15th ed., ed. Emily Morison Beck [Boston: Little Brown, 1980], p. 418).

[18. ]“Why Liberty?” p. 11.

[19. ]Geir Kjetsaa, Fyodor Dostoyevsky: A Writer’s Life, trans. Siri Hustvedt and David McDuff (New York: Fawcett Columbine, 1987), pp. 337–43; ibid., p. 341.

[20. ]Fyodor Dostoyevsky, “The Grand Inquisitor,” The Brothers Karamazov, book 5, part 5.

[21. ]February 18, 1959; see letters from Goodrich to F. A. Hayek, February 18, 1959, p. 5, box 22, folder 6, and December 24, 1970, p. 6, box 43, folder 22, F. A. Hayek Papers, Hoover Institution; “Why Liberty?” p. 12.

[22. ]Ruth Connolly, one of Goodrich’s former secretaries, often heard Goodrich and Rogge discuss this problem. She said that Rogge believed that many people who are now wards of the state had enough initiative to take responsibility for their lives if they could no longer depend on the state for their survival. Goodrich apparently was somewhat less optimistic. He wrote F. A. Hayek the following: This, of course, leaves the problem of what on earth you do with those who are enemies of a free society or those who do not wish to be free (I suppose this refers to those who cannot see that their responsibility temporarily passed to government will in the end leave them completely un-free) and with those who are unable to be free. Unless the concept of one vote to each individual is reasonably exploded and unless it is realized that the important thing is not the vote but the freedom of the individual who wishes to be free and responsible, adequately protected from intimidation in his own society and defended from external enemies, then your concept that a free society contains in it its own destruction may be definitive. I think it is coupled with a franchise which can be purchased by the method of taxation, that has to be so. (December 24, 1970, p. 6, F. A. Hayek Papers, box 43, folder 22, Hoover Institution)

[23. ]Berlin’s essay “Two Concepts of Liberty” is contained in his Four Essays on Liberty (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1969), pp. 118–72.

[24. ]Ibid., p. 131.

[25. ]Ibid., p. 134.

[26. ]Ibid., p. 124.

[27. ]The desire for freedom is the driving force behind most revolutions, but, ironically, once obtained it is also easily taken for granted. In George Orwell’s Animal Farm, after revolting against the humans, most of the animals forget why the revolution took place; thus the animals leave themselves open for oppression by the pigs. Unfortunately, such behavior is not uncommon in the human world.