The Online Library of Liberty

A project of Liberty Fund, Inc.

• Illustrations
• Foreword
• Preface
• Acknowledgments
• Part I: Family Life and Early Background
• Chapter 1: An American Family
• Chapter 2: Origins
• Chapter 3: Youth and Experience
• Chapter 4: Initiation Into Politics
• Chapter 5: The Early Years, 1894–1900
• Chapter 6: Entering the Business World
• Chapter 7: The Early Years, 1901–1916
• Part II: James P. Goodrich the Consummate Politician
• Chapter 8: The Political Years
• Chapter 9: The 1916 Campaign
• Chapter 10: Years As Governor, 1917–1921
• Chapter 11: The Middle Years, 1916–1923
• Chapter 12: The Great Russian Famine, 1921–1923
• Chapter 13: Emissary to Russia
• Chapter 14: Return to Russia, 1925
• Part III: Businessmen With the Midas Touch
• Chapter 15: The 1920s
• Chapter 16: The 1930s
• Chapter 17: Companies! Companies! Companies!
• Chapter 18: Ayrshire Collieries Corporation
• Chapter 19: The Ecologist
• Chapter 20: The Later Years, 1940–1960
• Chapter 21: The Later Years, 1960–1973
• Part IV: Pierre F. Goodrich Crusader and Philosopher
• Chapter 22: Associations and Causes
• Chapter 23: Wabash College
• Chapter 24: The Mont Pelerin Society
• Chapter 25: A Scholar’s Life
• Chapter 26: Education In a Free Society
• Chapter 27: Moral, Political, and Metaphysical Beliefs
• Chapter 28: Why Liberty?
• Chapter 29: Liberty Fund, Inc.
• Part V: The Goodriches Assayed
• Chapter 30: Who Was Pierre F. Goodrich?
• Chapter 31: Defining Influences
• Chapter 32: Why Did They Work So Hard? Work, Ideas, Citizenship, and Virtue
• Chapter 33: Epilogue
• Appendixes

Chapter 13

Emissary to Russia

In his last report to Herbert Hoover before he left the Soviet Union in November 1921, James Goodrich outlined the terrible suffering he had seen. He also wrote at length about the political turn of events he had discovered. Goodrich stressed to Hoover that the Russian peasant still had a friendliness toward the American people that had changed little from before the Russian civil war. He also offered an opinion that Lenin’s Bolshevik government was evolving into a regime that was less antagonistic to capitalism than had been previously thought. Moreover, Goodrich noted that he had talked to men of political affairs in the country and “found not one particle of sentiment for the old order (under the Czars) and the Russian people will have none of it.” He continued, “If Lenin can hold the majority of his party with him, and especially Trotsky and the army, this government will stand.”1

After learning about Goodrich’s account, President Warren G. Harding was convinced that direct aid from the United States government was the only way that relief could reach Russia in time to prevent the famine from becoming horrific in scope. Hoover encouraged this thinking. The ARA director was against the alternative, an appeal to the American public, for several reasons: First, it would take a relatively long time to mount because of the difficult logistics of such a campaign and because public sentiment was generally not in favor of helping the Bolsheviks; second, there would be private fund-raising groups that the ARA simply could not control; and third, a direct appeal to Congress had the best chance of maximizing a large return.

On December 6, President Harding made his first state of the union address to Congress. In that address, the president requested that Congress appropriate for Russian famine relief $10 million. This would be enough to purchase ten million bushels of corn and one million bushels of seed corn.2 On December 10, United States congressman Joseph W. Fordney of Michigan introduced legislation in the House of Representatives that would appropriate the $10 million that Harding was seeking. Meanwhile, the urgency of the situation was growing. On December 8, Colonel Haskell, director of ARA Russian operations, sent Hoover a sober forecast of what would occur if aid did not come immediately: “Somewhere between five million and seven million people in this area must die unless relieved from outside Russia. . . . As a Christian nation we must make greater effort to prevent this tragedy. Can you not ask those who have already assisted this organization to carry over eight million children through famine in other parts of Europe to again respond to the utmost of their ability?”3

By December 5, Goodrich had already returned to Indiana. Just five days later, he received Hoover’s telegram, summoning him back to Washington to appear before Congress. Instead of having hearings held before the Ways and Means Committee, Hoover had managed to have testimony heard before a more influential body, the House Foreign Affairs Committee. The hearings lasted two days, December 13 and 14. The first day was devoted entirely to the issue of famine relief. The second day’s testimony, about recent Soviet political developments, was offered in a closed executive session by Goodrich, Hoover, and others.

At the December 13 hearing, Goodrich was the first to testify. His testimony was the longest and most complete of any of the witnesses. Others who testified included Hoover; Samuel Gompers, president of the American Federation of Labor (AFL); Dr. Vernon Kellogg, secretary of the National Research Council; Carl Vroonman, former assistant secretary of the Department of Agriculture; and Ralph Snyder, executive board member of the American Farm Bureau Federation.4

In his opening statement, Goodrich first explained the conditions that led up to the great Soviet famine: the seven years of foreign and civil war that had disrupted normal agricultural cycles in the Volga region; the subsequent reduction in the amount of crops that had been planted; and the terrible drought of the preceding summer and the partial drought of 1920. Goodrich next recounted his nearly two-month tour of sixteen different communes in the famine regions.5

On reading Goodrich’s report and the exchange that took place between him and members of the committee, one is immediately struck by Goodrich’s decisiveness. When the former governor was asked during the hearing whether the proposed $10 million in relief was adequate, he answered unequivocally that it would take twice that—$20 million but no more—to successfully address the famine. He also attempted to allay any fear by the committee that American relief would not go directly to the starving peasants, but would be confiscated by authorities or pocketed by Communist bureaucrats. “I heard of one man caught stealing American food who was . . . shot by order of the Soviet authorities,” Goodrich said. Goodrich interspersed his very thorough statistical summary with sympathetic anecdotes: finding the two orphan girls in Markstadt half-naked and sobbing; meeting the distraught hospital administrator at Kazan; hearing the disturbing news from the farmers at Norga, who predicted that one-half of the commune’s population would be dead by the end of winter if foreign relief was not forthcoming.6

Hoover’s testimony primarily dealt with the anticipated criticisms of providing relief to a nonrecognized government that America feared. He emphasized the humanitarian nature of the undertaking. He also informed the committee that relief had been offered only after negotiations had resulted in the release of all American prisoners of war in Russia. The future president further made the observation that United States famine relief would not have the unintended result of propping up the Communist regime. This was so, Hoover argued, because the aid would be going to a region of Russia primarily outside the scope of socialist (communist) influence:

By these last remarks, it is obvious Hoover was trying to sensitize the committee into believing that the Volgarian peasants were really just destitute “blood cousins” who deserved American generosity. Hoover went on to explain that it would be impossible to provide sufficient relief funds privately, since the ARA had been able to raise from a skeptical American public only approximately $500,000 in contributions since August. Finally, Hoover appealed to the economics of the relief. He attempted to persuade the committee that famine aid through the direct provision of agricultural products would relieve a glutted American commodities market: “We are today feeding milk to our hogs; burning corn under our boilers. From an economic point of view there is no loss to America in exporting those foodstuffs for relief purposes. If it is undertaken by the Government it means, it is true, that we transfer the burden of the loss from the farmers to the taxpayer, but there is no economic loss to us as a Nation, and the farmer also bears part of the burden.”8

During the second day of testimony, held in closed session, Goodrich noted the concessions to capitalism that the Communist regime had sanctioned: farmers were now able to keep and sell for personal profit surplus crops; retail shops and banks were beginning to reappear; serious discussions regarding the role of private property and contracts were under way. All of this was very important to members of the committee because of the desire, on the part of many in Congress, to investigate whether recognition of Russia and the establishment of diplomatic relations could or should be pursued.

After the day’s hearing, United States senator Joseph I. France of Maryland announced to the press that Goodrich’s testimony would go far toward bringing about a marked alteration in American policy toward the Soviet Union. Senator France had initiated legislation that would create a seven-person commission to investigate the resumption of trade relations between the two countries as well as the issue of diplomatic recognition by the United States of the Soviet republic.9

A spirited debate about the proposed famine relief occurred on the House floor, during which time Goodrich’s testimony was often used as the reference point. Despite this rhetorical tussle, the House of Representatives passed the relief legislation by a vote of 181 to 71. In the Senate, however, approval was less trouble-free. Senator Tom Watson of Georgia made a number of arguments against the bill, including the fact that the Soviet Union still owed the United States nearly $200 million, as well as the spurious argument that “the Russians do not even know how to mill corn; they don’t like it, won’t eat it.”10

Despite these objections, the Senate passed the legislation in a very short time. By December 22 President Harding signed the relief measure into legislation. From the time of the relief bill’s introduction to its passage, exactly twelve days had passed. Considering the normally slow, grinding process of legislation, the quick passage was a miracle. Clearly Goodrich’s and Hoover’s testimonies had confirmed the seriousness of the famine and the urgency to act. By Christmas, news had reached the Russian peasants that America had come to their rescue.11

Goodrich’s knowledge of the situation was truly convincing. One Soviet expert claimed that Goodrich possessed “more intelligence of real human sympathy or understanding about Russia” than almost anyone he had ever met.12 The crucial role that Goodrich’s testimony played before Congress is perhaps best summarized in a letter that Edgar Rickard, director-general of the ARA, wrote to Walter L. Brown, ARA’s European director, shortly after enactment of the famine legislation:

When James Goodrich appeared before the House Foreign Affairs Committee in December 1921, he held no official position with the ARA. His earlier investigation in the Soviet Union had been simply as a private citizen, and only his travel expenses had been covered by the relief organization. On Christmas Eve, however, President Harding signed an executive order that appointed Hoover and Goodrich to the five-member Purchasing Commission for Russian Relief as chairman and vice-chairman, respectively.14 Just days before, Hoover had appointed Goodrich to the ARA Executive Committee. From January 4 to March 22, 1922, the Purchasing Committee met at least once a week to review bids by various agribusinesses. The committee reviewed hundreds of bids. When Hoover was unavailable to attend, Goodrich chaired the meetings until his second departure for the Soviet Union in mid February.15

By the end of January 1922, only one month after Congress had passed the legislation, $12 million had been spent for the following purchases: 6,945,000 bushels of corn, 1,370,652 bushels of seed wheat, 9,800 tons of corn grits, and 340,000 cases of condensed milk. By the end of January, three million bushels of grain had already been sent to the Soviet Union by thirteen steamships. Additional ships were in port loading in New York, Baltimore, Philadelphia, and New Orleans. By May 22, 1922, fifty-eight steamships had transported cargo to meet the needs of the starving Russians.16 It was perhaps the largest relief effort ever undertaken by the United States government.

Ironically, no sooner had Goodrich received his appointment to the ARA Executive Committee than it was decided that he should return to Russia, but, strangely enough, not under the official auspices of the ARA. Rather, President Harding had decided that Goodrich should serve as an unofficial emissary. Since Goodrich could not become involved in political matters and still be officially associated with the ARA, he wore a different hat when he returned to Russia in February 1922. An article by the Associated Press briefly described the former governor’s new position:

The United States and Russia had had no formal diplomatic relations since the Bolshevik revolution in October 1917. Thus, the Harding administration believed that Goodrich’s second trip could serve as an excellent opportunity for an unofficial representative to share America’s concerns over Soviet domestic and foreign policies. Also, since Goodrich had the ear of President Harding, Secretary of State Charles E. Hughes, and Hoover, Communist leaders could be assured that their views, conveyed to Goodrich, would be relayed in confidence to the highest United States political authorities.

On February 12, 1922, Goodrich left on his second tour. It was during this trip that he met with the Soviet president, Vladimir Lenin. Goodrich arrived in Moscow on March 9. In his manuscript about his trips to Russia, Goodrich describes the Moscow of March 1922 as totally different from the one he had left the preceding November: The streets were filled with activity, the people had a sense of cheerfulness, more stores were open, and people could purchase more than the necessities of life.18

At Tsaritsin, Goodrich learned that American corn had recently arrived and that some twenty thousand peasants from the region had come on sledges in one day to carry it away. By mid March, 135 trains were carrying fifty thousand tons of American corn to the furthermost corners of the famine region. Men were working around the clock to unload the grain.19

Goodrich was forced to spend his first week in Moscow dealing with ARA personnel problems that were embarrassing to the relief organization: drunkenness by members of the local (Moscow) team, and an ARA officer in Petrograd who blatantly hired prostitutes.20 Moreover, Goodrich had hand-carried a letter from Hoover to Colonel Haskell that contained Hoover’s concern that most of the Russian ARA staff were Catholic. “I haven’t any prejudice in any religious matter as you know,” wrote Hoover to Haskell, “but if we are going to have peace in the United States we need to have a sprinkling of Protestants on the job somehow.”21

On March 18, Goodrich traveled to Samara to find further troubles: The Cheka had recently made two hundred arrests for illegal political activity. Five Russian ARA officials were on the list. In an unrelated matter, forty-nine members of an organization of bandits were on trial in Samara. They had killed about a dozen people in carrying out their thievery. Goodrich attended the last evening of the trial with the chief of the new Department of Justice of Samara, a Monsieur Zgakanoff. Nine of the bandits were sentenced to death, and the rest were sent off to serve sentences varying from three years to life imprisonment in Siberia.22

If the activities of the local ARA teams were not exactly encouraging, the success of food distribution was. Heavy snows and below freezing temperatures had allowed peasants from long distances, up to three days away, to travel by sledges to the distribution centers. They hauled away several hundred pounds of corn each. Still, death had been a common visitor in many of the communes. On March 19, Goodrich attempted to travel by train to Orenburg, only to have the train stopped: first, to avoid a gang of bandits, and, later, by a terrific snowstorm that blocked the tracks for several days. When it was learned how long it would take for the tracks to become cleared, Goodrich had his car attached to a freight train and attempted to return to Samara. The freight train became lodged in an “insurmountable snowdrift,” and Goodrich was stuck for another five days near the town of Bogotae. The misfortune did allow Goodrich to discuss with several local peasants the conditions that existed. What he learned was not pleasant:

The misery caused by the famine was not limited to within Russia’s borders. Rats and mice from the famine region were migrating by the hundreds of millions to Hungary, overrunning Budapest. In the Hungarian capital, market halls, food stores, and warehouses were swarming with the rodents. In some Hungarian villages, farmers gave up raising poultry and began breeding cats to try and stop the rat and mice plague.24

Meanwhile, Goodrich became livid because of the inefficiency of the Russian train system. He claimed that a good American worker could do the work of ten Soviet railroaders. Despite repeated delays on the return trip to Moscow, the common response of both railroad worker and passenger alike was “Nitchevo,” meaning “it doesn’t matter.”25 While Goodrich was delayed in returning to Moscow, he took the opportunity to write a lengthy letter to President Harding. The report dealt only briefly with the immense gratitude that the Russian people felt toward America for coming to their rescue. The remainder of Goodrich’s letter was concerned with Russia’s political conditions. Goodrich lobbied forcefully for recognition of the Bolshevik regime. In his opinion, whether the American public and officials liked it or not, the Bolsheviks were the only power in Russia capable of running the government.

The fervor with which Goodrich believed in United States recognition of the Bolshevik regime is easily seen in the concluding paragraphs of his letter to President Harding:

Goodrich arrived back in Moscow on Thursday morning, March 30. In the Russian capital, he was invited on April 1 to a formal dinner with the president of the Russian banking system and the director of forestry. He discovered later that the two men’s interest in dining with him was to learn Washington’s attitude toward Russian recognition. Without United States diplomatic recognition, Russian businesses could not deal directly with their American counterparts. The terribly anemic performance of the post–civil war Russian economy was at least partially a result of the policy of the Harding administration. The high-level Russian officials could not understand why America, on the one hand, was willing to provide tremendous famine relief, but, on the other, refused to recognize the Communist government. Goodrich writes of the conundrum:

Goodrich subsequently met with the Russian commissar of railroads and the commissar of foreign affairs (comparable to the United States secretary of state). The latter also confronted Goodrich about recognition. That same week, Goodrich attended a meeting of the Communist Party held in the Imperial Theatre in Moscow and heard an address by Leon Trotsky, who then served as secretary of the Soviet army. Although Trotsky’s speech was generally well received by an audience that was “intensely patriotic and nationalistic in spirit,” he was openly criticized by one Russian. Goodrich believed that the fact that the dissenter was able to openly criticize one of the highest-ranking Soviet leaders was significant because it indicated a growing sense of freedom of speech.29

Goodrich left Moscow on April 4, 1922. He arrived in New York on April 18, having traveled from England on the ocean liner Olympic. Goodrich’s return, replete with a message purported to be direct from Lenin, prompted the Detroit Free Press to predict that the reestablishment of United States–Russian relations was just around the corner.

Goodrich had, in fact, met with Lenin only once during his second trip.31 On his return, Goodrich denied publicly that he carried any message from the Soviet leader to Harding. It is unlikely, however, that his meetings with Lenin, the Soviet foreign minister George Chitcherin, and other Russian leaders were limited to discussing the success of the relief work, as Goodrich claimed.32

At a breakfast meeting with Hoover in Washington on the morning of April 20, Goodrich reported on the success of the relief effort. Goodrich and Hoover then proceeded to discuss Russian developments at a luncheon that same day with President Harding at the White House.33 At these meetings, Goodrich’s reports tended to take on a political tone. Privately, Goodrich continued to press the issue of recognition to Harding, Secretary of State Hughes, and Hoover. It would be a matter that would preoccupy and frustrate the former governor for the next decade. Publicly, he still limited his discussion to the famine and the tremendous success the ARA had had in overcoming great obstacles to provide humanitarian relief.

On May 16, 1922, Goodrich met again with Hughes and Hoover in Washington, D.C., before embarking on his third tour of Russia on May 18. He stopped in both London and Paris to meet with top-level officials about the political situation in Russia. In London, Goodrich met on the morning of May 28 with the controversial United States ambassador to Great Britain, George Harvey. Harvey told Goodrich that the Soviets would soon meet the conditions set down by the American government in order to obtain recognition.34

Goodrich arrived in Moscow on June 7. A week later, he was invited to view some property in the government’s possession. Believing the property to be simply some furs, Goodrich was not particularly excited about the invitation. When he arrived at the storehouse, however, his attitude changed. Three large sealed chests were brought out and their locks were broken. There in front of him were the Russian Crown jewels in all their brilliance. Goodrich wrote: “The old Czar’s crown, the crown of the Czarina, and the various members of the royal family were there, brilliant with diamonds, varying from one to two hundred carats, all of purest water, and of wonderful color. There were crowns of diamonds, and pearls of emeralds, rubies, and amethysts; collars, bracelets, and necklaces of the precious stones. The scene beggared description.”35

Goodrich was shown the collection, purportedly worth $500 million at the time, for two reasons: first, to dispel the rumors that the crown jewels had been broken up and sold; and second, to inquire whether the jewels could be used as the basis for a loan in America to purchase agricultural implements and supplies.36 The first goal was accomplished, since Goodrich’s account of the incident was carried in newspapers by the Associated Press across the United States and Europe. Without formal recognition by the United States government, however, loans to the Soviet Republic, with or without the crown jewels as collateral, were out of the question.

It was during Goodrich’s third trip that he held a conference with Monsieur Rakovsky, the president of the Ukraine, whom Goodrich called “the clearest headed man I had met in Russia.” Rakovsky praised the work of the ARA. He also expressed his hope that it would continue its efforts in the Soviet Republic long after the immediate crisis had ended. The Ukrainian leader also pressed Goodrich on the issue of Soviet recognition. He probed Goodrich regarding whether America would take concessions for private property that had been confiscated by the national government after the civil war. Goodrich’s answer was much the same as before: Without a change in Soviet policy allowing for the private ownership of property and permitting American businesses to operate in Russia with limited governmental intrusion, the United States would not recognize or invest in the Soviet Republic.37 To be safe, Goodrich always combined this response with the caveat that he was speaking only as a private citizen. It was clear, however, that he was espousing the Harding administration’s views. Privately, Goodrich was much more sympathetic to Russia’s plea for recognition than he ever let on to the Russian leaders.

After Goodrich’s meetings, he cabled a brief report to Secretary Hughes. The matter that Goodrich spent the most time discussing was Lenin’s health. If news reports were accurate, Lenin’s death was imminent. Who would succeed him, whether there would be an attempt by other factions to overthrow the Bolsheviks from power, and other related questions were of critical importance to the United States. Goodrich wrote to Hughes:

In the meantime, Goodrich resumed his investigations of famine conditions by traveling through the various provinces. In the Tatar village of Tahtalla, he met with the president of the commune and learned that conditions had improved only marginally since the autumn of 1921. “‘In last September we had 1177 souls in this commune,’ he said. ‘There are 522 people left. Nearly 300 starved and the rest emigrated or died of typhus. Only about 12 percent of our livestock is left. If it were not for America we would all be dead. We raised very little last year and are now getting 250 adult and 250 child rations for relief, so you see the Americans are practically feeding the whole commune.’”39

Lawlessness continued to be a problem as well. Bands of marauders who had previously fought with the anti-Communist White Army continued to raid the communes and steal from and kill the Communist leaders. The problem was that most of the peasants were sympathetic to and befriended these soldiers, hating the Communists also. As one commune leader told Goodrich, only about 5 percent of the peasants were Communists themselves.40

Despite these political problems, Goodrich noted on his return to Moscow from Samara that, as far as the eye could see, “the fields bore evidence of good husbandry.” The weather had been excellent, and all indications were that the countryside east of Moscow would bear a bumper crop of rye, wheat, and other grain. “It seemed [to me] that in a few short weeks the work of American relief in Russia would be over.”41

During Goodrich’s second week in Moscow, he received separate invitations to meet with Leon Trotsky, head of the Russian army; Lev B. Kamenev, chairman of the Soviet Relief Commission; Maxim Litvinoff, acting secretary of state in Chitcherin’s absence; and Leonid Krassin, commissar of foreign trade, to discuss political relations between the United States and Russia. President Harding and Secretary Hughes had suggested that Goodrich meet with the highest leaders of the Soviet Union in order that they might better understand America’s attitude toward Russia, but Goodrich was reluctant to show his eagerness to meet. Goodrich intentionally waited to receive these invitations, and then he turned down the separate invitations, agreeing to meet with the Soviet leaders only collectively. Kamenev arranged the meeting while Goodrich was away from Moscow surveying the success of famine relief in several of the outlying provinces.42

On Sunday, June 18, Goodrich returned to Moscow. On the following day, the meeting with the Soviet leaders was held at the Kremlin office of Kamenev. Present were Kamenev, Litvinoff, Krassin, and Grigori Sokolnikoff, commissar of finance. Also present was Aleksei Rykov, acting president of the Soviet Republic and president of the Soviet Council. Rykov held these positions because of Lenin’s stroke of May 26, which had left the Soviet premier paralyzed over a good part of his body. Trotsky missed the meeting. Dr. Golder served as Goodrich’s interpreter. The points that Goodrich raised were contained in a note that Secretary Hughes had sent on March 25 to Litvinoff, listing specific conditions that had to be met prior to recognition.43

What ensued for the next three hours was a discussion covering the broadest range of issues integral to American-Russian relations. Time and again, Goodrich raised issues that concerned the Harding administration with regard to Soviet political, economic, and legal affairs: the lack of procedural due process in Russia, the lack of separation between the executive and judicial departments, the restrictions on the ownership of private property, the setting aside of contracts, the power and manipulation of labor unions, the Russian debt owed to the United States, the compensation due American companies that had been nationalized or whose property had been otherwise expropriated, and the reluctance of the United States to lend money to the Soviet Republic. On each issue, one or more of the five Soviet leaders—Rykov, Kamenev, Krassin, Litvinoff, and Sokolnikoff—responded to rebut or diffuse Goodrich’s arguments.44

With regard to the issue of debts owed to the United States, the Russian political leaders stood in unison in refusing to recognize and pay the foreign debts that had been incurred during the deposed czar’s reign. Rykov added: “You know that Russia cannot pay. It seems foolish to ask Russia to issue her obligations to pay when she knows that without financial help she cannot pay.” To this, Goodrich rejoined with his typical American “can do” attitude: “‘The difficulty with you gentlemen is that you yourselves have no faith in Russia,’ I replied. ‘Russia can pay, once her industrial and economic system is restored. You ought to show your faith in Russia by frankly saying that you recognize your debts, that they are valid obligations; that you will give us your undertaking to pay these debts, and will fix a definite time when interest and principal will be paid.’”45

Goodrich subsequently drafted a summary of the meeting and forwarded it to Hughes and Hoover. In Goodrich’s letter to Hughes, the former governor painted a gloomy picture of the deteriorating conditions in Russia:

On the next day, June 20, Goodrich attended a trial of the Socialist revolutionaries, this time with Dr. Sokolnikoff, minister of finance. Thirty-four prisoners who had denounced and killed many Communists were being tried for their political beliefs and activities. Goodrich left the trial in the late afternoon to attend a Moscow parade celebrating the Third Internationale. The day marked the anniversary of the slaughter of thousands of Communists by the “Whites,” and the Communist Party was attempting to make the most of it. All factories and offices had been closed, and tens of thousands of workers—not very enthusiastically, Goodrich noted—marched in step and weakly cried out “Comrades all together!” Goodrich observed that many banners denounced the political prisoners whose trial he had just left. By the end of the three-hour parade, a curious thing happened. Large crowds of marchers gathered before the Great Hall of the Nobles, demanding to be admitted to the trial of the revolutionaries. Against the defense’s objection, the court admitted the workers and permitted them to read a petition condemning the prisoners for “inciting a revolution in Russia, holding them responsible for the death of millions of Russian workers and peasants, and demanding the infliction of the death penalty.”47

The following day, Goodrich returned to the Volga valley to continue his inspection of ARA famine relief operations. On his return to Moscow, he began inquiring into the state of American business interests in Russia. He met with the managers of the Westinghouse Corporation, International Harvester, and the chairmen of the Soviet State Bank and the Commission on Concessions. From these meetings, Goodrich learned that the Soviet government rejected private ownership of property but was willing to enter into long lease agreements with foreign corporations. The major problem that plagued businesses was not the lack of private ownership or the lack of access to natural resources; rather, the major impediment was the liberal labor laws that at the time excessively burdened foreign businesses. It was far cheaper for American and German companies to manufacture goods in their own countries and ship them to Russia than it was to produce goods in the Soviet Union. For instance, under Soviet law, women workers who became pregnant were entitled to a full salary for seven months while on maternity leave. The managers of International Harvester told Goodrich that benefits of this kind made up nearly 25 percent of the company’s entire payroll.48

Goodrich next spent an afternoon touring the Kremlin, whose name means “fortress” in Russian. In his manuscript, he describes in detail the various historical sights he visited: the sixty-foot-high wall surrounding the towers, minarets, and gilded domes that adorn the churches and monasteries within the Kremlin; the twenty-six-foot-high, 185-ton bell that Empress Anna had cast in 1733; and the huge, elaborately decorated palaces of the czars. The Kremlin tour made quite an impression on him.49

On June 30, 1922, Goodrich left Moscow, completing his third trip to the Soviet Union. On his return train trip from Berlin to Riga, he found that Leonid Krassin, the Russian secretary of foreign trade, was a fellow passenger. The two spoke for several hours, with Krassin trying to convince Goodrich that American financial assistance and resumption of trade were justified. Goodrich told Krassin that before the United States would consider resuming trade relations with Russia, it would first want to know whether Russia was capable of succeeding in its own internal affairs: Could it balance its budget? Could its railroads make money? Could the natural resource trusts be operated efficiently? and so on. Goodrich further reminded Krassin that the Russian government had promised to submit a comprehensive plan of reconstruction at the Genoa, Italy, international economic conference in March 1922, but had failed to do so. Goodrich wanted to know what the plan was. He writes of Krassin’s response: “M. Krassin then proceeded for half an hour to talk about a perfectly foolish, impractical scheme involving railroad building, electrification, restoration of agriculture, purchase of thousands of tractors—all to be done by the Bolshevik government. Had this statement come from some young, enthusiastic communist I would not have been surprised, but coming from Krassin I was astounded.”50

On July 21, Goodrich returned from the trip along with Cora on the ocean liner Mauritania. Marie Moorman, the daughter of Goodrich’s business partner, Jesse Moorman of Winchester, had accompanied the Goodriches. After his third trip, Goodrich had intervened to arrange for four young Europeans to immigrate to the United States to begin new lives: Josephine Friedrich and Marie Kohlman from Bavaria, Peter Stuer from Latvia, and Hans Fredrichson from Denmark. Friedrich, who spoke no English and only a little French when she first arrived in Boston in September 1923, lived with the Goodriches as a companion to Cora from October 1923 to 1928, when she married.51

Upon Goodrich’s return in July 1922, he participated in a conference for officers of the ARA in New York. At this conference, the leadership of the ARA decided to cease feeding adults in Russia. They concluded, however, that they would continue feeding about one million children for another year.52 Goodrich and Hoover traveled to the White House on September 6, at which time Goodrich updated President Harding on the famine and the political discussions he had held with the Soviet leaders. Goodrich started to press privately for at least an open consideration of Russian recognition by the Harding administration. A brief newspaper excerpt captures the essence of Goodrich’s thinking:

Clearly, Secretary Hughes had a different opinion, and his strong will would not submit to Goodrich’s powers of persuasion. Hughes was a former governor of New York, an associate justice of the Supreme Court, and the Republican candidate for president in 1916, when he narrowly lost to Woodrow Wilson. He would also become the eleventh chief justice of the Supreme Court in 1930. The secretary of state believed that he should be the one sitting in the White House. At the very least, he was convinced that directing America’s foreign policy was his job. Hughes was adamantly opposed to any consideration of recognition without the radical changes dictated in his March 25 letter to Litvinoff.

Unable to shake Hughes from his position, Goodrich returned, discouraged, to Indiana and his neglected business interests. By mid September, negotiations to reestablish relations between the two countries had come to a complete halt. The Harding administration had decided, following Goodrich’s recommendation in June, to appoint a commission to examine the economic conditions in Russia. The Soviets refused to allow an American investigation team to enter Russia, however, unless the United States reciprocated by allowing a Soviet team to visit and examine America’s economic conditions. The demand by Moscow infuriated Hughes. It essentially ended communications between the two countries for a considerable time. In early September, the Times of London reported that it had recently learned that more than 1.7 million Russians had been executed by the Cheka during the Soviet civil war, more than had been killed during all of World War I. The horrific news, reported in United States newspapers, solidified America’s impression that the Communists were a brutal lot and were not to be trusted.54

Privately, Goodrich remained very interested in the reestablishment of United States–Russian relations. Haskell kept Goodrich informed of ongoing ARA activities as well as of political matters by writing him periodically from Moscow. Goodrich also kept a close eye on political developments in the Soviet Union through newspaper accounts and correspondence with Hoover and other ARA officials.55 In late November 1922, Goodrich tried to resurrect the idea of an American commission’s visiting the Soviet Union with the understanding that a Russian commission would be permitted to come to the United States at an undesignated later date. He floated the idea past Haskell in Moscow, who in turn discussed it with Karl Radek (chief of the Russian Propaganda Bureau), but apparently nothing came of the proposal.56

Back in Indiana, Goodrich attempted to stay involved in the Russian recognition issue. He had given up on converting Secretary Hughes to his way of thinking; instead, he focused on gaining the support of Hoover. “I would rather have them in the family circle where we can talk things over with them,” Goodrich wrote to Hoover. He added, “With the departure of the A.R.A. the last point of contact with Russia will be severed.”57 Goodrich was far from alone in seeking the establishment of diplomatic relations with the Soviets. On March 15, 1923, the Women’s Committee for Recognition of Russia met for its second annual conference in Washington, D.C. In a telegram to President Harding, the delegation demanded a change in United States policy, mentioning Goodrich’s position in the bargain:

Nonetheless, Hughes clearly had the upper hand in influencing Harding’s views. He periodically sent to the president letters from Americans who had lived in the Soviet Union and who supported the administration’s position of nonrecognition. Harding seemed content to believe that he and Hughes were right, despite protests to the contrary.59

Meanwhile, on June 16, 1923, a dinner was held in Moscow informally concluding the ARA’s work in Russia. Almost all of the top Soviet leaders were present, including Kamanev, who was now acting head of the Russian government as a result of Lenin’s medical relapse in March. In addition to Kamanev, Chitcherin, Litvinoff, Radek, and Sokolnikoff were there. Trotsky, absent from Moscow, wrote a glowing letter thanking the ARA for its relief efforts. He let it be known “that both people and the Government of Russia are ready to make every effort to re-establish normal relations with the great American people.”60

Frustrated at the pace of negotiations, Goodrich attempted in June 1923 to press his views about recognition directly with President Harding. He wrote to Harding seeking an opportunity to meet with the president; however, before the meeting ever came about, Harding became ill and died in San Francisco on August 2.61 Harding’s death made it necessary for Goodrich to start all over, promoting a more moderate American policy toward Russia with Calvin Coolidge, Harding’s successor. Goodrich was totally discouraged by the attitude of Hughes and the lack of any interest on the part of the State Department to reexamine the situation. In an August 1923 letter to Edgar Rickard, the ARA’s executive director, Goodrich wrote:

Shortly afterward, Hoover tried to arrange a fourth trip for Goodrich, in which he would establish “at least a temporary contact in Russia.” The commerce secretary also suggested Goodrich’s name to the Rockefeller Foundation as a possible representative of the foundation in the Soviet Union. Goodrich had a “very pleasant” talk with the Rockefeller Foundation, but nothing came of this meeting or of Hoover’s hopes to use Goodrich to further United States trade possibilities with the Kremlin.63 Goodrich would wait for two more years before he would again visit the Soviet Union and attempt to influence Washington to view Russia differently.

[1. ]Letter from James P. Goodrich to Herbert Hoover, n.d., Frank A. Golder Papers, box 31, ARA Personnel Records, Hoover Institution.

[2. ]Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States, Warren G. Harding (Washington, D.C.: Federal Register Division, National Archives and Records Service), 19:2626–27.

[3. ]Letter from Colonel Haskell to ARA, December 8, 1921, ARA Personnel Records, box 81–2, Hoover Institution.

[4. ]See For the Relief of the Distressed and Starving People of Russia, 67th Cong., 2d sess., H.R. 9458 and H.R. 9459. The bill was introduced by Joseph W. Fordney, a representative from Michigan.

[5. ]U.S. Congress, House, 67th Cong., 2d sess., Russian Relief Hearings, December 13, 1921, pp. 3–5.

[6. ]See “Finds View Supported by Report of Goodrich,” Indianapolis News, Dec. 16, 1921, p. 1, col. 3.

[7. ]U.S. Congress, Russian Relief Hearings, December 13, 1921, p. 38.

[8. ]Ibid., p. 39. See also “Congress Asked for 20 Million to Help Russia,” Indianapolis News, December 14, 1921, p. 1, col. 3.

[9. ]See “Finds View Supported by Report of Goodrich,” Indianapolis News, December 16, 1921, p. 1, col. 3.

[10. ]U.S. Congress, Senate, 67th Cong., 2d sess., December 21, 1921, p. 62.

[11. ]See “Goodrich Plea Wins America’s Aid for Russia,” Indianapolis Star, December 14, 1921, p. 1, col. 3.

[12. ]These remarks are attributed to Alexander Gumberg, a native Russian who met Goodrich at this time. Gumberg worked in the United States in furthering Soviet-American relations after the Bolsheviks took power. See James K. Libbey, Alexander Gumberg and Soviet-American Relations, 1917–1933 (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1977), p. 80.

[13. ]Letter from Edgar Rickard to Walter Brown, December 30, 1921, ARA Personnel Records, box 1A/236, Hoover Institution. See also Rhodes, James P. Goodrich, Indiana’s “Governor Strangelove,” p. 87.

[14. ]See Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States, Warren G. Harding (Washington, D.C.: Federal Register Division, National Archives and Records Service, 1922), 18:9033. Other members of the five-member Purchasing Commission included Edgar Rickard, Edward Flesh, and Donald Livingston. Rickard served as executive director of the American Relief Administration.

[15. ]“Minutes of the Meetings of the Purchasing Commission for Russian Relief” (appointed under Congressional Act 117, 67th Congress, H.R. 9458), Warren G. Harding Papers, box 568, file 156, folder 7, Manuscript Division, Ohio Historical Society, Columbus, and Warren G. Harding Papers, roll 181, Manuscript Division, U.S. Library of Congress.

[16. ]These figures were given by Goodrich in late January 1922 and reported in the New York Sun. See “Relief for the Starving Millions of Russia Near: Transportation Problem Settled, Says Ex-Gov. Goodrich, Back from Three Months Sojourn in Famine Districts,” January 28, 1922 (article in James P. Goodrich Papers, box 15). For a list of dates, port of debarkation, name of steamship, port of delivery, and tonnage transported, see Warren G. Harding Papers, box 568, file 156, folder 6, Manuscript Division, Ohio Historical Society, Columbus, Ohio, and Warren G. Harding Papers, roll 181, Manuscript Division, U.S. Library of Congress.

[17. ]See Frank J. Taylor, “U.S. and Russia May Resume Relations Soon,” The Globe, December 21, 1921 (article in James P. Goodrich Papers, box 15); “Russia Looks to America (Not Food, but Resumptions of Relations, Is Big Desire),” Indianapolis Star, December 22, 1921, p. 5, col. 2.

[18. ]Goodrich, “Russia Manuscript,” chap. K, p. 1.

[19. ]Ibid., pp. 1–2. Goodrich’s report on the success of famine relief is also contained in two unidentified newspaper articles, “Millions Fed Daily and Panic Has Disappeared, Hoover Reports to Harding,” and “Goodrich is Optimistic: Returning from Russia Today to Report to Harding,” April 19, 1922, James P. Goodrich Papers, box 15.

[20. ]Goodrich recounts his efforts to get these personnel problems under control in two letters to Walter L. Brown, director of the London ARA office, dated March 6, 1922, and March 10, 1922, James P. Goodrich Papers, box 16.

[21. ]Letter from Herbert Hoover to Colonel Haskell, February 16, 1922, James P. Goodrich Papers, box 19.

[22. ]Goodrich, “Russia Manuscript,” chap. K, pp. 7–9.

[23. ]Ibid., chap. L, p. 4.

[24. ]“Rats from Russia Overrun Budapest,” New York Times, January 29, 1922, p. 3, col. 4.

[25. ]Ibid., pp. 5–6.

[26. ]Letter from James Goodrich to Warren Harding, March 24, 1922, pp. 7–8, Frank A. Golder Papers, box 31, Hoover Institution.

[27. ]Ibid., p. 8.

[28. ]Goodrich, “Russia Manuscript,” chap. M, p. 5.

[29. ]Ibid., chap. N, pp. 9–11.

[30. ]“Lenine Note on Way to U.S.,” Detroit Free Press, April 17, 1922 (article located in James P. Goodrich Papers, box 15). See also “Goodrich Leaves Moscow for America to Report to Sec. Hoover on Famine Conditions in Russia,” New York Times, April 5, 1922, p. 31, col. 3; “Goodrich Arrives in London; Is Optimistic as to Famine Conditions,” New York Times, April 12, 1922, p. 4, col. 3; “Goodrich Is Returning to U.S. to Report to Pres. Harding on Famine Conditions,” New York Times, April 19, 1922, p. 21, col. 7; “Goodrich Arrives in U.S.,” New York Times, April 20, 1922, p. 17, col. 3; and “Goodrich Reports to Harding and Hoover, Gives Formal Statement,” New York Times, April 21, 1922, p. 3, col. 1.

[31. ]J. C. Young, “Goodrich Discusses N. Lenin,” New York Times, May 21, 1922, sec. 7, p. 11, col. 1.

[32. ]“Goodrich Depicts Russia to Harding,” New York Times, April 21, 1922, p. 3, col. 1.

[33. ]Goodrich mentions his breakfast meeting with Hoover and his luncheon with Harding at the White House in a letter to Colonel Haskell, April 20, 1922, James P. Goodrich Papers, box 19.

[34. ]In Paris, Goodrich met with a Mr. Logan, who was present at the Genoa conference at the invitation of the British prime minister Lloyd George. From Logan, Goodrich learned that a clear division existed between the pragmatic Communists, who were willing to accede to the capitalist countries’ demands, and the more ideological Communists, who were unwilling to move from their original position. Goodrich’s views of political events in Russia are summarized in two letters to Hoover: May 28, 1922; and June 2, 1922, Frank A. Golder Papers, box 31. See also “Goodrich Leaves London for Moscow to Investigate Harvest Prospects,” New York Times, May 30, 1922, p. 20, col. 3; “Goodrich Arrives in Moscow,” New York Times, June 7, 1922, p. 8, col. 2.

[35. ]Goodrich, “Russia Manuscript,” chap. O, p. 1. Goodrich describes the incident in a letter to Hoover, June 19, 1922, James P. Goodrich Papers, box 24.

[36. ]Goodrich, “Russia Manuscript,” chap. O, p. 2.

[37. ]Ibid., pp. 5–7.

[38. ]Telegram from Goodrich to Hughes, June 12, 1922, Frank A. Golder Papers, box 31.

[39. ]Goodrich, “Russia Manuscript,” chap. P, pp. 6–7.

[40. ]Ibid., chap. Q, pp. 1–3.

[41. ]Ibid., p. 4.

[42. ]Goodrich details his strategy in arranging the meeting with the Soviet leaders in his letters to Hoover dated June 10 and June 15, 1922, James P. Goodrich Papers, box 2. In the latter letter, Goodrich wrote to Hoover: I have not seen any of the men of the “higher-ups” as yet. I have been getting all the information I could from the outside and will send you additional memoranda by the next courier covering a great deal of information I have received. Mr. Kamenev and Mr. Rakow by messenger indicated a desire to talk matters of a political nature. I have declined to do so. Mr. Sakaloff, counsel for the commissariat of concessions asked me yesterday if I would accept an invitation to discuss matters with the central executive committee including Trotsky and others. I told him that I would give serious consideration to an invitation of that kind. I am rather expecting it. I have been standing rather stiff on this matter because I felt that if any discussion of America’s attitude toward Russia was to be had at all it only should be with those men in authority.

[43. ]Goodrich details the events leading up to the meeting and summarizes the meeting itself in a memorandum (pp. 14–19) attached to his letter to Hughes dated June 19, 1922, James P. Goodrich Papers, box 2. The relevant part of Hughes’s note to Litvinoff states:

It is only in the productivity of Russia that there is any hope for the Russian people and it is idle to expect resumptions of trade until the economic bases of production are securely established. Production is conditioned upon the safety of life, the recognition by firm guarantees of private property, the sanctity of contract, and the rights of free labor. If fundamental changes are contemplated, involving due regard for the protection of persons and property and the establishment of conditions essential to the maintenance of commerce, this Government will be glad to have convincing evidence of the consummation of such changes, and until this evidence is supplied this Government is unable to perceive that there is any proper basis for considering trade relations. . . . The foregoing is contained in a letter from Evan E. Young, American commissioner at Riga, to United States secretary of state Charles E. Hughes, September 29, 1922, Warren G. Harding Papers, box 567, file 156, folder 2, p. 13, Manuscript Division, Ohio Historical Society, and Warren G. Harding Papers, roll 181, Manuscript Division, U.S. Library of Congress.

[44. ]See Goodrich, “Russia Manuscript,” chap. R. The meeting between Goodrich and the Soviet leaders lasted three hours, according to Goodrich’s letter to Charles E. Hughes, June 20, 1922, Frank A. Golder Papers, box 31.

[45. ]Goodrich, “Russia Manuscript,” chap. R, p. 7.

[46. ]Letter from Goodrich to Hughes, June 20, 1922, Frank A. Golder Papers, box 31.

[47. ]Goodrich, “Russia Manuscript,” chap. S, pp. 5–6.

[48. ]Ibid., chap. T, pp. 1–4.

[49. ]See Goodrich, “Russia Manuscript,” chap. U, pp. 1–7.

[50. ]Ibid., p. 5.

[51. ]“Refugees from Chaos: The German-Americans,” Winchester (Ind.) News-Gazette, n.d.

[52. ]“Phone Association to Hold Annual Meeting” (Goodrich reports on Russia “As I See Her”), Indianapolis News, September 19, 1922, p. 9, col. 1; see also “Goodrich Praised by Russian Newspapers for His Relief Efforts,” Indianapolis News, July 27, 1922, p. 22, col. 4.

[53. ]Contained in a clipping dated July 7, 1922, Public Ledger Bureau, James P. Goodrich Papers, box 18. See also “Goodrich Tells of Report on Russia,” Indianapolis News, n.d. (found in James P. Goodrich Papers, box 15).

[54. ]See “Washington Ends Negotiations for Inquiry in Russia,” Baltimore Sun, September 19, 1922; “1,766,118 Executed by Russian Cheka,” New York Times, n.d. (reporting article from Times of London dated September 2, 1922, James P. Goodrich Papers, box 15).

[55. ]See memorandum from J. A. Lehrs to Colonel William N. Haskell (copy to James P. Goodrich), September 9, 1922, regarding interview between Haskell and Kamenev. Letters from Haskell to Goodrich, October 9, 1922, and October 11, 1922, James P. Goodrich Papers, box 19; letter from Haskell to Walter Lyman Brown (copy to James P. Goodrich), February 20, 1923, James P. Goodrich Papers, box 20. Dozens of articles about the Soviet Union and famine relief are contained in Goodrich’s collected papers, which indicates that Goodrich stayed abreast of events in Russia after his third trip. See James P. Goodrich Papers, box 15.

[56. ]This is mentioned in a letter from Colonel Haskell to Christian A. Herter of the Department of Commerce, December 2, 1922, Frank A. Golder Papers, box 31.

[57. ]Letter from Goodrich to Hoover, January 30, 1923, Commerce Papers, box 240, Herbert Hoover Presidential Library, West Branch, Iowa; see also Rhodes, James P. Goodrich, Indiana’s “Governor Strangelove,” p. 131.

[58. ]Warren G. Harding Papers, box 567, file 156, folder 3, Ohio State Historical Society, Columbus, Ohio, and Warren G. Harding Papers, roll 181, Manuscript Division, U.S. Library of Congress.

[59. ]See letter from Evan E. Young to Hughes, September 29, 1922; letter from Hughes to Harding, October 24, 1922, which includes Young’s letter; letter from J. O. J. Taylor, superintendent of Siberia Mission, M. E. Church, South, to Hughes, June 8, 1923; and letter from Hughes to Harding, June 12, 1923. Harding’s letter of June 15, 1923, to Hughes states: “It is very gratifying to have these expressions of approval from one [Taylor] who is in a position to properly appraise the situation in Russia.” Warren G. Harding Papers, box 856, file 156, folder 4, Manuscript Division, Ohio State Historical Society, and Warren G. Harding Papers, roll 181, Manuscript Division, U.S. Library of Congress.

[60. ]Goodrich was not present for this dinner. A list of the Russian leaders and ARA officials in attendance and a digest of the speeches given at the occasion can be found in James P. Goodrich Papers, box 16. See also Walter Duranty, “Soviet Heads Thank America for Relief,” New York Times, June 17, 1923.

[61. ]Letter from Goodrich to Harding, June 5, 1923, Frank A. Golder Papers, box 32; Rhodes, James P. Goodrich, Indiana’s “Governor Strangelove,” p. 134.

[62. ]Letter from Goodrich to Rickard, August 9, 1923, ARA Personnel Records, box 288, Hoover Institution; see also Rhodes, James P. Goodrich, Indiana’s “Governor Strangelove,” p. 135.

[63. ]Letter from Hoover to Goodrich, September 12, 1923; letter from Goodrich to Hoover, September 17, 1923, ARA Personnel Records, box 261 Hoover Institution; Rhodes, James P. Goodrich, Indiana’s “Governor Strangelove,” pp. 135–36.