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SATURDAY, JUNE 9, 1787. - Max Farrand, The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787, vol. 1 
The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787, ed. Max Farrand (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1911). Vol. 1.
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SATURDAY, JUNE 9, 1787.
The honorable Luther Martin Esquire One of the Deputies of the State of Maryland attended and took his Seat.
The order of the day being read
The House resolved itself into a Committee of the whole House to consider of the State of the american union.
Mr President left the Chair
Mr Gorham took the Chair of the Committee.
Mr President resumed the Chair.
Mr Gorham reported from the Committee that the Committee had made a further progress in the matter to them referred; and had directed him to move that they may have leave to sit again.
Resolved that this House will on Monday next again resolve itself into a Committee of the whole House to consider of the State of the American union
And then the House adjourned till Monday next at 11 o’Clock A. M.
In a Committee of the whole House
Saturday June 9. 1787.
Mr Gorham in the Chair.
A question being taken, on Mr Gerry’s motion, to strike out the following words in that clause of the 7th resolution, adopted by the Committee, which respects the appointment of the national Executive
namely “to be chosen by the national legislature” and to insert
“to be chosen by the Executives of the individual States”
it passed in the negative. [Ayes — 0; noes — 10; divided — 1.]1
It was moved by Mr Patterson seconded by Mr Brearley to enter on the consideration of theNAresolution submitted by Mr Randolph.
After some time passed in debate —
It was moved and seconded that the Committee do now rise, report a further progress, and request leave to sit again.
The Committee then rose.
Mr. Gerry, according to previous notice given by him, moved “that the National Executive should be elected by the Executives of the States whose proportion of votes should be the same with that allowed to the States in the election of the Senate.” If the appointmt. should be made by the Natl. Legislature, it would lessen that independence 〈of the Executive〉 which ought to prevail, would give birth to intrigue and corruption between the Executive & Legislature previous to the elections and to partiality in the Executive afterwards to the friends who promoted him. Some other mode therefore appeared to him necessary. He proposed that of appointing by the State Executives as most analogous to the principle observed in electing the other branches of the Natl. Govt.; the first branch being chosen by the people of the States, & the 2d. by the Legislatures of the States; he did not see any objection agst. letting the Executive be appointed by the Executives of the States. He supposed the Executives would be most likely to select the fittest men, and that it would be their interest to support the man of their own choice.
Mr. Randolph urged strongly the inexpediency of Mr. Gerry’s mode of appointing the Natl. Executive. The confidence of the people would not be secured by it to the Natl. magistrate. The small States would lose all chance of an appointment. from within themselves. Bad appointments would be made; the Executives of the States being little conversant with characters not within their own small spheres. The State Executives too notwithstanding their constitutional independence, being in fact dependent on the State Legislatures will generally be guided by the views of the latter, and prefer either favorites within the States, or such as it may be expected will be most partial to the interests of the State. A Natl. Executive thus chosen will not be likely to defend with becoming vigilance & firmness the national rights agst. State encroachments. Vacancies also must happen. How can these be filled? He could not suppose either that the Executives would feel the interest in supporting the Natl. Executive which had been imagined. They will not cherish the great Oak which is to reduce them to paltry shrubs.3
On the question for referring the appointment of the Natl. Executive to the State Executives as propd. by Mr. Gerry Massts. no. Cont. no. N. Y. no. N. J. no. Pa. no. Del. divd. Md. no. Va. no. S. C. no. Geo. no. [Ayes — 0; noes — 9; divided — 1.]4
Mr. Patterson moves that the Committee resume the clause relating to the rule of suffrage in the Natl. Legislature.
Mr. Brearly seconds him. He was sorry he said that any question on this point was brought into view. It had been much agitated in Congs. at the time of forming the Confederation and was then rightly settled by allowing to each sovereign State an equal vote. Otherwise the smaller States must have been destroyed instead of being saved. The substitution of a ratio, he admitted carried fairness on the face of it; but on a deeper examination was unfair and unjust. Judging of the disparity of the States by the quota of Congs. Virga. would have 16 votes, and Georgia but one. A like proportion to the others will make the whole number ninity.5 There will be 3. large states and 10 small ones. The large States by which he meant Massts. Pena. & Virga. will carry every thing before them. It had been admitted, and was known to him from facts within N. Jersey that where large and small counties were united into a district for electing representatives for the district, the large counties always carried their point, and Consequently that the large States would do so. Virga. with her sixteen votes will be a solid column indeed, a formidable phalanx. While Georgie with her Solitary vote, and the other little States will be obliged to throw themselves constantly into the scale of some large one, in order to have any weight at all. He had come to the convention with a view of being as useful as he could in giving energy and stability to the Federal Government. When the proposition for destroying the equality of votes came forward, he was astonished, he was alarmed. Is it fair then it will be asked that Georgia should have an equal vote with Virga.? He would not say it was. What remedy then? One only, that a map of the U. S. be spread out, that all the existing boundaries be erased, and that a new partition of the whole be made into 13 equal parts6
Mr. Patterson considered the proposition for a proportional representation as striking at the existence of the lesser States. He wd. premise however to an investigation of this question some remarks on the nature structure and powers of the Convention. The Convention he said was formed in pursuance of an Act of Congs. that this act was recited in several of the Commissions, particularly that of Massts. which he required to be read: That the amendment of the confederacy was the object of all the laws and commissions on the subject; that the articles of the confederation were therefore the proper basis of all the proceedings of the Convention. We ought to keep within its limits, or we should be charged by our constituents with usurpation. that the people of America were sharpsighted and not to be deceived. But the Commissions under which we acted were not only the measure of our power. they denoted also the sentiments of the States on the subject of our deliberation. The idea of a national Govt. as contradistinguished from a federal one, never entered into the mind of any of them, and to the public mind we must accommodate ourselves. We have no power to go beyond the federal scheme, and if we had the people are not ripe for any other. We must follow the people; the people will not follow us. The proposition could not be maintained whether considered in reference to us as a nation, or as a confederacy. A confederacy supposes sovereignty in the members composing it & sovereignty supposes equality. If we are to be considered as a nation, all State distinctions must be abolished, the whole must be thrown into hotchpot, and when an equal division is made, then there may be fairly an equality of representation. He held up Virga. Massts. & Pa. as the three large States, and the other ten as small ones; repeating the calculations of Mr. Brearly as to the disparity of votes which wd. take place, and affirming that the small States would never agree to it. He said there was no more reason that a great individual State contributing much, should have more votes than a small one contributing little, than that a rich individual citizen should have more votes than an indigent one. If the rateable property of A was to that of B as 40 to 1. ought A for that reason to have 40 times as many votes as B. Such a principle would never be admitted, and if it were admitted would put B entirely at the mercy of A. As A. has more to be protected than B so he ought to contribute more for the common protection. The same may be said of a large State wch. has more to be protected than a small one. Give the large States an influence in proportion to their magnitude, and what will be the consequence? Their ambition will be proportionally increased, and the small States will have every thing to fear. It was once proposed by Galloway & some others that America should be represented in the British Parlt. and then be bound by its laws. America could not have been entitled to more than ⅓ of the no. of Representatives which would fall to the share of G. B. Would American rights & interests have been safe under an authority thus constituted? It has been said that if a Natl. Govt. is to be formed so as to operate on the people and not on the States, the representatives ought to be drawn from the people. But why so? May not a Legislature filled by the State Legislatures operate on the people who chuse the State Legislatures? or may not a practicable coercion be found. He admitted that there was none such in the existing System. He was attached strongly to the plan of the existing confederacy, in which the people chuse their Legislative representatives; and the Legislatures their federal representatives. No other amendments were wanting than to mark the orbits of the States with due precision, and provide for the use of coercion, which was the great point. He alluded to the hint thrown out heretofore by Mr. Wilson of the necessity to which the large States might be reduced of confederating among themselves, by a refusal of the others to concur. Let them unite if they please, but let them remember that they have no authority to compel the others to unite. N. Jersey will never confederate on the plan before the Committee. She would be swallowed up. He had rather submit to a monarch, to a despot, than to such a fate. He would not only oppose the plan here but on his return home do everything in his power to defeat it there
Mr. Wilson. hoped if the Confederacy should be dissolved, that a majority, that a minority of the States would unite for their safety. He entered elaborately into the defence of a proportional representation, stating for his first position that as all authority was derived from the people, equal numbers of people ought to have an equal no. of representatives, and different numbers of people different numbers of representatives. This principle had been improperly violated in the Confederation, owing to the urgent circumstances of the time. As to the case of A. & B, stated by Mr. Patterson, he observed that in districts as large as the States, the number of people was the best measure of their comparative wealth. Whether therefore wealth or numbers were to form the ratio it would be the same. Mr. P. admitted persons, not property to be the measure of suffrage. Are not the citizens of Pena. equal to those of N. Jersey? does it require 150 of the former to balance 50 of the latter? Representatives of different districts ought clearly to hold the same proportion to each other, as their respective constituents hold to each other. If the small States will not confederate on this plan, Pena. & he presumed some other States, would not confederate on any other. We have been told that each State being sovereign, all are equal. So each man is naturally a sovereign over himself, and all men are therefore naturally equal. Can he retain this equality when he becomes a member of civil Government? He can not. As little can a Sovereign State, when it becomes a member of a federal Governt. If N. J. will not part with her Sovereignty it is in vain to talk of Govt. A new partition of the States is desireable, but evidently & totally impracticable.
Mr. Williamson, illustrated the cases by a comparison of the different States, to Counties of different sizes within the same State; observing that proportional representation was admitted to be just in the latter case, and could not therefore be fairly contested in the former.
The question being about to be put Mr. Patterson hoped that as so much depended on it, it might be thought best to postpone the decision till tomorrow, which was done nem. con —7
〈The Come. rose & the House adjourned.〉8
Met pursuant to adjournment.
Motion by Mr. Gerry to reconsider the appointment of the national executive.
That the national executive be appointed by the state executives.
He supposed that in the national legislature there will be a great number of bad men of various descriptions — these will make a wrong appointment. Besides, an executive thus appointed, will have his partiality in favor of those who appointed him — that this will not be the case by the effect of his motion, and the executive will by this means be independent of the national legislature, but the appointment by the state executives ought to be made by votes in proportion to their weight in the scale of the representation.
Mr. Randolph opposes the motion. The power vested by it is dangerous — confidence will be wanting — the large states will be masters of the election — an executive ought to have great experience, integrity and activity. The executives of the states cannot know the persons properly qualified as possessing these. An executive thus appointed will court the officers of his appointment, and will relax him in the duties of commander of the militia — Your single executive is already invested with negativing laws of the state. Will he duly exercise the power? Is there no danger in the combinations of states to appoint such an executive as may be too favorable to local state governments? Add to this the expense and difficulty of bringing the executives to one place to exercise their powers. Can you suppose they will ever cordially raise the great oak, when they must sit as shrubs under its shade?
Carried against the motion, 10 noes, and Delaware divided.
On motion of Mr. Patterson, the consideration of the 2d resolve was taken up, which is as follows: Resolved, therefore, that the rights of suffrage in the national legislature ought to be apportioned to the quotas of contribution, or to the number of inhabitants, as the one or other rule may seem best in different cases.
Judge Brearly. — The present question is an important one. On the principle that each state in the union was sovereign, congress, in the articles of confederation, determined that each state in the public councils had one vote. If the states still remain sovereign, the form of the present resolve is founded on principles of injustice. He then stated the comparative weight of each state — the number of votes 90. Georgia would be 1, Virginia 16, and so of the rest. This vote must defeat itself, or end in despotism. If we must have a national government, what is the remedy? Lay the map of the confederation on the table, and extinguish the present boundary lines of the respective state jurisdictions, and make a new division so that each state is equal — then a government on the present system will be just.
Mr. Patterson opposed the resolve. Let us consider with what powers are we sent here? (moved to have the credentials of Massachusetts read, which was done.) By this and the other credentials we see, that the basis of our present authority is founded on a revision of the articles of the present confederation, and to alter or amend them in such parts where they may appear defective. Can we on this ground form a national government? I fancy not. — Our commissions give a complexion to the business; and can we suppose that when we exceed the bounds of our duty, the people will approve our proceedings?
We are met here as the deputies of 13 independent, sovereign states, for federal purposes. Can we consolidate their sovereignty and form one nation, and annihilate the sovereignties of our states who have sent us here for other purposes?
What, pray, is intended by a proportional representation? Is property to be considered as part of it? Is a man, for example, possessing a property of £4000 to have 40 votes to one possessing only £100? This has been asserted on a former occasion. If state distinctions are still to be held up, shall I submit the welfare of the state of New-Jersey, with 5 votes in the national council, opposed to Virginia who has 16 votes? Suppose, as it was in agitation before the war, that America had been represented in the British parliament, and had sent 200 members; what would this number avail against 600? We would have been as much enslaved in that case as when unrepresented; and what is worse, without the prospect of redress. But it is said that this national government is to act on individuals and not on states; and cannot a federal government be so framed as to operate in the same way? It surely may. I therefore declare, that I will never consent to the present system, and I shall make all the interest against it in the state which I represent that I can. Myself or my state will never submit to tyranny or despotism.9
Upon the whole, every sovereign state according to a confederation must have an equal vote, or there is an end to liberty. As long therefore as state distinctions are held up, this rule must invariably apply; and if a consolidated national government must take place, then state distinctions must cease, or the states must be equalized.
Mr. Wilson was in favor of the resolve. He observed that a majority, nay even a minority, of the states have a right to confederate with each other, and the rest may do as they please. He considered numbers as the best criterion to determine representation. Every citizen of one state possesses the same rights with the citizen of another. Let us see how this rule will apply to the present question. Pennsylvania, from its numbers, has a right to 12 votes, when on the same principle New-Jersey is entitled to 5 votes. Shall New-Jersey have the same right or influence in the councils of the nation with Pennsylvania? I say no. It is unjust — I never will confederate on this plan. The gentleman from New-Jersey is candid in declaring his opinion — I commend him for it — I am equally so. I say again I never will confederate on his principles. If no state will part with any of its sovereignty, it is in vain to talk of a national government. The state who has five times the number of inhabitants ought, nay must have the same proportion of weight in the representation. If there was a probability of equalizing the states, he would be for it. But we have no such power. If however, we depart from the principle of representation in proportion to numbers, we will lose the object of our meeting.
The question postponed for farther consideration.
Adjourned to to-morrow morning.
Brearly. opposes the equality of Representation, alledges that although it is numerically equal, yet in its operation it will be unequal — illustrates by saying there will be two divisions in the States thus represented, the one made up of Mass. Penn. & Virgin. the other including the Ten other states — when Georga. sends one member, Virginia will send sixteen — These 16 members are united, the members of three or four small States although equal in number are not capable of combination, the influence of the 16 members of Virginia will be different, for these Reasons, from those from three or four small States — I agree that the Rule of confedn. is unequal — I shall be willing to take the map of the U S. and divide it into 13 equal parts — this being done there may fairly be an equality in the representation of the States —
Patterson. Our powers do not extend to the abolition of the State Governments, and the Erection of a national Govt. — They only authorise amendments in the present System, and have for yr. Basis the present Confederation which establishes the principle that each State has an equal vote in Congress — agrees wth. Brearly for an equal Division of the Territory of the US, and then the equality of Territory will be the parent or origin of an equality of Representation — But perhaps the inequality of the present system is not so obvious — the States are equals and they vote equal, in every state the individual Citizens have equal votes although their property is unequal — a man of 4000£ has one vote, and the man of 100£ has one vote, yet one has forty times as much property as the other — why shd. not this be the case in the several States — Mr. Galloway who was early in Cong. proposed that america shd. be represented in the Brith. parl. perhaps they wd. have sent 200 members, and G. Britain 500 members; but it was clearly seen that this project wd. not secure the american Liberties — neither wd. the smaller States be secured in their Liberties — the project of an equality in Representation will never succeed — Admit that a majority of the States in Convention shd. agree in the Measure — they cannot give the assent of the other States — I never will agree to this project here, and I will use my influence agt. it in N Jersey — New Jersey never will agree to the Scheme —
Wilson — the Doctrine of Representation is this — first the representative ought to speak the Language of his Constituents, and secondly that his language or vote shd. have the same influence as though the Constituents gave it — apply this principle and it concludes in favor of an equality of Representation & agt. the present System —10
Consider the Nature and Construction of this Assembly. Formed under the act of Congress passed in Conformity with one of the Articles of the Confedn.
See the Comn. from Massts.13
Assumption of Power13a —The Comn. measures our Power — to revise the Confedn. to report to Congress and the several Legs. — must not go beyond our Powers —
Self-constituted and self-ordained Body.
The Coms. give the political Complexion of the several States — not ripe — we must follow the People; the People will not follow us — The Plan must be accommodated to the public Mind — consult the Genius, the Temper, the Habits, the Prejudices of the People.
A little practicable Virtue to be preferred to Theory.
Not to sport Opinions of my own — not to say wt. is the best Govt. or what ought to be done — but what can be done — wt. can we do consistently with our Powers; wt. can we do that will meet with the Approbation of the People — their Will must guide —
Insurrections — So there are in every Govt. — even in England — it may shew, that our particular Systems are wrong — that our Instns. are too pure — not sufficiently removed from a State of Nature to answer the Purposes of a State of Society — it will not militate agt. the democratick Principle when properly regulated and modified —
The democratick Spirit beats high —
Not half wrong enough to have a good Govt. —
2. The Plan proposed — The 1st. Propn. withdrawn14 — it was incompatible with the 2d. The Principles were gradually unfolded —
Wt. Qy. of Land14a — The 1 Propn. accords with the Spirit of the Constn.
Each State is sovereign, free, and independt. etc. Sovereignty includes Equality —
If then the States in Union are as States still to continue in Union, they must be considered as Equals —
13 sovereign and independent States can never constitute one Nation, and at the same Time be States — they may be Treaty make one confederated Body —
Mr. Randolph — We ought to be one Nation — etc. The States as States must be cut up, and destroyed — This is the way to form us into a Nation — It has Equality — it will not break in upon the Rights of any Citizen — it will destroy State Politicks and Attachmts. Will it be acceded to, etc.
G. Morris — Every Citizen should enjoy a rateable Proportion of Sovereignty —
Enlarge his prospects, you increase his Desires — Proportion of Votes — State-Politicks, State-Attachments, State-Influence, State-Passions — Districts —
Great Britain and America — Suppose Representn. from the latter before the Revolutn. according to the Quantum of Property or Number of Souls — Wt. the Consequence —
3 Article —16 Com. Defence, Security of Liberty, mutual and general Welfare.
A national Govt. to operate individually upon the People in the first Instance, and not upon the States — and therefore a Representation from the People at large and not from the States —
Will the Operation of the natl. Govt. depend upon the Mode of Representn. — No — it depends upon the Quantum of Power lodged in the leg. ex. and judy. Departments — it will operate individually in the one Case as well as in the other —
Why not operate upon the States — if they are coerced, they will in Turn coerce each individual —
Let the People elect the State-Legr. — The State-Legr. elect the federal Legr. — assign to the State Legr. its Duty — the same to the federal — they will be Checks upon each other, and the best Checks that can be formed — Cong. the Sun of out political System —17
Why a Representation from the People at large — to equalize Representn. Majr. Butler18 — Representn. — Property — People —
Mr. Wilson — Majority of the States sufficient. This in Opposition to Mr. King —19
2 Views. 1. Under the Confedn. — 13th. Article — Rhode-Island. 2. As forming an original Combinn. or Confederacy — can bind the contracting Parties only —
The large States can agree upon a Reform only upon the Principle of an equal Representn.
If the lesser States form a Junction of Govt. and Territory, the Gy.21 ceases to operate as to them — This will prevent a Consolidn. of Govt. and Territory —
The people will likewise prevent any new State from being taken from the old — Vermont — Kentucky — several in Embryo — Republicks — Monarchies — large Frontiers.
1. The Confederation — its leading Principle. unanimously assented to —
2. The Nature and Construction of this Assembly. Formed under the Confedn. Resn. of Congress — The Comn. measures our Power — it gives the political Complexion of each State — to revise the Confedn.
Must not go beyond our Powers — People not ripe —
A little practicable Virtue to be preferred to Theory.
What expected — Regulation of Commerce, Colln. of the Revenue, Negative, etc this will draw after it such a Weight of Influence and Power as will answer the Purpose — they will call forth the dormant Powers —
3. The Plan proposed. The 1 Propn. withdrawn — it was incompatible with the 2d. Much Dispute about Distn. between federal and National Governments. The Principle was gradually unfolded —
Wt Qy. of Land, etc they approach each other, etc.21a — The 1 Prop. accords with the Spirit of the Confedn.
Each State is sovereign, free, and independent etc. The Idea of a Supreme, and the Maxim Imperium in Imperio —
If then the States in Union are as States still to continue in Union, they must be considered as Equals, etc.
13 sovereign and independant states can never constitute one Nation; they may by Treaty make one confederated Body —
Mr. Randolph — we ought to be one Nation — 2 Article — 5th. Article —22
G. Morris — Every Individual should enjoy a rateable Proportion of Sovereignty —
3 Article — Common Defence, Security of Liberty, mutual and general Welfare — Proportion of Votes.
If the lesser States form a Junction of Govt. and Territory, the Gy. ceases to operate as to them — This will prevent a Consoln. of Govt. and Territory —
The Propn. will likewise prevent any new States from being taken from the old — Vermont, Kentucky — Several in embryo — Republics — Monarchies — large Frontiers —
The large States can agree to a Reform only upon the Principle of an Equality of Representn.
In what we are all agreed —
“for the sole and express Purpose of revising the Articles of Confdn. and reporting to Congress and the several Legs. such Alterations and Provisions therein as shall when agreed to in Congress and confirmed by the States render the federal Constn. adequate to the Exigencies of Government and the Preservn. of the Union.”23
Connectt. as above —
Ambition goads him on. The Impulse is progressive — enlarge his Prospects, and you enlarge his Desires. As to orders — as to Societies. Mithradates — Com. Defence —
To promote the general Welfare, to protect Liberty and Property.
1 — Great Britain and America — Representn. from the latter before the Revolution according to the Number of Souls — Wt. the Consequence.
2. Representation from the People at large and not from the States —
3. National Governmt. to operate individually upon the People in the first Instance, and not upon the States —
Mr. Brearley. unfair; because of the Combination of the Parts.
Equalize the States —
Mr. Wilson — All Authority is derived from the People — the People entitled to exercise Authority in Person — Italy — Roman Citizens —
2 Things necessary — 1. That the Representatives express the Sentiments of the represented. 2. That the Sentiments thus expressed should have the same Operation as if expressed by the People themselves —
Numbers the best Estimate of Property. One free Citizen ought to be of equal Importance with another.
One Mass — 13 — it will be given away ⅓ of the Territory —
No Authority — it is besides impracticable.
He wishes the Distinction of States might be destroyed.
A Principle given up in the first Confedn.
Mr. Wm.son. It does not appear to him, that the lesser States will be swallowed up.
A small County, and a large County; according to Numbers —
[1 ]Vote 36. Detail of Ayes and Noes.
[2 ]Taken from Journal.
[3 ]For further discussion of this subject, see references under September 6, note 23.
[4 ]Journal and Yates include North Carolina voting “no”.
[5 ]See Records, July 10.
[6 ]See Appendix A, LXIX, and Appendix E.
[7 ]For further discussion of proportional representation, see Records of May 30, June 11, June 27-July 16, with references under June 27 note 2.
[8 ]See further Appendix A, XXXIX-XLI.
[9 ]According to Madison and King this is the end of Paterson’s speech. The paragraph following probably represents Yates’s own ideas.
[10 ][Endorsed:] 9 June | Question | Representation according to census — Debate | Brearly and Patterson no | Wilson aye
[11 ]Reprinted from American Historical Review (IX, 320-324, 330).
[12 ]The notes numbered A-E probably represent Paterson’s careful preparation for his speech of this date: A is a long and elaborate draft; B is the same in shorter form, but with some additional notes; C includes some notes for reference; D seems to consist of catch-words; and E is an elaboration of one or two points. These drafts contain notes of previous debates, but apparently only in so far as Paterson wished to use them for this speech. F seems to represent notes on the debate of this day, taken in a similar way for future use.
[13 ]See C below.
[13a]In MS. these first words were in the margin.
[14 ]Refers to action of May 30.
[14a]In MS. these first words were in the margin.
[15 ]Randolph’s expression, see June 1 and June 2.
[15a ]In MS. these first words were in the margin.
[16 ]Refers to Article III of Articles of Confederation.
[17 ]Dickinson’s metaphor, see June 7.
[18 ]Butler, see June 6.
[19 ]Debate of June 5.
[20 ]Refers to the 11th of the Randolph Resolutions or Virginia Plan.
[21a ]In MS. these first words were in the margin.
[22 ]Refers to Articles of Condeferation.
[23 ]Quotation from Commission of Massachusetts delegates. Used by Paterson in his speech.