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• Front Matter: Preface
• List of Cases Cited
• Introduction
• Declaration of Paris, 1856 1
• Déclaration De Paris, 1856.
• The Declaration of Paris, 1856.
• Declaration of St Petersburg, 1868 1
• Geneva Convention, 1864 1
• Convention Pour L’amélioration Du Sort Des Militaires Blessés Dans Les Armées En Campagne.
• Convention For the Amelioration of the Condition of Soldiers Wounded In Armies In the Field.
• Articles Concerning Naval Warfare ( La Marine ).
• Geneva Convention, 1906 1
• Convention Pour L’amélioration Du Sort Des Blessés Et Malades Dans Les Armées En Campagne.
• Convention For the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick In Armies In the Field.
• Chapitre Premier. —: Des Blessés Et Malades.
• Chapter I.—: The Wounded and Sick.
• Chapitre II.—: Des Formations Et Établissements Sanitaires.
• Chapter II.—: Medical Units and Establishments.
• Chapitre III.—: Du Personnel.
• Chapter III.—: Personnel.
• Chapitre IV.—: Du Matériel.
• Chapter IV.—: Material.
• Chapitre V.—: Des Convois D’Évacuation.
• Chapter V.—: Convoys of Evacuation.
• Chapter VI.—: Du Signe Distinctif.
• Chapter VI.—: The Distinctive Emblem.
• Chapitre VII.—: De L’application Et De L’exécution De La Convention.
• Chapter VII.—: Application and Carrying Out of the Convention.
• Chapitre VIII.—: De La Répression Des Abus Et Des Infractions.
• Chapter VIII.—: Prevention of Abuses and Infractions.
• Dispositions Générales.
• General Provisions.
• Protocole Final De La Conférence De Revision De La Convention De Genève.
• Final Protocol of the Conference For the Revision of the Geneva Convention.
• The Hague Peace Conferences 1899 and 1907
• The Peace Conference of 1899 1 .
• The Second Peace Conference of 1907 1 .
• Final Acts of the International Peace Conferences.
• The Conventions of the Hague Conferences of 1899 and 1907 1 .
• I.: Convention For the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes.
• 1.: Règlement Pacifique Des Conflits Internationaux.
• 1.: Pacific Settlement of International Disputes
• I.: Convention For the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes 1 .
• II.: The Recovery of Contract Debts.
• II.: Convention Concernant La Limitation De L’emploi De La Force Pour Le Recouvrement De Dettes Contractuelles.
• II.: Convention Respecting the Limitation of the Employment of Force For the Recovery of Contract Debts.
• Convention No. 2. the Limitation of the Employment of Force For the Recovery of Contract Debts 1 .
• III.: Convention Relative to the Commencement of Hostilities.
• III.: Convention Relative à L’ouverture Des Hostilités.
• III.: Convention Relative to the Opening of Hostilities.
• Convention No. 3. The Commencement of Hostilities 1 .
• IV.: Les Lois Et Coutumes De La Guerre Sur Terre.
• II.: Convention Concernant Les Lois Et Coutumes De La Guerre Sur Terre.
• IV.: Convention Concernant Les Lois Et Coutumes De La Guerre Sur Terre.
• Règlement Concernant Les Lois Et Coutumes De La Guerre Sur Terre.
• Section I.: Des Belligérants.
• Section II.: Des Hostilités.
• Section III.: De L’autorité Militaire Sur Le Territoire De L’État Ennemi.
• Section IV.: Des Belligérants Internés Et Des Blessés Soignés Chez Les Neutres.
• IV.: The Laws and Customs of War On Land.
• II.: Convention With Respect to the Laws and Customs of War On Land.
• IV.: Convention Concerning the Laws and Customs of War On Land.
• Regulations Respecting the Laws and Customs of War On Land.
• Section I.: Belligerents.
• Section II. Hostilities.
• Section III.: Military Authority Over the Territory of the Hostile State.
• Convention No. 4. Concerning the Laws and Customs of War On Land 1 .
• Appendix to Note On the Laws and Customs of War On Land. Translation of the Draft of an International Declaration Concerning the Laws and Customs of War Adopted By the Conference of Brussels, 27th August, 1874 1 .
• V.: Neutral Powers and Persons In Land Warfare.
• V.: Convention Concernant Les Droits Et Les Devoirs Des Puissances Et Des Personnes Neutres En Cas De Guerre Sur Terre.
• V.: Convention Respecting the Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers and Persons In War On Land.
• Convention No. 5. Respecting the Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers and Persons In War On Land 1 .
• VI.: Enemy Merchant-ships At the Outbreak of Hostilities.
• VI.: Convention Relative Au Régime Des Navires De Commerce Ennemis Au Début Des Hostilités.
• VI.: Convention Relative to the Status of Enemy Merchantships At the Outbreak of Hostilities.
• Convention No. 6. Relative to the Status of Enemy Merchant-ships At the Outbreak of Hostilities 1 .
• VII.: Conversion of Merchant-ships Into War-ships.
• VII.: Convention Relative à La Transformation Des Navires De Commerce En Bâtiments De Guerre.
• VII.: Convention Relative to the Conversion of Merchantships Into War-ships.
• Convention No. 7. Convention Relative to the Conversion of Merchant-ships Into War-ships 1 .
• VIII.: Automatic Submarine Contact Mines.
• VIII.: Convention Relative à La Pose De Mines Sous-marines Automatiques De Contact.
• VIII.: Convention Relative to the Laying of Automatic Submarine Contact Mines.
• Convention No. 8. Relative to the Laying of Automatic Submarine Contact Mines 1 .
• IX.: Bombardment By Naval Forces In Time of War.
• IX.: Convention Concernant Le Bombardement Par Des Forces Navales En Temps De Guerre.
• IX.: Convention Respecting Bombardment By Naval Forces In Time of War.
• Convention No. 9. Respecting Bombardment By Naval Forces In Time of War 1 .
• X.: Conventions For the Adaptation of the Principles of the Geneva Convention to Maritime War (1899 and 1907)
• X.: La Convention De Genève Et La Guerre Maritime 1 .
• III.: Convention Pour L’adaptation à La Guerre Maritime Des Principes De La Convention De Genève Du 22 Août, 1864.
• X.: Convention Pour L’adaptation à La Guerre Maritime Des Principes De La Convention De Genève.
• X.: The Geneva Convention and Maritime Warfare 1 .
• III.: Convention For the Adaptation to Maritime Warfare of the Principles of the Geneva Convention of August 22, 1864.
• X.: Convention For the Adaptation of the Principles of the Geneva Convention to Maritime War.
• Convention No. 10. The Adaptation of the Principles of the Geneva Convention to Maritime Warfare 1 .
• A Convention Relating to Hospital Ships, Signed At the Hague, the 21st December, 1904 2 .
• XI.: Restrictions On Capture In Maritime War
• XI.: Convention Relative à Certaines Restrictions à L’exercice Du Droit De Capture Dans La Guerre Maritime.
• XI.: Convention Relative to Certain Restrictions On the Exercise of the Right of Capture In Maritime War.
• Convention No. 11. Relative to Certain Restrictions On the Exercise of the Right of Capture In Maritime War.
• XII.: Establishment of an International Prize Court.
• XII.: Convention Relative à L’Établissement D’une Cour Internationale Des Prises.
• XII.: Convention Relative to the Establishment of an International Prize Court.
• Annex to Article 15. Distribution of Judges and Deputy Judges By Countries For Each Year of the Period of Six Years.
• Convention No. 12. Relative to the Establishment of an International Prize Court 1 .
• XIII.: Neutral Rights and Duties In Maritime War.
• XIII.: Convention Concernant Les Droits Et Les Devoirs Des Puissances Neutres En Cas De Guerre Maritime.
• XIII.: Convention Respecting the Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers In Maritime War.
• Convention No. 13. The Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers In Maritime War 1 .
• Declarations (1899 and 1907) Prohibiting Discharge of Projectiles, Etc. From Balloons
• Les Déclarations De 1899 Et 1907.
• Déclaration I.: Des Projectiles Et Des Explosifs Du Haut De Ballons.
• XIV.: Déclaration Relative à L’interdiction De Lancer Des Projectiles Et Des Explosifs Du Haut De Ballons.
• The Declarations of 1899 and 1907.
• Declaration I.: Projectiles and Explosives From Balloons.
• XIV.: Declaration Prohibiting the Discharge of Projectiles and Explosives From Balloons.
• Declaration Ii (1899).
• Des Gaz Asphyxiants Ou Délétères.
• Asphyxiating Or Deleterious Gases.
• II.: Declaration Prohibiting the Use of Asphyxiating Or Deleterious Gases 1 .
• Declaration Iii (1899).
• Des Balles à Enveloppe Dure Etc.
• Bullets With a Hard Envelope Etc.
• III.: Declaration Prohibiting the Use of Expanding Bullets 1 .
• Annexe Au Premier Vœu émis Par La Deuxième Conférence De La Paix 1 .
• Projet D’une Convention Relative à L’Établissement D’une Cour De Justice Arbitrale.
• Draft Convention Relative to the Creation of a Judicial Arbitration Court.
• The Draft Convention Relative to the Creation of a Judicial Arbitration Court 1 .
• The Results of the Second Peace Conference.
• Table of the Deposits of Acts of Ratification and Accessions to the Conventions and Declarations Signed the 29th July, 1899, At the First Peace Conference.
• Table of Signatures.
• Final Protocol of the London Naval Conference.
• Protocole De Clôture.
• Final Protocol.
• The Declaration of London, 1909
• Déclaration Relative Au Droit De La Guerre Maritime.
• Declaration Concerning the Laws of Naval War 1 .
• General Report On the Declaration Presented to the Naval Conference On Behalf of Its Drafting Committee 1 . ( Translation 2 .)
• Appendix. Instructions to British Delegation At the Second Peace Conference.
• Addenda and Errata.

III.

Declaration prohibiting the use of expanding bullets¹ .

The discussions leading to the adoption of this Declaration at the First Peace Conference showed considerable difference of opinion among the delegates. The chief opponents were the British and United States delegates. It was recognised by the delegates of both Powers that the use of bullets inflicting unnecessarily severe wounds should be prohibited, and Captain Crozier (United States) moved an amendment to this effect, but his only supporter was the British delegate¹ . The British view was expressed in a letter from the War Office to Lord Salisbury which the latter communicated to Sir Julian Pauncefote, and in which it was pointed out that experience in the Chitral campaign had demonstrated that a bullet with a hard covering had not sufficient stopping power, and the British Government was not prepared to give up the use of the bullet known as the “Mark iv” pattern as it possessed the minimum of destructive effect and did not inflict unnecessary suffering. For this reason the Indian Government had adopted the Dum-dum² bullet, in which a very small portion of the head of the leaden bullet is not covered by a hard metal envelope³ . It was clear that this bullet was the one at which the prohibition was aimed, though no direct evidence was adduced that it was of the nature indicated by the Declaration.

On the outbreak of the Boer war “Mark iv” bullets were not served out to the British troops, and the occasional use of expanding bullets by the Boers led to energetic protests on the part of the British Commanders.

Until the opening of the Second Conference neither Great Britain, the United States nor Portugal had signed this Declaration, but at the Fourth Plenary Meeting on the 17th August, 1907, the delegates of Great Britain and Portugal intimated their accession⁴ .

At the meeting of the First Sub-Committee of the Second Committee the President stated that none of the signatory Powers had asked for revision, and therefore any discussion on the subject was out of order. The United States Delegation had however filed a proposal in the following terms: “The use of bullets which inflict unnecessarily cruel wounds, such as explosive bullets, and in general every kind of bullet which exceeds the limit necessary for placing a man immediately hors de combat, should be forbidden⁵ .” These were the terms of the United States amendment in 1899 which, owing to the curious method of procedure at the Conference, was never put to the vote. General G. B. Davis (United States) at the meeting of the Second Committee on the 14th August, 1907, drew attention to this proposal, and also to the ruling of the President at the meeting of the Sub-Committee in which he stated that as the modification or restriction of the Declaration did not appear in the programme of the Conference a restrictive proposal of the United States was not connected with it¹ . He pointed out that his Delegation found it difficult to understand “that no one had asked for a revision of the Declaration² .” No discussion of the subject was allowed by the Chairman.

The Declaration has been signed by all the states represented at the First Peace Conference except the United States: it has not been signed by those states which were represented only at the Second Peace Conference.

Annexe au premier vœu émis par la deuxième conférence de la paix¹ .

Projet d’une Convention relative à l’Établissement d’une Cour de Justice Arbitrale.

Titre I.

Organisation de la Cour de justice arbitrale.

Art. 1.

Dans le but de faire progresser la cause de l’arbitrage, les Puissances contractantes conviennent d’organiser, sans porter atteinte à la Cour permanente d’arbitrage, une Cour de justice arbitrale, d’un accès libre et facile, réunissant des juges représentant les divers systèmes juridiques du monde, et capable d’assurer la continuité de la jurisprudence arbitrale.

Annex to the first wish expressed by the second peace conference² .

Draft Convention relative to the Creation of a Judicial Arbitration Court.

Part I.

Constitution of the Judicial Arbitration Court.

Art. 1.

With the view of promoting the cause of arbitration, the Contracting Powers agree to constitute, without derogation to the Permanent Court of Arbitration, a Judicial Arbitration Court, freely and easily accessible, composed of Judges representing the various juridical systems of the world, and capable of insuring continuity in arbitral jurisprudence.

Art. 2.

La Cour de Justice arbitrale se compose de juges et de juges suppléants choisis parmi les personnes jouissant de la plus haute considération morale et qui tous devront remplir les conditions requises, dans leurs pays respectifs, pour l’admission dans la haute magistrature, ou être des jurisconsultes d’une compétence notoire en matière de droit international.

Les juges et les juges suppléants de la Cour sont choisis, autant que possible, parmi les membres de la Cour permanente d’arbitrage. Le choix sera fait dans les six mois qui suivront la ratification de la présente Convention.

Art. 2.

The Judicial Arbitration Court is composed of Judges and Deputy Judges chosen from persons of the highest moral reputation, and all fulfilling conditions qualifying them, in their respective countries, to occupy high legal posts, or be jurists of recognized competence in matters of international law.

The Judges and Deputy Judges of the Court are appointed, as far as possible, from the members of the Permanent Court of Arbitration. The appointment shall be made within the six months after the ratification of the present Convention.

Art. 3.

Les juges et les juges suppléants sont nommés pour une période de douze ans à compter de la date où la nomination aura été notifiée au Conseil administratif institué par la Convention pour le règlement pacifique des conflits internationaux. Leur mandat peut être renouvelé.

En cas de décès ou de démission d’un juge ou d’un juge suppléant, il est pourvu à son remplacement selon le mode fixé pour sa nomination. Dans ce cas, la nomination est faite pour une nouvelle période de douze ans.

Art. 3.

The Judges and Deputy Judges are appointed for a period of twelve years, reckoned from the date on which the appointment is notified to the Administrative Council created by the Convention for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes. Their appointments can be renewed.

Should one of the Judges, or Deputy Judges, die or resign, the same procedure is followed in filling the vacancy as was followed in appointing him. In this case, the appointment is made for a fresh period of twelve years.

Art. 4.

Les juges de la Cour de justice arbitrale sont égaux entre eux et prennent rang d’après la date de la notification de leur nomination. La préséance appartient au plus âgé, au cas où la date est la même.

Les juges suppléants sont, dans l’exercice de leurs fonctions, assimilés aux juges titulaires. Toutefois, ils prennent rang après ceux-ci.

Art. 4.

The Judges of the Judicial Arbitration Court are equal amongst themselves, and rank according to the date of the notification of their appointment. The Judge who is senior in point of age takes precedence when the date of notification is the same.

The Deputy Judges are assimilated in the exercise of their functions to the Judges. They rank, however, after the latter.

Art. 5.

Les juges jouissent des privilèges et immunités diplomatiques dans l’exercice de leurs fonctions et en dehors de leurs pays.

Avant de prendre possession de leur siège, les juges et les juges suppléants doivent, devant le Conseil administratif, prêter serment ou faire une affirmation solennelle d’exercer leurs fonctions avec impartialité et en toute conscience.

Art. 5.

The Judges enjoy diplomatic privileges and immunities in the performance of their duties, and when outside their own country.

Before taking their seat, the Judges and Deputy Judges must take an oath, or make a solemn affirmation before the Administrative Council, to discharge their duties impartially and conscientiously.

Art. 6.

La Cour désigne annuellement trois juges qui forment une Délégation spéciale et trois autres destinés à les remplacer en cas d’empêchement. Ils peuvent être réélus. L’élection se fait au scrutin de liste. Sont considérés comme élus ceux qui réunissent le plus grand nombre de voix. La Délégation élit elle-même son Président, qui, à défaut d’une majorité, est désigné par le sort.

Un membre de la Délégation ne peut exercer ses fonctions quand la Puissance qui l’a nommé, ou dont il est le national, est une des Parties.

Les membres de la Délégation terminent les affaires qui leur ont été soumises, même au cas où la période pour laquelle ils ont été nommés juges serait expirée.

Art. 6.

The Court annually nominates three Judges to form a special Delegation and three more to replace them if the former are unable to act. They are eligible for re-election. The election is by ballot. The persons who secure the largest number of votes are considered elected. The Delegation itself elects its own President, who, in default of a majority, is appointed by lot.

A member of the Delegation cannot act when the Power which appointed him, or to which he belongs, is one of the parties.

The members of the Delegation are to conclude matters which have been submitted to them, even if the period for which they have been appointed Judges has expired.

Art. 7.

L’exercise des fonctions judiciaires est interdit au juge dans les affaires au sujet desquelles il aura, à un titre quelconque, concouru à la décision d’un Tribunal national, d’un Tribunal d’arbitrage, ou d’une Commission d’enquête, ou figuré dans l’instance comme conseil ou avocat d’une partie.

Aucun juge ne peut intervenir comme agent ou comme avocat devant la Cour de justice arbitrale ou la Cour permanente d’arbitrage, devant un Tribunal spécial d’arbitrage ou une Commission d’enquête, ni y agir pour une Partie en quelque qualité que ce soit, pendant toute la durée de son mandat.

Art. 7.

A Judge may not exercise his judicial functions in any case in which he has, in any way whatever, taken part in the decision of a National Tribunal, of a Tribunal of Arbitration, or of a Commission of Inquiry, or has figured in the suit as counsel or advocate for one of the parties.

No Judge can act as agent or advocate before the Judicial Arbitration Court or the Permanent Court of Arbitration, before a Special Tribunal of Arbitration or a Commission of Inquiry, nor act therein for one of the parties in any capacity whatsoever so long as his appointment lasts.

Art. 8.

La Cour élit son Président et son Vice-Président à la majorité absolue des suffrages exprimés. Après deux tours de scrutin, l’élection se fait à la majorité relative et, en cas de partage des voix, le sort décide.

Art. 8.

The Court elects its President and Vice-President by an absolute majority of the votes cast. After two ballots, the election is made by a bare majority and, in case the votes are equal, by lot.

Art. 9.

Les juges de la Cour de justice arbitrale reçoivent une indemnité annuelle de 6,000 florins néerlandais. Cette indemnité est payée à l’expiration de chaque semestre à dater du jour de la première réunion de la Cour.

Pendant l’exercice de leurs fonctions au cours des sessions ou dans les cas spéciaux prévus par la présente Convention, ils touchent une somme de 100 florins par jour. Il leur est alloué, en outre, une indemnité de voyage fixée d’après les règlements de leur pays. Les dispositions du présent alinéa s’appliquent aussi aux juges suppléants remplaçant les juges.

Ces allocations, comprises dans les frais généraux de la Cour, prévus par l’article 31, sont versées par l’entremise du Bureau international institué par la Convention pour le règlement pacifique des conflits internationaux.

Art. 9.

The Judges of the Judicial Arbitration Court receive an annual salary of 6,000 Netherland florins. This salary is paid at the end of each half-year, reckoned from the date on which the Court meets for the first time.

In the exercise of their duties during the sessions or in the special cases covered by the present Convention, they receive the sum of 100 florins per diem. They are further entitled to receive a travelling allowance fixed in accordance with the regulations existing in their own country. The provisions of the present paragraph are applicable also to Deputy Judges when acting for Judges.

These emoluments are included in the general expenses of the Court dealt with in Article 31, and are paid through the International Bureau created by the Convention for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes.

Art. 10.

Les Juges ne peuvent recevoir de leur propre Gouvernement ou de celui d’une autre Puissance aucune rémunération pour des services rentrant dans leurs devoirs comme membres de la Cour.

Art. 10.

The Judges may not accept from their own Government or from that of any other Power any remuneration for services connected with their duties as members of the Court.

Art. 11.

La Cour de justice arbitrale a son siège à La Haye et ne peut, sauf le cas de force majeure, le transporter ailleurs.

La Délégation peut, avec l’assentiment des Parties, choisir un autre lieu pour ses réunions si des circonstances particulières l’exigent.

Art. 11.

The seat of the Judicial Arbitration Court is at The Hague, and cannot except in the case of force majeure be transferred elsewhere.

The Delegation may choose, with the assent of the parties concerned, another place for its meetings, if special circumstances render such a step necessary.

Art. 12.

Le Conseil administratif remplit à l’égard de la Cour de justice arbitrale les fonctions qu’il remplit à l’égard de la Cour permanente d’arbitrage.

Art. 12.

The Administrative Council fulfils the same functions with regard to the Judicial Arbitration Court as with regard to the Permanent Court of Arbitration.

Art. 13.

Le Bureau international sert de greffe à la Cour de justice arbitrale et doit mettre ses locaux et son organisation à la disposition de la Cour. Il a la garde des archives et la gestion des affaires administratives.

Le Secrétaire-général du Bureau remplit les fonctions de greffier.

Les Secrétaires adjoints au greffier, les traducteurs, et les sténographes nécessaires sont désignés etassermentés par la Cour.

Art. 13.

The International Bureau acts as registry to the Judicial Arbitration Court, and shall place its offices and staff at the disposal of the Court. It has the custody of the archives and carries out the administrative work.

The Secretary-General of the Bureau acts as Registrar.

The necessary secretaries to assist the Registrar, translators and shorthand writers are appointed and sworn in by the Court.

Art. 14.

La Cour se réunit en session une fois par an. La session commence le troisième mercredi de juin et dure tant que l’ordre du jour n’aura pas été épuisé.

La Cour ne se réunit pas en session, si la Délégation estime que cette réunion n’est pas nécessaire. Toutefois, si une Puissance est partie à un litige actuellement pendant devant la Cour et dont l’instruction est terminée ou va être terminée, elle a le droit d’exiger que la session ait lieu.

En cas de nécessité, la Délégation peut convoquer la Cour en session extraordinaire.

Art. 14.

The Court meets in session once a year. The session opens on the third Wednesday in June and lasts until all the business on the agenda has been transacted.

The Court does not meet in session if the Delegation considers that such meeting is unnecessary. However, when a Power is party in a case actually pending before the Court, the pleadings in which are closed, or about to be closed, it may insist that the session be held.

When necessary, the Delegation may summon the Court in extraordinary session.

Art. 15.

Un compte rendu des travaux de la Cour sera dressé chaque année par la Délégation. Ce compte rendu sera transmis aux Puissances contractantes par l’intermédiaire du Bureau international. Il sera communiqué aussi à tous les juges et juges suppléants de la Cour.

Art. 15.

A Report of the work of the Court shall be drawn up every year by the Delegation. This Report shall be forwarded to the Contracting Powers through the International Bureau. It shall also be communicated to the Judges and Deputy Judges of the Court.

Art. 16.

Les juges et les juges suppléants, membres de la Cour de justice arbitrale, peuvent aussi être nommés aux fonctions de juge et de juge suppléant dans la Cour internationale des prises.

Art. 16.

The Judges and Deputy Judges of the Judicial Arbitration Court can also be appointed Judges and Deputy Judges in the International Prize Court.

Titre II.

Compétence et Procédure.

Art. 17.

La Cour de justice arbitrale est compétente pour tous les cas qui sont portés devant elle, en vertu d’une stipulation générale d’arbitrage ou d’un accord spécial.

Part II.

Jurisdiction and Procedure.

Art. 17.

The Judicial Arbitration Court is competent to deal with all cases submitted to it, in virtue either of a general undertaking to have recourse to arbitration or of a special agreement.

Art. 18.

La Délégation est compétente:—

1. Pour juger les cas d’arbitrage visés à l’article précédent, si les parties sont d’accord pour réclamer l’application de la procédure sommaire, réglée au titre iv., chapitre iv., de la Convention pour le règlement pacifique des conflits internationaux;

2. Pour procéder à une enquête en vertu et en conformité du titre iii. de la dite Convention en tant que la Délégation en est chargée par les Parties agissant d’un commun accord. Avec l’assentiment des Parties et par dérogation à l’article 7, alinéa 1, les membres de la Délégation ayant pris part à l’enquête peuvent siéger comme juges, si le litige est soumis à l’arbitrage de la Cour ou de la Délégation elle-même.

Art. 18.

The Delegation is competent:—

1. To decide the cases of arbitration referred to in the preceding Article, if the parties agree upon the application of the summary procedure, laid down in Part iv., Chapter iv., of the Convention for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes;

2. To hold an inquiry under and in accordance with Part iii. of the said Convention, in so far as such an inquiry is intrusted to the Delegation by the joint accord of the parties. With the assent of the parties, and as an exception to Article 7, paragraph 1, the members of the Delegation who have taken part in the inquiry may sit as Judges, if the case in dispute is submitted to the arbitration of the Court or of the Delegation itself.

Art. 19.

La Délégation est, en outre, compétente pour l’établissement du compromis visé par l’article 52 de la Convention pour le règlement pacifique des conflits internationaux, si les Parties sont d’accord pour s’en remettre à la Cour.

Elle est également compétente, même si la demande est faite seulement par l’une des Parties, après qu’un accord par la voie diplomatique a été vainement essayé, quand il s’agit:—

1. D’un différend rentrant dans un traité d’arbitrage général conclu ou renouvelé après la mise en vigueur de cette Convention et qui prévoit pour chaque différend un compromis, et n’exclut pour l’établissement de ce dernier ni explicitement ni implicitement la compétence de la Délégation. Toutefois, le recours à la Cour n’a pas lieu si l’autre Partie déclare qu’à son avis le différend n’appartient pas à la catégorie des questions à soumettre à un arbitrage obligatoire, à moins que le traité d’arbitrage ne confère au tribunal arbitral le pouvoir de décider cette question préalable.

2. D’un différend provenant de dettes contractuelles réclamées à une Puissance par une autre Puissance comme dues à ses nationaux, et pour la solution duquel l’offre d’arbitrage a été acceptée. Cette disposition n’est pas applicable si l’acceptation a été subordonnée à la condition que le compromis soit établi selon un autre mode.

Art. 19.

The Delegation is also competent to settle the Compromis referred to in Article 52 of the Convention for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes if the parties are agreed to leave it to the Court.

It is equally competent to do so, even if the request is only made by one of the parties, when all attempts to reach an understanding through the diplomatic channel have failed, in the case of:—

1. A dispute covered by a general Treaty of Arbitration concluded or renewed after the present Convention has come into force, providing for a Compromis in all disputes, and not either explicitly or implicitly excluding the settlement of the Compromis from the competence of the Delegation. Recourse cannot, however, be had to the Court if the other party declares that in its opinion the dispute does not belong to the category of questions which can be submitted to obligatory arbitration, unless the Treaty of Arbitration confers upon the Arbitration Tribunal the power of deciding this preliminary question.

2. A dispute arising from contract debts claimed from one Power by another Power as due to its nationals, and for the settlement of which the offer of arbitration has been accepted. This provision is not applicable if the acceptance is subject to the condition that the Compromis should be settled in some other way.

Art. 20.

Chacune des Parties a le droit de désigner un juge de la Cour pour prendre part, avec voix délibérative, à l’examen de l’affaire soumise à la Délégation.

Si la Délégation fonctionne en qualité de Commission d’enquête, ce mandat peut être confié à des personnes prises en dehors des juges de la Cour. Les frais de déplacement et la rétribution à allouer aux dites personnes sont fixés et supportés par les Puissances qui les ont nommés.

Art. 20.

Each of the parties concerned has the right to nominate a Judge of the Court to take part, with power to vote, in the examination of the case submitted to the Delegation.

If the Delegation acts as a Commission of Inquiry, this task may be intrusted to persons other than the Judges of the Court. The travelling expenses and remuneration to be given to the said persons are fixed and borne by the Powers appointing them.

Art. 21.

L’accès de la Cour de justice arbitrale, instituée par la présente Convention, n’est ouvert qu’aux Puissances contractantes.

Art. 21.

The Contracting Powers only may have access to the Judicial Arbitration Court set up by the present Convention.

Art. 22.

La Cour de justice arbitrale suit les règles de procédure édictées par la Convention pour le règlement pacifique des conflits internationaux, sauf ce qui est prescrit par la présente Convention.

Art. 22.

The Judicial Arbitration Court follows the rules of procedure laid down in the Convention for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes, except in so far as the procedure is prescribed by the present Convention.

Art. 23.

La Cour décide du choix de la langue dont elle fera usage et des langues dont l’emploi sera autorisé devant elle.

Art. 23.

The Court determines what language it will itself use and what languages may be used before it.

Art. 24.

Le Bureau international sert d’intermédiaire pour toutes les communications à faire aux juges au cours de l’instruction prévue à l’article 63, alinéa 2, de la Convention pour le règlement pacifique des conflits internationaux.

Art. 24.

The International Bureau serves as channel for all communications to be made to the Judges during the interchange of pleadings provided for in Article 63, paragraph 2, of the Convention for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes.

Art. 25.

Pour toutes les notifications à faire, notamment aux Parties, aux témoins, et aux experts, la Cour peut s’adresser directement au Gouvernement de la Puissance sur le territoire de laquelle la notification doit être effectuée. Il en est de même s’il s’agit de faire procéder à l’établissement de tout moyen de preuve.

Les requêtes adressées à cet effet ne peuvent être refusées que si la Puissance requise les juge de nature à porter atteinte à sa souveraineté ou à sa sécurité. S’il est donné suite à la requête, les frais ne comprennent que les dépenses d’exécution réellement effectuées.

La Cour a également la faculté de recourir à l’intermédiaire de la Puissance sur le territoire de laquelle elle a son siège.

Les notifications à faire aux Parties dans le lieu où siège la Cour peuvent être exécutées par le Bureau international.

Art. 25.

For all notices to be served, in particular on the parties, witnesses, or experts, the Court may apply direct to the Government of the State on whose territory the service is to be carried out. The same rule applies in the case of steps being taken to procure evidence.

Requests for this purpose can only be rejected when the Power applied to considers them calculated to impair its sovereign rights or its safety. If the request is complied with, the fees charged must only comprise the expenses actually incurred.

The Court is equally entitled to act through the Power on whose territory it sits.

Notices to be given to parties in the place where the Court sits may be served through the International Bureau.

Art. 26.

Les débats sont dirigés par le Président ou le Vice-Président et, en cas d’absence ou d’empêchement de l’un et de l’autre, par le plus ancien des juges présents.

Le juge nommé par une des parties ne peut siéger comme Président.

Art. 26.

The discussions are under the control of the President or Vice-President, or, in case they are both absent or cannot act, of the senior Judge present.

The Judge appointed by one of the parties cannot preside.

Art. 27.

Les délibérations de la Cour ont lieu à huis clos et restent secrètes.

Toute décision est prise à la majorité des juges présents. Si la Cour siège en nombre pair et qu’il y ait partage des voix, la voix du dernier des juges, dans l’ordre de préséance établi d’après l’article 4, alinéa 1, ne sera pas comptée.

Art. 27.

The Court considers its decisions in private, and the proceedings remain secret.

All questions are decided by a majority of the Judges present. If the number of Judges is even and equally divided, the vote of the junior Judge, in the order of precedence laid down in Article 4, paragraph 1, is not counted.

Art. 28.

Les arrêts de la Cour doivent être motivés. Ils mentionnent les noms des juges qui y ont participé; ils sont signés par le Président et par le greffier.

Art. 28.

The judgments of the Court must state the reasons on which they are based. They contain the names of the Judges taking part in them; they are signed by the President and by the Registrar.

Art. 29.

Chaque Partie supporte ses propres frais et une part égale des frais spéciaux de l’instance.

Art. 29.

Each party pays its own costs and an equal share of the costs of the trial.

Art. 30.

Les dispositions des articles 21 à 29 sont appliquées par analogie dans la procédure devant la Délégation.

Lorsque le droit d’adjoindre un membre à la Délégation n’a été exercé que par une seule Partie, la voix du membre adjoint n’est pas comptée s’il y a partage de voix.

Art. 30.

The provisions of Articles 21 to 29 are applicable so far as may be to the procedure before the Delegation.

When the right of adding a member to the Delegation has been exercised by one of the parties only, the vote of the additional member is not recorded if the votes are equally divided.

Art. 31.

Les frais généraux de la Cour sont supportés par les Puissances contractantes.

Le Conseil administratif s’adresse aux Puissances pour obtenir les fonds nécessaires au fonctionnement de la Cour.

Art. 31.

The general expenses of the Court are borne by the Contracting Powers.

The Administrative Council applies to the Powers to obtain the funds requisite for the working of the Court.

Art. 32.

La Cour fait elle-même son règlement d’ordre intérieur, qui doit être communiqué aux Puissances contractantes.

Après la ratification de la présente Convention, la Cour se réunira aussitôt que possible, pour élaborer ce règlement, pour élire le Président et le Vice-Président, ainsi que pour désigner les membres de la Délégation.

Art. 32.

The Court itself draws up its own rules of procedure, which must be communicated to the Contracting Powers.

After the ratification of the present Convention, the Court shall meet as early as possible in order to draw up these rules, to elect the President and Vice-President, and to appoint the members of the delegation.

Art. 33.

La Cour peut proposer des modifications à apporter aux dispositions de la présente Convention qui concernent la procédure. Ces propositions sont communiquées par l’intermédiaire du Gouvernement des Pays-Bas aux Puissances contractantes, qui se concerteront sur la suite à y donner.

Art. 33.

The Court may propose modifications in the provisions of the present Convention concerning procedure. These proposals are communicated through the Netherland Government to the Contracting Powers, which will confer together as to the measures to be taken thereon.

Titre III.

Dispositions Finales.

Art. 34.

La présente Convention sera ratifiée dans le plus bref délai possible.

Les ratifications seront déposées à La Haye.

Il sera dressé du dépôt de chaque ratification un procès-verbal, dont une copie, certifiée conforme, sera remise par la voie diplomatique à toutes les Puissances signataires.

Part III.

Final Provisions.

Art. 34.

The present Convention shall be ratified as soon as possible.

The ratifications shall be deposited at The Hague.

A procès-verbal of the deposit of each ratification shall be drawn up, of which a duly certified copy shall be sent through the diplomatic channel to all the Signatory Powers.

Art. 35.

La Convention entrera en vigueur six mois après sa ratification.

Elle aura une durée de douze ans, et sera renouvelée tacitement de douze ans en douze ans, sauf dénonciation.

La dénonciation devra être notifiée, au moins deux ans avant l’expiration de chaque période, au Gouvernement des Pays-Bas, qui en donnera connaissance aux autres Puissances.

La dénonciation ne produira effet qu’à l’égard de la Puissance qui l’aura notifiée. La Convention restera exécutoire dans les rapports entre les autres Puissances.

Art. 35.

The Convention shall come into force six months after its ratification.

It shall remain in force for twelve years, and shall be tacitly renewed for periods of twelve years, unless denounced.

The denunciation must be notified, at least two years before the expiry of each period, to the Netherland Government, which will inform the other Powers.

The denunciation shall only have effect in respect of the notifying Power. The Convention shall continue in force as far as the other Powers are concerned.

The Draft Convention relative to the creation of a Judicial Arbitration Court¹ .

Origin of the Draft Convention.The genesis of this Draft Convention which is annexed to the Vœu already recorded in the Final Act² cannot be understood without some reference to the Permanent Court of Arbitration created in 1899 and amended in 1907. It proposes to create another Court, called in order to distinguish it from the body brought into existence by the Conventions of 1899 and 1907, a “Court of Arbitral Justice” or a “Judicial Arbitration Court” intended to sit alongside and supplement the so-called Permanent Court, but of a far more permanent character than the already existing body.

The Permanent Court was called into being in consequence of the recognition by the Conference of 1899 that arbitration is the most effective and most equitable method of settling disputes which diplomacy has failed to settle in questions of a legal nature and especially in the interpretation or application of international conventions (1 H. C. 1899, Art. 16). By Article 20 of the 1 H. C. 1899 the contracting Powers undertook to organise a Permanent Court accessible at all times and working, unless otherwise agreed on by the parties, under the procedure laid down in the Convention. The parties, as is the rule in international arbitrations, choose their own judge and Article 17 provides that the Arbitration Convention is concluded for questions already existing or for questions which may eventually arise: it may embrace any dispute or only disputes of a certain category.

From Articles 16, 17 and 20 it is clear that questions of a judicial order were then deemed peculiarly susceptible of artibration, and it was hoped by means of the erection of a permanent Court that such questions would be frequently arbitrated and decided on the basis of respect for law. It thus seemed that the Convention had laid the foundations of a Court in the strictly juridical sense of the word, save that instead of judges, there would be arbitrators nominated by the free choice of the parties.

By Article 21 the Permanent Court was declared to be competent for all arbitration cases, unless the parties agreed to institute a special tribunal; it is therefore evident that the framers of the Convention considered that it was possible to submit to the Court problems other than those of an exclusively judicial nature. There was thus created a single institution competent to decide purely legal questions on the basis of respect for law, and wider problems of an extra-judicial character, either or both of which were to be decided by judges, or rather arbitrators, chosen by the parties to the dispute.

The Report of the Sub-Committee of the First Committee in 1907, prepared by Mr J. B. Scott¹ (from which the foregoing is taken), goes on to observe that in private litigation parties do not choose their own judges, but, as M. Bourgeois pointed out during the discussion, no nation in matters involving political interest will consent to go before a Court of arbitration unless it takes an active part in the appointment of the members composing it. In matters of a purely legal nature, he said, it is not the same, for everyone realises that a real Court composed of jurists may be considered as the most competent instrument for dealing with controversies of this nature and giving decisions on pure questions of law² .

The intention of the framers of the Draft Convention was to organise a Court competent primarily for controversies of a legal nature, but at the same time not prohibited from dealing, if the parties so desire, with cases of a different character. The Permanent Court established in 1899 is not strictly speaking permanent, for it requires to be organised each time resort is had to it; the panel of judges from which the litigants choose the arbitrators is, together with the Administrative Bureau, the only permanent part of the system. Another defect of the system, as has already been pointed out, is its expense¹ , which, said Mr Choate, was probably one of the reasons why certain nations had failed to appear before it. “It should be one element of reform,” he continued, “that the expense of the Court itself, including the salaries of the judges, shall be borne at common expense of all the signatory Powers, so as to furnish to the suitors a Court, at least, free of expense to them, as is the case with suitors of all nations in their national courts. The fact that there was nothing permanent, or continuous, or connected in the sessions of the Court or in the adjudication of the cases submitted to it has been an obvious source of weakness and want of prestige in the Tribunal. Each trial it had before it has been wholly independent of every other, and its occasional utterances, widely distant in point of time and disconnected in subject-matter, have not gone far towards constituting a consistent body of international law or of valuable contributions to international law, which ought to emanate from an international tribunal representing the power and might of all the nations.... Let us then seek to develope out of it a permanent court which shall hold regular and continuous sessions, which shall consist of the same judges, which shall pay due heed to its own decisions, which shall speak with the authority of the united voice of the nations and gradually build up a system of international law, definite and precise, which shall command the approval and regulate the conduct of the nations. By such a step in advance, we shall justify the confidence which has been placed in us and shall make the work of this Second Conference worthy of comparison with that of the Conference of 1899² .”

The Russian draft.Two proposals were before the First Sub-Committee of the First Committee at its meeting on the 1st August, namely a Russian draft³ and a United States draft⁴ . The Russian draft was in the nature of an extension of the work of the existing Permanent Court, the members of which were to assemble every year in full session for the following purposes: (1) to select by ballot three members from the list of arbitrators who must be ready at any time to constitute the Permanent Court: (2) to consider the annual report of the Administrative Council and of the International Bureau: (3) to express the opinion of the Permanent Court upon the questions which have arisen during the course of the procedure of an Arbitration Court as well as on the acts of the Administrative Council and the International Bureau: (4) to exchange ideas on the progress of international arbitration in general.

Under this scheme there would have been an annual meeting of the whole panel of judges of the Arbitration Court for the business set forth; three of their number were to be chosen, and these, as Mr Scott suggests, would, when selected, probably reside at the Hague and devote their time to cases presented for their decision¹ . The whole of the Russian scheme, which consisted of four Articles, was intended for incorporation into Convention No. 1 as Chapter ii., Articles 24-27. It was not discussed by the Examining Committee, though both it and the United States scheme were referred to that Committee after a discussion of the general principles of the two schemes by the First Sub-Committee on the 1st and 3rd August.

The United States draft.The United States draft proposed that a permanent Court of Arbitration should be established at the Hague to consist of 15 judges, the mode of choice to be left to the Conference, “but they shall be so chosen from the different countries that the various systems of law and procedure and the principal languages shall be suitably represented in the personnel of the Court” (Art. 1). The Court should meet annually at the Hague and remain in session as long as necessary; the judges were to receive a sufficient salary to enable them to devote their time to the consideration of the matters brought before them (Art. 2). No judge was to take part in the consideration of any case when his nation was a party thereto (unless with the express consent of the parties) (Art. 3). The cases which might come before the Court were set forth in Article 4. The judges were to act on Commissions of Enquiry or Special Arbitration Tribunals (Art. 5). The present Permanent Court of Arbitration might, as far as possible, constitute the basis of the Court, care being taken that the Powers which recently signed the Convention of 1899 are represented on it (Art. 6)² .

The only important opposition to the general scheme of a really permanent Court as outlined by the United States draft came from M. Beernaert, who contended that the comparative failure of the Permanent Court established in 1899 was due not to inherent defects but to the timidity of Governments to make trial of a new institution; the Permanent Court was preferable to that proposed by the United States plan, which he proceeded to criticise in detail, especially dwelling on the fact that permanent judges were imposed on the parties to the dispute who would thus be deprived of the right of choice which was essential to the idea of arbitration¹ .

M. Léon Bourgeois, in his capacity of French delegate, replied to the various speeches, particularly emphasising the fact that the proposed Court was not to take the place of the Permanent Court established in 1899, but that each would have its own separate sphere and that it was in no sense obligatory on the contracting parties to take cases before it² . Before the vote was taken several delegates enquired as to the manner in which the judges who should compose the new Court would be chosen, and no reply being forthcoming they decided to abstain from voting. The United States proposal was put to the vote and carried by 28 votes, with 12 abstentions³ .

Proceedings in the Examining Committee.In the Examining Committee (Comité d’Examen, B) the United States draft was taken as a basis, but it was subsequently withdrawn in favour of a common draft prepared by the American, British and German delegates⁴ . During the course of the discussions M. Ruy Barbosa (Brazil), on the 20th August, presented a draft based on the principle of the equality of states in their representation on the Court to be established, and the abolition of the existing Court. He supported his proposal in lengthy, detailed and somewhat heated speeches⁵ . His draft was not discussed by the Examining Committee and was subsequently withdrawn. Amendments were also presented by the Bulgarian, Haitian and Uruguayan delegates regarding the composition of the Court, the latter dealing with the question of obligatory arbitration⁶ .

The Examining Committee held 8 meetings between the 13th August and the 16th September but their labours did not result in their being able to lay before the Conference a draft Convention for its acceptance. The rock which so nearly proved fatal to the Prize Court Convention, viz. the mode of appointment of the judges, wrecked the scheme.

The draft Convention.It is not necessary to enter into a detailed explanation of the draft Convention, it will be sufficient to summarise its contents. It proposes the creation of a really permanent Court which shall meet at the Hague once a year for the hearing of such cases as shall be set down for it. The Court is to be freely and easily accessible, composed of judges representing the various judicial systems of the world and capable of insuring continuity in arbitral jurisprudence (Art. 1). It is to be composed of judges and deputy-judges of the highest qualification, appointed for a period of twelve years and taken as far as possible from the members of the Permanent Court of Arbitration (Arts. 2 and 3). The Court is annually to nominate three judges to form a special Delegation and three more to replace them should the necessity arise (Art. 6). No judge is to exercise his functions in any case in which he has taken part in the decision of a national tribunal, or in which he has acted as counsel or advocate; a judge cannot act in the latter capacity before the Judicial Arbitration Court, the Permanent Court of Arbitration, a Special Tribunal of Arbitration or a Commission of Inquiry (Art. 7).

The judges are to receive an annual salary of 6000 Netherland florins (about £480) per annum, together with a further allowance of 100 florins per diem when exercising their functions, and travelling expenses fixed in accordance with the regulations in their own country. These emoluments are included in the general expenses of the Court and are paid through the International Bureau created by 1 H. C. 1899 (Art. 9). The judges may not accept any remuneration from their own or any other Government for services connected with their duties in their capacity of members of the Court (Art. 10).

The Delegation is competent (1) to decide arbitrations, if the parties are agreed that the summary procedure laid down in Part iv. Chapter iv. 1 H. C. 1907 is to be applied: (2) to hold an inquiry under Part iii. of that Convention. With the assent of the parties, and as an exception to the rule laid down in Article 7, the members of the Delegation who have taken part in the inquiry may sit as judges if the case in dispute is submitted to the arbitration of the Court or of the Delegation itself (Art. 18). The Delegation is also competent to settle the Compromis under Article 53 of 1 H. C. 1907.

It will thus be seen that the draft follows the general principles of the United States scheme with the addition of the small Committee as suggested by the Russian proposal, but nothing is said of the number of judges who shall compose the Court or the mode in which they are to be chosen. This subject occupied the attention of the Examining Committee for a considerable time but all attempts to produce a scheme which would meet with general acceptance failed. At the meeting on the 5th September Mr Choate reviewed the various suggestions made on this important subject¹ .

Proposed methods of choosing Judges.The Sub-Committee which had charge of the preparation of the draft had attempted to devise a scheme which should serve as a basis of discussion. It recognised the equal sovereignty of nations and took account at the same time of the differences that existed between them in population, in territory, in commerce, in language, in system of law and other respects. A Court of seventeen judges was proposed to be organised for a period of twelve years. The eight great Powers would each nominate a judge for the full period of twelve years, other states for smaller periods varying in proportion to their population, territorial extent, commerce etc.¹ These periods ranged from ten years to one.

M. Barbosa had presented a counter-scheme² “based upon the alleged equality, not only in sovereignty, but in all other respects of all the states. It proposed to abolish the existing Court, and for a new Court to be constituted consisting of forty-five judges, one to be appointed by each state, and these to be divided into groups, in alphabetical order, of fifteen each, which were to sit for alternate periods of three years....Two objections to it were suggested—first, that an allotment of periods by alphabetical order was really the creation of a court by chance, and second, that it deprived each nation of any hand or voice in the Court for six years out of the nine for which it was proposed to establish it, whereas the first scheme had given every nation a seat in the Court by a permanent judge for a fixed period, besides the right to have a judge of its own appointment upon the Court whenever it had a case before it for decision³ .” This system was not considered by the Examining Committee. M. Barbosa subsequently withdrew the draft. Although it had been put forward as a counter proposal, the Brazilian delegate was not dissatisfied with the existing Court, and had introduced the alternative scheme merely “to illustrate by a concrete example the kind of Court consistent with the unimpaired equality of nations, and the exercise of sovereignty⁴ ,” which he was prepared to accept.

Another proposal was that seventeen nations including the eight great Powers, and nine others which together should represent all parts of the world, languages, legal systems, interests etc., “should be selected by the Conference with a power to each to appoint a judge for the whole term of the Court, thus recognising the principle of equality of sovereignty to be exercised in the power of creating the Court and selecting the judges⁵ .”

According to another proposal four judges should be assigned to America as a unit, the selection to be left to the States of the American Continent, while the other nations should elect thirteen judges among themselves.

All these schemes having failed, Mr Choate then proposed the following: “The plan would be for an election, each state casting one vote for a prescribed number of judges, which should be deemed suitable for the temporary and provisional organisation of the Court, to hold office, either until the next Conference, or for a specified number of years, or until the Powers, by a diplomatic interchange of views, should adopt some different method as a permanency¹ .”

Final efforts.A final effort was made to secure an acceptable result by sending all the various proposals to a Sub-Committee of 8 delegates consisting of Baron Marschall von Bieberstein, Count Tornielli, Sir Edward Fry, MM. Nélidow, Bourgeois, Choate, Barbosa and Mérey de Kapos-Mère, but this endeavour failed also, and the Examining Committee met for the last time on the 18th September when Mr Choate made a final effort which he said he hoped would meet all the objections raised to the other schemes. Each state was to nominate a judge and deputy-judge and to send their names to the International Bureau. The Bureau was then to make a list of the names submitted and of countries nominating them and to send the list to the signatory Powers. Each would then vote for 15 judges and 15 deputy-judges taken from the list, and return their votes to the Bureau who would notify the names of those receiving the greatest number of votes; in case of equality of votes the decision to be by lot. The project, said Mr Choate, was simplicity itself. If only 15 nations accepted it, a beginning would be made and accessions would soon follow² . M. Ruy Barbosa was inflexible in his opposition, and when it was put to the vote Mr Choate’s proposal was rejected by 9 to 5. Sir Edward Fry then moved to accept the draft, leaving out all the provisions relating to the nomination of the judges or the rotation to be established, and recommending that it be brought into force as soon as an agreement had been reached respecting the selection of the judges and the constitution of the Court. The draft was accepted by 8 votes to 5 with 2 abstentions, and Sir Edward Fry’s proposal by the same numbers³ .

The First Committee adopted the motion of Sir Edward Fry as a Declaration (the name was changed to Vœu in the Final Act) at their meeting on the 10th October, and the Conference at its Ninth Plenary Meeting on the 16th October also adopted it by 36 votes with 6 abstentions.Reservations. The following states made reservations chiefly in the sense of accepting the Court providing that the principle of the legal equality of states be recognised in the composition of the Court: Mexico, Brazil, Colombia, San Salvador, Persia, Guatemala, Hayti, Venezuela, Paraguay, San Domingo, Panama, Ecuador, China, Bolivia and Nicaragua¹ . On signing the Final Act Switzerland made a reservation of this Vœu, the Swiss Federal Council having declined to accept it.

The labour of weeks spent in discussing the various projects for the composition of the proposed Court of Arbitral Justice was frustrated, and rendered fruitless for the present by the opposition of the smaller Powers, headed by the Brazilian delegate, M. Ruy Barbosa. To them the doctrine of the equality of states was a dogma accepted in its crudest meaning. Equality before the law, and equality in influence are two very different things. The “primacy of the great Powers” is a fact, if it is not a legal principle, and if these Powers should be able in the future to agree upon a method for the appointment of the judges for the Court, the lesser Powers will in course of time gradually be found desirous of taking their part in an institution which would contain the germs of the most important judicial body ever known to the world. But are these Powers really in earnest in their desire to establish such an institution? The international Palais de Justice has been built, furnished and decorated, and is ready for the judges to take their seats; it is for the Powers to open the doors and send them in² .

THE RESULTS OF THE SECOND PEACE CONFERENCE.

The Second Peace Conference held its First Plenary Meeting on the 15th June, 1907, and its last on the 18th October¹ . The members of the Conference at their Final Meeting expressed profound appreciation of the humanitarian worth of the Conference, and condemned the pessimism of those who viewed the ideal of peace as a dangerous illusion. But outside the walls of the Palace where the delegates had sat for four tedious months, a different note was at once apparent. The humanitarian sentiments were derided. Peace, it was said, was neither more nor less secure after the Conference than before; the assembly had been actuated not by equitable principles but by political considerations. The failures of the Conference as embodied in its Vœux and Resolutions were emphasised; the noble sentiments, and high principles enunciated in the speeches at the Final Meeting were contrasted with the achievements of the representatives of forty-four sovereign Powers after four months of unintermitted labour; the “law of facts” had prevailed, the Conference was a failure, a “fiasco,” its one value was to afford a warning against the besetting sin of the hour—“against the moral and intellectual dishonesty of pandering to sentiment merely because it was popular, without regard to the inevitable results² .” The world had in fact become wearied by the complicated reports of the long drawn out proceedings of the Conference, and bored by the reiteration of the arguments of the delegates based on political self-interest; the enthusiasm which had greeted the commencement of the Conference had been turned to disgust at its apparently small results.

Judgments passed under such circumstances are apt to be coloured by the feelings of the moment, the failures are magnified, the positive and permanent results are neglected or belittled. There is a truth in the adverse criticisms which were expressed so freely at the conclusion of the Conference, but it is by no means the whole truth.

The foregoing pages show the actual results obtained by the Second Peace Conference, and the processes by which they were framed; the Conventions have been examined and their ambiguities and omissions noted. All legislation which is the result of compromise contains much that is open to criticism, international agreements no less than national statutes. A brief summary of work of the Second Conference will serve to assist in forming a judgment on its permanent value.

The Convention for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes prepared in 1899 was amended and enlarged, especially as regards Commissions of Inquiry, and a new chapter was added for facilitating appeal to arbitration by summary procedure. Already one important case has been decided under the terms of the new and still unratified Convention—the Casablanca Arbitration Case between France and Germany¹ —and another, the dispute between Great Britain and the United States regarding the Atlantic fishery question, has been set down for trial, the Protocole de Compromis in the latter case expressly providing for the application of the new summary procedure in the determination of questions arising under the award.

The second Convention provides for a case of compulsory arbitration in regard to contract debts, but its value is weakened by the abstentions from signature, and the reservations of many of the Powers in whose interest the Convention was proposed.

By the third Convention the signatory Powers recognise that war ought to be preceded by a declaration.

By the fourth Convention an important addition is made to the Convention relating to the laws and customs of land warfare of 1899 by the provision of a sanction for the breach of the Regulations adopted. Several alterations and additions are made to the Regulations themselves, though some of these are equivocal.

In the fifth Convention a commencement is made of a Code relating to neutrals in land warfare.

The sixth Convention registers a concession in favour of enemy private property at sea, by exempting from capture merchant-ships in port at the outbreak of war, as well as those on the high seas ignorant of its existence; but here again there is evidence of compromise, and the desirability of allowing days of grace to ships in enemy ports is all that the Convention provides, while the important qualification regarding ships whose build indicates that they are intended for conversion into war-ships may raise difficult questions in the application of the Convention.

The seventh Convention lays down the conditions to which merchant-ships converted into war-ships must conform in order to comply with the rule abolishing privateering; they are simple and straightforward, but the really difficult questions connected with the place and duration of the conversion are left unsolved.

The eighth Convention relating to submarine mines is a very unsatisfactory document. The endeavours of Great Britain to safeguard neutral commerce by strictly limiting the localities in which mines may be laid, and of Germany to prohibit floating mines altogether for a period of five years were unfortunately unsuccessful, and the Convention fails to prohibit the use of these deadly weapons under circumstances which would render their employment disastrous to innocent neutrals; the absence of a prohibition is, however, not to be mistaken for a tacit permission.

The bombardment of undefended coast towns is prohibited by the ninth Convention, except in case of the non-provision of supplies for the enemy fleet demanding them. The prohibition to bombard such towns for non-payment of a ransom is now recognised as a definite rule of international law.

By the tenth Convention important changes are introduced into the Convention of 1899 applying to naval warfare the principles of the Geneva Convention, and the Conference is to be congratulated on the execution of a highly humane piece of work. Several problems connected with this subject left outstanding from the first Conference were found capable of solution by the second.

The eleventh Convention is a valuable contribution towards the laws of naval warfare; small coasting fishing boats, a class of vessels which had in practice been left unmolested for a considerable time, are exempted from capture, and this exemption is extended to small boats engaged in petty local navigation. Enemy merchant seamen are also exempt from capture as prisoners of war. None of the topics in this Convention were mentioned in Court Benckendorff’s Circular.

The twelfth Convention establishing an International Prize Court (another subject which was not mentioned in the Russian programme) is the greatest achievement of the Conference. At the Tenth Plenary Meeting of the Conference on the 17th October, 1907, Sir Edward Fry spoke as follows of this Convention: “I have no intention to pass in review the labours of this Conference, I shall confine myself to saying that of all the projects we have adopted, the most remarkable in my opinion is that of the Prize Court, because it is the first time in the history of the world that there has been organised a Court truly international. International law of to-day is not much more than a chaos of opinions which are often contradictory, and of decisions based on national laws. We hope to see little by little formed in the future, around this Court, a system of laws truly international which will owe its existence only to principles of justice and equity, and which consequently will command not only the admiration of the world, but the respect and obedience of civilised nations¹ .” The obstacles to be overcome before the International Prize Court is an accomplished fact are great, but some of these have been removed by the Declaration of London of 1909, which however, like the Prize Court Convention (and all the Conventions of the Second Peace Conference), still remains unratified. It would be a striking testimony to the value of international gatherings, and the growth of the power of law, should both of these important Acts be ratified, even though some reservation were made by the ratifying Powers.

The thirteenth Convention regarding the rights and duties of neutrals in naval war is of too complex a character wholly to praise or blame; its weakness in regard to the enunciation of neutral duties has already been noticed. In none of the discussions was the influence of political considerations greater than in those on this subject.

The Declaration of 1899 prohibiting the discharge of projectiles and explosives from balloons, which had expired in 1905, was renewed until the termination of the next Peace Conference. It has not however been signed by such important Powers as Germany, France, and Russia. Several of the Powers which signed and ratified the Declaration in 1899 have clearly manifested their intention to remain unfettered in their use of what may in the future prove a most important factor in warfare both by land and sea, and in view of the abstention from signature of several important states it would appear unlikely that the Declaration will be ratified by many of the signatory Powers.

Such were the positive results of the Second Peace Conference; the failures which were many have already been discussed; the net results, though considerable, “are less than might have been hoped for, but perhaps as great as could reasonably be expected when all the circumstances are considered² .”

The most important work of the Second Peace Conference, apart from the amendments to the Conventions of the First, is to be found in the Conventions relating to maritime international law. Except in regard to the treatment of sick, wounded and shipwrecked persons in naval warfare, no attempt had been made since 1856 to enter into any international agreement on the subject, and many of the rules had, owing to modern changes, become obsolete or unworkable. The difficulties which the Conference had to face in dealing with this topic have already been referred to¹ ; that they were not entirely overcome at the first attempt is no cause for surprise. Conventions 7 to 13 all deal with naval warfare, and although the solutions provided for the difficult problems with which they deal are frequently of a tentative character, the results of the London Naval Conference afford reason to believe that many of the Conventions of 1907 will be elucidated and strengthened by the Conference of 1915.

In comparing the work of the Second Peace Conference with the First, it is necessary to recall the fact that the First Conference did not commence its labours on an arid plain, the soil had already been tilled, the seed sown and watered, and two of the three Conventions adopted by it were the fruits of previous international gatherings, subsequent discussions and international practice.

The Second Conference also was able to reap the results of the labours of the First, and like it to enter new fields and sow seeds for its successors; the bulk of its work, indeed, was of the latter character, and the fruits will appear in due time. These are, in fact, already becoming apparent. The Convention of the 20th December, 1907, between the five Central American States of Costa Rica, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua and San Salvador, whereby the signatory Powers agreed to submit to the decision of a permanent Arbitration Court all disputes (without any exceptions) which may arise between them, may be indirectly attributed to the discussion at the Hague. Already two cases have come before the Court sitting at Cartago (Costa Rica). An important step towards the preparation of regulations relative to the laws and customs of Naval Warfare has been taken by the London Naval Conference of 1909. The delegates, in preparing the Declaration of London, were able to avail themselves of the experience gained in the lengthy discussions on blockade, contraband, etc. at the Hague in 1907. The Second Conference, no less than the First, must be judged, not merely by the results of the moment, but by its subsequent influence.

The expectations of the immediate results of the Second Conference were not fully realised, too much had been anticipated from it, more might have been forthcoming but for the following circumstances.

The Second Conference was overpowered by numbers, the Committees were too large. It was also hampered at every turn by the effects of the legal doctrine that all the states represented were equal, and for this reason the Conference has been described as a “sham” which brought forth a progeny of shams¹ . Dr Westlake makes use of the same expression when he says “in a word the voting was a sham, and of shams we ought to have no more² .” “The claim of many of the smaller States to equality,” writes Sir Edward Fry, “as regards not only their independence, but their share in all international institutions waived by most of them in the case of the Prize Court, but successfully asserted in the case of the proposed new Arbitral Court, is one which may produce great difficulties, and may perhaps drive the greater Powers to act in many cases by themselves³ .” As a consequence of this principle (in the support of which the smaller Powers received encouragement from several of the greater who were desirous of obtaining their votes), and of the regulation adopted by the Conference that no Convention should be recommended for acceptance unless there was unanimity, proposals affecting maritime international law were placed at the mercy of purely inland states such as Luxemburg, Switzerland, and Servia, which ranked for the purpose of voting on a level with Great Britain, the United States, and Germany. The Prize Court Convention was nearly wrecked by the opposition of the smaller states, and the creation of an Arbitration Tribunal of a truly permanent character was frustrated by the same Powers.

Sir Edward Fry’s hint that the greater Powers might be driven to act by themselves bore fruit in the Naval Conference of London, when problems relating to contraband and blockade which were found insoluble in 1907 were adjusted by the representatives of a small number of the greater Powers. The Third Conference will, if it desires to avoid the excessive waste of time of the Second, be compelled either to abandon the principle of requiring unanimous votes, or to abandon entirely the principle of voting.

Another reason why no results were reached on several of the subjects introduced was the absence of preparation on the part of many of the Delegations. The soil must be tilled before the seed can be successfully sown. The German Delegation appears to have come fully prepared with drafts on all or nearly all the subjects enumerated in the Russian Circular, and the British, the United States, French and other Delegations had prepared drafts on matters in which they were specially interested. A careful examination, however, of the procès-verbal of the Committees, Sub-Committees and Examining Committees reveals the fact that delay was frequently occasioned by absence of instructions on the part of many of the Delegations. Owing to the wide latitude given by the Chairman to the introduction of new topics, and the fact that the discussions were not confined within due limits, new points were raised and proposals made which often left even the best instructed Delegations unprepared to take any definite line. Some questions of the greatest importance such as the British proposal for the abolition of contraband were publicly discussed for the first time, without the valuable assistance which the Conference derived in most of the other subjects from the previous careful and scientific examination by text-writers, or the body of experts composing the “Institut de Droit International.” The Conference felt these drawbacks and resolved that two years before the summoning of the next Conference by a careful preparation of drafts, and preliminary discussions of various topics it should be ascertained what subjects were ripe for embodiment in an international regulation, and a programme should then be prepared¹ . A useful precedent will be found in the various memoranda sent in to the British Government before the meeting of the London Naval Conference, as by means of these the views of the Governments summoned to the Conference were made known, and bases for discussion prepared before the delegates assembled.

The defects in the rules of procedure were striking and in many points fatal to progress. The President at the commencement of the Conference expressed the hope that speeches should be limited to ten minutes; this hope was unrealised. Frequently the same delegate addressed a Committee at inordinate length, and several times in the course of one meeting. “The least hopeful proposals were, under the pseudo-parliamentary procedure, allowed to be put through an indefinite number of stages without any likelihood of their ultimate decision² .” Amendments and contradictory resolutions were passed only to be sent on to another Committee where the same procedure not infrequently occurred.

Some of these causes of want of greater success are capable of remedy by a future Conference, but the more fundamental and permanent cause was political. Each Delegation had the primary duty to discharge of defending its state’s national interests: the Conference was not composed merely of lawyers intent on framing a scientific code of international law; it was a battlefield of diplomatists. In questions where political considerations were supreme, compromise was often impossible. Each delegate “did his best to advance his nation’s interests, but inasmuch as nations differ in status and power, proposals made by one nation would not commend themselves to another, and heated arguments would follow moving the whole assembly to excitement, each representative insisting on his nation’s sovereign rights, and declining to submit to coercion, with the result that proposals would be dropped half-way or suspended in a void of empty theories¹ .”

Notwithstanding all these circumstances the Conference was not a failure; it was disappointing but it is not discouraging. War will not be banished from the world by Peace Conferences; nevertheless such gatherings, by removing doubts in international rules, and bringing into greater prominence the solidarity of the interests of mankind, may do much to encourage arbitration and to remove the causes of war. The Second Peace Conference no less than the First produced solid results in these directions, and by establishing an International Prize Court it has provided the means for a pacific solution of the questions which may arise in construing its Conventions.

The work of future Conferences will be greatly assisted if more careful preparation is previously made of the questions to be brought forward; these must be chosen by the Powers themselves, and only those should be introduced on which bases of discussion can be first framed. The Permanent Administrative Council established at the Hague under the provisions of the Convention for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes might form a truly International Bureau for the preparatory work of future Conferences. Rules of procedure must be carefully drafted to avoid lengthy and futile discussions: voting should be abolished, and the sense of the Conference taken not by merely counting states, but by taking into account their differences in territory, wealth, population, armed forces, conceptions of right, and experience of the topics under consideration. States should be free to enter into Conventions among themselves as the results of such discussions. It should be possible for one state whose proposals have received the support of a substantial number of other states to ignore the dissentients, and to negotiate a Convention with those who have supported its proposals, without incurring the censure of the Conference or being accused of attempting to frustrate its labours.

Tsars have deserved well of posterity for their initiative in the summoning of International Conferences, but it is now time that such gatherings should meet freed from the patronage of any one monarch.

The appeal to the sentiment of the world which is made by the name of the “Peace Conference” has not been without its effect, but those objects which were the very basis of the invitation issued for the First Conference, “the maintenance of the general peace, and a possible reduction of the excessive armaments which were burdening all nations,” were absent from the programme sketched out for the Second¹ . Every International Conference which makes for the growth of international law, and a fuller acceptance of its rules is, however, a real “Peace” Conference, and is of value in maintaining “the general peace,” even though its work should consist in the preparation of laws of war.

There is much work in store for many years for future Conferences in settling and codifying the rules of international law, rules which govern the relations of states both in peace and war. The road to be travelled before the goal is reached will doubtless be long and tedious, and often there will apparently only be movement in a circle. No one who has studied the history of the attempts to codify national law will lightly estimate the labour involved, or be discouraged by the slowness of the rate of progress. Every addition to accepted rules, every solution of a disputed point is an advance towards the reign of law among states, and to this end the Second Peace Conference contributed in no small measure.

TABLE OF THE DEPOSITS

of acts of ratification and accessions to the Conventions and Declarations signed the 29th July, 1899, at the First Peace Conference.

S. = Signed and Ratified. A. = Acceded. R. = Reservation.

Réserves.

Reservations.

TABLE OF SIGNATURES.

Table of the States represented at the Second International Peace Conference which signed the Conventions, Declaration, and Final Act.

Signatures affixed and reservations made up to June 30, 1908, when, by virtue of the Final Act, the period within which the above instruments must be signed expires, with the exception however of Convention XII (see Article 53).

Réserves.

Reservations.

Final Protocol of the London Naval Conference.

Protocole de Clôture.

La Conférence Navale de Londres, convoquée par le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté Britannique, s’est réunie, le 4 décembre 1908, au Ministère des Affaires Étrangères, à l’effet de déterminer les principes généralement reconnus du droit international dans le sens de l’article 7 de la Convention signée à La Haye le 18 octobre 1907, pour l’établissement d’une Cour internationale des prises.

Les Puissances, dont l’énumération suit, ont pris part à cette Conférence, pour laquelle elles avaient désigné les Délégués nommés ci-après:—

[Dénomination des Plénipotentiaires.]

Dans une série de réunions, tenues du 4 décembre 1908 au 26 février 1909, la Conférence a arrêté, pour être soumis à la signature des Plénipotentiaires, la Déclaration relative au droit de la guerre maritime, dont le texte est annexé au présent Protocole.

En outre, le vœu suivant a été adopté par les Délégués des Puissances qui ont signé ou qui ont exprimé l’intention de signer la Convention de La Haye en date du 18 octobre 1907 pour l’établissement d’une Cour internationale des prises:—

Les Delégués des Puissances représentées à la Conférence Navale et qui ont signé ou qui ont exprimé l’intention de signer la Convention de La Haye en date du 18 octobre 1907 pour l’établissement d’une Cour internationale des prises, considérant les difficultés d’ordre constitutionnel qui, pour certains États, s’opposent à la ratification, sous sa forme actuelle, de cette Convention, sont d’accord pour signaler à leurs Gouvernements respectifs l’avantage que présenterait la conclusion d’un arrangement en vertu duquel lesdits États auraient, lors du dépôt de leurs ratifications, la faculté d’y joindre une réserve portant que le droit de recourir à la Cour internationale des prises, à propos des décisions de leurs tribunaux nationaux, se présentera comme une action directe en indemnité, pourvu toutefois que l’effet de cette réserve ne soit pas de nature à porter atteinte aux droits garantis par ladite Convention, soit aux particuliers, soit à leurs Gouvernements, et que les termes de la réserve forment l’objet d’une entente ultérieure entre les Puissances Signataires de la même Convention.

En foi de quoi les Plénipotentiaires et les Délégués remplaçant les Plénipotentiaires qui ont déjà dû quitter Londres ont signé le présent Protocole.

Fait à Londres le vingt-six février mil neuf cent neuf, en un seul exemplaire, qui sera déposé dans les archives du Gouvernement Britannique et dont des copies, certifiées conformes, seront remises par la voie diplomatique aux Puissances représentées à la Conférence Navale.

[Suivent les Signatures.]

Final Protocol.

The London Naval Conference, called together by His Britannic Majesty’s Government, assembled at the Foreign Office on the 4th December, 1908, with the object of laying down the generally-recognised principles of international law in accordance with Article 7 of the Convention signed at The Hague on the 18th October, 1907, for the establishment of an International Prize Court.

The Powers enumerated below took part in this Conference, at which they appointed as their Representatives the following Delegates¹ :—

[Names of Plenipotentiaries.]

In a series of sittings held from the 4th December, 1908, to the 26th February, 1909, the Conference has drawn up for signature by the Plenipotentiaries the Declaration concerning the laws of naval war, the text of which is annexed to the present Protocol.

Furthermore, the following wish has been recorded by the Delegates of those Powers which have signed or expressed the intention of signing the Convention of The Hague of the 18th October, 1907, for the establishment of an International Prize Court:—

The Delegates of the Powers represented at the Naval Conference which have signed or expressed the intentionof signing the Convention of The Hague of the 18th October, 1907, for the establishment of an International Prize Court, having regard to the difficulties of a constitutional nature which, in some States, stand in the way of the ratification of that Convention in its present form, agree to call the attention of their respective Governments to the advantage of concluding an arrangement under which suck States would have the power, at the time of depositing their ratifications, to add thereto a reservation to the effect that resort to the International Prize Court in respect of decisions of their National Tribunals shall take the form of a direct claim for compensation, provided always that the effect of this reservation shall not be such as to impair the rights secured under the said Convention either to individuals or to their Governments, and that the terms of the reservation shall form the subject of a subsequent understanding between the Powers signatory of that Convention¹ .

In faith whereof the Plenipotentiaries and the Delegates representing those Plenipotentiaries who have already left London have signed the present Protocol.

Done at London the twenty-sixth day of February, one thousand nine hundred and nine, in a single original, which shall be deposited in the archives of the British Government and of which duly certified copies shall be sent through the diplomatic channel to the Powers represented at the Naval Conference.

[Here follow the Signatures.]

THE DECLARATION OF LONDON, 1909

Déclaration relative au Droit de la Guerre Maritime.

Sa Majesté l’Empereur d’Allemagne, Roi de Prusse; le Président des États-Unis d’Amérique; Sa Majesté l’Empereur d’Autriche, Roi de Bohême, &c., et Roi Apostolique de Hongrie; Sa Majesté le Roi d’Espagne; le Président de la République Française; Sa Majesté le Roi du Royaume-Uni de Grande-Bretagne et d’Irlande et des Territoires Britanniques au delà des Mers, Empereur des Indes; Sa Majesté le Roi d’Italie; Sa Majesté l’Empereur du Japon; Sa Majesté la Reine des Pays-Bas; Sa Majesté l’Empereur de Toutes les Russies;

Considérant l’invitation par laquelle le Gouvernement Britannique a proposé à diverses Puissances de se réunir en Conférence afin de déterminer en commun ce que comportent les règles généralement reconnues du droit international au sens de l’article 7 de la Convention du 18 octobre 1907, relative à l’établissement d’une Cour internationale des prises;

Reconnaissant tous les avantages que, dans le cas malheureux d’une guerre maritime, la détermination desdites règles présente, soit pour le commerce pacifique, soit pour les belligérants et pour leurs relations politiques avec les Gouvernements neutres;

Considérant que les principes généraux du droit international sont souvent, dans leur application pratique, l’objet de méthodes divergentes;

Animés du désir d’assurer dorénavant une plus grande uniformité à cet égard;

Espérant qu’une œuvre d’un intérêt commun aussi important rencontrera l’approbation générale;

Ont nommé pour Leurs Plénipotentiaires, savoir:

[Dénomination des Plénipotentiaires¹ .]

Lesquels, après s’être communiqué leurs pleins pouvoirs, trouvés en bonne et due forme, sont convenus de faire la présente Déclaration:

Declaration concerning the Laws of Naval War¹ .

His Majesty the German Emperor, King of Prussia; the President of the United States of America; His Majesty the Emperor of Austria, King of Bohemia, &c., and Apostolic King of Hungary; His Majesty the King of Spain; the President of the French Republic; His Majesty the King of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland and of the British Dominions beyond the Seas, Emperor of India; His Majesty the King of Italy; His Majesty the Emperor of Japan; Her Majesty the Queen of the Netherlands; His Majesty the Emperor of All the Russias;

Having regard to the terms in which the British Government invited various Powers to meet in conference in order to arrive at an agreement as to what are the generally recognized rules of international law within the meaning of Article 7 of the Convention of the 18th October, 1907, relative to the establishment of an International Prize Court;

Recognizing all the advantages which an agreement as to the said rules would present in the unfortunate event of a naval war, both as regards peaceful commerce, and as regards the belligerents and their diplomatic relations with neutral Governments;

Having regard to the divergence often found in the methods by which it is sought to apply in practice the general principles of international law;

Animated by the desire to insure henceforward a greater measure of uniformity in this respect;

Hoping that a work so important to the common welfare will meet with general approval;

Have appointed as their Plenipotentiaries, that is to say:

[Names of Plenipotentiaries¹ .]

Who, after having communicated their full powers, found to be in good and due form, have agreed to make the present Declaration:—

Disposition préliminaire.

Les Puissances Signataires sont d’accord pour constater que les règles contenues dans les Chapitres suivants répondent, en substance, aux principes généralement reconnus du droit international.

Preliminary Provision.

The Signatory Powers are agreed that the rules contained in the following Chapters correspond in substance with the generally recognized principles of international law.

Chapitre Premier.

Du blocus en temps de guerre.

Art. 1.

Le blocus doit être limité aux ports et aux côtes de l’ennemi ou occupés par lui.

Chapter I.

Blockade in time of War.

Art. 1.

A blockade must not extend beyond the ports and coasts belonging to or occupied by the enemy.

Art. 2.

Conformément à la Déclaration de Paris de 1856, le blocus, pour être obligatoire, doit être effectif, c’est-à-dire maintenu par une force suffisante pour interdire réellement l’accès du littoral ennemi.

Art. 2.

In accordance with the Declaration of Paris of 1856, a blockade, in order to be binding, must be effective—that is to say, it must be maintained by a force sufficient really to prevent access to the enemy coastline¹ .

Art. 3.

La question de savoir si le blocus est effectif est une question de fait.

Art. 3.

The question whether a blockade is effective is a question of fact.

Art. 4.

Le blocus n’est pas considéré comme levé si, par suite du mauvais temps, les forces bloquantes se sont momentanément éloignées.

Art. 4.

A blockade is not regarded as raised if the blockading force is temporarily withdrawn in consequence of stress of weather.

Art. 5.

Le blocus doit être impartialement appliqué aux divers pavillons.

Art. 5.

A blockade must be applied impartially to the ships of all nations.

Art. 6.

Le commandant de la force bloquante peut accorder à des navires de guerre la permission d’entrer dans le port bloqué et d’en sortir ultérieurement.

Art. 6.

The commander of a blockading force may give permission to a warship to enter, and subsequently to leave, a blockaded port.

Art. 7.

Un navire neutre, en cas de détresse constatée par une autorité des forces bloquantes, peut pénétrer dans la localité bloquée et en sortir ultérieurement à la condition de n’y avoir laissé ni pris aucun chargement.

Art. 7.

In circumstances of distress, acknowledged by an authority of the blockading force, a neutral vessel may enter a place under blockade and subsequently leave it, provided that she has neither discharged nor shipped any cargo there.

Art. 8.

Le blocus, pour être obligatoire, doit être déclaré conformément à l’article 9 et notifié conformément aux articles 11 et 16.

Art. 8.

A blockade, in order to be binding, must be declared in accordance with Article 9, and notified in accordance with Articles 11 and 16.

Art. 9.

La déclaration de blocus est faite, soit par la Puissance bloquante, soit par les autorités navales agissant en son nom.

Elle précise:

1°. La date du commencement du blocus;

2°. Les limites géographiques du littoral bloqué;

3°. Le délai de sortie à accorder aux navires neutres.

Art. 9.

A declaration of blockade is made either by the blockading Power or by the naval authorities acting in its name.

It specifies—

(1) The date when the blockade begins;

(2) The geographical limits of the coastline under blockade;

(3) The period within which neutral vessels may come out.

Art. 10.

Si la Puissance bloquante ou les autorités navales agissant en son nom ne se conforment pas aux mentions, qu’en exécution de l’article 9—1° et 2°, elles ont dû inscrire dans la déclaration de blocus, cette déclaration est nulle, et une nouvelle déclaration est nécessaire pour que le blocus produise ses effets.

Art. 10.

If the operations of the blockading Power, or of the naval authorities acting in its name, do not tally with the particulars, which, in accordance with Article 9 (1) and (2), must be inserted in the declaration of blockade, the declaration is void, and a new declaration is necessary in order to make the blockade operative.

Art. 11.

La déclaration de blocus est notifiée:

1°. Aux Puissances neutres, par la Puissance bloquante, au moyen d’une communication adressée aux Gouvernements eux-mêmes ou à leurs représentants accrédités auprès d’elle;

2°. Aux autorités locales, par le commandant de la force bloquante. Ces autorités, de leur côté, en informeront, aussitôt que possible, les consuls étrangers qui exercent leurs fonctions dans le port ou sur le littoral bloqués.

Art. 11.

A declaration of blockade is notified—

(1) To neutral Powers, by the blockading Power by means of a communication addressed to the Governments direct, or to their representatives accredited to it;

(2) To the local authorities, by the officer commanding the blockading force. The local authorities will, in turn, inform the foreign consular officers at the port or on the coastline under blockade as soon as possible.

Art. 12.

Les règles relatives à la déclaration et à la notification de blocus sont applicables dans le cas où le blocus serait étendu ou viendrait à être repris après avoir été levé.

Art. 12.

The rules as to declaration and notification of blockade apply to cases where the limits of a blockade are extended, or where a blockade is reestablished after having been raised.

Art. 13.

La levée volontaire du blocus, ainsi que toute restriction qui y serait apportée, doit être notifiée dans la forme prescrite par l’article 11.

Art. 13.

The voluntary raising of a blockade, as also any restriction in the limits of a blockade, must be notified in the manner prescribed by Article 11.

Art. 14.

La saisissabilité d’un navire neutre pour violation de blocus est subordonnée à la connaissance réelle ou présumée du blocus.

Art. 14.

The liability of a neutral vessel to capture for breach of blockade is contingent on her knowledge, actual or presumptive, of the blockade.

Art. 15.

La connaissance du blocus est, sauf preuve contraire, présumée, lorsque le navire a quitté un port neutre postérieurement à la notification, en temps utile, du blocus à la Puissance dont relève ce port.

Art. 15.

Failing proof to the contrary, knowledge of the blockade is presumed if the vessel left a neutral port subsequently to the notification of the blockade to the Power to which such port belongs, provided that such notification was made in sufficient time.

Art. 16.

Si le navire qui approche du port bloqué n’a pas connu ou ne peut être présumé avoir connu l’existence du blocus, la notification doit être faite au navire même par un officier de l’un des bâtiments de la force bloquante. Cette notification doit être portée sur le livre de bord avec indication de la date et de l’heure, ainsi que de la position géographique du navire à ce moment.

Le navire neutre qui sort du port bloqué, alors que, par la négligence du commandant de la force bloquante, aucune déclaration de blocus n’a été notifiée aux autorités locales ou qu’un délai n’a pas été indiqué dans la déclaration notifiée, doit être laissé libre de passer.

Art. 16.

If a vessel approaching a blockaded port has no knowledge, actual or presumptive, of the blockade, the notification must be made to the vessel itself by an officer of one of the ships of the blockading force. This notification should be entered in the vessel’s logbook, and must state the day and hour, and the geographical position of the vessel at the time.

If through the negligence of the officer commanding the blockading force no declaration of blockade has been notified to the local authorities, or, if in the declaration, as notified, no period has been mentioned within which neutral vessels may come out, a neutral vessel coming out of the blockaded port must be allowed to pass free.

Art. 17.

La saisie des navires neutres pour violation de blocus ne peut être effectuée que dans le rayon d’action des bâtiments de guerre chargés d’assurer l’effectivité du blocus.

Art. 17.

Neutral vessels may not be captured for breach of blockade except within the area of operations of the warships detailed to render the blockade effective.

Art. 18.

Les forces bloquantes ne doivent pas barrer l’accès aux ports et aux côtes neutres.

Art. 18.

The blockading forces must not bar access to neutral ports or coasts.

Art. 19.

La violation du blocus est insuffisamment caractérisée pour autoriser la saisie du navire, lorsque celui-ci est actuellement dirigé vers un port non bloqué, quelle que soit la destination ultérieure du navire ou de son chargement.

Art. 19.

Whatever may be the ulterior destination of a vessel or of her cargo, she cannot be captured for breach of blockade, if, at the moment, she is on her way to a non-blockaded port.

Art. 20.

Le navire qui, en violation du blocus, est sorti du port bloqué ou a tenté d’y entrer, reste saisissable tant qu’il est poursuivi par un bâtiment de la force bloquante. Si la chasse en est abandonnée ou si le blocus est levé, la saisie n’en peut plus être pratiquée.

Art. 20.

A vessel which has broken blockade outwards, or which has attempted to break blockade inwards, is liable to capture so long as she is pursued by a ship of the blockading force. If the pursuit is abandoned, or if the blockade is raised, her capture can no longer be effected.

Art. 21.

Le navire reconnu coupable de violation de blocus est confisqué. Le chargement est également confisqué, à moins qu’il soit prouvé qu’au moment où la marchandise a été embarquée, le chargeur n’a ni connu ni pu connaître l’intention de violer le blocus.

Art. 21.

A vessel found guilty of breach of blockade is condemned. The cargo is also condemned, unless it is proved that at the time of the shipment of the goods the shipper neither knew nor could have known of the intention to break the blockade.

Chapitre II.

De la contrebande de guerre.

Art. 22.

Sont de plein droit considérés comme contrebande de guerre les objets et matériaux suivants, compris sous le nom de contrebande absolue, savoir:

1°. Les armes de toute nature, y compris les armes de chasse, et les pièces détachées caractérisées.

2°. Les projectiles, gargousses et cartouches de toute nature, et les pièces détachées caractérisées.

3°. Les poudres et les explosifs spécialement affectés à la guerre.

4°. Les affûts, caissons, avant-trains, fourgons, forges de campagne, et les pièces détachées caractérisées.

5°. Les effets d’habillement et d’équipement militaires caractérisés.

6°. Les harnachements militaires caractérisés de toute nature.

7°. Les animaux de selle, de trait et de bât, utilisables pour la guerre.

8°. Le matériel de campement et les pièces détachées caractérisées.

9°. Les plaques de blindage.

10°. Les bâtiments et embarcations de guerre et les pièces détachées spécialement caractérisées comme ne pouvant être utilisées que sur un navire de guerre.

11°. Les instruments et appareils exclusivement faits pour la fabrication des munitions de guerre, pour la fabrication et la réparation des armes et du matériel militaire, terrestre ou naval.

Chapter II.

Contraband of War¹ .

Art. 22.

The following articles may, without notice² , be treated as contraband of war, under the name of absolute contraband:—

(1) Arms of all kinds, including arms for sporting purposes, and their distinctive component parts.

(2) Projectiles, charges, and cartridges of all kinds, and their distinctive component parts.

(3) Powder and explosives specially prepared for use in war.

(4) Gun-mountings, limber boxes, limbers, military waggons, field forges, and their distinctive component parts.

(5) Clothing and equipment of a distinctively military character.

(6) All kinds of harness of a distinctively military character.

(7) Saddle, draught, and pack animals suitable for use in war.

(8) Articles of camp equipment, and their distinctive component parts.

(9) Armour plates.

(10) Warships, including boats, and their distinctive component parts of such a nature that they can only be used on a vessel of war.

(11) Implements and apparatus designed exclusively for the manufacture of munitions of war, for the manufacture or repair of arms, or war material for use on land or sea.

Art. 23.

Les objets et matériaux qui sont exclusivement employés à la guerre peuvent être ajoutés à la liste de contrebande absolue au moyen d’une déclaration notifiée.

La notification est adressée aux Gouvernements des autres Puissances ou à leurs représentants accrédités auprès de la Puissance qui fait la déclaration. La notification faite après l’ouverture des hostilités n’est adressée qu’aux Puissances neutres.

Art. 23.

Articles exclusively used for war may be added to the list of absolute contraband by a declaration, which must be notified.

Such notification must be addressed to the Governments of other Powers, or to their representatives accredited to the Power making the declaration. A notification made after the outbreak of hostilities is addressed only to neutral Powers.

Art. 24.

Sont de plein droit considérés comme contrebande de guerre les objets et matériaux susceptibles de servir aux usages de la guerre comme à des usages pacifiques, et compris sous le nom de contrebande conditionnelle, savoir:

1°. Les vivres.

2°. Les fourrages et les graines propres à la nourriture des animaux.

3°. Les vêtements et les tissus d’habillement, les chaussures, propres à des usages militaires.

4°. L’or et l’argent monnayés et en lingots, les papiers représentatifs de la monnaie.

5°. Les véhicules de toute nature pouvant servir à la guerre, ainsi que les pièces détachées.

6°. Les navires, bateaux et embarcations de tout genre, les docks flottants, parties de bassins, ainsi que les pièces détachées.

7°. Le matériel fixe ou roulant des chemins de fer, le matériel des télégraphes, radiotélégraphes et téléphones.

8°. Les aérostats et les appareils d’aviation, les pièces détachées caractérisées ainsi que les accessoires, objets et matériaux caractérisés comme devant servir à l’aérostation ou à l’aviation.

9°. Les combustibles; les matières lubréfiantes.

10°. Les poudres et les explosifs qui ne sont pas spécialement affectés à la guerre.

11°. Les fils de fer barbelés, ainsi que les instruments servant à les fixer ou à les couper.

12°. Les fers à cheval et le matériel de maréchalerie.

13°. Les objets de harnachement et de sellerie.

14°. Les jumelles, les télescopes, les chronomètres et les divers instruments nautiques.

Art. 24.

The following articles, susceptible of use in war as well as for purposes of peace, may, without notice¹ , be treated as contraband of war, under the name of conditional contraband:—

(1) Foodstuffs.

(2) Forage and grain, suitable for feeding animals.

(3) Clothing, fabrics for clothing, and boots and shoes, suitable for use in war.

(4) Gold and silver in coin or bullion; paper money.

(5) Vehicles of all kinds available for use in war, and their component parts.

(6) Vessels, craft, and boats of all kinds; floating docks, parts of docks and their component parts.

(7) Railway material, both fixed and rolling-stock, and material for telegraphs, wireless telegraphs, and telephones.

(8) Balloons and flying machines and their distinctive component parts, together with accessories and articles recognizable as intended for use in connection with balloons and flying machines.

(9) Fuel; lubricants.

(10) Powder and explosives not specially prepared for use in war.

(11) Barbed wire and implements for fixing and cutting the same.

(12) Horseshoes and shoeing materials.

(13) Harness and saddlery.

(14) Field glasses, telescopes, chronometers, and all kinds of nautical instruments.

Art. 25.

Les objets et matériaux susceptibles de servir aux usages de la guerre comme à des usages pacifiques, et autres que ceux visés aux articles 22 et 24, peuvent être ajoutés à la liste de contrebande conditionnelle au moyen d’une déclaration qui sera notifiée de la manière prévue à l’article 23, deuxième alinéa.

Art. 25.

Articles susceptible of use in war as well as for purposes of peace, other than those enumerated in Articles 22 and 24, may be added to the list of conditional contraband by a declaration, which must be notified in the manner provided for in the second paragraph of Article 23.

Art. 26.

Si une Puissance renonce, en ce qui la concerne, à considérer comme contrebande de guerre des objets et matériaux qui rentrent dans une des catégories énumérées aux articles 22 et 24, elle fera connaître son intention par une déclaration notifiée de la manière prévue à l’article 23, deuxième alinéa.

Art. 26.

If a Power waives, so far as it is concerned, the right to treat as contraband of war an article comprised in any of the classes enumerated in Articles 22 and 24, such intention shall be announced by a declaration, which must be notified in the manner provided for in the second paragraph of Article 23.

Art. 27.

Les objets et matériaux, qui ne sont pas susceptibles de servir aux usages de la guerre, ne peuvent pas être déclarés contrebande de guerre.

Art. 27.

Articles which are not susceptible of use in war may not be declared contraband of war.

Art. 28.

Ne peuvent pas être déclarés contrebande de guerre les articles suivants, savoir:

1°. Le coton brut, les laines, soies, jutes, lins, chanvres bruts, et les autres matières premières des industries textiles, ainsi que leurs filés.

2°. Les noix et graines oléagineuses; le coprah.

3°. Les caoutchoucs, résines, gommes et laques; le houblon.

4°. Les peaux brutes, les cornes, os et ivoires.

5°. Les engrais naturels et artificiels, y compris les nitrates et phosphates pouvant servir à l’agriculture.

6°. Les minerais.

7°. Les terres, les argiles, la chaux, la craie, les pierres y compris les marbres, les briques, ardoises et tuiles.

8°. Les porcelaines et verreries.

9°. Le papier et les matières préparées pour sa fabrication.

10°. Les savons, couleurs, y compris les matières exclusivement destinées à les produire, et les vernis.

11°. L’hypochlorite de chaux, les cendres de soude, la soude caustique, le sulfate de soude en pains, l’ammoniaque, le sulfate d’ammoniaque et le sulfate de cuivre.

12°. Les machines servant à l’agriculture, aux mines, aux industries textiles et à l’imprimerie.

13°. Les pierres précieuses, les pierres fines, les perles, la nacre et les coraux.

14°. Les horloges, pendules, et montres autres que les chronomètres.

15°. Les articles de mode et les objets de fantaisie.

16°. Les plumes de tout genre, les crins et soies.

17°. Les objets d’ameublement ou d’ornement; les meubles et accessoires de bureau.

Art. 28.

The following may not be declared contraband of war:—

(1) Raw cotton, wool, silk, jute, flax, hemp, and other raw materials of the textile industries, and yarns of the same.

(2) Oil seeds and nuts; copra.

(3) Rubber, resins, gums, and lacs; hops.

(4) Raw hides, horns, bones, and ivory.

(5) Natural and artificial manures, including nitrates and phosphates for agricultural purposes.

(6) Metallic ores.

(7) Earths, clays, lime, chalk, stone, including marble, bricks, slates, and tiles.

(8) Chinaware and glass.

(9) Paper and paper-making materials.

(10) Soap, paint and colours, including articles exclusively used in their manufacture, and varnish.

(11) Bleaching powder, soda ash, caustic soda, salt cake, ammonia, sulphate of ammonia, and sulphate of copper.

(12) Agricultural, mining, textile, and printing machinery.

(13) Precious and semi-precious stones, pearls, mother-of-pearl, and coral.

(14) Clocks and watches, other than chronometers.

(15) Fashion and fancy goods.

(16) Feathers of all kinds, hairs, and bristles.

(17) Articles of household furniture and decoration; office furniture and requisites.

Art. 29.

Ne peuvent non plus être considérés comme contrebande de guerre:

1°. Les objets et matériaux servant exclusivement à soigner les malades et les blessés. Toutefois, ils peuvent, en cas de nécessité militaire importante, être réquisitionnés, moyennant une indemnité, lorsqu’ils ont la destination prévue à l’article 30.

2°. Les objets et matériaux destinés à l’usage du navire où ils sont trouvés, ainsi qu’à l’usage de l’équipage et des passagers de ce navire pendant la traversée.

Art. 29.

Likewise the following may not be treated as contraband of war:—

(1) Articles serving exclusively to aid the sick and wounded. They can, however, in case of urgent military necessity and subject to the payment of compensation, be requisitioned, if their destination is that specified in Article 30.

(2) Articles intended for the use of the vessel in which they are found, as well as those intended for the use of her crew and passengers during the voyage.

Art. 30.

Les articles de contrebande absolue sont saisissables, s’il est établi qu’ils sont destinés au territoire de l’ennemi ou à un territoire occupé par lui ou à ses forces armées. Peu importe que le transport de ces objets se fasse directement ou exige, soit un transbordement, soit un trajet par terre.

Art. 30.

Absolute contraband is liable to capture if it is shown to be destined to territory belonging to or occupied by the enemy, or to the armed forces of the enemy. It is immaterial whether the carriage of the goods is direct or entails transhipment or a subsequent transport by land.

Art. 31.

La destination prévue à l’article 30 est définitivement prouvée dans les cas suivants:

1°. Lorsque la marchandise est documentée pour être débarquée dans un port de l’ennemi ou pour être livrée à ses forces armées.

2°. Lorsque le navire ne doit aborder qu’à des ports ennemis, ou lorsqu’il doit toucher à un port de l’ennemi ou rejoindre ses forces armées, avant-d’arriver au port neutre pour lequel la marchandise est documentée.

Art. 31.

Proof of the destination specified in Article 30 is complete in the following cases:—

(1) When the goods are documented for discharge in an enemy port, or for delivery to the armed forces of the enemy.

(2) When the vessel is to call at enemy ports only, or when she is to touch at an enemy port or meet the armed forces of the enemy before reaching the neutral port for which the goods in question are documented.

Art. 32.

Les papiers de bord font preuve complète de l’itinéraire du navire transportant de la contrebande absolue, à moins que le navire soit rencontré ayant manifestement dévié de la route qu’il devrait suivre d’après ses papiers de bord et sans pouvoir justifier d’une cause suffisante de cette déviation.

Art. 32.

Where a vessel is carrying absolute contraband, her papers are conclusive proof as to the voyage on which she is engaged, unless she is found clearly out of the course indicated by her papers and unable to give adequate reasons to justify such deviation.

Art. 33.

Les articles de contrebande conditionnelle sont saisissables, s’il est établi qu’ils sont destinés à l’usage des forces armées ou des administrations de l’État ennemi, à moins, dans ce dernier cas, que les circonstances établissent qu’en fait ces articles ne peuvent être utilisés pour la guerre en cours; cette dernière réserve ne s’applique pas aux envois visés par l’article 24—4°.

Art. 33.

Conditional contraband is liable to capture if it is shown to be destined for the use of the armed forces or of a government department of the enemy State, unless in this latter case the circumstances show that the goods cannot in fact be used for the purposes of the war in progress. This latter exception does not apply to a consignment coming under Article 24 (4).

Art. 34.

Il y a présomption de la destination prévue à l’article 33, si l’envoi est adressé aux autorités ennemies, ou à un commerçant établi en pays ennemi et lorsqu’il est notoire que ce commerçant fournit à l’ennemi des objets et matériaux de cette nature. Il en est de même si l’envoi est à destination d’une place fortifiée ennemie, ou d’une autre place servant de base aux forces armées ennemies; toutefois, cette présomption ne s’applique pas au navire de commerce lui-même faisant route vers une de ces places et dont on entend établir le caractère de contrebande.

A défaut des présomptions ci-dessus, la destination est présumée innocente.

Les présomptions établies dans le présent article admettent la preuve contraire.

Art. 34.

The destination referred to in Article 33 is presumed to exist if the goods are consigned to enemy authorities, or to a contractor established in the enemy country who, as a matter of common knowledge, supplies articles of this kind to the enemy¹ . A similar presumption arises if the goods are consigned to a fortified place belonging to the enemy, or other place serving as a base for the armed forces of the enemy. No such presumption, however, arises in the case of a merchant vessel bound for one of these places if it is sought to prove that she herself is contraband.

In cases where the above presumptions do not arise, the destination is presumed to be innocent.

The presumptions set up by this Article may be rebutted.

Art. 35.

Les articles de contrebande conditionnelle ne sont saisissables que sur le navire qui fait route vers le territoire de l’ennemi ou vers un territoire occupé par lui ou vers ses forces armées et qui ne doit pas les décharger dans un port intermédiaire neutre.

Les papiers de bord font preuve complète de l’itinéraire du navire ainsi que du lieu de déchargement des marchandises, à moins que ce navire soit rencontré ayant manifestement dévié de la route qu’il devrait suivre d’après ses papiers de bord et sans pouvoir justifier d’une cause suffisante de cette déviation.

Art. 35.

Conditional contraband is not liable to capture, except when found on board a vessel bound for territory belonging to or occupied by the enemy, or for the armed forces of the enemy, and when it is not to be discharged in an intervening neutral port.

The ship’s papers are conclusive proof¹ both as to the voyage on which the vessel is engaged and as to the port of discharge of the goods, unless she is found clearly out of the course indicated by her papers, and unable to give adequate reasons to justify such deviation.

Art. 36.

Par dérogation à l’article 35, si le territoire de l’ennemi n’a pas de frontière maritime, les articles de contrebande conditionnelle sont saisissables, lorsqu’il est établi qu’ils ont la destination prévue à l’article 33.

Art. 36.

Notwithstanding the provisions of Article 35, conditional contraband, if shown to have the destination referred to in Article 33, is liable to capture in cases where the enemy country has no seaboard.

Art. 37.

Le navire transportant des articles, qui sont saisissables comme contrebande absolue ou conditionnelle, peut être saisi, en haute mer ou dans les eaux des belligérants, pendant tout le cours de son voyage, même s’il a l’intention de toucher à un port d’escale avant d’atteindre la destination ennemie.

Art. 37.

A vessel carrying goods liable to capture as absolute or conditional contraband may be captured on the high seas or in the territorial waters of the belligerents throughout the whole of her voyage, even if she is to touch at a port of call before reaching the hostile destination.

Art. 38.

Une saisie ne peut être pratiquée en raison d’un transport de contrebande antérieurement effectué et actuellement achevé.

Art. 38.

A vessel may not be captured on the ground that she has carried contraband on a previous occasion if such carriage is in point of fact at an end.

Art. 39.

Les articles de contrebande sont sujets à confiscation.

Art. 39.

Contraband goods are liable to condemnation.

Art. 40.

La confiscation du navire transportant de la contrebande est permise, si cette contrebande forme, soit par sa valeur, soit par son poids, soit par son volume, soit par son fret, plus de la moitié de la cargaison.

Art. 40.

A vessel carrying contraband may be condemned if the contraband, reckoned either by value, weight, volume, or freight, forms more than half the cargo.

Art. 41.

Si le navire transportant de la contrebande est relâché, les frais occasionnés au capteur par la procédure devant la juridiction nationale des prises ainsi que par la conservation du navire et de sa cargaison pendant l’instruction sont à la charge du navire.

Art. 41.

If a vessel carrying contraband is released, the costs and expenses incurred by the captor in respect of the proceedings in the national prize court and the custody of the ship and cargo during the proceedings are to be borne by the ship.

Art. 42.

Les marchandises qui appartiennent au propriétaire de la contrebande et qui se trouvent à bord du même navire sont sujettes à confiscation.

Art. 42.

Goods which belong to the owner of the contraband and are on board the same vessel are liable to condemnation.

Art. 43.

Si un navire est rencontré en mer naviguant dans l’ignorance des hostilités ou de la déclaration de contrebande applicable à son chargement, les articles de contrebande ne peuvent être confisqués que moyennant indemnité; le navire et le surplus de la cargaison sont exempts de la confiscation et des frais prévus par l’article 41. Il en est de même si le capitaine, après avoir eu connaissance de l’ouverture des hostilités ou de la déclaration de contrebande, n’a pu encore décharger les articles de contrebande.

Le navire est réputé connaître l’état de guerre ou la déclaration de contrebande, lorsqu’il a quitté un port neutre, après que la notification de l’ouverture des hostilités ou de la déclaration de contrebande a été faite en temps utile à la Puissance dont relève ce port. L’état de guerre est, en outre, réputé connu par le navire lorsqu’il a quitté un port ennemi après l’ouverture des hostilités.

Art. 43.

If a vessel is encountered at sea while unaware of the outbreak of hostilities or of the declaration of contraband which applies to her cargo, the contraband cannot be condemned except on payment of compensation; the vessel herself and the remainder of the cargo are not liable to condemnation or to the costs and expenses referred to in Article 41. The same rule applies if the master, after becoming aware of the outbreak of hostilities, or of the declaration of contraband, has had no opportunity of discharging the contraband.

A vessel is deemed to be aware of the existence of a state of war; or of a declaration of contraband, if she left a neutral port subsequently to the notification to the Power to which such port belongs of the outbreak of hostilities or of the declaration of contraband respectively, provided that such notification was made in sufficient time. A vessel is also deemed to be aware of the existence of a state of war if she left an enemy port after the outbreak of hostilities.

Art. 44.

Le navire arrêté pour cause de contrebande et non susceptible de confiscation à raison de la proportion de la contrebande peut être autorisé, suivant les circonstances, à continuer sa route, si le capitaine est prêt à livrer la contrebande au bâtiment belligérant.

La remise de la contrebande est mentionnée par le capteur sur le livre de bord du navire arrêté, et le capitaine de ce navire doit remettre au capteur copie certifiée conforme de tous papiers utiles.

Le capteur a la faculté de détruire la contrebande qui lui est ainsi livrée.

Art. 44.

A vessel which has been stopped on the ground that she is carrying contraband, and which is not liable to condemnation on account of the proportion of contraband on board, may, when the circumstances permit, be allowed to continue her voyage if the master is willing to hand over the contraband to the belligerent warship.

The delivery of the contraband must be entered by the captor on the logbook of the vessel stopped, and the master must give the captor duly certified copies of all relevant papers.

The captor is at liberty to destroy the contraband that has been handed over to him under these conditions.

Chapitre III.

De l’assistance hostile.

Art. 45.

Un navire neutre est confisqué et, d’une manière générale, passible du traitement que subirait un navire neutre sujet à confiscation pour contrebande de guerre:

1°. Lorsqu’il voyage spécialement en vue du transport de passagers individuels incorporés dans la force armée de l’ennemi, ou en vue de la transmission de nouvelles dans l’intérêt de l’ennemi.

2°. Lorsqu’à la connaissance soit du propriétaire, soit de celui qui a affrété le navire en totalité, soit du capitaine, il transporte un détachement militaire de l’ennemi ou une ou plusieurs personnes qui, pendant le voyage, prêtent une assistance directe aux opérations de l’ennemi.

Dans les cas visés aux numéros précédents, les marchandises appartenant au propriétaire du navire sont également sujettes à confiscation.

Les dispositions du présent article ne s’appliquent pas si, lorsque le navire est rencontré en mer, il ignore les hostilités ou si le capitaine, après avoir appris l’ouverture des hostilités, n’a pu encore débarquer les personnes transportées. Le navire est réputé connaître l’état de guerre, lorsqu’il a quitté un port ennemi après l’ouverture des hostilités ou un port neutre postérieurement à la notification en temps utile de l’ouverture des hostilités à la Puissance dont relève ce port.

Chapter III.

Unneutral Service.

Art. 45.

A neutral vessel will be condemned and will, in a general way, receive the same treatment as a neutral vessel liable to condemnation for carriage of contraband:—

(1) If she is on a voyage specially undertaken with a view to the transport of individual passengers who are embodied in the armed forces of the enemy, or with a view to the transmission of intelligence in the interest of the enemy.

(2) If, to the knowledge of either the owner, the charterer, or the master, she is transporting a military detachment of the enemy, or one or more persons who, in the course of the voyage, directly assist the operations of the enemy.

In the cases specified under the above heads, goods belonging to the owner of the vessel are likewise liable to condemnation.

The provisions of the present Article do not apply if the vessel is encountered at sea while unaware of the outbreak of hostilities, or if the master, after becoming aware of the outbreak of hostilities, has had no opportunity of disembarking the passengers. The vessel is deemed to be aware of the existence of a state of war if she left an enemy port subsequently to the outbreak of hostilities, or a neutral port subsequently to the notification of the outbreak of hostilities to the Power to which such port belongs, provided that such notification was made in sufficient time.

Art. 46.

Un navire neutre est confisqué et, d’une manière générale, passible du traitement qu’il subirait s’il était un navire de commerce ennemi:

1°. Lorsqu’il prend une part directe aux hostilités.

2°. Lorsqu’il se trouve sous les ordres ou sous le contrôle d’un agent placé à bord par le Gouvernement ennemi.

3°. Lorsqu’il est affrété en totalité par le Gouvernement ennemi.

4°. Lorsqu’il est actuellement et exclusivement affecté, soit au transport de troupes ennemies, soit à la transmission de nouvelles dans l’intérêt de l’ennemi.

Dans les cas visés par le présent article, les marchandises appartenant au propriétaire du navire sont également sujettes à confiscation.

Art. 46.

A neutral vessel will be condemned and, in a general way, receive the same treatment as would be applicable to her if she were an enemy merchant vessel:

(1) If she takes a direct part in the hostilities;

(2) If she is under the orders or control of an agent placed on board by the enemy Government;

(3) If she is in the exclusive employment of the enemy Government;

(4) If she is at the time exclusively devoted either to the transport of enemy troops or to the transmission of intelligence in the interest of the enemy.

In the cases covered by the present Article, goods belonging to the owner of the vessel are likewise liable to condemnation.

Art. 47.

Tout individu incorporé dans la force armée de l’ennemi, et qui sera trouvé à bord d’un navire de commerce neutre, pourra être fait prisonnier de guerre, quand même il n’y aurait pas lieu de saisir ce navire.

Art. 47.

Any individual embodied in the armed forces of the enemy who is found on board a neutral merchant vessel, may be made a prisoner of war, even though there be no ground for the capture of the vessel.

Chapitre IV.

De la destruction des prises neutres.

Art. 48.

Un navire neutre saisi ne peut être détruit par le capteur, mais il doit être conduit dans tel port qu’il appartiendra pour y être statué ce que de droit sur la validité de la capture.

Chapter IV.

Destruction of Neutral Prizes¹ .

Art. 48.

A neutral vessel which has been captured may not be destroyed by the captor; she must be taken into such port as is proper for the determination there of all questions concerning the validity of the capture² .

Art. 49.

Par exception, un navire neutre, saisi par un bâtiment belligérant et qui serait sujet à confiscation, peut être détruit, si l’observation de l’article 48 peut compromettre la sécurité³ du bâtiment de guerre ou le succès des opérations dans lesquelles celui-ci est actuellement engagé.

Art. 49.

As an exception, a neutral vessel which has been captured by a belligerent warship, and which would be liable to condemnation, may be destroyed if the observance of Article 48 would involve danger³ to the safety of the warship or to the success of the operations in which she is engaged at the time.

Art. 50.

Avant la destruction, les personnes qui se trouvent à bord devront être mises en sûreté, et tous les papiers de bord et autres pièces, que les intéressés estimeront utiles pour le jugement sur la validité de la capture, devront être transbordés sur le bâtiment de guerre.

Art. 50.

Before the vessel is destroyed all persons on board must be placed in safety, and all the ship’s papers and other documents which the parties interested consider relevant for the purpose of deciding on the validity of the capture must be taken on board the warship.

Art. 51.

Le capteur qui a détruit un navire neutre doit, préalablement à tout jugement sur la validité de la capture, justifier en fait n’avoir agi qu’en présence d’une nécessité exceptionnelle, comme elle est prévue à l’article 49. Faute par lui de ce faire, il est tenu à indemnité vis-à-vis des intéressés, sans qu’il y ait à rechercher si la capture était valable ou non.

Art. 51.

A captor who has destroyed a neutral vessel must, prior to any decision respecting the validity of the prize, establish that he only acted in the face of an exceptional necessity of the nature contemplated in Article 49. If he fails to do this, he must compensate the parties interested and no examination shall be made of the question whether the capture was valid or not.

Art. 52.

Si la capture d’un navire neutre, dont la destruction a été justifiée, est ensuite déclarée nulle, le capteur doit indemniser les intéressés en remplacement de la restitution à laquelle ils auraient droit.

Art. 52.

If the capture of a neutral vessel is subsequently held to be invalid, though the act of destruction has been held to have been justifiable, the captor must pay compensation to the parties interested, in place of the restitution to which they would have been entitled.

Art. 53.

Si des marchandises neutres qui n’étaient pas susceptibles de confiscation ont été détruites avec le navire, le propriétaire de ces marchandises a droit à une indemnité.

Art. 53.

If neutral goods not liable to condemnation have been destroyed with the vessel, the owner of such goods is entitled to compensation.

Art. 54.

Le capteur a la faculté d’exiger la remise ou de procéder à la destruction des marchandises confiscables trouvées à bord d’un navire qui lui-même n’est pas sujet à confiscation, lorsque les circonstances sont telles que, d’après l’article 49, elles justifieraient la destruction d’un navire passible de confiscation. Il mentionne les objets livrés ou détruits sur le livre de bord du navire arrêté et se fait remettre par le capitaine copie certifiée conforme de tous papiers utiles. Lorsque la remise ou la destruction a été effectuée et que les formalités ont été remplies, le capitaine doit être autorisé à continuer sa route.

Les dispositions des articles 51 et 52 concernant la responsabilité du capteur qui a détruit un navire neutre sont applicables.

Art. 54.

The captor has the right to demand the handing over, or to proceed himself to the destruction of, any goods liable to condemnation found on board a vessel not herself liable to condemnation, provided that the circumstances are such as would, under Article 49, justify the destruction of a vessel herself liable to condemnation. The captor must enter the goods surrendered or destroyed in the logbook of the vessel stopped, and must obtain duly certified copies of all relevant papers. When the goods have been handed over or destroyed, and the formalities duly carried out, the master must be allowed to continue his voyage.

The provisions of Articles 51 and 52 respecting the obligations of a captor who has destroyed a neutral vessel are applicable.

Chapitre V.

Du transfert de pavillon.

Art. 55.

Le transfert sous pavillon neutre d’un navire ennemi, effectué avant l’ouverture des hostilités, est valable à moins qu’il soit établi que ce transfert a été effectué en vue d’éluder les conséquences qu’entraîne le caractère de navire ennemi. Il y a néanmoins présomption de nullité si l’acte de transfert ne se trouve pas à bord, alors que le navire a perdu la nationalité belligérante moins de soixante jours avant l’ouverture des hostilités; la preuve contraire est admise.

Il y a présomption absolue de validité d’un transfert effectué plus de trente jours avant l’ouverture des hostilités, s’il est absolu, complet, conforme à la législation des pays intéressés, et s’il a cet effet que le contrôle du navire et le bénéfice de son emploi ne restent pas entre les mêmes mains qu’avant le transfert. Toutefois, si le navire a perdu la nationalité belligérante moins de soixante jours avant l’ouverture des hostilités et si l’acte de transfert ne se trouve pas à bord, la saisie du navire ne pourra donner lieu à des dommages et intérêts.

Chapter V.

Transfer to a Neutral Flag.

Art. 55.

The transfer of an enemy vessel to a neutral flag, effected before the outbreak of hostilities, is valid, unless it is proved that such transfer was made in order to evade the consequences to which an enemy vessel, as such, is exposed. There is, however, a presumption, if the bill of sale is not on board a vessel which has lost her belligerent nationality less than sixty days before the outbreak of hostilities, that the transfer is void. This presumption may be rebutted.

Where the transfer was effected more than thirty days before the outbreak of hostilities, there is an absolute presumption that it is valid if it is unconditional, complete, and in conformity with the laws of the countries concerned, and if its effect is such that neither the control of, nor the profits arising from the employment of, the vessel remain in the same hands as before the transfer. If, however, the vessel lost her belligerent nationality less than sixty days before the outbreak of hostilities and if the bill of sale is not on board, the capture of the vessel gives no right to damages.

Art. 56.

Le transfert sous pavillon neutre d’un navire ennemi, effectué après l’ouverture des hostilités, est nul, à moins qu’il soit établi que ce transfert n’a pas été effectué en vue d’éluder les conséquences qu’entraîne le caractère de navire ennemi.

Toutefois, il y a présomption absolute de nullité:

1°. Si le transfert a été effectué pendant que le navire est en voyage ou dans un port bloqué.

2°. S’il y a faculté de réméré ou de retour.

3°. Si les conditions, auxquelles est soumis le droit de pavillon d’après la législation du pavillon arboré, n’ont pas été observées.

Art. 56.

The transfer of an enemy vessel to a neutral flag, effected after the outbreak of hostilities, is void unless it is proved that such transfer was not made in order to evade the consequences to which an enemy vessel, as such, is exposed.

There is, however, an absolute presumption that a transfer is void—

(1) If the transfer has been made during a voyage or in a blockaded port.

(2) If a right to repurchase or recover the vessel is reserved to the vendor.

(3) If the requirements of the municipal law governing the right to fly the flag under which the vessel is sailing, have not been fulfilled.

Chapitre VI.

Du caractère ennemi.

Art. 57.

Sous réserve des dispositions relatives au transfert de pavillon, le caractère neutre ou ennemi du navire est déterminé par le pavillon qu’il a le droit de porter.

Le cas où le navire neutre se livre à une navigation réservée en temps de paix reste hors de cause et n’est nullement visé par cette règle.

Chapter VI.

Enemy Character.

Art. 57.

Subject to the provisions respecting transfer to another flag, the neutral or enemy character of a vessel is determined by the flag which she is entitled to fly.

The case where a neutral vessel is engaged in a trade which is closed in time of peace, remains outside the scope of, and is in no wise affected by, this rule¹ .

Art. 58.

Le caractère neutre ou ennemi des marchandises trouvées à bord d’un navire ennemi est déterminé par le caractère neutre ou ennemi de leur propriétaire.

Art. 58.

The neutral or enemy character of goods found on board an enemy vessel is determined by the neutral or enemy character of the owner² .

Art. 59.

Si le caractère neutre de la marchandise trouvée à bord d’un navire ennemi n’est pas établi, la marchandise est présumée ennemie.

Art. 59.

In the absence of proof of the neutral character of goods found on board an enemy vessel, they are presumed to be enemy goods.

Art. 60.

Le caractère ennemi de la marchandise chargée à bord d’un navire ennemi subsiste jusqu’à l’arrivée à destination, nonobstant un transfert intervenu pendant le cours de l’expédition, après l’ouverture des hostilités.

Toutefois, si, antérieurement à la capture, un précédent propriétaire neutre exerce, en cas de faillite du propriétaire ennemi actuel, un droit de revendication légale sur la marchandise, celle-ci reprend le caractère neutre.

Art. 60.

Enemy goods on board an enemy vessel retain their enemy character until they reach their destination, notwithstanding any transfer effected after the outbreak of hostilities while the goods are being forwarded.

If, however, prior to the capture, a former neutral owner exercises, on the bankruptcy of an existing enemy owner, a recognized legal right to recover the goods, they regain their neutral character.

Chapitre VII.

Du convoi.

Art. 61.

Les navires neutres sous convoi de leur pavillon sont exempts de visite. Le commandant du convoi donne par écrit, à la demande du commandant d’un bâtiment de guerre belligérant, sur le caractère des navires et sur leur chargement, toutes informations que la visite servirait à obtenir.

Chapter VII.

Convoy.

Art. 61.

Neutral vessels under convoy of warships of their own nationality are exempt from search. The commander of a convoy gives, in writing, at the request of the commander of a belligerent warship, all information as to the character of the vessels and their cargoes, which could be obtained by search.

Art. 62.

Si le commandant du bâtiment de guerre belligérant a lieu de soupçonner que la religion du commandant du convoi a été surprise, il lui communique ses soupçons. C’est au commandant du convoi seul qu’il appartient en ce cas de procéder à une vérification. Il doit constater le résultat de cette vérification par un procès-verbal dont une copie est remise à l’officier du bâtiment de guerre. Si des faits ainsi constatés justifient, dans l’opinion du commandant du convoi, la saisie d’un ou de plusieurs navires, la protection du convoi doit leur être retirée.

Art. 62.

If the commander of the belligerent warship has reason to suspect that the confidence of the commander of the convoy has been abused, he communicates his suspicions to him. In such a case it is for the commander of the convoy alone to investigate the matter. He must record the result of such investigation in a report, of which a copy is handed to the officer of the warship. If, in the opinion of the commander of the convoy, the facts shown in the report justify the capture of one or more vessels, the protection of the convoy must be withdrawn from such vessels.

Chapitre VIII.

De la résistance à la visite.

Art. 63.

La résistance opposée par la force à l’exercice légitime du droit d’arrêt, de visite et de saisie entraîne, dans tous les cas, la confiscation du navire. Le chargement est passible du même traitement que subirait le chargement d’un navire ennemi; les marchandises appartenant au capitaine ou au propriétaire du navire sont considérées comme marchandises ennemies.

Chapter VIII.

Resistance to Search.

Art. 63.

Forcible resistance to the legitimate exercise of the right of stoppage, search, and capture, involves in all cases the condemnation of the vessel. The cargo is liable to the same treatment as the cargo of an enemy vessel. Goods belonging to the master or owner of the vessel are treated as enemy goods.

Chapitre IX.

Des dommages et intérêts.

Art. 64.

Si la saisie du navire ou des marchandises n’est pas validée par la juridiction des prises ou si, sans qu’il y ait eu de mise en jugement, la saisie n’est pas maintenue, les intéressés ont droit à des dommages et intérêts, à moins qu’il y ait eu des motifs suffisants de saisir le navire ou les marchandises.

Chapter IX.

Compensation.

Art. 64.

If the capture of a vessel or of goods is not upheld by the prize court, or if the prize is released without any judgment being given, the parties interested have the right to compensation, unless there were good reasons for capturing the vessel or goods.

DISPOSITIONS FINALES.

Art. 65.

Les dispositions de la présente Déclaration forment un ensemble indivisible.

FINAL PROVISIONS.

Art. 65.

The provisions of the present Declaration must be treated as a whole, and cannot be separated.

Art. 66.

Les Puissances Signataires s’engagent à s’assurer, dans le cas d’une guerre où les belligérants seraient tous parties à la présente Déclaration, l’observation réciproque des règles contenues dans cette Déclaration. Elles donneront, en conséquence, à leurs autorités et à leurs forces armées les instructions nécessaires et prendront les mesures qu’il conviendra pour en garantir l’application par leurs tribunaux, spécialement par leurs tribunaux de prises.

Art. 66.

The Signatory Powers undertake to insure in any war in which all the belligerents are parties to the present Declaration the mutual observance of the rules contained herein. They will therefore issue the necessary instructions to their authorities and to their armed forces, and will take such measures as may be required in order to insure that it will be applied by their courts, and more particularly by their prize courts.

Art. 67.

La présente Déclaration sera ratifiée aussitôt que possible.

Les ratifications seront déposées à Londres.

Le premier dépôt de ratifications sera constaté par un procès-verbal signé par les Représentants des Puissances qui y prennent part, et par le Principal Secrétaire d’État de Sa Majesté Britannique au Département des Affaires Étrangères.

Les dépôts ultérieurs de ratifications se feront au moyen d’une notification écrite adressée au Gouvernement Britannique et accompagnée de l’instrument de ratification.

Copie certifiée conforme du procès-verbal relatif au premier dépôt de ratifications, des notifications mentionnées à l’alinéa précédent, ainsi que de instruments de ratification qui les accompagnent, sera immédiatement, par les soins du Gouvernement Britannique et par la voie diplomatique, remise aux Puissances Signataires. Dans les cas visés par l’alinéa précédent, ledit Gouvernement leur fera connaître en même temps la date à laquelle il a reçu la notification.

Art. 67.

The present Declaration shall be ratified as soon as possible.

The ratifications shall be deposited in London.

The first deposit of ratifications shall be recorded in a Protocol signed by the Representatives of the Powers taking part therein, and by His Britannic Majesty’s Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

The subsequent deposits of ratifications shall be made by means of a written notification addressed to the British Government, and accompanied by the instrument of ratification.

A duly certified copy of the Protocol relating to the first deposit of ratifications, and of the notifications mentioned in the preceding paragraph as well as of the instruments of ratification which accompany them, shall be immediately sent by the British Government, through the diplomatic channel, to the Signatory Powers. The said Government shall, in the cases contemplated in the preceding paragraph, inform them at the same time of the date on which it received the notification.

Art. 68.

La présente Déclaration produira effet, pour les Puissances qui auront participé au premier dépôt de ratifications, soixante jours après la date du procès-verbal de ce dépôt et, pour les Puissances qui ratifieront ultérieurement, soixante jours après que la notification de leur ratification aura été reçue par le Gouvernement Britannique.

Art. 68.

The present Declaration shall take effect, in the case of the Powers which were parties to the first deposit of ratifications, sixty days after the date of the Protocol recording such deposit, and, in the case of the Powers which shall ratify subsequently, sixty days after the notification of their ratification shall have been received by the British Government.

Art. 69.

S’il arrivait qu’une des Puissances Signataires voulût dénoncer la présente Déclaration, elle ne pourra le faire que pour la fin d’une période de douze ans commençant à courir soixante jours après le premier dépôt de ratifications et, ensuite, pour la fin de périodes successives de six ans, dont la première commencera à l’expiration de la période de douze ans.

La dénonciation devra être, au moins un an à l’avance, notifiée par écrit au Gouvernement Britannique, qui en donnera connaissance à toutes les autres Puissances.

Elle ne produira ses effets qu’à l’égard de la Puissance qui l’aura notifiée.

Art. 69.

In the event of one of the Signatory Powers wishing to denounce the present Declaration, such denunciation can only be made to take effect at the end of a period of twelve years, beginning sixty days after the first deposit of ratifications, and, after that time, at the end of successive periods of six years, of which the first will begin at the end of the period of twelve years¹ .

Such denunciation must be notified in writing, at least one year in advance, to the British Government, which shall inform all the other Powers.

It will only operate in respect of the denouncing Power.

Art. 70.

Les Puissances représentées à la Conférence Navale de Londres, attachant un prix particulier à la reconnaissance générale des règles adoptées par elles, expriment l’espoir que les Puissances qui n’y étaient pas représentées adhèreront à la présente Déclaration. Elles prient le Gouvernement Britannique de vouloir bien les inviter à le faire.

La Puissance qui désire adhérer notifie par écrit son intention au Gouvernement Britannique, en lui transmettant l’acte d’adhésion, qui sera déposé dans les archives dudit Gouvernement.

Ce Gouvernement transmettra immédiatement à toutes les autres Puissances copie certifiée conforme de la notification, ainsi que de l’acte d’adhésion, en indiquant la date à laquelle il a reçu la notification. L’adhésion produira effet soixante jours après cette date.

La situation des Puissances adhérentes sera, en tout ce qui concerne cette Déclaration, assimilée à la situation des Puissances Signataires.

Art. 70.

The Powers represented at the London Naval Conference attach particular importance to the general recognition of the rules which they have adopted, and therefore express the hope that the Powers which were not represented there will accede to the present Declaration. They request the British Government to invite them to do so.

A Power which desires to accede shall notify its intention in writing to the British Government, and transmit simultaneously the act of accession, which will be deposited in the archives of the said Government.

The said Government shall forthwith transmit to all the other Powers a duly certified copy of the notification, together with the act of accession, and communicate the date on which such notification was received. The accession takes effect sixty days after such date.

In respect of all matters concerning this Declaration, acceding Powers shall be on the same footing as the Signatory Powers.

Art. 71.

La présente Déclaration, qui portera la date du 26 février 1909, pourra être signée à Londres jusqu’au 30 juin 1909, par les Plénipotentiaries des Puissances représentées à la Conférence Navale.

En foi de quoi, les Plénipotentiaires ont revêtu la présente Déclaration de leurs signatures et y ont apposé leurs cachets.

Fait à Londres, le vingt-six février mil neuf cent neuf, en un seul exemplaire, qui restera déposé dans les archives du Gouvernement Britannique et dont des copies, certifiées conformes, seront remise par la voie diplomatique aux Puissances représentées à la Conférence Navale.

[Suivent les Signatures.]

Art. 71.

The present Declaration, which bears the date of the 26th February, 1909, may be signed in London up till the 30th June, 1909, by the Plenipotentiaries of the Powers represented at the Naval Conference.

In faith whereof the Plenipotentiaries have signed the present Declaration, and have thereto affixed their seals.

Done at London, the twenty-sixth day of February, one thousand nine hundred and nine, in a single original, which shall remain deposited in the archives of the British Government, and of which duly certified copies shall be sent through the diplomatic channel to the Powers represented at the Naval Conference.

[Here follow the Signatures¹ .]

General Report on the Declaration Presented to the Naval Conference on behalf of its Drafting Committee¹ .

(Translation² .)

Origin of Conference.On the 27th February, 1908, the British Government addressed a circular to various Powers³ inviting them to meet at a Conference with the object of reaching an agreement as to the definition of the generally recognized principles of international law in the sense of Article 7, paragraph 2, of the Convention signed at The Hague on the 18th October, 1907, for the establishment of an International Prize Court. This agreement appeared necessary to the British Government on account of certain divergences of view which had become apparent at the second Peace Conference in connection with the settlement of various important questions of international maritime law in time of war. The existence of these divergent views might, it seemed, render difficult the acceptance of the International Prize Court, as the power of this Court would be the more extended in proportion as the rules to be applied by it were more uncertain.

Programme suggested by British Government.The British Government suggested that the following questions might form the programme of the proposed Conference, and invited the Powers to express their views regarding them in preparatory Memoranda¹ :

(a) Contraband, including the circumstances under which particular articles can be considered as contraband; the penalties for their carriage; the immunity of a ship from search when under convoy; and the rules with regard to compensation where vessels have been seized but have been found in fact only to be carrying innocent cargo;

(b) Blockade, including the questions as to the locality where seizure can be effected, and the notice that is necessary before a ship can be seized;

(c) The doctrine of continuous voyage in respect both of contraband and of blockade;

(d) The legality of the destruction of neutral vessels prior to their condemnation by a prize court;

(e) The rules as to neutral ships or persons rendering “unneutral service” (“assistance hostile”);

(f) The legality of the conversion of a merchant-vessel into a warship on the high seas;

(g) The rules as to the transfer of merchant-vessels from a belligerent to a neutral flag during or in contemplation of hostilities;

(h) The question whether the nationality or the domicile of the owner should be adopted as the dominant factor in deciding whether property is enemy property.

Bases of discussion at Conference.The invitations were accepted, and the Conference met on the 4th December last. The British Government had been so good as to assist its deliberations by presenting a collection of papers which quickly became known among us by the name of the Red Book, and which, after a short introduction, contains a “Statement of the views expressed by the Powers in their Memoranda, and observations intended to serve as a basis for the deliberations of the Conference.” These are the “bases of discussion” which served as a starting-point for the examination of the chief questions of existing international maritime law. The Conference could not but express its gratitude for this valuable preparatory work, which was of great assistance to it. It made it possible to observe, in the first place, that the divergences in the practices and doctrines of the different countries were perhaps less wide than was generally believed, that the essential ideas were often the same in all countries, and that the methods of application alone varied with traditions or prejudices, with permanent or accidental interests. It was, therefore, possible to extract a common element which it could be agreed to recommend for uniform application. This is the end to which the efforts of the different Delegations tended, and they vied with one another in their zeal in the search for the grounds of a common understanding. Their efforts were strenuous, as is shown by the prolonged discussions of the Conference, the Grand Committee, and the Examining Committees, and by the numerous proposals which were presented. Sailors, diplomatists, and jurists cordially co-operated in a work the description of which, rather than a final estimate of its essential value, is the object of this Report, as our impartiality might naturally be suspected.

The Declaration concerning the laws of naval warfare.The body of rules contained in the Declaration, which is the result of the deliberations of the Naval Conference, and which is to be entitled Declaration concerning the laws of naval war, answers well to the desire expressed by the British Government in its invitation of February 1908. The questions in the programme are all settled except two, with regard to which explanations will be given later. The solutions have been extracted from the various views or practices which prevail and represent what may be called the media sententia. They are not always in absolute agreement with the views peculiar to each country, but they shock the essential ideas of none. They must not be examined separately, but as a whole, otherwise there is a risk of the most serious misunderstandings. In fact, if one or more isolated rules are examined either from the belligerent or the neutral point of view, the reader may find that the interests with which he is especially concerned are jeopardized by the adoption of these rules. But they have another side. The work is one of compromise and mutual concessions. Is it, as a whole, a good one?

We confidently hope that those who study it seriously will answer that it is. The Declaration puts uniformity and certainty in the place of the diversity and obscurity from which international relations have too long suffered. The Conference has tried to reconcile in an equitable and practical way the rights of belligerents with those of neutral commerce; it consists of Powers whose conditions, from the political, economic, and geographical points of view, vary considerably. There is therefore reason to suppose that the rules on which these Powers have agreed take sufficient account of the different interests involved, and hence may be accepted without objection by all the others.

The Preamble.The Preamble of the Declaration summarizes the general ideas just set forth.

Having regard to the terms in which the British Government invited various Powers to meet in conference in order to arrive at an agreement as to what are the generally recognized rules of international law within the meaning of Article 7 of the Convention of the 18th October, 1907, relative to the establishment of an International Prize Court;

Recognizing all the advantages which an agreement as to the said rules would present in the unfortunate event of a naval war, both as regards peaceful commerce, and as regards the belligerents and their diplomatic relations with neutral Governments;

Having regard to the divergence often found in the methods by which it is sought to apply in practice the general principles of international law;

Animated by the desire to insure henceforward a greater measure of uniformity in this respect;

Hoping that a work so important to the common welfare will meet with general approval;

What is the scope of application of the rules thus laid down? They must be observed in the relations between the signatory parties, since those parties acknowledge them as principles of recognized international law and, besides, expressly bind themselves to secure the benefit of them for one another. The Signatory Powers who are or will be parties to the Convention establishing the International Prize Court will have, besides, an opportunity of having these rules applied to disputes in which they are concerned, whether the Court regards them as generally recognized rules, or takes account of the pledge given to observe them. It is moreover to be hoped that these rules will before long be accepted by the majority of States, who will recognize the advantage of substituting exact provisions for more or less indefinite usages which tend to give rise to controversy.

It has been said above that two points in the programme of the Conference were not decided.

Unsolved problems: (1) Conversion of merchant vessels into warships¹ .1. The programme mentions under head (f): the legality of the conversion of a merchant vessel into a warship on the high seas. The conflicting views on this subject which became apparent at the Conference of The Hague in 1907, have recurred at the present Conference. It may be concluded, both from the statements in the Memoranda and from the discussion, that there is no generally accepted rule on this point, nor do there appear to be any precedents which can be adduced. Though the two opposite opinions were defended with great warmth, a lively desire for an understanding was expressed on all sides; everybody was at least agreed that it would be a great advantage to put an end to uncertainty. Serious efforts were made to do justice to the interests espoused by both sides, but these unfortunately failed. A subsidiary question dependent on the previous one, on which, at one moment, it appeared possible to come to an agreement, is that of reconversion. According to one proposal, it was to be laid down that “merchant vessels converted into warships cannot be reconverted into merchant vessels during the whole course of the war.” The rule was absolute and made no distinction as regards the place where reconversion could be effected; it was dictated by the idea that such conversion would always have disadvantages, would be productive of surprises, and lead to actual frauds. As unanimity in favour of this proposal was not forthcoming, a subsidiary one was brought forward, viz., “the conversion of a warship into a merchant vessel on the high seas is forbidden during the war.” The case had in view was that of a warship (generally a recently converted merchant vessel) doffing its character so as to be able freely to revictual or refit in a neutral port without being bound by the restrictions imposed on warships. Will not the position of the neutral State between two belligerents be delicate, and will not such State expose itself to reproach whether it treats the newly converted ship as a merchant vessel or as a warship? Agreement might perhaps have been reached on this proposal, but it seemed very difficult to deal with this secondary aspect of a question which there was no hope of settling as a whole. This was the decisive reason for the rejection of all proposals.

The question of conversion on the high seas and that of reconversion therefore remain open.

(2) Enemy character of property.2. Under head (h), the British Programme mentions: the question whether the nationality or the domicile of the owner should be adopted as the dominant factor in deciding whether property is enemy property. This question was subjected to a searching examination by a special Committee, which had to acknowledge the uncertainty of actual practice; it was proposed to put an end to this by the following provisions:—

“The neutral or enemy character of goods found on board an enemy vessel is determined by the neutral or enemy nationality of their owner, or, if he is of no nationality or of double nationality (i.e. both neutral and enemy), by his domicile in a neutral or enemy country;

“Provided that goods belonging to a limited liability or joint stock company are considered as neutral or enemy according as the company has its headquarters in a neutral or enemy country.”

Unanimity not being forthcoming, these provisions remained without effect.

We now reach the explanation of the Declaration itself, on which we shall try, by summarizing the Reports already approved by the Conference, to give an exact and uncontroversial commentary; this, when it has become an official commentary by receiving the approval of the Conference, may serve as a guide to the different authorities—administrative, military, and judicial—who may be called on to apply it.

Preliminary Provision.

The Signatory Powers are agreed that the rules contained in the following Chapters correspond in substance with the generally recognized principles of international law.

This provision dominates all the rules which follow. Its spirit has been indicated in the general remarks to be found at the beginning of this Report. The purpose of the Conference has, above all, been to note, to define, and, where needful, to complete what might be considered as customary law.

Chapter I.

Blockade in time of war¹ .

Blockade is here regarded solely as an operation of war, and there is no intention of touching in any way on what is called pacific blockade.

Article 1. (See ante, p. 542.)Blockade, as an operation of war, can be directed by a belligerent only against his adversary. This very simple rule is laid down at the start, but its full scope is apparent only when it is read in connexion with Article 18.

Article 2. (See ante, p. 542.)The first condition necessary to render a blockade binding is that it should be effective. There has been universal agreement on this subject for a long time. As for the definition of an effective blockade, we thought that we had only to adopt the one to be found in the Declaration of Paris of the 16th April, 1856, which, conventionally, binds a great number of States, and is in fact accepted by the rest.

Article 3. (See ante, p. 542.)It is easily to be understood that difficulties often arise on the question whether a blockade is effective or not; opposing interests are at stake. The blockading belligerent wishes to economize his efforts, and neutrals desire their trade to be as little hampered as possible. Diplomatic protests have sometimes been made on this subject. The point may be a delicate one, because no absolute rule can be laid down as to the number and position of the blockading ships. All depends on matters of fact and geographical conditions. In one case a single ship will suffice to blockade a port as effectively as possible, whereas in another a whole fleet may not be enough really to prevent access to one or more ports declared to be blockaded. It is therefore essentially a question of fact, to be decided on the merits of each case, and not according to a formula drawn up beforehand. Who shall decide it? The judicial authority. This will be, in the first place, the national tribunal which is called on to pronounce as to the validity of the prize and which the vessel captured for breach of blockade can ask to declare the capture void, because the blockade, not being effective, was not binding. This resort has always existed; it may not always have given satisfaction to the Powers concerned, because they may have thought that the national tribunal was rather naturally led to consider effective the blockade declared to be so by its Government. But when the International Prize Court Convention comes into force, there will be an absolutely impartial tribunal, to which neutrals may apply, and which will decide whether, in a given case, the blockade was effective or not. The possibility of this resort, besides allowing certain injustices to be redressed, will most likely have a preventive effect, in that a Government will take care to establish its blockades in such a way that their effect cannot be annulled by decisions which would inflict on it a heavy loss. The full scope of Article 3 is thus seen when it is understood that the question with which it deals must be settled by a Court. The foregoing explanation is inserted in the Report at the request of the Committee, in order to remove all possibility of misunderstanding.

It is not enough for a blockade to be established: it must be maintained. It it is raised it may be re-established, but this requires the observance of the same formalities as though it were established for the first time.Article 4. (See ante, p. 542.) By tradition, a blockade is not regarded as raised when it is in consequence of stress of weather that the blockading forces are temporarily withdrawn. This is laid down in Article 4. It must be considered limitative in the sense that stress of weather is the only form of compulsion which can be alleged. If the blockading forces were withdrawn for any other reason, the blockade would be regarded as raised, and, if it were resumed, Articles 12 (last rule) and 13 would apply.

Article 5. (See ante, p. 542.)Blockade, as an operation of lawful warfare, must be respected by neutrals in so far as it really remains an operation of war which has the object of interrupting all commercial relations with the blockaded port. It may not be made the means of allowing a belligerent to favour the vessels of certain nations by letting them pass. This is the point of Article 5.

Article 6. (See ante, p. 542.)Does the prohibition which applies to all merchant vessels apply also to warships? No definite reply can be given. The commander of the blockading forces may think it useful to cut off all communication with the blockaded place, and refuse access to neutral warships; no rule is imposed on him. If he lets them in, it is as a matter of courtesy. If a rule has been drawn up merely to lay down this, it is in order that it may not be claimed that a blockade has ceased to be effective on account of leave granted to such and such neutral warships.

The blockading commander must act impartially, as stated in Article 5. Nevertheless, the mere fact that he has let a warship pass does not oblige him to let pass all neutral warships which may come. It is a question of judgment. The presence of a neutral warship in a blockaded port may not have the same consequences at all stages of the blockade, and the commander must be left free to judge whether he can be courteous without making any sacrifice of his military interests.

Article 7. (See ante, p. 542.)Distress can explain the entrance of a neutral vessel into a blockaded place, for instance, if she is in want of food or water, or needs immediate repairs. As soon as her distress is acknowledged by an authority of the blockading force, she may cross the line of blockade; it is not a favour which she has to ask of the humanity or courtesy of the blockading authority. The latter may deny the state of distress, but when once it is proved to exist, the consequence follows of itself. The vessel which has thus entered the blockaded port will not be obliged to remain there for the whole duration of the blockade; she may leave as soon as she is fit to do so, when she has obtained the food or water which she needs, or when she has been repaired. But the leave granted to her must not be made an excuse for commercial transactions; therefore she is forbidden to discharge or ship any cargo.

It is needless to say that a blockading squadron which insisted on preventing a vessel in distress from passing, might do so if she afforded her the help which she needed.

Article 8. (See ante, p. 543.)Independently of the condition prescribed by the Declaration of Paris that it must be effective, a blockade, to be binding, must be declared and notified. Article 8 confines itself to laying down the principle which is applied by the following Articles.

To remove all possibility of misunderstanding it is enough to define clearly the meaning of these two expressions, which will frequently be used. The declaration of blockade is the act of the competent authority (a Government or commander of a squadron) stating that a blockade is, or is about to be, established under conditions to be specified (Article 9). The notification is the fact of bringing the declaration of blockade to the knowledge of the neutral Powers or of certain authorities (Article 11).

These two things—declaration and notification—will in most cases be done previously to the enforcement of the rules of blockade, that is to say, to the real prohibition of passage. Nevertheless, as we shall see later, it is sometimes possible for passage to be forbidden by the very fact of the blockade which is brought to the knowledge of a vessel approaching a blockaded port by means of a notification which is special, whereas the notification which has just been defined, and which is spoken of in Article 11, is of a general character.

Article 9. (See ante, p. 543.)The declaration of blockade in most cases emanates from the belligerent Government itself. That Government may have left the commander of its naval forces free himself to declare a blockade according to the circumstances. There will not, perhaps, be as much reason as formerly to give this discretion, because of the ease and rapidity of communication. This, being merely an internal question, matters little.

The declaration of blockade must specify certain points which it is in the interest of neutrals to know, in order to be aware of the extent of their obligations. The moment from which it is forbidden to communicate with the blockaded place must be exactly known. It is important, as affecting the obligations both of the blockading Power and of neutrals, that there should be no uncertainty as to the places really blockaded. Finally, the custom has long been established of allowing neutral vessels which are in a blockaded port to leave it. This custom is here confirmed, in the sense that the blockading Power must allow a period within which vessels may leave; the length of this period is not fixed, because it clearly depends on very varying circumstances, but it is understood that the period should be reasonable.

Article 10. (See ante, p. 543.)The object of this article is to insure the observance of Article 9. Supposing the declaration of blockade contains statements which do not tally with the actual facts; it states that the blockade began, or will begin, on such a day, whereas, in fact, it only began several days later. Its geographical limits are inaccurately given; they are wider than those within which the blockading forces are operating. What shall be the sanction? The nullity of the declaration of blockade, which prevents it from being operative. If then, in such a case, a neutral vessel is captured for breach of blockade, she can refer to the nullity of the declaration of blockade as a plea for the nullity of the capture; if her plea is rejected by the national tribunal, she can appeal to the International Court.

To avoid misunderstandings, the significance of this provision must be noticed. The declaration states that the blockade begins on the 1st February, it really only begins on the 8th. It is needless to say that the declaration had no effect from the 1st to the 8th, because at that time there was no blockade at all; the declaration states a fact, but does not take the place of one. The rule goes further: the declaration shall not even be operative from the 8th onwards; it is definitely void, and another must be made.

There is no question here of cases where Article 9 is disregarded by neglect to allow neutral vessels in the blockaded port time to leave it. The sanction could not be the same. There is no reason to annul the declaration as regards neutral vessels wishing to enter the blockaded port. A special sanction is needed in that case, and it is provided by Article 16, paragraph 2.

Article 11. (See ante, p. 543.)A declaration of blockade is not valid unless notified. The observance of a rule can only be required by those who have the opportunity of knowing it.

Two notifications must be made:—

1. The first is addressed to neutral Powers by the belligerent Power, which communicates it to the Governments themselves or to their representatives accredited to it. The communication to the Governments will in most cases be made through the diplomatic agents; it might happen that a belligerent had no diplomatic relations with a neutral country; he will then address himself, ordinarily by telegraph, directly to the Government of that country. It is the duty of the neutral Governments advised of the declaration of blockade to take the necessary measures to dispatch the news to the different parts of their territory, especially their ports.

2. The second notification is made by the commander of the blockading force to the local authorities. These must inform, as soon as possible, the foreign Consuls residing at the blockaded place or on the blockaded coastline. These authorities would be responsible for the neglect of this obligation. Neutrals might suffer loss from the fact of not having been informed of the blockade in sufficient time.

Article 12. (See ante, p. 544.)Supposing a blockade is extended beyond its original limits: as regards the new part, it is a new blockade and, in consequence, the rules as to declaration and notification must be applied to it. The same is true in cases where a blockade is re-established after having been raised; the fact that a blockade has already existed in the same locality must not be taken into account.

Article 13. (See ante, p. 544.)If it is indispensable to know of the establishment of a blockade, it would at least be useful for the public to be told of its raising, since it puts an end to the restrictions imposed on the relations of neutrals with the blockaded port. It has therefore been thought fit to ask the Power which raises a blockade to make known the fact in the form in which it has notified the establishment of the blockade (Article 11). Only it must be observed that the sanction could not be the same in the two cases. To ensure the notification of the declaration of blockade there is a direct and adequate sanction: an unnotified blockade is not binding. In the case of the raising there can be no parallel to this. The public will really gain by the raising, even without being told of it officially. The blockading Power which did not notify the raising would expose itself to diplomatic remonstrances on the ground of the nonfulfilment of an international duty. This nonfulfilment will have more or less serious consequences, according to circumstances. Sometimes the raising of the blockade will really have become known at once, and official notification would add nothing to this effective publicity.

It is needless to add that only the voluntary raising of a blockade is here in question; if the blockading force has been driven off by the arrival of enemy forces, it cannot be held bound to make known its defeat, which its adversary will undertake to do without delay. Instead of raising a blockade, a belligerent may confine himself to restricting it; he only blockades one port instead of two. As regards the port which ceases to be included in the blockade, it is a case of voluntary raising, and consequently the same rule applies.

Article 14. (See ante, p. 544.)For a vessel to be liable to capture for breach of blockade, the first condition is that she must be aware of the blockade, because it is not just to punish some one for breaking a rule which he does not know. Nevertheless, there are circumstances in which, even in the absence of proof of actual knowledge, knowledge may be presumed, the right of rebutting this presumption being always reserved to the party concerned. (Article 15.)

Article 15. (See ante, p. 544.)A vessel has left a neutral port subsequently to the notification of the blockade made to the Powers to which the port belongs. Was this notification made in sufficient time, that is to say, so as to reach the port in question, where it had to be published by the port authorities? That is a question of fact to be examined. If it is settled affirmatively, it is natural to suppose that the vessel was aware of the blockade at the time of her departure. This presumption is not however absolute, and the right to adduce proof to the contrary is reserved. It is for the incriminated vessel to furnish it, by showing that circumstances existed which explain her ignorance.

Article 16. (See ante, p. 544.)A vessel is supposed to be approaching a blockaded port without its being possible to tell whether she knows or is presumed to know of the existence of the blockade; no notification in the sense of Article 11 has reached her. In that case a special notification is necessary in order that the vessel may be duly informed of the fact of the blockade. This notification is made to the vessel herself by an officer of one of the warships of the blockading force, and is entered on the vessel’s logbook. It may be made to the vessels of a convoyed fleet by a neutral warship through the commander of the convoy, who acknowledges receipt of it and takes the necessary measures to have the notification entered on the logbook of each vessel. The entry notes the time and place where it is made, and the names of the blockaded places. The vessel is prevented from passing, and the blockade is thus made binding for her, though not previously notified; this adverb is therefore omitted in Article 8. It cannot be admitted that a merchant vessel should claim to disregard a real blockade, and to break it for the sole reason that she was not personally aware of it. But, though she may be prevented from passing, she may only be captured when she tries to break blockade after receiving the notification. This special notification is seen to play a very small part, and must not be confused with the special notification absolutely insisted on by the practice of certain navies¹ .

What has just been said refers to the vessel coming in. The vessel leaving the blockaded port must also be considered. If a regular notification of the blockade has been made to the local authorities (Article 11 (2)), the position is simple: the vessel is, or is presumed to be, aware of the blockade, and is therefore liable to capture in case she has not kept to the period for leaving allowed by the blockading Power. But it may happen that no declaration of blockade has been notified to the local authorities, or that that declaration has contained no mention of the period allowed for leaving, in spite of the rule prescribed by Article 9 (3). The sanction of the blockading Power’s offence is that the vessel must be allowed to go free. It is a strong sanction, which corresponds exactly with the nature of the offence committed, and will be the best means of preventing its commission.

It is needless to say that this provision only concerns vessels to which the period allowed for leaving would have been of use—that is to say, neutral vessels which were in the port at the time when the blockade was established; it has nothing to do with vessels which are in the port after having broken blockade.

The commander of the blockading squadron may always repair his omission or mistake, make a notification of the blockade to the local authorities, or complete that which he has already made.

As is seen from these explanations, the most ordinary case is assumed—that in which the absence of notification implies negligence on the part of the commander of the blockading forces. The situation is clearly altogether changed if the commander has done all in his power to make the notification, but has been prevented from doing so by lack of goodwill on the part of the local authorities, who have intercepted all communications from outside. In that case he cannot be forced to let pass vessels which wish to leave, and which, in the absence of the prescribed notification and of presumptive knowledge of the blockade, are in a position similar to that contemplated in Article 16, paragraph 1.

Article 17. (See ante, p. 545.)The other condition of the liability of a vessel to capture is that she should be found within the area of operations of the warships detailed to make the blockade effective; it is not enough that she should be on her way to the blockaded port.

As for what constitutes the area of operations, an explanation has been given which has been universally accepted, and is quoted here as furnishing the best commentary on the rule laid down by Article 17:—

“When a Government decides to undertake blockading operations against some part of the enemy coast it details a certain number of warships to take part in the blockade, and entrusts the command to an officer whose duty is to use them for the purpose of making the blockade effective. The commander of the naval force thus formed posts the ships at his disposal according to the line of the coast and the geographical position of the blockaded places, and instructs each ship as to the part which she has to play, and especially as to the zone which she is to watch. All the zones watched taken together, and so organized as to make the blockade effective, form the area of operations of the blockading naval force.

“The area of operations so constituted is intimately connected with the effectiveness of the blockade, and also with the number of ships employed on it.

“Cases may occur in which a single ship will be enough to keep a blockade effective,—for instance, at the entrance of a port, or at the mouth of a river with a small estuary, so long as circumstances allow the blockading ship to stay near enough to the entrance. In that case the area of operations is itself near the coast. But, on the other hand, if circumstances force her to remain far off, one ship may not be enough to secure effectiveness, and to maintain this she will then have to be supported by others. From this cause the area of operations becomes wider, and extends further from the coast. It may therefore vary with circumstances, and with the number of blockading ships, but it will always be limited by the condition that effectiveness must be assured.

“It does not seem possible to fix the limits of the area of operations in definite figures, any more than to fix beforehand and definitely the number of ships necessary to assure the effectiveness of any blockade. These points must be settled according to circumstances in each particular case of a blockade. This might perhaps be done at the time of making the declaration.

“It is clear that a blockade will not be established in the same way on a defenceless coast as on one possessing all modern means of defence. In the latter case there could be no question of enforcing a rule such as that which formerly required that ships should be stationary and sufficiently close to the blockaded places; the position would be too dangerous for the ships of the blockading force which, besides, now possess more powerful means of watching effectively a much wider zone than formerly.

“The area of operations of a blockading naval force may be rather wide, but as it depends on the number of ships contributing to the effectiveness of the blockade, and is always limited by the condition that it should be effective, it will never reach distant seas where merchant vessels sail which are, perhaps, making for the blockaded ports, but whose destination is contingent on the changes which circumstances may produce in the blockade during their voyage. To sum up, the idea of the area of operations joined with that of effectiveness, as we have tried to define it, that is to say, including the zone of operations of the blockading forces, allows the belligerent effectively to exercise the right of blockade which he admittedly possesses and, on the other hand, saves neutrals from exposure to the drawbacks of blockade at a great distance, while it leaves them free to run the risk which they knowingly incur by approaching points to which access is forbidden by the belligerent¹ .”

Article 18. (See ante, p. 545.)This rule has been thought necessary the better to protect the commercial interests of neutral countries; it completes Article 1, according to which a blockade must not extend beyond the ports and coasts of the enemy, which implies that, as it is an operation of war, it must not be directed against a neutral port, in spite of the importance to a belligerent of the part played by that neutral port in supplying his adversary.

Article 19. (See ante, p. 545.)It is the true destination of the vessel which must be considered when a breach of blockade is in question, and not the ulterior destination of the cargo. Proof or presumption of the latter is therefore not enough to justify the capture, for breach of blockade, of a ship actually bound for an unblockaded port. But the cruiser might always prove that this destination to an unblockaded port is only apparent, and that in reality the immediate destination of the vessel is the blockaded port.

Article 20. (See ante, p. 545.)A vessel has left the blockaded port or has tried to enter it. Shall she remain indefinitely liable to capture? To reply by an absolute affirmative would be to go too far. This vessel must remain liable to capture so long as she is pursued by a ship of the blockading force; it would not be enough for her to be encountered by a cruiser of the blockading enemy which did not belong to the blockading squadron² . The question whether or not the pursuit is abandoned is one of fact; it is not enough that the vessel should take refuge in a neutral port. The ship which is pursuing her can wait till she leaves it, so that the pursuit is necessarily suspended, but not abandoned. Capture is no longer possible when the blockade has been raised.

Article 21. (See ante, p. 545.)The vessel is condemned in all cases. The cargo is also condemned on principle, but the interested party is allowed to oppose a plea of good faith, that is to say, to prove that, when the goods were shipped, the shipper did not know and could not have known of the intention to break the blockade.

Chapter II.

Contraband of war¹ .

This chapter is one of the most, if not the most important, of the Declaration. It deals with a matter which has sometimes given rise to serious disputes between belligerents and neutrals. Therefore regulations to establish exactly the rights and duties of each have often been urgently called for. Peaceful trade may be grateful for the precision with which a subject of the highest importance to its interests is now for the first time treated.

The notion of contraband of war connotes two elements: it concerns objects of a certain kind and with a certain destination. Cannons, for instance, are carried in a neutral vessel. Are they contraband? That depends: if they are destined for a neutral Government,—no; if they are destined for an enemy Government,—yes. The trade in certain articles is by no means generally forbidden during war; it is the trade with the enemy in these articles which is illicit, and against which the belligerent to whose detriment it is carried on may protect himself by the measures allowed by international law.

Articles 22 and 24 enumerate the articles which may be contraband of war, and which are so in fact when they have a certain destination laid down in Articles 30 and 33. The traditional distinction between absolute and conditional contraband is maintained: Articles 22 and 30 refer to the former, and Articles 24 and 33 to the latter.

Article 22. (See ante, p. 546.)This list is that drawn up at the second Peace Conference by the Committee charged with the special study of the question of contraband¹ . It was the result of mutual concessions, and it has not seemed wise to reopen discussion on this subject for the purpose either of cutting out or of adding articles.

The words de plein droit (without notice)² imply that the provision becomes operative by the mere fact of the war, and that no declaration by the belligerents is necessary. Trade is already warned in time of peace.

Article 23. (See ante, p. 547.)Certain discoveries or inventions might make the list in Article 22 insufficient. An addition may be made to it on condition that it concerns articles exclusively used for war. This addition must be notified to the other Powers, which will take the necessary measures to inform their subjects of it. In theory the notification may be made in time of peace or of war. The former case will doubtless rarely occur, because a State which made such a notification might be suspected of meditating a war; it would, nevertheless, have the advantage of informing trade beforehand. There was no reason for making it impossible.

The right given to a Power to make an addition to the list by a mere declaration has been thought too wide. It should be noticed that this right does not involve the dangers supposed. In the first place, it is understood that the declaration is only operative for the Power which makes it, in the sense that the article added will only be contraband for it, as a belligerent; other States may, of course, also make a similar declaration. The addition may only refer to articles exclusively used for war; at present, it would be hard to mention any such articles which are not included in the list. The future is left free. If a Power claimed to add to the list of absolute contraband articles not exclusively used for war, it might expose itself to diplomatic remonstrances, because it would be disregarding an accepted rule. Besides, there would be an eventual resort to the International Prize Court. Suppose that the Court holds that the article mentioned in the declaration of absolute contraband is wrongly placed there because it is not exclusively used for war, but that it might have been included in a declaration of conditional contraband. Confiscation may then be justified if the capture was made in the conditions laid down for this kind of contraband (Articles 33—35) which differ from those enforced for absolute contraband (Article 30).

It had been suggested that, in the interest of neutral trade, a period should elapse between the notification and its enforcement. But that would be very damaging to the belligerent, whose object is precisely to protect himself, since, during that period, the trade in articles which he thinks dangerous would be free and the effect of his measure a failure. Account has been taken, in another form, of the considerations of equity which have been adduced (see Article 43).

Article 24. (See ante, p. 547.)On the expression de plein droit (without notice) the same remark must be made with regard to Article 22¹ . The articles enumerated are only conditional contraband if they have the destination specified in Article 33.

Foodstuffs include products necessary or useful for sustaining man, whether solid or liquid.

Paper money only includes inconvertible paper money, i.e. banknotes which may or not be legal tender. Bills of exchange and cheques are excluded.

Engines and boilers are included in (6).

Railway material includes fixtures (such as rails, sleepers, turntables, parts of bridges), and rolling stock (such as locomotives, carriages, and trucks).

Article 25. (See ante, p. 548.)This provision corresponds, as regards conditional contraband, to that in Article 23 as regards absolute contraband.

Article 26. (See ante, p. 548.)A belligerent may not wish to use the right to treat as contraband of war all the articles included in the above lists. It may suit him to add to conditional contraband an article included in absolute contraband or to declare free, so far as he is concerned, the trade in some article included in one class or the other. It is desirable that he should make known his intention on this subject, and he will probably do so in order to have the credit of the measure. If he does not do so, but confines himself to giving instructions to his cruisers, the vessels searched will be agreeably surprised if the searcher does not reproach them with carrying what they themselves consider contraband. Nothing can prevent a Power from making such a declaration in time of peace. See what is said as regards Article 23.

Article 27. (See ante, p. 549.)The existence of a so-called free list (Article 28) makes it useful thus to put on record that articles which cannot be used for purposes of war may not be declared contraband of war. It might have been thought that articles not included in that list might at least be declared conditional contraband.

Article 28. (See ante, p. 549.)To lessen the drawbacks of war as regards neutral trade it has been thought useful to draw up this so-called free list, but this does not mean, as has been explained above, that all articles outside it might be declared contraband of war.

The ores here referred to are the product of mines from which metals are derived.

There was a demand that dyestuffs should be included in (10), but this seemed too general, for there are materials from which colours are derived, such as coal, which also have other uses. Products only used for making colours enjoy the exemption.

“Articles de Paris,” an expression the meaning of which is universally understood, come under (15).

Article 29. (See ante, p. 550.)(16) refers to the hair of certain animals, such as pigs and wild boars. Carpets and mats come under household furniture and ornaments (17). The articles enumerated in Article 29 are also excluded from treatment as contraband, but for reasons different from those which have led to the inclusion of the list in Article 28.

Motives of humanity have exempted articles exclusively used to aid the sick and wounded, which, of course, include drugs and different medicines. This does not refer to hospital-ships, which enjoy special immunity under the convention of The Hague of the 18th October, 1907, but to ordinary merchant vessels, whose cargo includes articles of the kind mentioned. The cruiser has, however, the right, in case of urgent necessity, to requisition such articles for the needs of her crew or of the fleet to which she belongs, but they can only be requisitioned on payment of compensation. It must, however, be observed that this right of requisition may not be exercised in all cases. The articles in question must have the destination specified in Article 30, that is to say, an enemy destination. Otherwise, the ordinary law regains its sway; a belligerent could not have the right of requisition as regards neutral vessels on the high seas.

Articles intended for the use of the vessel, which might in themselves and by their nature, be contraband of war, may not be so treated,—for instance, arms intended for the defence of the vessel against pirates or for making signals. The same is true of articles intended for the use of the crew and passengers during the voyage; the crew here include all persons in the service of the vessel in general.

Destination of Contraband.—As has been said, the second element in the notion of contraband is destination. Great difficulties have arisen on this subject, which find expression in the theory of continuous voyage, so often attacked or adduced without a clear comprehension of its exact meaning¹ . Cases must simply be considered on their merits so as to see how they can be settled without unnecessarily annoying neutrals or sacrificing the legitimate rights of belligerents.

In order to effect a compromise between conflicting theories and practices, absolute and conditional contraband have been differently treated in this connection.

Articles 30 to 32 refer to absolute, and Articles 33 to 36 to conditional, contraband.

Article 30. (See ante, p. 550.)The articles included in the list in Article 22 are absolute contraband when they are destined for territory belonging to or occupied by the enemy, or for his armed military or naval forces. These articles are liable to capture as soon as a final destination of this kind can be shown by the captor to exist. It is not, therefore, the destination of the vessel which is decisive, but that of the goods. It makes no difference if these goods are on board a vessel which is to discharge them in a neutral port; as soon as the captor is able to show that they are to be forwarded from there by land or sea to an enemy country, it is enough to justify the capture and subsequent condemnation of the cargo. The very principle of continuous voyage, as regards absolute contraband, is established by Article 30. The journey made by the goods is regarded as a whole.

Article 31. (See ante, p. 550.)As has been said, the obligation of proving that the contraband goods really have the destination specified in Article 30 rests with the captor. In certain cases proof of the destination specified in Article 31 is conclusive, that is to say, the proof may not be rebutted.

First Case.—The goods are documented for discharge in an enemy port, that is to say, according to the ship’s papers referring to those goods, they are to be discharged there. In this case there is a real admission of enemy destination on the part of the interested parties themselves.

Second Case.—The vessel is to touch at enemy ports only; or she is to touch at an enemy port before reaching the neutral port for which the goods are documented, so that although these goods, according to the papers referring to them, are to be discharged in a neutral port, the vessel carrying them is to touch at an enemy port before reaching that neutral port. They will be liable to capture, and the possibility of proving that their neutral destination is real and in accordance with the intentions of the parties interested is not admitted. The fact that, before reaching that destination, the vessel will touch at an enemy port, would occasion too great a risk for the belligerent whose cruiser searches the vessel. Even without assuming that there is intentional fraud, there might be a strong temptation for the master of the merchant vessel to discharge the contrabrand, for which he would get a good price, and for the local authorities to requisition the goods.

The same case arises where the vessel, before reaching the neutral port, is to join the armed forces of the enemy.

For the sake of simplicity, the provision only speaks of an enemy port, but it is understood that a port occupied by the enemy must be regarded as an enemy port, as follows from the general rule in Article 30.

Article 32. (See ante, p. 551.)The papers, therefore, are conclusive proof of the course of the vessel unless she is encountered in circumstances which show that their statements are not to be trusted. See also the explanations given as regards Article 35.

Article 33. (See ante, p. 551.)The rules for conditional contraband differ from those laid down for absolute contraband in two respects: (1) there is no question of destination for the enemy in general, but of destination for the use of his armed forces or government departments; (2) the doctrine of continuous voyage is excluded. Articles 33 and 34 refer to the first, and Article 35 to the second principle.

The articles included in the list of conditional contraband may serve for peaceful uses as well as for hostile purposes. If, from the circumstances, the peaceful purpose is clear, their capture is not justified; it is otherwise if a hostile purpose is to be assumed, as, for instance, in the case of foodstuffs destined for an enemy army or fleet, or of coal destined for an enemy fleet. In such a case there is clearly no room for doubt. But what is the solution when the articles are destined for the civil government departments of the enemy State? It may be money sent to a government department, for use in the payment of its official salaries, or rails sent to a department of public works. In these cases there is enemy destination which renders the goods liable in the first place to capture, and in the second to condemnation. The reasons for this are at once legal and practical. The State is one, although it necessarily acts through different departments. If a civil department may freely receive foodstuffs or money, that department is not the only gainer, but the entire State, including its military administration, gains also, since the general resources of the State are thereby increased. Further, the receipts of a civil department may be considered of greater use to the military administration and directly assigned to the latter. Money or foodstuffs really destined for a civil department may thus come to be used directly for the needs of the army. This possibility, which is always present, shows why destination for the departments of the enemy State is assimilated to that for its armed forces.

It is the departments of the State which are dependent on the central power that are in question, and not all the departments which may exist in the enemy State; local and municipal bodies, for instance, are not included, and articles destined for their use would not be contraband.

War may be waged in such circumstances that destination for the use of a civil department cannot be suspect, and consequently cannot make goods contraband. For instance, there is a war in Europe, and the colonies of the belligerent countries are not, in fact, affected by it. Foodstuffs or other articles in the list of conditional contraband destined for the use of the civil government of a colony would not be held to be contraband of war, because the considerations adduced above do not apply to their case; the resources of the civil government cannot be drawn on for the needs of the war. Gold, silver, or paper money are exceptions, because a sum of money can easily be sent from one end of the world to the other.

Article 34. (See ante, p. 551.)Contraband articles will not usually be directly addressed to the military authorities or to the government departments of the enemy State. Their true destination will be more or less concealed, and the captor must prove it in order to justify their capture. But it has been thought reasonable to set up presumptions based on the nature of the person to whom, or place for which, the articles are destined. It may be an enemy authority or a trader established in an enemy country who, as a matter of common knowledge, supplies the enemy Government with articles of the kind in question. It may be a fortified place belonging to the enemy or a place used as a base, whether of operations or of supply, for the armed forces of the enemy.

This general presumption may not be applied to the merchant vessel herself on her way to a fortified place, though she may in herself be conditional contraband, but only if her destination for the use of the armed forces or government departments of the enemy State is directly proved.

In the absence of the above presumptions, the destination is presumed to be innocent. That is the ordinary law, according to which the captor must prove the illicit character of the goods which he claims to capture.

Finally, all the presumptions thus set up in the interest of the captor or against him may be rebutted. The national tribunals, in the first place, and, in the second, the International Court, will exercise their judgment.

Article 35. (See ante, p. 552.)As has been said above, the doctrine of continuous voyage is excluded for conditional contraband, which is only liable to capture when it is to be discharged in an enemy port. As soon as the goods are documented for discharge in a neutral port they can no longer be contraband, and no examination will be made as to whether they are to be forwarded to the enemy by sea or land from that neutral port. It is here that the case of absolute contraband is essentially different.

The ship’s papers furnish complete proof as to the voyage on which the vessel is engaged and as to the place where the cargo is to be discharged; but this would not be so if the vessel were encountered clearly out of the course which she should follow according to her papers, and unable to give adequate reasons to justify such deviation.

This rule as to the proof furnished by the ship’s papers is intended to prevent claims frivolously raised by a cruiser and giving rise to unjustifiable captures. It must not be too literally interpreted, for that would make all frauds easy. Thus it does not hold good when the vessel is encountered at sea clearly out of the course which she ought to have followed, and unable to justify such deviation. The ship’s papers are then in contradiction with the true facts and lose all value as evidence; the cruiser will be free to decide according to the merits of the case. In the same way, a search of the vessel may reveal facts which irrefutably prove that her destination or the place where the goods are to be discharged is incorrectly entered in the ship’s papers. The commander of the cruiser is then free to judge of the circumstances and capture the vessel or not according to his judgment. To resume, the ship’s papers are proof, unless facts show their evidence to be false¹ . This qualification of the value of the ship’s papers as proof seems self-evident and unworthy of special mention. The aim has been not to appear to weaken the force of the general rule, which forms a safeguard for neutral trade.

It does not follow that, because a single entry in the ship’s papers is shown to be false, their evidence loses its value as a whole. The entries which cannot be proved false retain their value.

Article 36. (See ante, p. 553.)The case contemplated is certainly rare, but has nevertheless arisen in recent wars. In the case of absolute contraband, there is no difficulty, since destination for the enemy may always be proved, whatever the route by which the goods are sent (Article 30). For conditional contraband the case is different, and an exception must be made to the general rule laid down in Article 35, paragraph 1, so as to allow the captor to prove that the suspected goods really have the special destination referred to in Article 33 without the possibility of being confronted by the objection that they were to be discharged in a neutral port.

Article 37. (See ante, p. 553.)The vessel may be captured for contraband during the whole of her voyage, provided that she is in waters where an act of war is lawful. The fact that she intends to touch at a port of call before reaching the enemy destination does not prevent capture, provided that destination in her particular case is proved in conformity with the rules laid down in Article 30 to 32 for absolute, and in Articles 33 to 35 for conditional contraband, subject to the exception provided for in Article 36.

Article 38. (See ante, p. 553.)A vessel is liable to capture for carrying contraband, but not for having done so.

Article 39. (See ante, p. 553.)This presents no difficulty.

Article 40. (See ante, p. 553.)It was universally admitted that in certain cases the condemnation of the contraband is not enough, and that the vessel herself should also be condemned, but opinions differed as to what these cases were. It was decided that the contraband must bear a certain proportion to the total cargo. But the question divides itself into two parts: (1) What shall be the proportion? The solution adopted is the mean between those proposed, which varied from a quarter to three quarters. (2) How shall this proportion be reckoned? Must the contraband form more than half the cargo in volume, weight, value, or freight? The adoption of a single fixed standard gives rise to theoretical objections, and also to practices intended to avoid condemnation of the vessel in spite of the importance of the cargo. If the standard of volume or weight is adopted, the master will ship innocent goods occupying space, or of weight, sufficient to exceed the contraband. A similar remark may be made as regards the standard of value or freight. The consequence is that, in order to justify condemnation, it is enough that the contraband should form more than half the cargo by any one of the above standards. This may seem harsh; but, on the one hand, any other system would make fraudulent calculations easy, and, on the other, the condemnation of the vessel may be said to be justified when the carriage of contraband formed an important part of her venture—a statement which applies to all the cases specified.

Article 41. (See ante, p. 554.)It is not just that, on the one hand, the carriage of more than a certain proportion of contraband should involve the condemnation of the vessel, while if the contraband forms less than this proportion, it alone is confiscated. This often involves no loss for the master, the freight of this contraband having been paid in advance. Does this not encourage trade in contraband, and ought not a certain penalty to be imposed for the carriage of a proportion of contraband less than that required to entail condemnation? A kind of fine was proposed which should bear a relation to the value of the contraband articles. Objections of various sorts were brought forward against this proposal, although the principle of the infliction of some kind of pecuniary loss for the carriage of contraband seemed justified. The same object was attained in another way by providing that the costs and expenses incurred by the captor in respect of the proceedings in the national prize court and of the custody of the vessel and of her cargo during the proceedings are to be paid by the vessel. The expenses of the custody of the vessel include in this case the keep of the captured vessel’s crew. It should be added that the loss to a vessel by being taken to a prize port and kept there is the most serious deterrent as regards the carriage of contraband.

Article 42. (See ante, p. 554.)The owner of the contraband is punished in the first place by the condemnation of his contraband property; and in the second by that of the goods, even if innocent, which he may possess on board the same vessel.

Article 43. (See ante, p. 554.)This provision is intended to spare neutrals who might in fact be carrying contraband, but against whom no charge could be made. This may arise in two cases. The first is that in which they are unaware of the outbreak of hostilities; the second is that in which, though aware of this, they do not know of the declaration of contraband made by a belligerent, in accordance with Articles 23 and 25, which is, as it happens, the one applicable to the whole or a part of the cargo. It would be unjust to capture the ship and condemn the contraband; on the other hand, the cruiser cannot be obliged to let go on to the enemy goods suitable for use in the war of which he may stand in urgent need. These opposing interests are reconciled by making condemnation conditional on the payment of compensation (see the convention of the 18th October, 1907, on the rules for enemy merchant vessels on the outbreak of hostilities, which expresses a similar idea.¹ .

Article 44. (See ante, p. 555.)A neutral vessel is stopped for carrying contraband. She is not liable to condemnation, because the contraband does not reach the proportion specified in Article 40. She can nevertheless be taken to a prize port for judgment to be passed on the contraband. This right of the captor appears too wide in certain cases, if the importance of the contraband, possibly slight (for instance, a case of guns or revolvers), is compared with the heavy loss incurred by the vessel by being thus turned out of her course and detained during the time taken up by the proceedings. The question has, therefore, been asked whether the right of the neutral vessel to continue her voyage might not be admitted if the contraband articles were handed over to the captor, who, on his part, might only refuse to receive them for sufficient reasons, for instance, the rough state of the sea, which would make transhipment difficult or impossible, well-founded suspicions as to the amount of contraband which the merchant vessel is really carrying, the difficulty of stowing the articles on board the warship, &c. This proposal did not gain sufficient support. It was alleged to be impossible to impose such an obligation on the cruiser, for which this handing over of goods would almost always have drawbacks. If, by chance, it has none, the cruiser will not refuse it, because she herself will gain by not being turned out of her course by having to take the vessel to a port. The idea of an obligation having thus been excluded, it was decided to provide for the voluntarily handing over of the contraband, which, it is hoped, will be carried out whenever possible, to the great advantage of both parties. The formalities provided for are very simple and need no explanation.

There must be a judgment of a prize court as regards the goods thus handed over. For this purpose the captor must be furnished with the necessary papers. It may be supposed that there might be doubt as to the character of certain articles which the cruiser claims as contraband; the master of the merchant vessel contests this claim, but prefers to deliver them up so as to be at liberty to continue his voyage. This is merely a capture which has to be confirmed by the prize court.

The contraband delivered up by the merchant vessel may hamper the cruiser, which must be left free to destroy it at the moment of handing over or later.

Chapter III.

Unneutral service¹ .

In a general way, it may be said that the merchant vessel which violates neutrality, whether by carrying contraband of war or by breaking blockade, affords aid to the enemy, and it is on this ground that the belligerent whom she injures by her acts is justified in inflicting on her certain losses. But there are cases where such unneutral service bears a particularly distinctive character, and for such cases it has been thought necessary to make special provision. They have been divided into two classes according to the gravity of the act of which the neutral vessel is accused.

In the cases included in the first class (Article 45), the vessel is condemned, and receives the treatment of a vessel subject to condemnation for carrying contraband. This means that the vessel does not lose her neutral character and has a full claim to the rights enjoyed by neutral vessels; for instance, she may not be destroyed by the captor except under the conditions laid down for neutral vessels (Articles 48 et seqq.); the rule that the flag covers the goods applies to goods she carries on board.

In the more serious cases which belong to the second class (Article 46), the vessel is, again, condemned; but further, she is treated not only as a vessel subject to condemnation for carrying contraband, but as an enemy merchant vessel, which treatment entails certain consequences. The rule governing the destruction of neutral prizes does not apply to the vessel, and, as she has become an enemy vessel, it is no longer the second but the third rule of the Declaration of Paris which is applicable. The goods on board will be presumed to be enemy goods; neutrals will have the right to claim their property on establishing their neutrality (Article 59). It would, however, be going too far to say that the original neutral character of the vessel is completely lost, so that she should be treated as though she had always been an enemy vessel. The vessel may plead that the allegation made against her has no foundation in fact, that the act of which she is accused has not the character of unneutral service. She has, therefore, the right of appeal to the International Court in virtue of the provisions which protect neutral property.

Article 45. (See ante, p. 555.)The first case supposes passengers travelling as individuals; the case of a military detachment is dealt with hereafter. The case is that of individuals embodied in the armed military or naval forces of the enemy. There was some doubt as to the meaning of this word. Does it include those individuals only who are summoned to serve in virtue of the law of their country and who have really joined the corps to which they are to belong? Or does it also include such individuals from the moment when they are summoned, and before they join that corps? The question is of great practical importance. Supposing the case is one of individuals who are natives of a continental European country and are settled in America; these individuals have military obligations towards their country of origin; they have, for instance, to belong to the reserve of the active army of that country. Their country is at war and they sail to perform their service. Shall they be considered as embodied in the sense of the provision which we are discussing? If we judged by the municipal law of certain countries, we might argue that they should be so considered. But, apart from reasons of pure law, the contrary opinion has seemed more in accordance with practical necessity and has been accepted by all in a spirit of conciliation. It would be difficult, perhaps even impossible, without having recourse to vexatious measures to which neutral Governments would not submit, to pick out among the passengers in a vessel, those who are bound to perform military service and are on their way to do so.

The transmission of intelligence in the interest of the enemy is to be treated in the same way as the carriage of passengers embodied in his armed force. The reference to a vessel especially undertaking a voyage is intended to show that her usual service is not meant. She has been turned from her course; she has touched at a port which she does not ordinarily visit in order to embark the passengers in question. She need not be exclusively devoted to the service of the enemy; that case would come into the second class (Article 56 (4)).

In the two cases just mentioned the vessel has performed but a single service; she has been employed to carry certain people, or transmit certain intelligence; she is not continuously in the service of the enemy. In consequence she may be captured during the voyage on which she is performing the service which she has to render. Once that voyage is finished, all is over, in the sense that she may not be captured for having rendered the service in question. The principle is the same as that recognized in the case of contraband (Article 38).

The second case also falls under two heads.

There is, first, the carriage of a military detachment of the enemy, or that of one or more persons who during the voyage directly assist his operations, for instance, by signalling. If these people are soldiers or sailors in uniform there is no difficulty, the vessel is clearly liable to condemnation. If they are soldiers or sailors in mufti who might be mistaken for ordinary passengers, knowledge on the part of the master or owner is required, the character being assimilated to the latter. The rule is the same in the case of persons directly assisting the enemy during the voyage.

In these cases, if the vessel is condemned for unneutral service, the goods belonging to her owner are also liable to condemnation.

These provisions assume that the state of war was known to the vessel engaged in the operations specified; such knowledge is the reason and justification of her condemnation. The position is altogether different when the vessel is unaware of the outbreak of hostilities, so that she undertakes the service in ordinary circumstances. She may have learnt of the outbreak of hostilities while at sea, but have had no chance of landing the persons whom she was carrying. Condemnation would then be unjust, and the equitable rule adopted is in accordance with the provisions already accepted in other matters. If a vessel has left an enemy port subsequently to the outbreak of hostilities, or a neutral port after that outbreak has been notified to the Power to whom such port belongs, her knowledge of the existence of a state of war will be presumed.

The question here is merely one of preventing the condemnation of the vessel. The persons found on board her who belong to the armed forces of the enemy may be made prisoners of war by the cruiser.

Article 46. (See ante, p. 557.)The cases here contemplated¹ are more serious than those in Article 45, which justifies the severer treatment inflicted on the vessel, as explained above.

First Case.—The vessel takes a direct part in the hostilities. This may take different forms. It is needless to say that, in an armed conflict, the vessel takes all the risks incidental thereto. We suppose her to have fallen into the power of the enemy whom she was fighting, and who is entitled to treat her as an enemy merchant vessel.

Second Case.—The vessel is under the orders or control of an agent placed on board by the enemy Government. His presence marks the relation in which she stands to the enemy. In other circumstances the vessel may also have relations with the enemy, but to be subject to condemnation she must come under the third head.

Third Case.—The whole vessel is chartered by the enemy Government, and is therefore entirely at its disposal; it can use her for different purposes more or less directly connected with the war, notably, as a transport; such is the position of colliers which accompany a belligerent fleet. There will often be a charter-party between the belligerent Government and the owner or master of the vessel, but all that is required is proof, and the fact that the whole vessel has in fact been chartered is enough, in whatever way it may be established.

Fourth Case.—The vessel is at the time exclusively devoted to the carriage of enemy troops or to the transmission of intelligence in the enemy’s interest. The case is different from those dealt with by Article 45, and the question is one of a service to which the ship is permanently devoted. The decision accordingly is that, so long as such service lasts, the vessel is liable to capture, even if, at the moment when an enemy cruiser searches her, she is engaged neither in the transport of troops nor in the transmission of intelligence.

As in the cases in Article 45 and for the same reasons, goods found on board belonging to the owner of the vessel are also liable to condemnation.

It was proposed to treat as an enemy merchant vessel a neutral vessel making, at the time, and with the sanction of the enemy Government, a voyage which she has only been permitted to make subsequently to the outbreak of hostilities or during the two preceding months¹ . This rule would be enforced notably on neutral merchant vessels admitted by a belligerent to a service reserved in time of peace to the national marine of that belligerent—for instance, to the coasting trade. Several Delegations formally rejected this proposal, so that the question thus raised remains an open one² .

Article 47. (See ante, p. 557.)Individuals embodied in the armed military or naval forces of a belligerent may be on board a neutral merchant vessel when she is searched. If the vessel is subject to condemnation, the cruiser will capture her and take her to one of her own ports with the persons on board. Clearly the soldiers or sailors of the enemy State will not be set free, but will be treated as prisoners of war. Perhaps the case will not be one for the capture of the ship—for instance, because the master was unaware of the status of an individual who had come on board as an ordinary passenger. Must the soldier or soldiers on board the vessel be set free? That does not appear admissible. The belligerent cruiser cannot be compelled to set free active enemies who are physically in her power and are more dangerous than this or that contraband article. She must naturally proceed with great discretion, and must act on her own responsibility in requiring the surrender of these individuals, but the right to do so is hers; it has therefore been thought necessary to explain the point.

Chapter IV.

Destruction of neutral prizes¹ .

The destruction of neutral prizes was a subject comprised in the programme of the second Peace Conference, and on that occasion no settlement was reached. It reappeared in the programme of the present Conference, and this time agreement has been found possible. Such a result, which bears witness to the sincere desire of all parties to arrive at an understanding, is a matter for congratulation. It has been shown once more that conflicting hard-and-fast rules do not always correspond to things as they are, and that if there be readiness to descend to particulars, and to arrive at the precise way in which the rules have been applied, it will often be found that the actual practice is very much the same, although the doctrines professed appear to be entirely in conflict. To enable two parties to agree, it is first of all necessary that they should understand each other, and this frequently is not the case. Thus it has been found that those who declared for the right to destroy neutral prizes never claimed to use this right wantonly or at every opportunity, but only by way of exception; while, on the other hand, those who maintained the principle that destruction is forbidden, admitted that the principle must give way in certain exceptional cases. It therefore became a question of reaching an understanding with regard to those exceptional cases to which, according to both views, the right to destroy should be confined. But this was not all: there was need for some guarantee against abuse in the exercise of this right; the possibility of arbitrary action in determining these exceptional cases must be limited by throwing some real responsibility upon the captor. It was at this stage that a new idea was introduced into the discussion, thanks to which it was possible to arrive at an agreement. The possibility of intervention by a court of justice will make the captor reflect before he acts, and at the same time secure reparation in cases where there was no reason for the destruction.

Such is the general spirit of the provisions of this chapter.

Article 48. (See ante, p. 557.)The general principle is very simple. A neutral vessel which has been seized may not be destroyed by the captor; so much may be admitted by every one, whatever view is taken as to the effect produced by the capture. The vessel must be taken into a port for the determination there as to the validity of the prize. A prize crew will be put on board or not, according to circumstances.

Article 49. (See ante, p. 557.)The first condition necessary to justify the destruction of the captured vessel is that she should be liable to condemnation upon the facts of the case. If the captor cannot even hope to obtain the condemnation of the vessel, how can he lay claim to the right to destroy her?

The second condition is that the observance of the general principle would involve danger to the safety of the warship or to the success of the operations in which she is engaged at the time. This is what was finally agreed upon after various solutions had been tried. It was understood that the phrase compromettre la sécurité was synonymous with mettre en danger le navire, and might be translated into English by: involve danger. It is, of course, the situation at the moment when the destruction takes place which must be considered in order to decide whether the conditions are or are not fulfilled. For a danger which did not exist at the actual moment of the capture may have appeared some time afterwards.

Article 50. (See ante, p. 558.)This provision lays down the precautions to be taken in the interests of the persons on board and of the administration of justice.

Article 51. (See ante, p. 558.)This claim gives a guarantee against the arbitrary destruction of prizes by throwing a real responsibility upon the captor who has carried out the destruction. The result is that before any decision is given respecting the validity of the prize, the captor must prove that the situation he was in was really one which fell under the head of the exceptional cases contemplated. This must be proved in proceedings to which the neutral is a party, and if the latter is not satisfied with the decision of the national prize court he may take his case to the International Court. Proof to the above effect is, therefore, a condition precedent which the captor must fulfil. If he fails to do this, he must compensate the parties interested in the vessel and the cargo, and the question whether the capture was valid or not will not be gone into. In this way a real sanction is provided in respect of the obligation not to destroy a prize except in particular cases, the sanction taking the form of a fine inflicted on the captor. If, on the other hand, this proof is given, the prize procedure follows the usual course; if the prize is declared valid, no compensation is due; if it is declared void, the parties interested have a right to be compensated. Resort to the International Court can only be made after the decision of the prize court has been given on the whole matter, and not immediately after the preliminary question has been decided.

Articles 52 and 53. (See ante, p. 558.)Supposing a vessel which has been destroyed carried neutral goods not liable to condemnation: the owner of such goods has, in every case, a right to compensation, that is, without there being occasion to distinguish between cases where the destruction was or was not justified. This is equitable and a further guarantee against arbitrary destruction.

Article 54. (See ante, p. 558.)A cruiser encounters a neutral merchant vessel carrying contraband in a proportion less than that specified in Article 40. The captain may put a prize crew on board the vessel and take her into a port for adjudication. He may, in conformity with the provisions of Article 44, agree to the handing over of the contraband if offered by the vessel stopped. But what is to happen if neither of these solutions is reached? The vessel stopped does not offer to hand over the contraband, and the cruiser is not in a position to take the vessel into a national port. Is the cruiser obliged to let the neutral vessel go with the contraband on board? To require this seemed going too far, at least in certain exceptional circumstances. These circumstances are in fact the same as would have justified the destruction of the vessel, had she been liable to condemnation. In such a case, the cruiser may demand the handing over, or proceed to the destruction, of the goods liable to condemnation. The reasons for which the right to destroy the vessel has been recognized may justify the destruction of the contraband goods, the more so as the considerations of humanity which can be adduced against the destruction of a vessel do not in this case apply. Against arbitrary demands by the cruiser there are the same guarantees as those which made it possible to recognize the right to destroy the vessel. The captor must, as a preliminary, prove that he was really faced by the exceptional circumstances specified; failing this, he is condemned to pay the value of the goods handed over or destroyed, and the question whether they were contraband or not will not be gone into.

The Article prescribes certain formalities which are necessary to establish the facts of the case and to enable the prize court to adjudicate.

Of course, when once the goods have been handed over or destroyed, and the formalities carried out, the vessel which has been stopped must be left free to continue her voyage.

Chapter V.

Transfer to a neutral flag¹ .

An enemy merchant vessel is liable to capture, whereas a neutral merchant vessel is immune. It can therefore be readily understood that a belligerent cruiser encountering a merchant vessel which lays claim to neutral nationality has to inquire whether such nationality has been acquired legitimately or merely in order to shield the vessel from the risks to which she would have been exposed had she retained her former nationality. This question naturally arises when the transfer has taken place a comparatively short time before the moment at which the ship is searched, whether the actual date be before, or after, the outbreak of hostilities. The answer will be different according as the question is looked at from the point of view of commercial or belligerent interests. Fortunately, rules have been agreed upon which conciliate both these interests as far as possible and which at the same time tell belligerents and neutral commerce what their position is.

Article 55. (See ante, p. 559.)The general rule laid down in the first paragraph is that the transfer of an enemy vessel to a neutral flag is valid, assuming, of course, that the ordinary requirements of the law have been fulfilled. It is upon the captor, if he wishes to have the transfer annulled, that the onus lies of proving that its object was to evade the consequences entailed by the war in prospect. There is one case which is treated as suspicious, that, namely, in which the bill of sale is not on board when the ship has changed her nationality less than sixty days before the outbreak of hostilities. The presumption of validity which has been set up by the first paragraph in favour of the vessel is then replaced by a presumption in favour of the captor. It is presumed that the transfer is void, but the presumption may be rebutted. With a view to such rebuttal, proof may be given that the transfer was not effected in order to evade the consequences of the war; it is unnecessary to add that the ordinary requirements of the law must have been fulfilled.

It was thought desirable to give to commerce a guarantee that the right of treating a transfer as void on the ground that it was effected in order to evade the consequences of war should not extend too far, and should not cover too long a period. Consequently, if the transfer has been effected more than thirty days before the outbreak of hostilities, it cannot be impeached on that ground alone, and it is regarded as unquestionably valid if it has been made under conditions which show that it is genuine and final; these conditions are as follows: the transfer must be unconditional, complete, and in conformity with the laws of the countries concerned, and its effect must be such that both the control of, and the profits earned by, the vessel pass into other hands. When once these conditions are proved to exist, the captor is not allowed to set up the contention that the vendor foresaw the war in which his country was about to be involved, and wished by the sale to shield himself from the risks to which a state of war would have exposed him in respect of the vessels he was transferring. Even in this case, however, when a vessel is encountered by a cruiser and her bill of sale is not on board, she may be captured if a change of nationality has taken place less than sixty days before the outbreak of hostilities; that circumstance has made her suspect. But if before the prize court the proof required by the second paragraph is adduced, she must be released, though she cannot claim compensation, inasmuch as there was good reason for capturing her.

Article 56. (See ante, p. 560.)The rule respecting transfers made after the outbreak of hostilities is more simple. Such a transfer is only valid if it is proved that its object was not to evade the consequences to which an enemy vessel, as such, is exposed. The rule accepted in respect of transfers made before the outbreak of hostilities is inverted. In that case there is a presumption that the transfer is valid; in the present, that it is void—provided always that proof to the contrary may be given. For instance, it might be proved that the transfer had taken place by inheritance.

Article 56 recites cases in which the presumption that the transfer is void is absolute, for reasons which can be readily understood: in the first case, the connection between the transfer and the war risk run by the vessel is evident; in the second, the transferee is a mere man of straw, who is to be treated as owner during a dangerous period, after which the vendor will recover possession of his vessel; lastly, the third case might strictly be regarded as already provided for, since a vessel which lays claim to neutral nationality must naturally prove that she has a right to it.

At one time provision was made in this Article for the case of a vessel which was retained, after the transfer, in the trade in which she had previously been engaged¹ . Such a circumstance is in the highest degree suspicious; the transfer has a fictitious appearance, inasmuch as nothing has changed in regard to the vessel’s trade. This would apply, for instance, if a vessel were running on the same line before and after the transfer. It was, however, objected, that to set up an absolute presumption would sometimes be too severe, and that certain kinds of vessels, as, for example, tank-ships² , could, no account of their build, engage only in a certain definite trade. To meet this objection, the word “route” was then added, so that it would have been necessary that the vessel should be engaged in the same trade and on the same route; it was thought that in this way the above contention would have been satisfactorily met. However, the suppression of this case from the list being insisted on, it was agreed to eliminate it. Consequently a transfer of this character now falls within the general rule; it is certainly presumed to be void, but the presumption may be rebutted.

Chapter VI.

Enemy character³ .

The rule in the Declaration of Paris, that “the neutral flag covers enemy goods, with the exception of contraband of war,” corresponds so closely with the advance of civilization, and has taken so firm a hold on the public mind that it is impossible, in the face of so extensive an application, to avoid seeing in that rule the embodiment of a principle of the common law of nations which can no longer be disputed. The determination of the neutral or enemy character of merchant vessels accordingly decides not only the question of the validity of their capture, but also the fate of the non-contraband goods on board. A similar general observation may be made with reference to the neutral or enemy character of goods. No one thinks of contesting to-day the principle according to which “neutral goods, with the exception of contraband of war, are not liable to capture on board an enemy ship.” It is, therefore, only in respect of goods found on board an enemy ship that the question whether they are neutral or enemy property arises.

The determination of what constitutes neutral or enemy character thus appears as a development of the two principles laid down in 1856, or rather as a means of securing their just application in practice.

The advantage of deducing from the practices of different countries some clear and simple rules on this subject may be said to need no demonstration. The uncertainty as to the risks of capture, if it does not put an end to trade, is at least the most serious of hindrances to its continuance. A trader ought to know the risks which he runs in putting his goods on board this or that ship, while the underwriter, if he does not know the extent of those risks, is obliged to charge war premiums which are often either excessive or else inadequate.

The rules which form this chapter are, unfortunately, incomplete; certain important points had to be laid aside, as has been already observed in the introductory explanations, and as will be further explained below.

Article 57. (See ante, p. 560.)The principle, therefore, is that the neutral or enemy character of a vessel is determined by the flag which she is entitled to fly. It is a simple rule which appears satisfactorily to meet the special case of ships, as distinguished from that of other movable property, and notably of the cargo. From more than one point of view, ships may be said to possess an individuality; notably they have a nationality, a national character. This attribute of nationality finds visible expression in the right to fly a flag; it has the effect of placing ships under the protection and control of the State to which they belong; it makes them amenable to the sovereignty and to the laws of that State, and liable to requisition, should the occasion arise. Here is the surest test of whether a vessel is really a unit in the merchant marine of a country, and here therefore the best test by which to decide whether her character is neutral or enemy. It is, moreover, preferable to rely exclusively upon this test, and to discard all considerations connected with the personal status of the owner.

The text makes use of the words “the flag which the vessel is entitled to fly”; that expression means, of course, the flag under which, whether she is actually flying it or not, the vessel is entitled to sail according to the municipal laws which govern that right.

Article 57 safeguards the provisions respecting transfer to another flag, as to which it is sufficient to refer to Articles 55 and 56; a vessel may very well have the right to fly a neutral flag, as far as the law of the country to which she claims to belong is concerned, but may be treated as an enemy vessel by a belligerent, because the transfer in virtue of which she has hoisted the neutral flag is annulled by Article 55 or Article 56.

Lastly, the question was raised whether a vessel loses her neutral character when she is engaged in a trade which the enemy, prior to the war, reserved exclusively for his national vessels; but as has been observed above in connection with the subject of Unneutral service, no agreement was reached, and the question remains an open one, as the second paragraph of Article 57 is careful to explain.

Article 58. (See ante, p. 561.)Unlike ships, goods have no individuality of their own; their neutral or enemy character is made to depend upon the personal status of their owner. This opinion prevailed after an exhaustive study of different views, which inclined towards reliance on the country of origin of the goods, the status of the person at whose risk they are, of the consignee, or of the consignor. The test adopted in Article 58 appears, moreover, to be in conformity with the terms of the Declaration of Paris, as also with those of the convention of The Hague of the 18th October, 1907, relative to the establishment of an International Prize Court, where the expression neutral or enemy property is used (Articles 1, 3, 4, 8)¹ .

But it cannot be concealed that Article 58 solves no more than a part of the problem, and that the easier part; it is the neutral or enemy character of the owner which determines the character of the goods, but what is to determine the neutral or enemy character of the owner? On this point nothing is said, because it was found impossible to arrive at an agreement. Opinions were divided between domicile and nationality; no useful purpose will be served by reproducing here the arguments adduced to support the two positions. It was hoped that a compromise might have been reached on the basis of a clause to the following effect:—

“The neutral or enemy character of goods found on board an enemy vessel is determined by the neutral or enemy nationality of their owner, or, if he is of no nationality or of double nationality (i.e., both neutral and enemy), by his domicile in a neutral or enemy country;

“Provided that goods belonging to a limited liability or joint stock company are considered as neutral or enemy according as the company has its headquarters in a neutral or enemy country² .”

But there was no unanimity.

Article 59. (See ante, p. 561.)Article 59 gives expression to the traditional rule according to which goods found on board an enemy vessel are, failing proof to the contrary, presumed to be enemy goods; this is merely a simple presumption, which leaves to the claimant the right, but at the same time the onus, of proving his title.

Article 60. (See ante, p. 561.)This provision contemplates the case where goods which were enemy property at the time of dispatch have been the subject of a sale or transfer during the course of the voyage. The ease with which enemy goods might secure protection from the exercise of the right of capture by means of a sale which is made subject to a reconveyance of the property on arrival has always led to a refusal to recognise such transfers. The enemy character subsists.

With regard to the moment from which goods must be considered to acquire and retain the enemy character of their owner, the text has been inspired by the same spirit of equity as governed the convention of The Hague, relative to the status of merchant vessels on the outbreak of hostilities, and by the same desire to protect mercantile operations undertaken in the security of a time of peace. It is only when the transfer takes place after the outbreak of hostilities that it is, so far as the loss of enemy character is concerned, inoperative until the arrival of the goods in question. The date which is taken into consideration here is that of the transfer, and not of the departure of the vessel. For, while the vessel which started before the war began, and remains, perhaps, unaware of the outbreak of hostilities, may enjoy on this account some degree of exemption, the goods may nevertheless possess enemy character; the enemy owner of these goods is in a position to be aware of the state of war, and it is for that very reason that he is likely to seek to evade its consequences.

It was, however, thought right to add what is, if not a limitation, at least a complement agreed to be necessary. In a great number of countries an unpaid vendor has, in the event of the bankruptcy of the buyer, a recognised legal right to recover the goods which have already become the property of the buyer but not yet reached him (stoppage in transitu). In such a case the sale is cancelled, and, in consequence of the recovery, the vendor obtains the goods again and is not deemed ever to have ceased to be the owner. This right gives to neutral commerce, in the case of a genuine bankruptcy, a protection too valuable to be sacrificed, and the second paragraph of Article 60 is intended to preserve it.

Chapter VII.

Convoy¹ .

The practice of convoy has, in the past, occasionally given rise to grave difficulties and even to conflict. It is, therefore, satisfactory to be able to record the agreement which has been reached upon this subject.

Article 61. (See ante, p. 561.)The principle laid down is simple: a neutral vessel under the convoy of a warship of her own nationality is exempt from search. The reason for this rule is that the belligerent cruiser ought to be able to find in the assurances of the commander of the convoy as good a guarantee as would be afforded by the exercise of the right of search itself; in fact, she cannot call in question the assurances given by the official representative of a neutral Government, without displaying a lack of international courtesy. If neutral Governments allow belligerents to search vessels sailing under their flag, it is because they do not wish to be responsible for the supervision of such vessels, and therefore allow belligerents to protect themselves. The situation is altered when a neutral Government consents to undertake that responsibility; the right of search has no longer the same importance.

But it follows from the explanation of the rule respecting convoy that the neutral Government undertakes to afford the belligerents every guarantee that the vessels convoyed shall not take advantage of the protection accorded to them in order to do anything inconsistent with their neutrality, as, for example, to carry contraband, render unneutral service to the belligerent, or attempt to break blockade. There is need, therefore, that a genuine supervision should be exercised from the outset over the vessels which are to be convoyed; and that supervision must be continued throughout the voyage. The Government must act with vigilance so as to prevent all abuse of the right of convoy, and must give to the officer who is put in command of a convoy precise instructions to this effect.

A belligerent cruiser encounters a convoy; she communicates with the commander of the convoy, who must, at her request, give in writing all relevant information about the vessels under his protection. A written declaration is required, because it prevents all ambiguities and misunderstandings, and because it pledges to a greater extent the responsibility of the commander. The object of such a declaration is to make search unnecessary by the mere fact of giving to the cruiser the information which the search itself would have supplied.

Article 62. (See ante, p. 562.)In the majority of cases the cruiser will be satisfied with the declaration which the commander of the convoy will have given to her, but she may have serious grounds for believing that the confidence of the commander has been abused, as for example, that a ship under convoy of which the papers are apparently in order and exhibit nothing suspicious is, in fact, carrying contraband cleverly concealed. The cruiser may, in such a case, communicate her suspicions to the commander of the convoy, and an investigation may be considered necessary. If so, it will be made by the commander of the convoy, since it is he alone who exercises authority over the vessels placed under his protection. It appeared, nevertheless, that much difficulty might often be avoided if the belligerent were allowed to be present at this investigation; otherwise he might still suspect, if not the good faith, at least the vigilance and perspicacity of the person who conducted the search. But it was not thought that an obligation to allow the officer of the cruiser to be present at the investigation should be imposed upon the commander of the convoy. He must act as he thinks best; if he agrees to the presence of an officer of the cruiser, it will be as an act of courtesy or good policy. He must in every case draw up a report of the investigation and give a copy to the officer of the cruiser.

Differences of opinion may occur between the two officers, particularly in relation to conditional contraband. The character of a port to which a cargo of corn is destined may be disputed. Is it an ordinary commercial port? or is it a port which serves as a base of supply for the armed forces? The situation which arises out of the mere fact of the convoy must in such a case be respected. The officer of the cruiser can do no more than make his protest, and the difficulty must be settled through the diplomatic channel.

The situation is altogether different if a vessel under convoy is found beyond the possibility of dispute to be carrying contraband. The vessel has no longer a right to protection, since the condition upon which such protection was granted has not been fulfilled. Besides deceiving her own Government, she has tried to deceive the belligerent. She must therefore be treated as a neutral merchant vessel encountered in the ordinary way and searched by a belligerent cruiser. She cannot complain at being exposed to such rigorous treatment, since there is in her case an aggravation of the offence committed by a carrier of contraband.

Chapter VIII.

Resistance to search.

Article 63. (See ante, p. 562.)The subject treated in this chapter was not mentioned in the programme submitted by the British Government in February 1908, but it is intimately connected with several of the questions in that programme, and thus attracted the attention of the Conference in the course of its deliberations; and it was thought necessary to frame a rule upon it, the drafting of which presented little difficulty¹ .

A belligerent cruiser encounters a merchant vessel and summons her to stop in order that she may be searched. The vessel summoned does not stop, but tries to avoid the search by flight. The cruiser may employ force to stop her, and the merchant vessel, if she is damaged or sunk, has no right to complain, seeing that she has failed to comply with an obligation imposed upon her by the law of nations.

If the vessel is stopped, and it is shown that it was only in order to escape the inconvenience of being searched that recourse was had to flight, and that beyond this she had done nothing contrary to neutrality, she will not be punished for her attempt at flight. If, on the other hand, it is established that the vessel has contraband on board, or that she has in some way or other failed to comply with her duty as a neutral, she will suffer the consequences of her infraction of neutrality, but in this case as in the last, she will not undergo any punishment for her attempt at flight. Expression was given to the contrary view, namely, that a ship should be punished for an obvious attempt at flight as much as for forcible resistance. It was suggested that the prospect of having the escaping vessel condemned as good prize would influence the captain of the cruiser to do his best to spare her. But in the end this view did not prevail.

The situation is different if forcible resistance is made to any legitimate action by the cruiser. The vessel commits an act of hostility and must, from that moment, be treated as an enemy vessel; she will therefore be subject to condemnation, although the search may not have shown that anything contrary to neutrality had been done. So far no difficulty seems to arise.

What must be decided with regard to the cargo? The rule which appeared to be the best is that according to which the cargo will be treated like the cargo on board an enemy vessel. This assimilation involves the following consequences: a neutral vessel which has offered resistance becomes an enemy vessel and the goods on board are presumed to be enemy goods. Neutrals who are interested may claim their property, in accordance with Article 3 of the Declaration of Paris, but enemy goods will be condemned, since the rule that the flag covers the goods cannot be adduced, because the captured vessel on board which they are found is considered to be an enemy vessel. It will be noticed that the right to claim the goods is open to all neutrals, even to those whose nationality is that of the captured vessel; it would seem to be an excess of severity to make such persons suffer for the action of the master. There is, however, an exception as regards the goods which belong to the owner of the vessel; it seems natural that he should bear the consequences of the acts of his agent. His property on board the vessel is therefore treated as enemy goods. A fortiori the same rule applies to the goods belonging to the master.

Chapter IX.

Compensation.

This chapter is of very general application, inasmuch as the provisions which it contains are operative in all the numerous cases in which a cruiser may capture a vessel or goods.

Article 64. (See ante, p. 563.)A cruiser has captured a neutral vessel, on the ground, for example, of carriage of contraband or breach of blockade. The prize court releases the vessel declaring the capture to be void. This decision alone is evidently not enough to indemnify the parties interested for the loss incurred in consequence of the capture, and this loss may have been considerable, since the vessel has been during a period, which may often be a very long one, prevented from engaging in her ordinary trade. May these parties claim to be compensated for this injury? Reason requires that the affirmative answer should be given, if the injury has been undeserved, that is to say, if the capture was not brought about by some fault of the parties. It may, indeed, happen that there was good reason for the capture, because the master of the vessel searched did not produce evidence which ought in the ordinary course to have been available, and which was only furnished at a later stage. In such a case it would be unjust that compensation should be awarded. On the other hand, if the cruiser has really been at fault, if the vessel has been captured when there were not good reasons for doing so, it is just that compensation should be granted.

It may also happen that a vessel which has been captured and taken into a port is released by the action of the executive without the intervention of a prize court. The existing practice, under such circumstances, is not uniform. In some countries the prize court has no jurisdiction unless there is a question of validating a capture, and cannot adjudicate on a claim for compensation based upon the ground that the capture would have been held unjustifiable; in other countries the prize court would have jurisdiction to entertain a claim of this kind. On this point, therefore, there is a difference which is not altogether equitable, and it is desirable to lay down a rule which will produce the same result in all countries. It is reasonable that every capture effected without good reasons should give to the parties interested a right to compensation, without its being necessary to draw any distinction between the cases in which the capture has or has not been followed by a decision of a prize court; and this argument is all the more forcible when the capture may have so little justification that the vessel is released by the action of the executive. A provision in general terms has therefore been adopted, which is capable of covering all cases of capture.

It should be observed that in the text no reference is made to the question whether the national tribunals are competent to adjudicate on a claim for compensation. In cases where proceedings are taken against the property captured, no doubt upon this point can be entertained. In the course of the proceedings taken to determine the validity of a capture the parties interested have the opportunity of making good their right to compensation, and, if the national tribunal does not give them satisfaction, they can apply to the International Prize Court. If, on the other hand, the action of the belligerent has been confined to the capture, it is the law of the belligerent captor which decides whether there are tribunals competent to entertain a demand for compensation, and, if so, what are those tribunals; the International Court has not, according to the convention of The Hague, any jurisdiction in such a case. From an international point of view, the diplomatic channel is the only one available for making good such a claim, whether the cause for complaint is founded on a decision actually delivered, or on the absence of any tribunal having jurisdiction to entertain it.

The question was raised as to whether it was necessary to draw a distinction between the direct and the indirect losses suffered by vessel or goods¹ . The best course appeared to be to leave the prize court free to estimate the amount of compensation due, which will vary according to the circumstances and cannot be laid down in advance in rules going into minute details.

For the sake of simplicity, mention has only been made of the vessel, but what has been said applies of course to cargo captured and afterwards released. Innocent goods on board a vessel which has been captured suffer, in the same way, all the inconvenience which attends the capture of the vessel; but if there was good cause for capturing the vessel, whether the capture has subsequently been held to be valid or not, the owners of the cargo have no right to compensation.

It is perhaps useful to indicate certain cases in which the capture of a vessel would be justified, whatever might be the ultimate decision of the prize court. Notably, there is the case where some or all of the ship’s papers have been thrown overboard, suppressed, or intentionally destroyed on the initiative of the master or one of the crew or passengers. There is in such a case an element which will justify any suspicion and afford an excuse for capturing the vessel, subject to the master’s ability to account for his actions before the prize court. Even if the court should accept the explanation given and should not find any reason for condemnation, the parties interested cannot hope to recover compensation.

An analogous case would be that in which there were found on board two sets of papers, or false or forged papers, if this irregularity were connected with circumstances calculated to contribute to the capture of the vessel.

It appeared sufficient that these cases in which there would be a reasonable excuse for the capture should be mentioned in the present Report, and should not be made the object of express provisions, since, otherwise, the mention of these two particular cases might have led to the supposition that they were the only cases in which a capture could be justified.

Such then are the principles of international law to which the Naval Conference has sought to give recognition as being fitted to regulate in practice the intercourse of nations on certain important questions in regard to which precise rules have hitherto been wanting. The Conference has thus taken up the work of codification begun by the Declaration of Paris of 1856. It has worked in the same spirit as the second Peace Conference and, taking advantage of the labours accomplished at The Hague, it has been able to solve some of the problems which, owing to the lack of time, that Conference was compelled to leave unsolved. Let us hope that it may be possible to say that those who have drawn up the Declaration of London of 1909 are not altogether unworthy of their predecessors of 1856 and 1907.

Final provisions.

These provisions have reference to various questions relating to the effect of the Declaration, its ratification, its coming into force, its denunciation, and the accession of unrepresented Powers.

Article 65. (See ante, p. 563.)This Article is of great importance, and is in conformity with that which was adopted in the Declaration of Paris.

The rules contained in the present Declaration relate to matters of great importance and great diversity. They have not all been accepted with the same degree of eagerness by all the Delegations. Concessions have been made on one point in consideration of concessions obtained on another. The whole, all things considered, has been recognised as satisfactory, and a legitimate expectation would be falsified if one Power might make reservations on a rule to which another Power attached importance.

Article 66. (See ante, p. 563.)According to the engagement resulting from this Article, the Declaration applies to the relations between the Signatory Powers when the belligerents are likewise parties to the Declaration.

It will be the duty of each Power to take the measures necessary to insure the observance of the Declaration. These measures may vary in different countries, and may or may not involve the intervention of the legislature. The matter is one of national legal requirements.

It should be observed that neutral Powers also may find themselves in a position of having to give instructions to their authorities, notably to the commanders of convoys as previously explained.

Article 67. (See ante, p. 563.)This provision, of a purely formal character, needs no explanation. The wording adopted at The Hague by the second Peace Conference has been borrowed.

Articles 68 and 69. (See ante, p. 564.)It follows implicitly from Article 69 that the Declaration is of indefinite duration. The periods after which denunciation is allowed have been fixed on the analogy of the convention for the establishment of an International Prize Court.

Article 70. (See ante, p. 565.)The Declaration of Paris also contained an invitation to the Powers which were not represented to accede to the Declaration. The official invitation in this case, instead of being made individually by each of the Powers represented at the Conference, may more conveniently be made by Great Britain acting in the name of all the Powers.

The procedure for accession is very simple. The fact that the acceding Powers are placed on the same footing in every respect as the signatory Powers of course involves compliance by the former with Article 65. A Power cannot accede to a part of the Declaration, but only to the whole.

Article 71. (See ante, p. 566.)As at The Hague, account has been taken of the situation of certain Powers the Representatives of which may not be in a position to sign the Declaration at once, but which desire nevertheless to be considered as signatory, and not as acceding, Powers.

It is scarcely necessary to say that the Plenipotentiaries of the Powers referred to in Article 71 are not necessarily those who were, as such, delegates at the Naval Conference.

APPENDIX.

INSTRUCTIONS TO BRITISH DELEGATION AT THE SECOND PEACE CONFERENCE.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir Edward Fry¹ .

Foreign Office, June 12, 1907.

Sir,

1. In my despatch of the 19th April last I informed you that the King had been graciously pleased to appoint you to be His Majesty’s First Plenipotentiary to represent this country at the Second Peace Conference, which will assemble at The Hague on the 15th instant, in conjunction with the Right Honourable Sir Ernest Mason Satow, G.C.M.G., the Right Honourable Lord Reay, G.C.S.I., G.C.I.E., and Sir Henry Howard, K.C.M.G., C.B., His Majesty’s Minister at the Hague. Lieut. General Sir Edmond Roche Elles, G.C.I.E., K.C.B., and Captain Charles Langdale Ottley, M.V.O., R.N., Director of Naval Intelligence, have been appointed as Expert Delegates to assist you and your colleagues in the discussion of the military and naval questions which will come before the Conference.

2. You are aware from the correspondence that has been furnished to you from time to time that the proposal for this Conference, like that which was held at The Hague in 1899, emanated from His Majesty the Emperor of Russia, who in the spring of last year addressed an invitation to His Majesty’s Government to be represented at it. A similar invitation was at the same time sent to some forty-seven other States. The note conveying this invitation also indicated certain topics which it was thought might usefully be discussed at the Conference and which may be summarized as follows:

(I) Improvements to be made in the provisions of the Convention respecting the pacific settlement of international disputes regarding both the Court of Arbitration and the International Commissions of Inquiry.

(II) Additions to be made to the provisions of the Convention of 1899 respecting the Laws and Practices of Land Warfare, among others the opening of hostilities, the rights of neutrals on land, &c., consideration of the Declarations of 1899 and the question of the renewal of the one that has lapsed.

(III) Elaboration of a Convention respecting the Laws and Practices of Naval Warfare concerning—

• (A) The special operations of naval warfare, such as the bombardment of ports, towns, and villages by a naval force, the laying of mines, &c.
• (B) The transformation of commercial vessels into war-ships.
• (C) The private property of belligerents at sea.
• (D) The period to be accorded to commercial vessels in leaving neutral ports or those of the enemy after the outbreak of hostilities.
• (E) The rights and duties of neutrals at sea, among other questions that of contraband, the treatment to which the ships of belligerents should be subjected in neutral ports, destruction by force majeure of neutral ships of commerce as prizes.
• (F) Arrangements relative to land warfare which should be made equally applicable to naval warfare.

(IV) Additions to be made to the Convention of 1899 for the adaptation to naval warfare of the principles of the Geneva Convention of 1864.

3. In accepting this invitation, His Majesty’s Government expressed the opinion that the subjects above indicated might, as a whole, be freely discussed with advantage, but they thought it desirable to reserve generally the right to abstain from taking part in the discussion at the Conference of any of the questions mentioned in the programme, should the discussion take a form unlikely, in their opinion, to lead to any useful result. Several other Powers have, as you are aware, made a similar reservation.

4. His Majesty’s Government further reserved to themselves the right of suggesting the discussion of other cognate questions of international interest not specifically mentioned in the programme. Foremost among such questions is that of expenditure on armaments, which His Majesty’s Government have from the first been desirous of seeing discussed at the Conference. They felt it was better to have a discussion, even if it did not lead to a satisfactory conclusion. Discussion without result would, at any rate, have kept the door open for continuing negotiations on the subject. Whereas, to put the question aside would seem like an admission that it was hopeless, and had receded since the first Conference, of which it was the prime object. They felt that, this being a question on which perhaps there must be many discussions, and even failures, before progress is made, even a failure to secure a definite result was better than no discussion at all.

5. His Majesty’s Government have accordingly reserved their right to bring this question forward at the Conference, and have told the United States’ Government, who have made a similar reservation, that they would support them in promoting a discussion. If, therefore, the United States’ Delegates bring the subject forward, it will be your duty to support them. But, after the apparently final declaration of the German Government that under no circumstances would they take any part in such a discussion, it is doubtful how far it would be expedient to proceed with it. The position of Germany both as a military and a naval Power is such that it is difficult to regard as serious any discussion in which she does not take part. His Majesty’s Government would be most reluctant that anything should take place at The Hague Conference, summoned, as it is, in the interests of peace, that would be of a nature to cause friction or ill-feeling. You will therefore consult closely with your United States’ colleagues, and ascertain what instructions they have, and consider with them what line it is best to take.

6. The Spanish Government have also made a similar reservation on this question, and their Delegates should also be consulted; and it is possible that the Italian Delegates may also have some instructions as to the procedure to be adopted.

7. Should it be decided that the subject shall be discussed and a practical proposal be invited, you are authorized to say that His Majesty’s Government would agree to a proposal that the Great Powers should communicate to each other in advance their programmes of new naval construction. If this were done, they might be led to realize how closely in some cases the naval construction of one Power is dependent upon that of another; and an opportunity would be given for negotiations with the object of reducing the programmes, before the Governments of the Great Powers were finally committed to them by announcing them to their respective Parliaments. His Majesty’s Government are aware that this would not necessarily lead directly to any reduction in expenditure, but they are hopeful that the mere fact of communication between the Powers would provide opportunities for negotiation that do not now exist, and would tend to alleviate the burden of expenditure or retard its increase. Though, however, they consider that this or some other proposal put forward by another Power would be useful for the sake of the discussion to which it would give rise, even if it were not eventually accepted you should not put forward any proposal unless there be a general decision and a strong desire that a discussion should take place, and unless it is made clear that such a course will be taken in good part.

8. I now pass to the consideration of the various heads of the programme in the order in which they are set out in the invitation:

I.

Improvements to be made in the Provisions of the Convention of 1899 respecting the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes.

9. I am not aware of any proposals that will be made by other Powers for amending the provisions of this Convention, but I believe that Professor de Martens will, with the concurrence of the Government of the Czar, suggest certain amendments for increasing the utility of the “Commission d’Enquête” provided for in Articles IX—XIV of the Convention. The nature of the proposals is not at present known, but as at present advised, I see no reason for thinking it likely that His Majesty’s Government will be unable to agree to them, if you and your colleagues report that you consider that they may be introduced into the Convention with advantage.

10. His Majesty’s Government, however, are anxious to secure the adaptation of the machinery of the existing Tribunal, which was created by the Convention, to the purposes of an International Tribunal of Appeal from the decisions of belligerent Prize Courts affecting neutrals. The judgments of the Tribunal in such cases would probably prove the most rapid and efficient means which can, under existing conditions, be devised for giving form and authority to the canons of international law in matters of prize. It would no doubt be necessary that the procedure of the Court should be formulated, and its powers precisely defined, and that the Powers should bind themselves to employ the executive of their Governments to enforce its decrees against their own subjects or citizens. The advantages would far outweigh any difficulty that might arise from the fact that some alterations in the municipal laws of this Country, and probably also of other States, would be required. His Majesty’s Government consider that if The Hague Conference accomplishes no other object than the constitution of such a Tribunal, it will render an inestimable service to civilization and mankind.

11. It is not improbable that the question of the choice of languages to be used by and before the Permanent Court of Arbitration may be raised under the present head. By Articles XXX and XXXVIII of the Convention it is for the Tribunal itself to decide this point, unless the parties have themselves settled the language question in advance. His Majesty’s Government are aware that in some cases which have come before the Court this rule has been found to involve practical difficulties, but, after careful consideration, they have come to the conclusion that the existing arrangement is the best that can hope to meet with general consent. You should accordingly not support any suggestion which may be made at the Conference for altering the rules as to the choice of languages.

II.

Additions to be made to the Provisions of the Convention of 1899, respecting the Laws and Practices of Land Warfare, &c.

12. The Russian Government have mentioned the opening of hostilities and the rights of neutrals on land as matters which might be treated in additional stipulations. But beyond this indication, no intimation has reached His Majesty’s Government as to the precise measures or principles which are to be brought forward for adoption. As at present advised they are not aware that the necessity or advisability of any such additions to the Convention has made itself felt in this country, and they have had no material before them enabling them to foreshadow the direction which a discussion on the points briefly mentioned in the Russian programme might take at the Conference. They therefore feel unable to lay down any specific directions for your guidance in the matter, and can only at this stage express their readiness to give any definite proposals which may eventually be made the earnest and impartial consideration which the important nature of the subject deserves.

13. The declarations referred to in the Russian note were the agreements to abstain from (1) the use of projectiles diffusing noxious gases; (2) the use of expanding bullets; and (3) the use of projectiles and explosives from balloons for a term of five years, that were signed by a majority of the Powers at the last Hague Conference, Great Britain, Germany, the United States, &c., dissenting. Should these questions be raised at the Conference, His Majesty’s Government think, as regards (1), that it is unnecessary for you to take the initiative in proposing such a prohibition, although you should not dissent from it if there should be a general consensus of the other Powers in its favour; with respect to (2), that the restriction may be supported so far as warfare between the High Contracting Powers is concerned; and with regard to (3), you should support any proposal for the renewal of this prohibition.

III.

Elaboration of a Convention respecting the Laws and Practices of Naval Warfare concerning—

(A)

The Special Operations of Naval Warfare, such as the Bombardment of Ports, Towns, and Villages, by a Naval Force, the laying of Mines, &c.

14. His Majesty’s Government consider that the objection, on humanitarian grounds, to the bombardment of unfortified towns is too strong to justify a resort to that measure, even though it may be permissible under the abstract doctrines of international law. They wish it, however, to be clearly understood that any general prohibition of such practice must not be held to apply to such operations as the bombardment of towns or places used as bases or storehouses of naval or military equipment and supply, or ports containing fighting ships, and that the landing of troops, or anything partaking of the character of a naval or military operation, is also not covered.

15. His Majesty’s Government would view with satisfaction the abandonment of the employment of automatic mines in naval warfare altogether. Failing the acceptance of such a total prohibition they earnestly hope that the employment of these engines of war will only be sanctioned under the strictest limitations. They would advocate an arrangement by which the use of automatic mines should be limited to territorial waters, and, if possible, to such portions of territorial waters as adjoin naval bases or fortified ports. All mines thus employed should be effectively anchored, and so constructed that, in the event of their breaking adrift, they would either automatically become harmless or sink, and that in any case their active life should not exceed a limited period of, say, six months.

(B)

The Transformation of Commercial Vessels into War-ships.

16. As the best and surest means to meet the many difficulties arising in connection with the question of the status, or belligerent character, of ships engaged in naval operations, His Majesty’s Government would like to see the Powers agree upon some precise definition of a “war-ship.” Having given their attentive consideration to the problem in its many various aspects, they are of opinion that if such definition is to cover all vessels which may be directly associated with the warlike operations of a fleet, it should establish and comprise two categories of ships, viz.: (A) fighting ships, and (B) fleet auxiliaries. For these two classes of vessels, you might propose for acceptance some such definition as the following:—

(A) “Any vessel under a recognised naval flag, officered and manned by regular commission, and armed for the purpose of attacking an enemy, no vessel being allowed to assume this status unless before leaving a national port, or to surrender it except after arrival at one.”

(B) “A vessel under the mercantile flag of either a belligerent or neutral State which is engaged in transporting troops or on duties bringing her into direct communication with the belligerent fighting ships for the purpose of assisting their operations, either by the conveyance of seamen, munitions of war, fuel, provisions, water, or any kind of naval stores, or by executing repairs, or by carrying despatches or information, and whether such ship sails in company with the fighting ships or only meets them from time to time.”

17. The general acceptance of definition (A), as supplemented by definition (B), coupled with a general undertaking that no vessel was to perform fighting services unless qualified under definition (A), would, it is believed, prove sufficient to prevent the issue by any Power of letters of marque (whether such Power were a party to the Declaration of Paris or not), as none but regularly commissioned men-of-war would have the status of “fighting ships.” You might with advantage ascertain the views of your United States’ colleagues on this subject, to which particular importance is likely to be attached by their Government, special regard being had to the fact that, although conditionally refusing to sign the Declaration of Paris, the United States intimated their intention of observing it during the war with Spain in 1898.

(C)

The Private Property of Belligerents at Sea.

18. It is probable that a proposal will be brought before The Hague Conference to sanction the principle of the immunity of enemies’ merchant ships and private property from capture at sea in time of war. His Majesty’s Government have given careful consideration to this question, and the arguments on both sides have been fully set out in the various papers which have been at your disposal. They cannot disregard the weighty arguments which have been put forward in favour of immunity. Anything which restrains acts of war is in itself a step towards the abolition of all war, and by diminishing the apprehension of the evils which war would cause, removes one incentive to expenditure upon armaments. It is also possible to imagine cases in which the interests of Great Britain might benefit by the adoption of this principle of immunity from capture.

19. But, on the other hand, it must be remembered that the principle, if carried to its logical conclusion, must entail the abolition of the right of commercial blockade. Unless commercial blockade is discontinued there will be constant interference with an enemy’s ships, and constant disputes as to what constitutes an effective blockade. And when such disputes have once arisen between belligerent Powers it is obvious that the one which considers itself aggrieved by the application of commercial blockade to any of its ports would cease to respect the immunity of the merchant ships and private property of its enemy, wherever they were to be found. It seems to them, therefore, that it is impossible to separate this question of immunity from capture from that of commercial blockade; and that the question to which His Majesty’s Government have to apply themselves is whether they should agree to a proposal which would deprive the British navy in time of war of the right of interfering with an enemy’s merchant ships or property, and of the power of commercial blockade.

20. The British navy is the only offensive weapon which Great Britain has against Continental Powers. The latter have a double means of offence: they have their navies and they have their powerful armies. During recent years, the proportion between the British army and the great Continental armies has come to be such that the British army operating alone could not be regarded as a means of offence against the mainland of a great Continental Power. For her ability to bring pressure to bear upon her enemies in war Great Britain has, therefore, to rely on the navy alone. His Majesty’s Government cannot therefore authorize you to agree to any Resolution which would diminish the effective means which the navy has of bringing pressure to bear upon an enemy.

21. You should, however, raise no objection to the discussion of this question of immunity from capture at the Conference, nor should you refuse to participate in it, nor need you necessarily take the initiative in opposing a Resolution if brought forward. If at some future date the great Continental armies were to be diminished, and other changes favourable to the diminution of armaments were to take place, the British Government might be able to reconsider the question. If, for instance, nations generally were willing to diminish their armaments, naval and military, to an extent which would materially relieve them from the apprehension of the consequences of war, and by rendering aggression difficult would make war itself improbable; and if it became apparent that such a change could be brought about by an agreement to secure this immunity from capture at sea under all circumstances, and was dependent upon it, the British Government might feel that the risks they would run by adhering to such an agreement and the objections in principle now to be urged against it, would be outweighed by the general gain and relief which such a change would bring. But at the present time they are unable to assent to a Resolution which might, under existing conditions, so limit the prospective liability of war as to remove some of the considerations which now restrain public opinion from contemplating it, and might, after the outbreak of war, tend to prolong it.

(D)

The Period to be accorded to Commercial Vessels in leaving Neutral Ports or those of the Enemy after the Outbreak of Hostilities.

22. It has been customary on the outbreak of hostilities for belligerents to grant certain days of grace to enemy and neutral ships. In the view of His Majesty’s Government the allowance of such an interval before the strict rules of hostilities are enforced should, as indeed the term “days of grace” implies, be treated purely as a matter of grace and favour, and not as one of right, and they are of opinion that any fixed rule on the point would be undesirable, as the circumstances of each case must necessarily differ. It will be to the general interest of this country to maintain the utmost liberty of action in this particular.

(E)

The Rights and Duties of Neutrals at Sea: among other Questions that of Contraband; the Treatment to which the Ships of Belligerents should be subjected in Neutral Ports; Destruction by force majeure of Neutral Ships of Commerce as Prizes.

23. Many questions in regard to neutrality obligations may be raised at the coming Conference as a result of the experience of the late war between Russia and Japan. On the general principles involved nations are agreed, but in the application of these principles great divergence in the standard of obligations adopted by different Powers is sure to arise. Rules based on the following principles would, His Majesty’s Government consider, help to clear the situation:—

(a) Neutrals shall not allow their territorial waters to be used for purposes which will directly assist a belligerent in operations of war.

(b) Neutrals shall not allow fighting ships, or ships built or equipped, wholly or partly, for fighting purposes to leave their ports or territorial waters after the outbreak of war with the intention of assisting either of the belligerents.

(c) The customary maritime facilities known as “hospitality” shall not be withheld.

(d) A neutral State is not called upon to enforce the observance of the restrictions imposed upon trade by a belligerent by declarations of contraband, but must not assist in their violation.

(e) A neutral shall not allow the entrance of prizes into its harbours unless the prize is in want of fuel or supplies, or in actual danger on account of bad weather or unseaworthiness.

24. Great Britain as a belligerent is not likely, in any conditions which can at present be foreseen as probable, to have to depend on the assistance of neutrals in the direct carrying out of operations of war. Her interests as a neutral require uniformity of practice on the part of neutrals generally, and it would be desirable that the rules which obtain in this country as regards the obligations of neutrality should, if possible, obtain international sanction at the Conference.

25. With regard to contraband, many most difficult questions arose during the late war. These cases were sufficient to show that the rules with regard to contraband that were developed at the end of the eighteenth and the beginning of the nineteenth centuries are no longer satisfactory for the changed conditions under which both commerce and war are now carried on. His Majesty’s Government recognize to the full the desirability of freeing neutral commerce to the utmost extent possible from interference by belligerent Powers, and they are ready and willing for their part, in lieu of endeavouring to frame new and more satisfactory rules for the prevention of contraband trade in the future, to abandon the principle of contraband of war altogether, thus allowing the oversea trade in neutral vessels between belligerents on the one hand and neutrals on the other, to continue during war without any restriction, subject only to its exclusion by blockade from an enemy’s port. They are convinced that not only the interest of Great Britain, but the common interest of all nations will be found, on an unbiassed examination of the subject, to be served by the adoption of the course suggested.

26. In the event of the proposal not being favourably received, an endeavour should be made to frame a list of the articles that are to be regarded as contraband. Your efforts should then be directed to restricting that definition within the narrowest possible limits and upon lines which have the point of practical extinction as their ultimate aim.

27. If a definite list of contraband cannot be secured, you should support and, if necessary, propose regulations intended to insure that nations shall publish during peace the lists of articles they will regard as contraband during war, and that no change shall be made in the list on the outbreak of or during hostilities.

28. A list might be prepared and submitted for adoption by the Conference, specifying the articles which in no event shall fall within the enumeration of contraband, e.g., mails, food-stuffs destined for places other than beleaguered fortresses, and any raw materials required for the purposes of peaceful industry. It is essential to the interest of Great Britain that every effective measure necessary to protect the importation of food supplies and raw materials for peaceful industries should be accompanied by all the sanctions which the law of nations can supply.

29. His Majesty’s Government would further be glad to see the right of search limited in every practicable way, e.g., by the adoption of a system of Consular certificates declaring the absence of contraband from the cargo, and by the exemption of passenger and mail steamers upon defined routes, &c.

30. If an arrangement can be made for the abolition of contraband His Majesty’s Government would be willing, for their part, that it should also extend to what are technically known as the “analogues of contraband,” viz., the carriage of belligerent despatches and of persons in the naval and military services of a belligerent in cases where the rendering of such services by the neutral was not of such a kind or so great in extent as to identify the neutral vessel with the belligerent forces, and bring her within the definition of war-ship which His Majesty’s Government are anxious to secure.

31. The object which His Majesty’s Government have in view, as you are aware, is to limit, so far as may be, the restrictions that war entails upon legitimate neutral trade, and they feel that the extent to which this is possible in connection with the “analogues of contraband” is a matter that must be worked out in detail at the Conference.

32. Upon one point, however, they do desire to lay particular stress. The question of the carriage of enemy despatches cannot be entirely separated from that of mails in general, and they would welcome, and wish you to do all you can to secure, an arrangement under which mail packets or bags in transit on board a neutral ship, in accordance with the provisions of the Postal Conventions, should be inviolable, even though such mails should contain despatches for a belligerent, and the neutral vessel carrying such mails should not be subjected to any interference for so doing except in the case of her endeavouring to violate a blockade.

33. The subject of the treatment of interned belligerent vessels appears to be included in the Russian programme under the heading, “Régime auquel seraient soumis les bâtiments des belligérants dans les ports neutres.” His Majesty’s Government hold that while the war-ship of a belligerent taking refuge in a neutral port must, failing her departure within twenty-four hours, be interned, the question of her ultimate disposal is one which it would be best to leave to be dealt with under the terms of the Treaty of Peace. You will no doubt remember that one of the conditions of peace put forward by the Japanese Plenipotentiaries at the negotiations at Portsmouth, U.S.A., but afterwards abandoned, was the surrender to Japan of the Russian war-ships which had taken refuge at Kiao-chau, Shanghae, and Saigon, and which had there been interned.

34. As regards the sinking of neutral prizes, which gave rise to so much feeling in this country during the Russo-Japanese war, Great Britain has always maintained that the right to destroy is confined to enemy vessels only, and this view is favoured by other Powers. Concerning the right to destroy captured neutral vessels, the view hitherto taken by the greater Naval Powers has been that, in the event of it being impossible to bring in a vessel for adjudication, she must be released. You should urge the maintenance of the doctrine upon this subject which British prize courts have, for at least 200 years, held to be the law.

IV.

Additions to be made to the Convention of 1899 for the Adaptation to Naval Warfare of the Principles of the Geneva Convention of 1864.

35. A Convention of fourteen articles, applying the principles of the Geneva Convention of 1864 to maritime warfare, was signed by the Powers represented at The Hague Conference of 1899, Article X (respecting the landing of the shipwrecked, wounded, or sick of a belligerent Power at a neutral port) being excluded at the time of ratification both by this country and the other Signatory Powers. The Russian programme contemplates supplementary provisions to the Convention, which are to deal only with the treatment of shipwrecked, wounded, or sick men, and with vessels employed for these purposes, and His Majesty’s Government see no reason why they should withhold their consent to such provisions, if proposed at the Conference, provided that misuse of the privileges involved can be prevented.

36. In addition to the subjects mentioned in the Russian programme, His Majesty’s Government believe that a discussion will be initiated by the Government of the United States on the question of the employment of armed force for the collection of ordinary contract debts due to the subjects or citizens of a Power by other Governments. This practice is viewed with great disfavour on the American Continent, and the objections to it have become embodied in a principle known as the “Drago Doctrine.” His Majesty’s Government consider that you may express a general adherence to the “Drago Doctrine,” subject to the limitations mentioned in section 4 of the “Instructions to the United States’ Delegates to the Third International Conference of American States,” a copy of which was communicated to my predecessor by the American Ambassador on the 7th November, 1906. That is to say that, as a general principle, the debts of a State to the private subjects of another State are not to be collected by the employment of coercive measures in the nature of war, although occasions may, and do, occur when the non-payment of public debts is accompanied by such circumstances of fraud and injustice or violation of Treaty obligations as to justify the resort to force as a means of compelling payment. Each case, as it arises, must be considered on its merits, and the Government of the injured individual must decide in each case whether the general rule has or has not been overstepped to a degree sufficient to justify or demand interference.

37. Another matter which may be raised at the Conference is the extension of the 3-mile limit as the normal boundary of territorial waters. His Majesty’s Government are opposed to the extension of the 3-mile limit. It is now accepted by practically every country, and to enlarge such limit on account of the longer range of modern artillery or other cause would introduce uncertainty into what is now defined and settled, and would only increase the area over which the preservation of neutrality is obligatory upon a neutral Power, thus tending to diminish the sphere of action of the strongest navy, and to add to the difficulties of the weaker Powers.

38. The foregoing observations and directions will place you in possession generally of the views of His Majesty’s Government on the various points set out in the Russian programme. More precise instructions will, if necessary, be furnished to you from time to time as occasion may require.

39. I inclose a Full Power under the Royal sign manual, which will enable you and your co-Plenipotentiaries to sign with or without reservations, and subject to ultimate ratification by the King, any Convention which may result as the outcome of your labours, and I request you to keep me fully and constantly informed of the proceedings of the Conference, which His Majesty’s Government will watch with the greatest interest.

I am, &c.

(Signed) E. GREY.

ADDENDA AND ERRATA.

cambridge: printed by john clay, m.a. at the university press.

[1 ]De Martens, Nouveau Recueil de Traités (2nd series), Vol. xxvi. p. 1002; Parl. Papers, Misc. No. 1 (1899), pp. 62, 88, 118, 169, 179, 182-5, 192-4, 218, 260; T. E. Holland, The laws of war on land, p. 42; F. W. Holls, op. cit. pp. 99-117; G. B. Davis, International Law, p. 547; E. Lémonon, La seconde Conférence, p. 387.

[1 ]Parl. Papers, Misc. No. 1 (1899), p. 183.

[2 ]So called from the Arsenal near Calcutta where the bullet was first made.

[3 ]See Parl. Papers, Misc. No. 1 (1899), p. 118.

[4 ]La Deux. Confér. T. i. p. 26; Parl. Papers, Misc. No. 4 (1907), p. 26.

[5 ]Ibid. T. iii. p. 251.

[1 ]La Deux. Confér. T. iii. p. 159.

[2 ]Ibid. p. 17. General Davis in an Article on The Declarations of 1899, in the Amer. Journ. of Inter. Law (Vol. ii. p. 76), discusses the proposition which he was not allowed to make at the Conference.

[1 ]See ante, p. 66.

[2 ]See ante, p. 67.

[1 ]See ante, pp. 66-9, 85; Parl. Papers, pp. 59-61, 257-301; La Deux. Confér. T. i. pp. 332-5, 347-398; T. ii. pp. 144-161, 309-325, 331-351, 596-630, 1031-70; A. Ernst, L’œuvre de la deuxième Conférence de la Paix, pp. 14-17; A. H. Fried, Die zweite Haager Konferenz, pp. 98-119; E. Lémonon, La seconde Conférence de la Paix, pp. 220-279; T.J. Lawrence, International problems and Hague Conferences, pp. 73-5; J. Westlake, Quarterly Review, January, 1908, p. 234; J. B. Scott, The proposed Court of Arbitral Justice, Amer. Journ. of Inter. Law, Vol. ii. pp. 772-810; Idem, The Hague Peace Conferences of 1899 and 1907, Vol. i. pp. 421-466.

[2 ]See ante, pp. 67, 85.

[1 ]The subject was discussed by the First Sub-Committee of the First Committee and subsequently by an Examining Committee called Comité d’Examen, B.

[2 ]La Deux. Confér. T. i. p. 348; T. ii. pp. 347-8.

[1 ]See ante, p. 177.

[2 ]La Deux. Confér. T. ii. p. 328; Mr Choate’s speech in introducing the subject for discussion before the First Sub-Committee of the First Committee on the 1st August, 1907, is set out in English on pp. 327-330.

[3 ]La Deux. Confér. T. ii. p. 1030.

[4 ]Ibid. p. 1031.

[1 ]The Hague Peace Conferences, Vol. i. p. 438.

[2 ]La Deux. Confér. T. ii. p. 1031; J. B. Scott, The Hague Peace Conferences, p. 821.

[1 ]La Deux. Confér. T. ii. pp. 331-4.

[2 ]La Deux. Confér. T. ii. pp. 347-9.

[3 ]Ibid. T. ii. p. 350. The states abstaining from voting were: Austria-Hungary, Belgium, Denmark, Spain, Greece, Norway, Roumania, Servia, Siam, Sweden, Switzerland and Turkey.

[4 ]La Deux. Confér. T. ii. p. 1035.

[5 ]Ibid. pp. 618-622, 624-7; see post, p. 515.

[6 ]Ibid. pp. 1033, 1034, 915.

[1 ]La Deux. Confér. T. ii. pp. 689-693, where Mr Choate’s speech is given in English. The résumé of these various schemes is taken from Mr Choate’s speech and Mr J. B. Scott’s Hague Peace Conferences, pp. 457-460.

[1 ]See Table set out in La Deux. Confér. T. ii. pp. 609-612.

[2 ]Ibid. pp. 1045-8; see also pp. 618-622.

[3 ]Ibid. p. 690.

[4 ]J. B. Scott, The Hague Peace Conferences, Vol. i. p. 459.

[5 ]La Deux. Confér. T. ii. p. 690.

[1 ]La Deux. Confér. T. ii. p. 691.

[2 ]Ibid. pp. 697-9.

[3 ]Ibid. pp. 704-8.

[1 ]La Deux. Confér. T. i. pp. 333-5.

[2 ]Ibid. p. 391.

[1 ]The official record of the Conference, La Deuxième Conférence Internationale de la Paix, consists of 3 folio volumes, containing over 3000 pages, and these do not represent the whole of the printed matter officially supplied to the delegates. The Special Correspondent of The Times estimated that the total number of documents which were printed for circulation was close on 850, and as 600 copies of each were sent out the total number of copies approximated to 510,000 (see The Times for 19th Oct. 1907).

[2 ]See leading Article on “The Hague Fiasco” in The Times, 19th Oct. 1907.

[1 ]For the Award in the Casablanca Arbitration see Amer. Journ. of Inter. Law, Vol. iii. pp. 698, 755.

[1 ]Parl. Papers, Misc. No. 4 (1908), p. 79; La Deux. Confér. T. i. p. 592.

[2 ]Report of Sir Edward Fry to Sir Edward Grey, Parl. Papers, Misc. No. 1 (1908), p. 19.

[1 ]See ante, pp. 87-93.

[1 ]See The Times, 19th October, 1907.

[2 ]Quarterly Review, January, 1908, p. 230.

[3 ]Parl. Papers, Misc. No. 1 (1908), p. 21. See ante, p. 517.

[1 ]See ante, p. 94.

[2 ]Edinburgh Review, January, 1908, p. 224.

[1 ]Report of the Chinese Minister Lu-Cheng-Hsiang to the Emperor (The Times, 20th February, 1908).

[1 ]See ante, p. 75.

[1 ]For names of Powers see post, p. 540.

[1 ]See ante, p. 443.

[1 ]Great Britain was represented by the Earl of Desart, K.C.B., King’s Proctor; the United States of America by Rear-Admiral Charles H. Stockton, retired, and Mr George Grafton Wilson, Professor at Brown University, and Lecturer on International Law at the Naval War College and at Harvard University. For text of British Instructions see Parl. Papers, Misc. No. 4 (1909), pp. 20-32.

[1 ]For Report on this Declaration see post, p. 567. See also as regards the Conference and this Declaration Parl. Papers, Misc. Nos. 4 and 5 (1909), especially No. 5 (1909), pp. 93-104, which contains the Report of the British Delegates to Sir Edward Grey; T. G. Bowles, The Declaration of London, The Nineteenth Century, Vol. lxv. p. 744; The Edinburgh Review, July, 1909, p. 162; E. Lémonon, La Conférence navale de Londres, Revue de Droit International (2nd series), pp. 239, 435; C. H. Stockton, The International Naval Conference of London, Am. Journ. of Int. Law, Vol. iii. p. 596; E. A. Whittuck, International Documents, p. 254.

[1 ]See ante, p. 2.

[1 ]See ante, p. 4.

[2 ]See note, p. 583, post.

[1 ]See note, p. 583, post.

[1 ]Considerable discussion took place in the Press, and several questions were asked in the House of Commons with reference to this Article, both with regard to the translation of commerçant by “contractor,” and as to whether ennemi meant enemy government. The Report (see post, p. 588) in discussing the destination of conditional contraband says, “It may be an enemy authority or a trader established in an enemy country who as a matter of common knowledge, supplies the enemy Government with articles of the kind in question.” The Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs (Mr Mackinnon Wood) stated in the House of Commons on the 29th March, 1909, that the word commerçant in this Article “cannot possibly apply to a mere merchant who supplies goods to the general public,” and the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (Sir Edward Grey) on the 5th April, 1909, in answer to a question on the divergence between the terms of Article 34 and the General Report, replied as follows: “For the reasons already given, I cannot admit that there is any ambignity as to the meaning of Article 34. It is made clear, both by Article 33, on which Article 34 is dependent, and by the general official report of the Conference, that the word ennemi in Article 34 can only mean the enemy government. It is evident, however, that if the point had been raised at the time it would have been made perfectly clear in the drafting, and we therefore propose to make a declaration, at the time of the ratification, that the word ennemi in Article 34 means the government of the enemy.” (See The Times, 6th April, 1909.)

[1 ]The General Report qualifies this by the statement, “It must not be too literally interpreted, for that would make all frauds easy...the ship’s papers are proof, unless facts show their evidence to be false.” (See post, p. 589. See also letter of Mr Arthur Cohen, K.C., in The Times, 6th April, 1909.) On “ship’s papers” see T. E. Holland, Manual of Naval Prize Law, pp. 3, 43, 45-59.

[1 ]See ante, pp. 88-92.

[2 ]As to prizes taken into neutral ports, see 13 H. C. 1907, Art. 23 (ante, pp. 452, 478).

[3 ]See post, p. 598.

[1 ]For “the Rule of war of 1756,” to which this paragraph has reference, see Wheaton’s Elements of International Law, § 508; see also post, pp. 596, 604.

[2 ]The Conference was unable to agree on rules for the determination of the neutral or enemy character of the owner (see post, p. 571).

[1 ]Cp. 12 H. C. 1907, Art. 55 (1) and (2), ante, p. 427.

[1 ]The Declaration has been signed by all the Powers represented at the Conference.

[1 ]This Committee consists of Messrs Kriege (Germany), Wilson (United States of America), Dumba (Austria-Hungary), Estrada (Spain), Renault (France) (Reporter), Hurst (Great Britain), Ricci-Busatti (Italy), Sakamoto (Japan), Ruyssenaers (Netherlands), Baron Taube (Russia).

“The work of the Conference was materially facilitated by the preliminary exchange of views between the several Governments which had agreed to send Delegates. This entitled His Majesty’s Government, with the valuable assistance of the eminent French jurist, M. Fromageot, whose services had been placed at their disposal by the courtesy of the French Government, to present to the Conference as bases for its discussion a set of draft articles dealing with the questions comprised in the programme, and laying down a number of generally recognised rules of international law which it was found possible to deduce from the statements furnished by the different Powers....Under the courteous and efficient chairmanship of M. Renault, the distinguished French Plenipotentiary, whose unfailing tact, unrivalled knowledge, and wide experience materially contributed to the smooth progress of the discussions, the main lines of the general agreement which was subsequently embodied in the terms of the final Declaration, were laid down in this Grand Committee. A more restricted number of members was then selected to constitute an Examining Committee, which proceeded to work out in greater detail the questions presenting special difficulties, whilst the duty of preparing the final text of the rules agreed upon was assigned to a Drafting Committee. A small Legal Committee was also appointed to consider the very technical questions involved in the problem of how to determine what constitutes enemy property. Over the Legal Committee, M. Fromageot presided, whilst M. Renault acted as chairman and reporter of the other committees. The proceedings of the Conference in plenary meetings are recorded in the minutes, and short summaries were made of the discussions in Grand Committee. Attached to these minutes is, among other papers, the General Report to the Conference prepared by M. Renault. We desire to call your particular attention to this document, which contains a most lucid explanatory and critical commentary on the provisions of the Declaration. It should be borne in mind that, in accordance with the principles and practice of continental jurisprudence, such a report is considered an authoritative statement of the meaning and intention of the instrument which it explains, and that consequently foreign Governments and Courts, and, no doubt also, the International Prize Court, will construe and interpret the provisions of the Declaration by the light of the commentary given in the report.” (Extract from Report of British Delegates to Sir Edward Grey, Parl. Papers, Misc. No. 4 (1909), pp. 93, 94.)

[2 ]For original French text of the Report see Parl. Papers, Misc. No. 5 (1909), pp. 342-377; and for the translation, Parl. Papers, Misc. No. 4 (1909), p. 33. The original Report and the translation contain the text of the various Articles; these are here omitted, but referred to in the side-notes of which there are none in the original or in the translation. The translation of the Report contains only two footnotes, viz. the names of the members of the Committee, and the note on “de plein droit” (Article 23).

[3 ]The Powers are those enumerated in the Declaration (ante, p. 511).

[1 ]For texts of the Memoranda of the Powers see Parl. Papers, Misc. No. 5 (1909), pp. 2-56. The British Memorandum in English is to be found in No. 4 (1909), pp. 3-11.

[1 ]For British rules on this subject see Parl. Papers, Misc. No. 4 (1909), pp. 5-7; for Instructions to British Delegation, Ibid. p. 25.

[1 ]The first paragraph of this Article is based on a proposition of the Italian Delegation (Parl. Papers, Misc. No. 5 (1909), p. 161).

[1 ]Exposé par M. le Contre-Amiral de Bris (French Naval Delegate), Parl. Papers, Misc. No. 5 (1909), p. 255 (annexe, 67).

[2 ]As regards the question whether the continuous pursuit of a vessel guilty of breach of blockade must be undertaken by the same cruiser or can be taken up by others in the various lines of the blockade, see the following Memorandum of the United States Delegation: “As regards Article 25 [of the Bases de discussion] the Delegation, while believing that this Article could be combined with Article 24 with advantage, so as to deal with the whole question together, accepts the article, under the reservation that a pursuit is considered as continued and not abandoned within the meaning of the article, even if it is abandoned by one line of the blockading force to be resumed after an interval by a ship of the second line, until the limit of the area of operations is reached. In certain conditions there might be several lines, each having its respective zone of pursuit.” (Annexe, No. 69, Parl. Papers, Misc. No. 5 (1909), p. 256. See also p. 175 for explanations of this memorandum. See also Article by Admiral C. H. Stockton, Am. Journ. of Int. Law, Vol. iii. p. 604.)

[1 ]For British rules on this subject see Parl. Papers, Misc. No. 4 (1909), pp. 3-5, and Instructions to British Delegation, Ibid. p. 23.

[1 ]See La Deux. Confér. T. iii. pp. 1108-14.

[2 ]The following note is appended to the translation of “de plein droit” in Parl. Papers, Misc. No. 4 (1909), p. 43: “In view of the difficulty of finding an exact equivalent in English for the expression ‘de plein droit,’ it has been decided to translate it by the words ‘without notice,’ which represents the meaning attached to it by the draftsman of the present General Report.”

[1 ]See note 2, p. 583, ante.

[1 ]“When an adventure includes the carriage of goods to a neutral port, and thence to an ulterior destination, the doctrine of ‘continuous voyage’ consists in treating for certain purposes the whole journey as one transportation, with the consequences which would have attached had there been no interposition of the neutral port.” (See British Memorandum, Parl. Papers, Misc. No. 4 (1909), pp. 7-9.)

[1 ]See note on Article 35, ante, p. 552.

[1 ]See ante, pp. 296-7 (Articles 2, 3 and 4).

[1 ]For British rules on this subject see Parl. Papers, Misc. No. 4 (1909), p. 9; for Instructions to British Delegation, Ibid. p. 30.

[1 ]For further explanations of the cases dealt with in this Article see Parl. Papers, Misc. No. 5 (1909), pp. 191-3. Articles 45, 46 and 47 are based on a German draft (see Annexe, No. 55, Ibid. p. 247).

[1 ]See Article 2 (4) of German proposition, Parl. Papers, Misc. No. 5 (1909), p. 247, and Exposé by M. Kriege, p. 279.

[2 ]See Article 57, par. 2, and post, p. 602.

[1 ]See ante, pp. 88-92. The rule laid down in the British Memorandum on the subject is as follows: “The duty of a belligerent captor is to bring in, for adjudication by a Prize Court, any merchant-ship which he has seized. Where this is impossible, she may, if she is an enemy ship, be destroyed after removal of the crew and papers; if the nationality of a ship is neutral, or if there is any doubt as to the nationality, she should be dismissed, for her destruction cannot be justified as between the neutral owner and the captor by any necessity on the part of a belligerent” (Parl. Papers, Misc. No. 4 (1909), p. 9). The British delegate was instructed that an agreement “might perhaps be found by proceeding on the lines of an affirmation of the general principle that neutral prizes must not be destroyed before adjudication, followed by a precise statement of the conditions on which alone a departure from the principle would be allowed in exceptional circumstances” (Ibid. p. 28).

[1 ]For British rules see Parl. Papers, Misc. No. 4 (1909), p. 10; for Instructions to British Delegation, Ibid. p. 31.

[1 ]See British proposition, Parl. Papers, Misc. No. 5 (1909), pp. 180, 212, 244, 252.

[2 ]Les navires pétroliers.

[3 ]For British rules as to enemy property see Ibid. No. 4 (1909), p. 11; for British Instructions, Ibid. p. 32. For discussions on this subject see Ibid. No. 5 (1909), pp. 167, 181, 183, 191, 206, 209.

[1 ]See ante, pp. 408, 409, 411.

[2 ]For discussions see Parl. Papers, Misc. No. 5 (1909), pp. 279, 330.

[1 ]“A neutral vessel is not entitled to resist the exercise of the right of search by a belligerent war-ship on the ground that she is under the convoy of a war-ship of her own nationality.” This was the British rule as stated in the Memorandum, but, as was pointed out in the “Instructions,” this doctrine has not been enforced in recent wars. Germany was the only other Power maintaining the same view as Great Britain. The British Delegation was instructed that the specific abandonment of the British rule “would effect no substantial alteration in the actual situation, and may very well be admitted to be little more than the formal acknowledgment of a now generally accepted rule.” (See Parl. Papers, Misc. No. 4 (1909), pp. 4, 25.)

[1 ]The subject was first introduced by the German delegate at the Second Plenary Meeting on the 7th Dec., 1908, in connection with contraband. (Parl. Papers, Misc. No. 5 (1909), p. 140.)

[1 ]See views expressed in Memorandum of Austria-Hungary, Parl. Papers, Misc. No. 5 (1909), p. 75.

[1 ]Parl. Papers, Misc. No. 1 (1908), p. 11.

[P. 540, note 2,]for “especially No. 5” read “especially No. 4.”

[¹]See ante, pp. 308-321, also Parl. Papers, Misc. No. 5 (1909), pp. 263-8 for various Memoranda on the subject.